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COMPETITION - APPROXIMATION OF LEGISLATION SERIES - 1976 - 27 The purpose of this study has been to bring into being the basic information which 
is necessary for the preparation of legal texts whose role would be to unify the rules 
of conflict of laws in relation to real rights of property. It deals only with certain 
aspects of those rights in the Member States of the Community. It is divided into 
three parts. The first deals with security interests in movables in the six original 
Member States. These are so described as to pinpoint the main similarities and 
differences. 
Part two covers the legal systems of England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland 
and Ireland. It is divided into three sections. The first section deals with immova-
bles, the second with movables (including security interests therein) and the third 
with intellectual property. 
Part three covers the law of property in Denmark and includes some references to 
Norwegian law. It is divided into three sections. Section one describes the law of 
property in general, section two treats of security interests in rem and section three 
covers intellectual property. 
This study in comparative law contributes remarkably to current knowledge on the 
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POREWORD 
The present study is intended to serve as working material to assist the European 
Communities in their projected comprehensive unification of private international 
law. This purpose determines the objectives and also the limits of the study. 
1. Given such a purpose, it would not be appropriate to pursue the usual 
objectives of comparative studies of law. The present work therefore cannot, 
and is not intended, either to set out concrete proposals for the material 
unification of the law (ï), or to offer new solutions to problems remaining 
unsolved within the national legal systems. Specific private international 
law problems have also been left to be dealt with in other studies. 
The present work is therefore chiefly confined to a comparative description 
of the prevailing law and to the highlighting of striking similarities and 
divergences. 
2. The special regulations governing rights in aircraft will not be dealt with 
in this study. Although aircraft are movables, security rights in aircraft 
are largely based on the prevailing immovable property law and for that reason 
tend to fall outside the scope of this investigation. Moreover, for the 
majority of the member states of the European Communities (2) the Geneva 
convention of 19"th June 1948 on the international recognition of rights in 
aircraft is now in force (3). Under the convention the signatories are 
obliged to a certain extent to harmonise real (in rem) rights in aircraft 
(particularly contractual non-possessory charges).Furthermore, the 
convention contains (4) the private international law stipulation that the 
basic law to be applied is the law of the country in which the aircraft is 
registered (lex libri siti). In this situation there appears to be little 
room for the inclusion of these rights in aircraft in the future harmonisation 
plans of the European Communities. But careful consideration will be needed 
when it comes to defining the limits of the harmonisation. If aircraft are to 
be completely excluded from the scope of a future agreement (5)» there could 
be undesirable consequences. Thus, for example, the transfer of title to an 
aircraft is governed in German law by the general provisions of the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (civil code) relating to movables (6) and registration 
is not required. Retention of title ("Eigentumsvorbehalt") without the 
necessity for observation of any formalities and no doubt also fiduciary 
transfer of title by way of security ("Sicherungsübereignung") are thus 
permissible under German law (7)· If a German aircraft under retention 
of title, were to be sold in Prance for instance, or if an aircraft subject to 
fiduciary transfer of title by way of security in Germany were to be legally 
seized in Prance, French law could not recognise these prior charges : they 
would come within the scope neither of the Geneva convention nor of 'the 
projected agreement. -ΙΟ-
There are of course good reasons for holding the view that this would be a 
useful result, because the person wishing to have a "secure security" would be 
forced to make use of the mortgage procedures laid down by the Geneva 
convention with their attendant publicity. 
It would be possible to include aircraft in an agreed solution which avoided 
conflict with the provisions of the Geneva convention and was merely 
superimposed on them. Prom the point of view of private international law 
the lex libri siti rather than the lex rei sitae would have to be declared to 
apply - contrary to the general rule - and this would have to be extended 
beyond the cases (8) dealt with in the Geneva convention (9). But the types 
of security recognised by the Geneva convention would have to continue to have 
precedence (10). This solution would not appear to be very sound. 
Similar problems arise in the case of ships and ships under construction which 
can be mortgaged. In this sector however there is as yet no settlement 
comparable to the Geneva convention, although it appears that draft proposals 
are in the course of preparation (11 ). For this reason ships will also be 
excluded from the discussions which follow. - 11 
Notes 
(ï) This would require, in addition, a detailed discussion of the legal systems 
outside the European Communities and in particular of the legal concept of 
the "security interest" under the American UCC. 
(2) Namely Prance, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany (see German BGB1. II, 
Appendix : index reference B, position at 31.12.1969, p. 142). 
(3) German BGB1. II, 1959, 129-
(4) Art. 1 I of the convention. 
(5) As for example by the Fédération Bancaire in Art. 5 of their plan. 
(6) ss. 929 ff. BGB. 
(7) RONKE in ERMAN, Handkommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 4th ed., Vol. II, 
1967, Introduction to s. 1204, end of note 6. 
(8) Art. 1 I. 
(9) See MAKAROV in RabelsZ 29 (1965), pp. 454, 455, under B. 
(10) Art. 1 II of the Geneva convention. 
(11) See FEDERATION BANCAIRE, p. 16. -13-
A. INTRODUCTION 
I. THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL TYPES OF SECURITY WITHIN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
AS A WHOLE 
A description of the types of security on movables in the legal systems of 
different countries cannot be restricted to the portrayal in isolation of 
individual legal concepts such as, say, retention of title. In order to 
grasp the full economic and legal significance of the different types of 
security, it is necessary to have regard to the position they occupy in 
relation to the remainder of the civil law system in question. Thus in the 
case of contracts of sale, for example, the full implication of retention of 
title does not become apparent until one has at least glanced at the other 
legal relationships between seller and buyer. 
II. METHOD OF PRESENTATION 
The above-mentioned considerations have determined the method of 
presentation used in this study. Instead of taking a horizontal section 
through all the countries for each individual type of security, when the 
examples grouped under any one type may perhaps resemble each other in name 
only, it has been thought preferable to present a total picture for each 
country. The classification of types of security in each national section 
has been carried out as uniformly as possible, so that it should be 
relatively easy to follow cross-references for a given legal concept from 
country to country. For the sake of clarity the text contains a certain 
amount of deliberate repetition, particularly in the treatment of the 
closely-related systems of Italy and Prance. 
Some types of security can only be used to cover credit in the form of 
loans (ï), others only for credit on goods (2). 
This has made classification according to these two major economic purposes 
appear advisable. Legal concepts which feature in both types of loan (3) 
were classified according to their most typical economic purpose. Thus one 
can imagine, say, a debt for the purchase price of an article which is 
urgently required for current use being secured by the pledging of another 
asset which can be temporarily dispensed with (e.g. securities). 
Nevertheless the pledge is more typically used to secure a loan; this 
aspect has therefore taken precedence for classification purposes. 
Efforts have been made in this presentation not to portray the national 
legal systems merely, as it were, from within, but to show how they stand 
in relation to the systems of their neighbours (4). It is possible however 
that the subjective viewpoint of the author, whose legal ideas are coloured 
by the influence of his native Germany, may have played a part here. The 
reader is expressly warned of this to enable him to make allowances for 
possible bias. - 14 
III. THE PASSING OF OWNERSHIP IN MOVABLE OBJECTS (5) (6) 
1. As a rule the transition of the object sold out of the legal sphere of 
the vendor into that of the purchaser is not completed from one moment 
to the next, but in certain stages. The question as to who is formally 
the owner at any given time appears to be less important than, for 
example, the question of who bears the risk. In Prance, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Italy the bearing of risk is admittedly linked as a 
general rule to the formal transition of ownership since these countries 
follow the maxim res perit domino. In Germany and the Netherlands on 
the other hand the change of ownership and the transition of risk 
constitute two completely distinct areas of problem under non-mandatory 
law (7). 
Even when the purchaser is regarded, according to the letter of the law, 
as being already the owner of an object which is still in the possession 
of the seller, the question arises under French and Italian law, for 
example, as to whether his title is valid in the event of seizure by 
third party creditors or on the bankruptcy of the seller. 
Again, the formal position as owner enjoyed by a person who has had 
property transferred to him by way of security on a fiduciary basis 
under German or Dutch law is no guide to the position of the same 
recipient of security on the bankruptcy of the giver of the security. 
These points, selected by way of example, are merely intended to 
demonstrate that the statement that someone is the owner of a certain 
object does not have unequivocal force. His true material position in 
law is by no means always, but only tends to be, that of an unlimited 
power of disposition over the object against the whole world. An 
accurate idea of the legal power of the "owner" cannot be gained from 
the concept of ownership on its own but only from its functional role 
within the legal system as a whole. The present study attempts -
without claiming to be exhaustive - to include the most important points 
of view in each case. 
2. Leading specialists in this subject have moreover stressed, no doubt 
rightly, that the apparently fundamental divergence between the 
different legal systems arising in the case of the more technical 
problems, problems of legal construction, is often merely superficial. 
In the practical sphere, they maintain, there is a strong tendency to 
convergence (8). 
In any case at least an outline knowledge of the different systems of 
transfer of ownership is necessary for an understanding of the general 
legal relationship between creditor and debtor. We will therefore 
examine this problem briefly from a general point of view (9) before 
turning to a detailed country-by-country analysis. 15 -
3. The attribution of movable objects to individual legal persons cannot be 
unalterably fixed once and for all; the legal system must therefore 
provide a set of instruments which makes possible a change of attribution. 
The following are the main solutions which may be considered feasible : 
a) Principle of simple contract 
The contract of sale also embodies the transfer of ownership. 
Transmission of the object to the buyer is not required in order to 
effect the transfer. This is basically the system prevailing in 
France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy. 
b) Principle of transmission within the framework of a unitary contract 
The contract of sale also embodies the legal elements necessary for 
the transfer of ownership. However, by way of further evidence of 
the change of ownership, an actual act of transmission is required, 
to publicise what has occurred. This was the rule laid down by the 
Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht of 1794 (10). 
c) Principle of contract with separation rule 
The intention, binding on the parties to the contract, to alter the 
attribution of goods (the contractual act which creates the obligation) 
is distinct from the realisation of the intention (the fulfilling 
disposition). The two legal acts may, but need not, take place at 
separate times. On the other hand there is no need for actual 
transmission of the object by way of publicity in order to effect the 
change of ownership (11). 
d) Principle of transmission with separation rule 
Intention and execution, the creating of the obligation and the real 
("dinglich") fulfilling disposition are two distinct, but not 
necessarily time-separated, legal acts. But the disposition which 
transfers the title also requires, in addition to the legal element, 
the actual transmission of the object as an act of publicity. This 
principle applies in German and Dutch law (12). 
4. The separation rule (c and d above) must be distinguished from the 
abstraction rule (13). 
a) The separation rule merely states that creation of obligation and 
actual disposition constitute two distinct legal acts. The 
abstraction rule goes a step further and states that the validity of 
the act of disposition must be judged without reference to the 
existence or efficacity of the act of creation of obligation on which 
it is based (14). In other words : the separation rule implies that 
creation of obligation and the act of disposition constitute two 
distinct steps; the abstraction rule, on the other hand, increases 
this separation to the point where the second step can even be made 
independently of the first. This connection between separation and 
abstraction rules has been a special characteristic of German law 
since the time of SAVIGNY (15). -16-
b) This will immediately lead one to query whether, under the German 
system, the purchaser may validly retain the object which has 
effectively become his property even if the legal contract of sale is 
void. That would indeed be an unjust result. The purchaser has 
certainly become the owner under the abstraction rule, but this does 
not mean that he may also remain the owner. Rather, the vendor has a 
contractual right to claim the retransfer of title back to himself 
because an "unjustified enrichment" has taken place (16). 
c) It is also possible that within a legal system the separation rule can 
apply but not the abstraction rule. In this case although the creation 
of obligation and the act of disposition still remain two distinct 
legal steps, the second (disposition) is not effective without the 
first (valid creation of obligation) s the causal act of disposition. 
This is the predominating view of modern judicial practice in the 
Netherlands (17). 
5. The principles of unity and separation (and abstraction) and the rules of 
consent and actual transmission are not embodied in pure form in any of 
the legal systems under consideration. Instead one finds many kinds of 
compromise between opposing principles (18). 
a) In the case of debts incurred in respect of items determined by generic 
description ("Gattungsschulden") even when the principle of consent is 
fully applicable the property cannot pass immediately upon conclusion 
of the contract of sale. Rather, an "individualisation" is required, 
which often does not take place until the time of transmission of the 
goods to the purchaser or to a carrier (19). 
Then again, the transmission principle, in German law for instance, is 
no more than a general legal rule which has been considerably restricted 
by the admission in law of various substitutes for transmission (20). 
b) The separation principle in turn is merely a theoretical notion in the 
case of cash purchases. On the other hand the parties may agree, even 
when the unity principle applies, that the transfer of ownership should 
not take place immediately on conclusion of the contract but should be 
deferred, for example until payment of the last instalment of the 
purchase price (21). But if the transfer of ownership depends upon the 
agreement of the parties, this constitutes without question a step away 
from the unity principle in the direction of the separation principle. 
Moreover, under the unity principle preliminary agreements can to a 
large extent assume the function of contracts of sale with a purely 
contractual effect that does not transfer ownership (22). Here, too, 
we see a result that constitutes an approach towards the separation 
principle. 
c) Nor is the abstraction principle of German law always strictly adhered 
to. Thus we find continued attempts to upset the act of disposition 
with the help of the same defect as the act of creation of obligation 
("defective identity") by means of Sections 119 II, 123, 134 and 138, 
particularly para. 2, of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. There is also 
nothing, in principle, to prevent disposition being made expressly 
conditional upon a valid creation of obligation ("conditional 
connection") (23). Finally, if one regards the acts of creation of 
obligation and of disposition as a "uniform act", one can in the case of an invalid act of creation of obligation even cast doubt on the 
efficacity of the act of fulfilment through Section 139 BGB (24). 
The acceptance of the principles of separation and abstraction in 
Germany following SAVIGNY (25) vras a notable advance in the safeguarding 
of transactions. As common law followed the maxim nemo plus juris 
transferre potest quam ipse habet it did not recognise an acquisition 
in good faith by a person not entitled to acquire. (Easier acquisition 
by possession ("Ersitzung") only provided an imperfect substitute). 
In this situation it aided the clarity and security of legal 
relationships that the transfer of ownership should be separated from 
shortcomings in their legal basis or from the complete absence of a 
legal basis. Once the acquisition in good faith by a person not 
entitled to acquire had been accepted (26), the abstraction principle 
largely ceased to have a function as transactions in good faith were no 
longer based upon it. The remaining effects of the abstraction 
principle are less desirable. Among these are the fact that, for 
instance, the right to claim restitution as a result of "unjustified 
enrichment" is not an effective weapon in the face of seizure by 
third-party creditors and only ranks as a normal debt in a bankruptcy. 
This explains the manifold attempts to find some means of circumventing 
the abstraction principle which has been indubitably established by the 
German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. 
In conclusion the situation can perhaps be summed up as follows : the 
solution for the regulation of the transfer of ownership offered by any 
one of the systems described above could equally well be arrived at 
under any of the remaining systems if the necessary express agreement 
were made by the parties. Thus the differences, at first sight 
fundamental, are finally reduced to the meaning of a rule of 
interpretation (27). No general assertion can be made however as to 
what tests are applied to the proof of an agreement which deviates from 
statute law. 18 
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FRANCE 
I. CREDIT IN THE FOM OF LOANS 
The pledge 
a) For the traditional pledge French law requires, in addition to the 
pledging contract, the divesting of possession by the pledgor either to 
the pledgee or to a third party agreed by both pledgor and pledgee (the 
"tiers convenu" or pledge-holder) (ï). If the object is in the 
possession of a third party, notice must be given to him and his formal 
acceptance of the fact that henceforth he holds the object for the 
pledgee must be obtained (2). Qualified co-possession by (would-be) 
pledgee and pledgor (3) is not sufficient to create a pledge. 
b) The requirements as to form differ in civil and commercial law. Under 
civil law the pledging requires public declaration or a private document 
which gives precise details of the debt secured and the pledged object 
(4). The law further stipulates (5) that where a private document is 
used it must be "dûment enregistré", i.e. it must bear the duty stamp 
and an authenticated date. It is however accepted that any other form 
of "date certaine" (6) is sufficient (7). According to the predominating 
view, these requirements as to form do not affect the relation of the 
parties one to another but are merely a prerequisite for the validity of 
the transaction against third parties (8). 
Under commercial law the creation of a pledge without observation of the 
formal requirements is also valid against third parties (9). Commercial 
law is applicable when the secured debt arises from a commercial 
transaction, whether the pledgor is a trader or not (10). 
c) The effect of the pledging is that the pledgee gains the right to 
preferential satisfaction in the case of execution or bankruptcy, with -
in recent years - precedence over all other creditors in the case of 
bankruptcy (11). He further has a right of retention (12) which in 
French law is also valid against third parties (13). So long as a bona 
fide acquisition does not supervene, the pledgee can also uphold his 
right against third-party purchasers ("droit de suite"). 
d) The realisation of the pledged property requires a court decision (14) 
in civil law, whereas in commercial law sale by public auction is 
permissible when repayment becomes due, after 8 days notice given by the 
pledgee to the pledgor and to any person having the object on hire or 
lease (15). 
e) If the pledge-holder (16) is a general warehouse ("magasin général"), the 
goods stored can be pledged by means of a special "warrant". The warrant 
is an instrument transferable by endorsement, which embodies both the 
debt (17) and the security created for the debt (18). 
This method enables credit to be mobilised particularly easily. - 22 -
A certain relaxation of the strict rules governing pledges and a small 
step in the direction of a non-possessory pledge are evidenced by the 
fact that in the case of the warrant the requirement of giving notice to 
the pledge-holder and the latter's declaration (19) that henceforth he 
wishes to hold the object on behalf of the new pledgee are dispensed 
with (20). 
A further point worth noting is that the principle of real subrogation 
has gained explicit legal recognition with this form of security (21). 
Finally it should be mentioned that it is possible to use as security a 
portion, determined solely by quantity, of a larger parcel of goods (22). 
Physical separation or other "individualisation" of the goods is not 
required. Here we see the principle of speciality abandoned. 
Until recently a creditor who held security in the form of one of these 
warrants had a special advantage over the normal pledgee in that his 
claim had precedence over that of the tax authorities. This precedence 
is now granted to every pledgee (23). 
2. Sale and repurchase 
As long ago as the era of canonical law, when the charging of interest was 
prohibited, a stopgap formula was found in the device of the sale with a 
repurchase clause. In this way an attempt was made to create what was in 
effect an interest-bearing loan, either by treating the sum lent as the 
"purchase price" and the interest on the loan as "rental" for the object 
which was left with the "vendor" "by way of hire", or by compensating the 
purchaser by allowing him to use the object. This same formula could be 
used today to provide the lender with a real security for his loan. Only 
by making use of his right of repurchase and by repaying the "purchase 
price" would the debtor regain his property (24). An advantage over the 
genuine pledge, and thus the purpose of this device, would be that the 
borrower would not need to let the object out of his hands but could 
continue to use it as a "hirer". 
Such an arrangement was in fact sanctioned by several fairly old decisions 
(25), but in later years contracts of this type were held to be prohibited 
forfeitable pledges (26) and were refused recognition on account of being 
designed to circumvent the law (27). 
But if the parties are primari" concerned will creating a non-possessory pledge 
rather than a forfeitable pledge, they could agree to a disposal of the 
object pledged as security in a manner analogous to that provided by the 
rules governing pledging and could thus escape incurring nullity on the 
grounds of violation of the prohibition on forfeitable pledges. 
As far as one can see, cases of this kind do not occur in practice nowadays. 
From the prevailing economic point of view we are dealing with a typical 
example of a trust by way of security (fiduciary transfer of title by way of 
security). But in common with all other legal systems based on Roman law 
the French system takes exception on principle to legal acts of a fiduciary 
nature (27 a). This rejection of fiduciary transactions appears to go so 
far in France (28) that the variant of the"sale with repurchase clause" just 
described is barely discussed at all in present-day judicial practice and 
literature (29). -23-
3. The "gage automobile" 
It should be mentioned by way of explanation at this juncture that under 
French law the "gage automobile" can only be used to provide security for 
the purchase of the motor vehicle itself, i.e. for the debt due to the 
vendor or to a third-party financing the purchase but not for any other 
debts (30). 
4. The "warrant agricole" 
a) In imitation of the warehouse warrant (31) the legislators have created 
a whole series of mutually similar non-possessory pledges. They are 
also called "warrants" and are documents transferable by endorsement 
which embody both the debt secured and the real security. But whereas 
in the case of the warehouse warrant the goods serving as security are 
in the possession of a third party as pledge-holder and the transaction 
can thus be classified immediately as a pledge, the goods serving as 
security in the case of the warrants to be discussed here under 
headings 4-8 remain in the direct possession of the pledgor. We are 
therefore dealing with non-possessory pledges ("warrantage à domicile"). 
b) The urgent credit requirements of agriculture were the first to be 
catered for in this way, when the "warrant agricole" was created (32). 
This type of warrant makes it possible for farmers and farming 
cooperatives (33) to provide security for loans. 
The farm equipment, to the extent that it belongs to the loan debtor, 
serves as security (34). The contract by which it is agreed that this 
form of security shall be provided must be entered in a special register 
with the "juge de paix" (35). 
c) As far as its effect against third-party creditors is concerned the 
registered warrant resembles the normal pledge in that the creditor 
receives preferential satisfaction (36). 
d) Despite the publicity attendant upon entry in the public register the 
creation of a warrant does not ensure validity against bona fide 
third-party purchasers, i.e. does not confer a "droit de suite". But 
bona fide acquisition of freedom from encumbrances is possible (37). 
In the case of wine and other liquors the recipient of security can gain 
a great degree of protection against third-parties acquiring in good faith 
in that the authorisations which must be obtained from the tax authorities 
prior to sale can be made to be dependent on his approval (38). 
e) The realisation of the goods serving as security follows a procedure which 
lies midway between the realisation of pledges under civil law and the 
realisation of pledges under commercial law : after the due date has 
passed and after a reminder by the creditor which has proved ineffective, 
the creditor may serve on the debtor a final demand for payment, by means 
of a registered letter. Fifteen days thereafter the "juge de paix", on 
application from the creditor, fixes a date for the auction of the goods 
serving as security (39)· - 24 
5. The "warrant hotelier" 
Another special law (40) gives hoteliers the possibility of using the hotel 
equipment as security for loans. The individual provisions of this law 
correspond for the main part to those of the "warrant agricole" (41)· 
This form of security has acquired practically no importance (42), chiefly, 
no doubt, because creditors prefer the greater scope offered by the 
"nantissement du fonds de commerce" (43). 
6. The "warrant pétrolier" 
Licensed importers of petroleum can use a warrant to create a non-possessory 
security on the basis of their stocks of petroleum and petroleum products 
(44), a right which was in part granted as compensation for the 
state-imposed obligation to hold reserve stocks. As this form of security, 
too, has gained relatively little acceptance (45), it should suffice if 
attention is drawn here to a peculiarity worthy of note : the security 
consists of a given quantity of petroleum or petroleum products of a given 
quality, without any requirement that it should be separated from the main 
body of the stocks in question (46). The principle of speciality has thus 
been abandoned. 
7 · The "warrant sur stocks de guerre" 
This form of warrant was conceived to meet wartime needs and resembled the 
"warrant pétrolier". The law which introduced it was only temporary and was 
not renewed after the end of the second world war (47). 
8. The "warrant industriel" (47 a) 
This form of non-possessory real security can be utilised by industrial 
concerns in possession of a so-called "lettre d'agrément" (48). The "lettre 
d'agrément" is a request from the state to produce goods of a stated type 
and quantity. These end products can be pledged with the help of the 
"warrant industriel". This warrant breaches the speciality principle in the 
same way as does the "warrant pétrolier". 
9. The "nantissement d'un fonds de commerce" 
As well as the seller of a "fonds de commerce" being able to secure for 
himself a bankruptcy-proof seller's privilege in respect of the "fonds", 
(49) the owner of a "fonds de commerce" can likewise use it to provide 
himself with a bankruptcy-proof security for credit (50). 
In contrast to the seller's special privilege however the "nantissement" 
cannot cover stocks of goods (51 )· The assets to be charged thus consist 
largely of intangibles although movables consisting of goods not intended 
for resale are included. A further difference from the privilege of the 
seller of a "fonds de commerce" lies in the fact that a "nantissement" does 
not involve a division of the assets charged into separate elements such as 
"plant and equipment" and "intangible assets" (52). - 25 -
For further information the reader is referred to the section dealing 
with the seller's special privilege (53). 
10. The film mortgage 
a) Since all films to be shown in France and indeed all film-making 
projects in progress, are, for different reasons, entered in a central 
public register, an obvious course was to make this register the basis 
of a special film-mortgage system (54). The object charged can be the 
film material itself or the copyright or both at the same time (55)· 
b) Acquisition in good faith is excluded, realisation takes place on the 
order of the president of the tribunal de commerce de la Seine under 
the provisions applying to the "fonds de commerce". The mortgagee has 
first claim on the sale proceeds, even in priority to debts due in 
respect of wages and salaries (56). 
II. CREDIT ON GOODS 
1. The general rule applicable to sales 
a) Under French law the general rule is that the buyer of a specified 
individual movable object (species) acquires the property therein 
directly upon conclusion of the contract of sale (57). 
Influenced by opinions as to what is natural and reasonable, (58) the 
French Code Civil adheres to the principle of consent betvreen the 
parties (59) and a physical act of delivery is therefore not regarded 
as essential for a transfer of ownership (60). 
Although an informal contract for the sale of movables is valid (6l), 
it should be noted that in the case of a dispute involving a value of 
over 50 F proof can as a rule only be effected by means of documents 
(62). 
Unlike German law, for instance, French law recognises no division 
between the act of creation of obligation and the act of disposition. 
On the contrary, the contract of sale and the passing of title 
constitute a single uniform act in law (63). Efforts (64) to introduce 
a separation between obligations and proprietary rights in France have 
not succeeded up to now. 
There are however isolated authors in French legal literature who argue 
that the principle of separation and hence the concept of the "real 
contract" are already in existence (65). These voices remain in the 
minority. Certainly there appears to be no mandatory legal'provision 
which would stand in the way of an express arrangement by the parties 
to bind themselves initially as to obligation only and to defer 
agreement about the transfer of ownership until a later point in time. 
b) The property also passes immediately on conclusion of the sale in 
accordance with the rule just described above when goods are sold 
en bloc. This is so even where the price is based on weights, 
quantities or dimensions which have not yet been established (66). 26 -
c) In the case of debts incurred in respect of items determined by 
generic description (genus)(67). 
There is no question of an immediate passing of title upon conclusion 
of the sale. There is no express legal provision governing the 
transition of ownership in this case (68). It is accepted that with 
debts of this kind (69) the ownership passes in principle when the 
goods are "individualised" (70). However, the point in time at which 
an individualisation can be said to take place is disputed (71)· 
d) If future objects are sold, the buyer acquires ownership in them at 
the time when they come into being (72), not at the time of delivery. 
e) A contract for the sale of an object belonging to someone else is 
declared by a specific legal provision (73) to be void (74)· 
As this rule has been fundamentally unsuccessful, it has been 
interpreted very narrowly (75) · Thus there is agreement that only the 
buyer can invoke this nullity clause (76). The situation can be 
remedied by subsequent ratification on the part of the true owner (77) 
and the buyer then acquires the title at the moment of ratification. 
More important, the situation is also remedied if the seller 
subsequently acquires the object (78). Even here the seller no doubt 
first holds the title for a theoretical second of time before it passes 
on to the. buyer. 
There is from the outset no question of nullity if the parties agree 
that, contrary to the general rule (79), the title shall not pass to 
the buyer immediately upon conclusion of the sale (SO). 
f) The circumstance that the buyer is already the owner of the goods upon 
the conclusion of the sale does not however endanger the security for 
the purchase price debt. This is because the seller has the right of 
retention of the goods. He can withhold delivery (8l) until the 
purchase price has been paid, except when he has contracted to make 
delivery before receiving payment (82). Even in the latter case he 
can invoke his right of retention if the buyer becomes bankrupt or 
insolvent and fails to provide security (83). The right of retention 
is also valid against third parties (84). It can thus be upheld for 
example against a third party purchaser to whom the buyer has 
meanwhile resold the goods and who for his part has already become the 
owner (85). 
2. The right to restitution (revendication) 
a) If the seller has made delivery before payment even though he was not 
obliged to do so, he can restore the status quo by instituting an 
action for the return of the goods within 8 days of delivery, i.e. of 
physical transmission to the buyer (86). A prerequisite for the 
success of this course of action is that the goods should still be in 
the possession of the buyer and should be in an unaltered condition. 
b) In the event of the bankruptcy of the buyer the seller does not have 
this right to reclaim the goods (87). He can however, even in this 
event, retake the goods so long as they are still in transit to the 
buyer or his selling agent (88). Even this possibility is closed to 
the seller if the buyer has meanwhile sold the goods to a third party 
as "goods in course of transportation" by means of invoices or 
consignment documents (89). - 27 
3. Rescission of contract in the event of non-payment 
a) Should the buyer not pay the purchase price when it falls due, the 
seller may take steps to rescind the contract. As a rule he must 
first bring an action to this effect and the court will pronounce as 
to rescission (90). 
b) Rescission of the contract restores the title to the goods to the 
seller and thus gives him the possibility of reclaiming them as owner. 
In the event of the bankruptcy of the buyer this would result in the 
segregation of the goods from the rest of the estate. Segregation is 
only admissible however if rescission of the contract has taken place 
before the commencement of the bankruptcy (91) or if the action for 
rescission had already been instituted before the commencement of the 
bankruptcy (92). The rescission itself is therefore subject to the 
sa-me restrictions (93). 
In cases where rescission of the contract is admissible, the seller may 
reclaim not only the goods themselves but also the proceeds of a 
further sale of the goods ("Ersatzaussonderung") (94). 
c) The stipulation that rescission of the contract has to be effected by 
the bringing of an action is not mandatory. The parties may thus agree 
that under certain conditions a dissolution shall take place 
automatically (95)· 
Tacit agreement to a clause of this kind is however barely admissible. 
An express understanding ("clause résolutoire expresse") is generally 
required (96). Without such an express clause the seller cannot 
unilaterally rescind the contract of sale (97). 
d) The "condition" must nevertheless have occurred before the commencement 
of bankruptcy, as rescission due to "the occurrence of a condition" is 
subject to the same limitations (98) as rescission by action at law 
(99). The mere "occurrence of a condition" - payments falling into 
arrears for instance - is not of itself sufficient. Rather, the 
seller ought to have declared unequivocally before the commencement of 
the bankruptcy that he intended to invoke rescission of the contract 
(IOO). We are therefore dealing basically with a "right to 
reconstitution" ("Gestaltungsrecht"). 
4. The seller's privilege 
a) Every seller of a movable object has a special privilege with regard 
to that object in respect of the unpaid purchase price (101). 
It is open to dispute whether special privileges with regard to 
movables should in general be considered to, constitute genuine absolute 
rights in the goods in question (102). In practice the question does 
not generally arise as the third-party purchaser in any case usually 
acquires the title to the goods free of encumbrances as a result of 
acquisition in good faith (103). The problem of an absolute right 
against the whole world ("droit de suite") only becomes really 
significant therefore when vre are not dealing with acquisition in good 
faith, i.e. in the event of bad faith on the part of the purchaser or 
when the goods have been lost by or stolen from the owner (104). 
Moreover, by virtue of an express provision (105), the seller's 
privilege in particular is dependent on the buyer still having the -28-
goods in his possession. The question as to the "droit de suite" is 
thus only relevant in those cases where the buyer has resold the goods 
but still has them in his possession. It is disputed whether in such 
a case the seller can validly invoke the seller's privilege or not 
(106). 
There is, on the other hand, agreement that the privilege extends to 
the purchase price debt and the purchase price resulting from a 
further sale (107). 
There is also a type of subrogation on the sale of seed-corn and 
similar items to farmers. The seller's privilege here extends to the 
proceeds of the harvest in question (108). 
b) In the bankruptcy of the buyer the seller's privilege only applies in 
the same limited way as rescission of contract and the resultant 
segregation of the goods (109). The reader is therefore referred to 
the section of this study dealing with these matters (110). 
It is to be noted that the seller's privilege is chiefly to be seen 
at work in the case of an individual execution, whereas in bankruptcy 
it is only effective in certain - admittedly important - exceptional 
cases. 
c) A particular case : the privilege of a seller of a "fonds de commerce " 
The sale of a "fonds de commerce" (111) involves not only movables but 
also all goods, means of production, intangibles etc., excluding land 
and, in principle, contractual relationships (112). 
Nevertheless movables constitute a substantial part of a "fonds de 
commerce" as a rule, so it will be appropriate to examine briefly the 
aspects of the sale of a "fonds de commerce" which are relevant to our 
investigation. 
The special peculiarity of the seller's privilege in this case is that 
it can be upheld in bankruptcy (113 and also against third-party 
purchasers ("droit de suite") (114-)- But a "droit de suite" is only 
valid against the third-party purchaser of the entire "fonds de 
commerce". Individual movable objects, by contrast, can be acquired 
in good faith free of encumbrances. 
In order for the privilege to be valid, the contract of sale requires 
at least a stamped private document, duly authenticated, and entry in 
a special register at the office of the "tribunal de commerce" at the 
relevant place of business within 15 days from the conclusion of the 
sale (115). The privilege remains in force for 10 years and this 
period can be extended (Hó). This special seller's privilege 
includes only the firm name and the right to rent shop-premises and/or 
workshops and customer goodwill, unless further-reaching arrangements 
have been made in the contract (117). 
In contrast to the creation of a "nantissement" (which gives security 
in the form of a charge) of a "fonds de commerce" in respect of other 
debts than those arising from the sale of the "fonds de commerce" 
itself (118), the subject of the seller's privilege which we are 
discussing here is not a unified whole. For a start the sale price has 
to be apportioned over the groups "goods", "plant and equipment" and 
"intangibles" (119)· Partial privileges arise accordingly; both -29-
voluntary payments by the debtor and the proceeds of a compulsory 
sale must be divided up and allocated over the groups (120). As there 
is a possibility under this rule that the seller does not receive full 
satisfaction in the "goods" group, for example, while in the "plant 
and equipment" group a surplus is achieved for the other creditors, a 
"nantissement" which does not permit the apportionment of the security 
over several groups is often agreed in practice (121). 
5. Retention of title 
a) The legal construction 
The rules under which a purchaser acquires the title to goods directly 
upon concluding the contract of sale (122) are not mandatory. The 
parties are at liberty to agree that the property in the goods shall 
pass at a different point in time (123). 
Thus the transfer of title can be fixed for the time when payment of 
the purchase price is completed. An agreement of this kind is usually 
made by means of the "réserve de propriété" clause. There is almost 
unanimous concurrence that the whole contract is not subject to this 
one condition. For if the seller wished to arrange, by means of a 
condition, that he did not lose his title until payment was completed, 
it would be a condition precedent (124). In that case the efficacity 
of the contract of sale would depend on the will of the buyer, that is, 
on whether he paid. The seller would not be able - for lack of a fully 
valid obligation - to sue for payment. 
It would be easier to regard the "réserve de propriété" as a "clause 
résolutoire expresse" (125). But this would mean that the buyer would 
have to be treated as the owner. In a bankruptcy the seller would from 
the outset have no chance of having the goods segregated (126), nor 
could he oppose seizure by a third-party creditor, as he would not 
himself be the owner. 
One solution favouring the seller would be to assume the existence of 
a real act of transfer of ownership distinct from the contractual sale 
agreement. In this case the sale would be unconditional and the 
transfer of ownership subject to a condition precedent (127). But the 
separation principle and with it the idea of the real ("dinglich") 
contract are rejected by the prevailing opinion in France (128). 
Opposed to this predominating view however there is a not inconsiderable 
school of thought which holds that, in a sale with retention of title, 
the contract of sale is unconditional and only the transfer of 
ownership is subject to a condition precedent (129). If the sale is 
regarded as unconditional and the passing of the property as 
conditional, this would argue to a certain extent the existence, at 
least in theory, of two distinct legal acts - in other words the 
separation principle (130). This is by no means the only possible 
interpretation. One could also suppose that there was a single legal 
act that was made unconditionally but with a view to conditional 
transfer of ownership. Finally, one could make the dogmatic 
interpretation that by virtue of the autonomy of the parties payment 
of the purchase price was a characteristic feature of the transition of 
ownership. 30 
In conclusion it may be said that the dogmatic interpretation of 
retention of title in France remains much disputed, frequently without 
any great degree of conceptual clarity (131). 
b) The moment of agreement 
There appears to be little doubt in France that retention of title must 
be agreed immediately upon conclusion of the sale. A later declaration -
upon delivery, say - that there is to be retention of title, made 
unilaterally by the seller, is ineffective because the buyer has already 
acquired ownership under the general rules. 
Even a mutually agreed subsequent retention of title comes up against 
objections from the point of view of legal construction. The problem 
becomes important in the practical sphere when, for example, a normal 
contract of sale is first concluded but the parties later agree to 
postponement of payment with retention of title. In this case the title 
vrould first be transferred back to the seller, then transferred once 
again to the buyer, this time subject to a condition precedent. 
But it is questionable whether this construction would find favour. If 
one considers the economic result which the parties are aiming at, one 
can hardly deny that the buyer, who has already acquired the title to 
the property, makes a fiduciary transfer of title to the seller by way 
of security. This concept is not however recognised by French law. 
c) Efficacity inter partes 
Although the efficacity of retention of title inter partes is accepted, 
it is not particularly important in commerce. In the event of 
non-payment the seller could bring about the rescission of the contract 
(132) and by the same means vrould regain the title to the goods. Thus 
to reach this goal the seller does not require retention of title. On 
the contrary : by retaining the title the seller may be taking upon 
himself a far-reaching disadvantage. For, following the maxim res perit 
domino (133), the seller would have to bear the risk of the chance loss 
of the goods right up to the time of completion of payment. Admittedly 
the bearing of risk is not linked to ownership by virtue of mandatory 
law and the parties may agree otherwise (134); but it is doubtful 
whether the courts would recognise the mere retention of title clause as 
constituting at the same time a contrary agreement with regard to the 
passing of risk (135)· 
d) Efficacity against third parties 
Whilst there has been much controversy over the theoretical problems of 
retention of title, there is a large measure of unity concerning its 
actual effect including its efficacity in relation to third parties. 
Here - in contrast to Italian law in particular (136) - there is no 
difference between third-party creditors and third-party purchasers. 
Retention of title has no doubt been "invented" by sellers primarily in 
order to give them a better position in a bankruptcy than ordinary 
creditors. Judicial practice has hovrever substantially denied 
recognition to retention of title in this most important situation (137 ). 
It can only be invoked subject to the same restrictions as the action 
for rescission, the "clause résolutoire expresse" and the demand for 
restitution in the case of a cash sale (138). - 31 -
But it is generally admitted that retention of title can be upheld against 
seizure by a third-party creditor in an individual execution (1J9) and that 
the seizure can be set aside by means òf an "action en distraction" (l4o). 
In maintaining retention of title in the face of third parties in this way, 
the observation of a particular form is not required, at any rate not in 
substantive law (l4l). But even here the particularities of the French 
law of evidence must be observed. Apart from the rules already mentioned 
(142), it should be noted that retention of title against third parties 
requires a "date certaine" (l4]5). In commercial law this does not apply 
however (144). 
e) Alteration of the goods 
If goods subject to retention of title are joined with other goods, the 
owner of the principle part of the goods becomes the owner of the whole, but 
must reimburse the owner of the subsidiary part for his share (l45). 
Separation can be demanded, in spite of the possible damage which might 
occur to the principle part of the goods, if the subsidiary part is 
substantially more valuable than the principle part and if the "joining" has 
taken place without the owner's knowledge (146). 
In the case of an inseparable mingling or mixing of the goods a proportional 
ownership arises. If it is possible to separate the goods again, any owner 
who was unaware that mixing was going to take place, may demand separation 
(147). If one owner's share of the goods is superior to the others in 
quantity and value, he can acquire the ownership of the whole if he 
reimburses the other owners (148). 
If material has been transformed so that the value of the new object is 
substantially greater than that of the original material, the person who has 
carried the work of transformation can acquire the ownership of the new 
object if he reimburses the original owner for the value of the material 
(149). When material belonging to different owners is transformed, 
proportional ownership arises on the basis of the values of the material used 
and the value of the work involved (I50). 
f) Installation of the object into real property 
The retained title expires if the object in question is so installed in real 
property as to become "immeuble par nature" (151)· On the other hand, in 
cases where an object normally becomes "immeuble par destination" (152), 
there is no extinguishment of title for only an object belonging to the owner 
of the real property can be "immeuble par destination"(l53)· 
g) "Extended" retention of title 
As retention of title has proved to be ineffective in bankruptcy in French 
law and sellers have therefore preferred to use other forms of security, 
retention of title as such has no great practical significance. This is even 
more true of its extended forms, which in German law have gained wide 
currency and have been the subject of perceptive discussion in judicial 
practice and jurisprudence. As far as one can see, such questions have not 
become topical in France. - 32 
The chief case of extended retention of title, namely the assignment in 
advance of debts due in respect of resale, meets with considerable 
difficulties in French law. The difficulties arise firstly from the 
fact than an assignment by way of security (fiducia cum creditore) is 
involved, vrhich is not generally recognised in France (154).Secondly, 
for the assignment to be effective - at least in relation to third 
parties - notification to the third-party debtor is required 
("signification") (155)· Moreover, if this complicated course should 
be taken there is no reason why the action should not be regarded as a 
normal pledging (156) and not as an assignment by way of security. 
Finally, and quite apart from the problems of "signification", the 
admissibility of the assignment of future debts in French law is 
disputed (157). 
Even the so-called transformation clause, by means of which the supplier 
of materials attempts to extend to the finished products his right of 
retention of title is evidently almost unknown in French practice (158). 
6. "Location-vente" 
a) Whereas a seller in Italy, for example, has at his disposal a fairly 
vride range of methods of security that will withstand bankruptcy, and 
in Germany is comprehensively covered in this respect, in France - as 
already stated - this is not so. This state of affairs has stimulated 
the imagination of sellers in France to find other ways of obtaining a 
security that is, above all other qualities, proof against bankruptcy. 
As it is acknowledged that a landlord or lessor can have his property 
segregated in the bankruptcy of his tenant, attempts have been made to 
build into the contract of sale elements of a letting in such a way as 
to give the seller the right of segregation in the bankruptcy of the 
purchaser. The buyer is designated the "lessee" and the instalments of 
the purchase price are described as "rent". Once the amount of "rent" 
paid has reached the value of the goods, the "lessee" becomes the 
owner (159). 
b) Judicial practice has established however that this procedure merely 
constitutes a change of name which cannot alter the character of the 
contract of sale. The courts have therefore correctly treated such 
contracts as credit sales (with retention of title ?) (16O). 
c) Attempts to suggest that a loan ("prêt à usage") or deposit ("dépôt") 
of the goods has been made by the seller to or with the purchaser have 
met vrith a similar fate (161). 
d) As an interim conclusion it may be stated that all clauses by means of 
which the seller tries to extend his preferential right in law 
("privilège") beyond the point of commencement of bankruptcy are 
unsuccessful (162). 
7. "Location - promesse de vente", leasing, "essai-location" 
a) One type of transaction however has proved to be capable of withstanding 
a bankruptcy. This is where the later seller of the goods leases them 
initially to the future purchaser, but where the lessee - in contrast to 
the lessee in a "location-vente" - remains free to decide whether or not 
on the expiration of the rental period he will accept the lessor's offer 
of sale (163). Judicial practice insists that the contract should be 33 
clearly worded to distinguish this type of transaction from a 
"location-vente". The possible purchaser's freedom of decision must be 
unequivocally stated (164). Furthermore the rent charged must be 
reasonably consistent with the usage value of the object, and the 
transfer price must not be merely a symbolic amount (165). 
b) A particular variety of the "location - promesse de vente" which has 
gained ground recently is the "leasing" or "crédit-bail" (166). 
The leasing firm's ownership permits it to segregate its property in 
the bankruptcy of the leasing customer, provided the transaction is not 
in reality a concealed credit sale (167). 
c) Similar to the "location - promesse de vente" is a method which combines 
elements of rental with sale on approval ("essai-location"). Here too 
the subject matter is not definitely sold, but the lessee remains free 
to decide whether he will eventually acquire it or not (168). And here 
too the (possible) seller can have the goods segregated in the 
bankruptcy of the (possible) purchaser (I69). 
The "gage automobile" 
a) When, in 1934, the Cour de Cassation laid down, in two decisions of 
principle (170), that retention of title could not be upheld in a 
bankruptcy, the legislators felt that some action was required of them. 
Accordingly a special law (171) was passed which now gives sellers of 
motor vehicles (172) and third parties financing the purchase of motor 
vehicles (173) the chance to obtain a real security whose chief 
characteristic is that it is proof against bankruptcy. Technically this 
has been achieved by the creation of a special kind of pledge ("gage 
automobile"). In fact it is basically more a question of a mortgage on 
movables. 
b) It is disputed whether what is involved here is a means of security 
provided by the law or one which must be agreed contractually (174)-
However that may be, the sale or financing contract must be evidenced 
by a private document duly stamped and authenticated in order to be 
valid against third parties (175)· This provision as to form applies 
to commercial acts as well (176). 
The contract also requires entry in a public register at the prefecture 
vrhich licensed the vehicle (177). The seller receives an official 
confirmation of the registration which carries with it the legal 
fiction that he is the owner. The seller or the financing third-party 
is thus treated as a pledgee and accordingly retains his preferential 
position even in a bankruptcy. 
The charge lasts initially for 5 years only and can then be extended 
once for another period of 5 years (178). 
c) The publicity attendant upon the charge could be a justification for the 
exclusion of bona fide acquisition free from encumbrances. Whether this 
conclusion can in fact be drawn is however the subject of controversy 
(179). -34-
d) Realisation in every case follows the provisions of commercial law. 
Under these provisions the creditor need only inform the debtor, after 
the debt has fallen due, of his intention to realise. 8 days thereafter 
he has the right to realise the security at a public sale, without 
obtaining any judicial authorisation (180). 
In the bankruptcy of the buyer the creditor may demand satisfaction 
before all other privileged claims as though he were a genuine 
pledgee (181). 
9. Relationship between retention of title and the "gage automobile" 
Under Italian law the seller of a motor vehicle, with retention of title 
and the special motor vehicle mortgage, has two equally valuable means of 
security at his disposal. The relationship of the two types of security 
to each other has therefore a certain practical significance in Italy (182). 
As retention of title is ineffective in a bankruptcy under French law, no 
seller will omit to secure himself by means of a "gage automobile". Only 
if he has forgotten to do this but claims to have retained the title to 
the vehicle and the vehicle is then the subject of individual execution, 
does the problem of the relationship between retention of title and a 
non-possessory charge in the shape of the "gage automobile" arise under 
French law. In this rather theoretical case one should not regard the 
"gage automobile" as the only possible form of security for the seller, 
but should also take account of retention of title with its usual scope. 
10. "Nantissement de l'outillage et du matériel d'équipement professionel" 
a) In order to promote the sale of capital goods the legislators have 
created for the sellers or financing third parties of such goods a 
further bankruptcy-proof means of security (183). 
Not only traders but all the professions, for example, are considered 
as potential givers of security. The decisive factor is simply that the 
objects purchased should consist of equipment used for professional 
purposes. The charge lasts 5 years and can be renewed twice (I84). 
The credit and security agreement must be contained in the contract of 
sale and must be entered within 15 days in a special register at the 
office of the tribunal de commerce at the purchaser's place of business 
(185). At the creditor's request the equipment serving as security 
must also be marked with a notice to the effect that it bears a charge 
(186). 
b) Only when this notice of pledging is affixed to the equipment serving 
as security will the creditor's rights be valid against third-party 
purchasers (187) ; the publicity attendant upon registration is thus not 
of itself sufficient to exclude acquisition in good faith (188). 
c) Realisation takes place in a similar manner as with the "gage 
automobile" (189). 35 
d) Validity against third-party creditors is not dependent on the display 
of the notice mentioned above. The creditor has the right to 
preferential satisfaction of his debt - even, and particularly, in a 
bankruptcy - vrith precedence over all other privileges except court and 
maintenance costs and certain claims in respect of vrages and salaries 
(190). 
To preserve precedence over possible prior mortgagees, over the vendor 
of the undertaking and over creditors vrith a "nantissement" on the 
"fonds de commerce", notice must however be given to these creditors 
within 2 months (191). 
e) If the equipment serving as security is installed in real estate the 
creditor's preferential right remains intact in the event of the 
equipment becoming "immeuble par destination" (192). 
f) Regarding the relationship to other forms of security it is the rule 
that the "nantissement de l'outillage etc." cannot extend to motor 
vehicles, ships or aircraft (193). In the case of these objects, 
therefore, the seller must make use of the appropriate means of 
security provided by special legislation. 
As far as retention of title is concerned, the same considerations 
apply as in the discussion of the "gage automobile" (194)· 
11. Particularities of instalment-purchase of consumer goods 
Mention has already been made of the special rules for the purchase of 
motor vehicles and professional equipment on credit. 
Unlike the other countries France has undertaken no general comprehensive 
codification of the law relating to instalment-purchase. Various 
provisions are to be found vrhich contain rules for the protection of the 
inexperienced buyer from exploitation. Under these rules the seller or 
financing third-party must make clear disclosure of the credit terms to 
the borrower. In addition the permitted credit amounts and duration are 
laid down (195). Violation of these provisions not only results in penal 
sanctions but leads to the complete nullity of the transaction (196). The 
provisions do not however contain any special rules regarding the seller's 
security. 36 
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BELGIUM 
Belgian law follows French law to a large extent. The present review will 
therefore deal only with the most important divergences (ï). 
I. CREDIT IN THE FORM OP LOANS 
1. The pledge 
Belgian law, unlike French law, does not require the entry of the first 
acceptor in the pledge-holder's registers in the case of the warrant (2) 
2. The "warrant charbonnier" 
a) As a result of a crisis in the Belgian coal industry the means of 
creating a non-possessory charge on stocks of coal was provided by 
legislation passed in 1958 (3). The "warrant charbonnier" is the only 
form of security of this type under Belgian law. 
b) It was modelled on the French "warrant pétrolier", "warrant sur stocks 
de guerre" and "warrant industriel". Additional reliability is provided 
by the fact that the existence and value of the stocks of coal subject 
to the charge are certified by the national authorities (4). 
3. The pledging of a "fonds de commerce" 
Although manifestly an imitation of the equivalent French law, the Belgian 
provisions (5) nevertheless have certain special features which deserve 
underlining. 
a) The creditor can only be a bank or specially-authorised credit 
institution (6). 
b) The security consists of the whole "fonds de commerce" (again excluding 
land and accounts receivable), unless limitations are agreed (7). 
Whereas under French law there is no question of stocks being charged 
(8), under Belgian law they can be included among the assets forming the 
security if agreement to that effect is expressly made (9). 
An interesting solution to the conflict of interests between the secured 
creditor and other creditors has been devised in this case : only half 
the proceeds of sale of stocks goes to the secured creditor, leaving the 
other half available for the remaining creditors (10). -46-
c) It is disputed whether a bona fide secured creditor can acquire a 
charge on objects which do not belong to the giver of the security (11). 
Equally controversial is the question as to whether the charge extends 
to "immeubles par destination" (12). 
d) The duration of the charge is 10 years (13); an extension appears 
possible even in the absence of an express provision to that effect 
(14). 
4. The privilege on agricultural loans 
The credit requirements of agriculture, particularly of the tenant-farmer, 
were catered for by the creation of a "privilège agricole" (15)· 
a) The debt due in respect of the loan is not ipso jure guaranteed by this 
form of security : instead, an express agreement is required upon 
conclusion of the loan contract (16) and entry must be made in a public 
register (17)· 
b) The right has a duration of 10 years and can be extended beyond this 
period (18). 
c) The security itself consists of the assets of the farming business to 
the extent that they are subject in law to the lessor's privilege (19)· 
Included are the- last harvest and all objects used in the carrying on 
of the farming business (20). If the borrower also ovms the land, the 
right extends to his "immeubles par destination" and to standing crops 
(21). If the lender is in good faith the right also covers assets 
which do not belong to the borrower (22). 
d) Strictly speaking, therefore, this is not a genuine privilege, for the 
latter only embraces the debtor's assets. 
Moreover, the creditor also has a "droit de suite" (23), limited in 
time, so that the right thus constitutes a genuine real right effective 
against even third-party purchasers acquiring in good faith (24). It 
would thus be more correct to describe it as a mortgage on movables (25) 
II. CREDIT ON GOODS 
1. Rescission of contract 
Rescission of contract on account of non-payment is only possible in 
relation to third parties to the same extent as the claim for return of the 
goods, that is to say, in the oase of sale without deferment of payment 
only within 8 days from delivery (26), and in the case of sale with 
deferment not at all (27). 
2. General privilege of the seller 
Under Belgian law the general privilege of the seller is extinguished if 
the object sold becomes "immeuble par destination" (28). -47-
3- Enlarged seller's privilege applicable to capital business assets 
a) On the sale of movable capital business assets the seller's privilege can 
be considerably strengthened (29). To obtain this extension of his rights, 
the seller has only to submit a copy of the contract of sale or invoice to 
the commercial court at the buyer's place of business within 15 days from 
delivery or completion of installation. The court then enters the contract 
in a public register. 
This special seller's privilege lasts for 5 years. If within this period 
execution or commencement of bankruptcy takes place, the privilege will be 
valid beyond the end of the 5-year period until such time as the proceedings 
are wound up. There are no other possibilities of extending the duration. 
b) The significant enlargement of the seller's privilege in this case compared 
with the general seller's privilege lies in the fact that it is 
bankruptcy-proof (30) and remains intact even if the object is installed 
into a piece of real property ("immeuble par destination ou par 
incorporation") (31). In the same way as the general seller's privilege 
this special form only subsists so long as the object forms part of the 
buyer's assets. On resale to third parties the privilege attaches to the 
debt for the purchase price after its payment to the original buyer. 
4. Retention of title 
a) This concept, although not completely unknown (32), gives the seller even 
fewer advantages than in France. The effects of retention of title are 
confined to the parties to the contract. As in France it is ineffective 
against third-party purchasers acquiring in good faith and on the 
bankruptcy of the buyer, but beyond this it is also ineffective even in the 
case of individual execution on the object sold (33)· 
b) Within the European Communities it is thus Belgium which rejects retention 
of title most firmly as being a "secret lien", at least under the 
prevailing law. But it is noticeable in this connection that the way is 
being opened for a change of view on the part of the Belgian legislators in 
that the instalment-purchase law of 1957 (3^) gave the executive the power 
to make retention of title valid against third parties by introducing 
compulsory or voluntary registration in a public register (35). No use has 
yet been made of this power (36). 
5. "Location-vente" and similar devices 
In the instalment-purchase law mentioned above there is an explanatory 
definition of this type of transaction. The statute rightly stresses that the 
deciding factor in classifying a sale as an instalment-purchase transaction 
is not the terms used by the parties but the commercial intention behind the 
transaction. By "vente à tempérament" is meant "toute convention, quelle que 
soit sa qualification ou sa forme, qui doit normalement emporter acquisition de 
meubles corporels et dont le prix s'acquitte en quatre paiements au moins". -48-
6. Absence of special forms of seller's security 
The "gage automobile" and the "nantissement de l'outillage et du matériel 
d'équipement professionnel" do not exist in Belgian law. 
7. Instalment-purchase 
The instalment-purchase law of 1957 has already been mentioned (37). For 
the sake of ease of reference it may be repeated that this statute confers 
upon the executive the power to make retention of title into an effective 






































A more detailed review is provided by WAELBROECK in : Revue du Marché 
Commun, 1962, 292 ff. 
WAELBROECK, Revue du Marché Commun, 1962, 2 92, 295, before item 4-
Law of 5.5.1958 (Mon. 22.5.1°58 - B.L. 1958, 340), modified bv t.hn 1-,,- P" 
31.12.1958. 
Art. 5 of the law. 
Law of 25.IO.I919 in the version of 30.3. and 4-5-1936 (reproduced in : Les 
Codes Larcier, 1959 issue, Vol. I, p. 256). 
Art. 7 of the law. 
Art. 2 I of the law. 
See Β I 9 footnote 51. 
Art. 2 II of the law. 
Art. 2 II of the law. 
See VAN RYN/HEHN3N, IV, No. 2602 with further references. 
See VAN RYN/KEENKN , IV, No. 2604 with further references. 
Art. 9 I of the law. 
VAN RYN/HEBNEN, IV, No. 2601. 
Law of 15.4.1884, latest modification by the law of 12.7.1952, reproduced in 
Les Codes LARCIER, 1959 issue, Vol. I, p. 48Ο. 
Art. 4 of the law. 
Arts. 5 I, 15 of the law. 
Art. 6 of the law. 
Art. 4 I of the law. 
Art. 20 No. 1 para. 1 loi hypothécaire. 
295, footnote 4. 
5 loi 
Art. 12 II of the law. In this connection DE PAGE, VII, No. 
DE PAGE, VII, No. 295, footnote 3 vrith further references. 
Art. 7 of the law. 
This is the effect of Art. 7 of the law, Art. 20 No. 1 para. 
hypothécaire; Arts. 826 ff. CPC. See DE PAGE, VII, Nos. 135, ISO. 
DE PAGE, VII, No. 294 footnote 1. 
Art. 20 No. 5, para. 7 loi hypothécaire -this law replaced Arts. 2091 ff. 
C. civ. in 1851), 









20 No. 5 para. 2 loi hypothécaire. 
20 No. 5 loi hypothécaire in the version of 29-7.1957; Art. 546 C. com, 
see LIMPENS, No. 2079; FARGAUD, No. 153; HERTENS, pp. 80 ff. 
Art. 546 C. com. 
Art. 20 No. 5 paras. 2 and 3 loi hypothécaire; Art. 546 V C. 
Art. 4 s. 2 of the instalment-purchase law of 9-7.1957 (Mon. 
even malees express mention of retention of title. 
Cass. (Belgian), 9.2.1933, Pas., 1933, I, 103; Cass. (Belgian), 31.5-1956, 
J. Trib., 1956, 697 = Rev. crit. jur. beige 1956, 241, KLUYSKENS' note. 
Law of 9.7.1957 (Mon. 26.7.1957), Art. 30. 
In this connection see DE CALOTE, Les ventes, les prêts et les prêts 
personnels à tempérament, Brussels (Bruylant), 1965, pp· 276 ff. 
It appears doubtful vrhether this power applies to all forms of instalment-
purchase envisaged by Art. 1 of the instalment-purchase law and the cases 
listed under Art. 2 Nos. 1-5. See DE CALOTE (previous footnote), No. 205, 
footnote 282. 
See footnote 32. 
See 4b. - 51 -
D. LUXEMBOURG 
In the sphere in which we are interested for the purposes of this study the law 
of Luxembourg is basically the same as that of France and Belgium. It will be 
sufficient to emphasise the particularities. Most of the special forms of 
security in the form of movables offered by French and Belgian law are unknown in 
Luxembourg. Thtis the "gage automobile", the "nantissement de l'outillage et du 
matériel d'équipement professionnel", the film mortgage and most of the 
specialised warrants do not exist here. The sole special forms of security in 
this connection are the "warrant agricole" and the "nantissement d'un fonds de 
commerce". 
1. The "warrant agricole" 
Farmers and farming cooperatives can make use of a "warrant agricole" (1) to 
provide security for their borrowings. The charge is embodied in an endorsable 
document and entered in a public register. It covers the harvest ani other 
products of the farming business including livestock. 
If the provider of the security is not the owner of the business bait only a 
tenant, the value of the warrant is primarily dependent on its relationship 
to the landlord's privilege. The three parties affected thus have the 
possibility of determining the details of the order of precedence. 
Further description of the "warrant agricole" can be dispensed with since it 
is very little used in practice (2). 
2. The "nantissement d'un fonds de commerce" 
The provisions governing this form of security (3) are closer to those of 
their Belgian predecessor than to the French example (4). Only certain credit 
institutions and breweries specially authorised by the state cani toecone 
secured creditors under this heading. As in the Belgian -rødel stoets of goods 
can also be declared to form part of the security and here again only
 !>0 > of 
the sale proceeds accrue to the secured creditor, so that something shall toe 
left for the unsecured creditors. 52-
Notes 
(1) Law of 3.5.1934. See FARGAUD, Nos. I8O-I.84. 
(2) MACKEL in : Revue du Marché Commun, 1962, 296, 297 left. 
(3) Order of 27.5.1937. 
(4) See FARGAUD Nos. 186 ff.; MACKEL (prev. f'note). -53-
E. ITALY 
I. CREDIT IN THE FORM OF LOANS 
1. The pledge 
a) Under Italian law the classical pledge basically requires, besides the 
consent of pledgor and pledgee, the physical transmission of the object 
to the pledgee or the physical transmission of the documents vrhich give 
an exclusive right of disposition over the object (1). 
b) Transmission can also be made to a third-party designated by the main 
parties as pledge-holder ("terzo designato") (2). Should the object 
already be in the possession of a third-party, for storage purposes for 
instance, it is not clear whether, in order to create a pledge, the 
agreement of the third-party that henceforth he holds the object on 
behalf of the pledgee must be obtained in addition to the giving of 
notice to him by the pledgee and pledgor (3). 
c) Whilst there is no question of constructive possession by way of 
substitute for actual transmission being acceptable (4), the granting 
of qualified co-possession (concustodia) (5) is sufficient, following 
the German example (6). In this situation not only is the pledgor 
effectively unable to dispose of the object serving as security on his 
own but also - for instance if the object remains on his premises - the 
pledging must be adequately publicised by means of a clearly visible 
notice (7). 
d) If the secured debt amounts to more than 5,000 Lire, the pledging 
contract requires a document vrith "data certa", i.e. as a rule official 
authentication (8). Simple written form is sufficient in the case of 
state-authorised credit institutions (9)· 
e) In practice the pledging of movables usually takes one of the following 
forms : 
aa) Small loans by pawnbroking establishments ("Monti di pieta") (10). 
bb) Pledging of securities. Bearer securities are movables in Italian 
law also and obey the same principles of transfer (11). 
cc) Pledging of movable objects by means of a representative document 
(12). 
dd) Pledging of goods stored in a public vrarehouse by means of a special 
certificate ("nota di pegno") (13). 
In all these cases the pledgee has the right to realise the object 
pledged (14); but he can only claim preferential satisfaction (15) in 
respect of debts of over 5,000 Lire if the right to do so is based on a 
document vrith "data certa" (16). 54-
2. The motor vehicle mortgage 
The mortgage on motor vehicles under R.D.L. 1927 can - unlike its 
equivalent in France - be used not only as security for the purchase price 
of the motor vehicle but for other loans as well (17). 
3. Sale and repurchase 
a) In Italy the law does not openly recognise a non-possessory real 
security of general application corresponding to the system of fiduciary 
transfer of title by way of security in Germany and the Netherlands. A 
transfer of full rights of this type, in vrhich the object constituting 
the security remains vrith the debtor, is at least approved by judicial 
pra.ctice in Italy, even if under a different name. We refer to the 
revival of the formula of sale vrith a repurchase clause, previously 
also current in the other countries but there correctly described as 
transfer of title by way of security (18). 
If a person requires money and cannot or does not wish to provide any 
other kind of security, he may "sell" an object belonging to him to a 
bank. When the contract is concluded the property in the object passes 
(19) to the bank. The bank advances the money. But basically neither 
the customer nor the bank really intend to make a disposition or an 
acquisition, as the case may be, and they thus do not intend a genuine 
sale to take place. For this reason the customer retains the object 
"on hire" or "on loan" and also has a "right to repurchase" (20). Under 
Article I503 I of the Codice Civile the restoration of the original 
position of the parties - and at the same time, by virtue of Articles 
I376 and 1470 Codice Civile, the restoration of the title - is brought 
about by a declaration of intent and by repayment of the purchase price" 
In other words the bank's customer can only finally keep the object in 
his ownership by repaying the "purchase price". In reality this is a 
loan on the security of a fiduciary transfer of title (21). 
It is a peculiarity of this type of transaction that the bank has 
"purchased." the object constituting the security and could thus deal 
vrith it as it pleased and retain any profit arising on resale. For this 
reason the device runs the risk of nullity for being conceived as a means 
of circumventing the law (22), as it can be interpreted as a circumvention 
of the law relating to mortgages and charges which prohibits the 
forfeiture clause (lex comi" ssoria) (23). In judicial practice and 
jurisprudence the problem has most often been discussed from this 
angle (24). It should be noted however that the prohibition of forfeiture 
clauses only concerns a particular type of realisation of a security. 
This prohibition should not be allovred to have a bearing on the question 
of what kinds of security one is permitted to create (25). 
b) The evolution of the formula of a "vendita con patto di riscatto a scopo 
di garanzia" is evidently still very much in a state of flux in Italy and 
no definite assertions can be made about it. The objects forming the 
security in the cases decided by judicial practice are primarily, though 
not exclusively, real property. But there is no reason why other 
considerations should apply to movable property. It also appears to be 
disptxted whether the object serving as security may remain in the direct 
possession of the giver of the security ("the seller"). Thus the supreme 
court, which recognises the formula of the sale vrith repurchase clause in 
principle as a means of creating security, sanctioned a prohibited 
circur.iventory act in a recent decision (26) because, among other reasons, the object serving as security remained in the possession of the party 
providing the security. But it is doubtful whether this circumstance alone 
is sufficient to characterise an act as circumventory. 
As to the effects of this type of security in an individual execution or a 
bankruptcy, particularly of the giver of the security, jurisprudence and 
judicial practice do not arrive at a definite conclusion. As the fiction 
of a genuine sale is maintained, the recipient of the security should not 
only be able to claim preferential satisfaction of the debt due in respect 
of his loan but also release of his property or segregation of the object 
from the bankrupt's estate. 
4. The privileges 
Besides the means of creating security based on movables there are special 
privileges (27). They are valid not only in a bankruptcy but in an individual 
execution as well. As well as being used to secure various types of debt in 
general this formula also finds application in securing certain kinds of loan. 
a) If a bank specially authorised for the purpose finances the purchase of 
machinery, the bank acquires a privilege in the machines in the same way as 
the seller (28). 
Where the finance for the purchase price has only partly been provided by 
the bank and payment of the purchase price in deferred, the privileges of 
seller and bank compete with each other. In this case precedence follows 
the order of the entries in the register of the competent regional court 
(29). 
b) For machines costing 500^000 Lire or more the privilege is not confined to 
special banks but is available to any financing third-party (30). 
c) Agricultural banks are given a privilege in the fruits of the land in 
respect of loans for the carrying on of farming business and for the sale, 
treatment and transformation of the products thereof (31)· Por loans for the 
purchase of livestock and implements they have a privilege in the objects 
purchased with the help of the loan (32). By agreement between the parties 
these privileges can be extended to all farm assets and can also be created 
in respect of loans for improvement work on land (33)· 
d) For certain business loans to craftsman-traders there is a privilege on the 
entire equipment of the business (33a). The scope of this privilege can be 
restricted by contractual agreement to specific machines. The privilege is 
only valid against third parties if the loan agreement has been drawn up in 
writing, makes reference to the special statute and has been entered in a 
special register at the "Ufficio del registro" at the place of business of 
the trader in question. If the machines serving as security have a value of 
more than 500,000 Lire, registration of the loan agreement as provided by 
Article 1524 II Codice Civile is required to secure validity against 
third parties. 
e) Certain loans to small and medium-sized Industrial concerns are secured by 
a privilege in the stocks of raw materials and goods of these undertakings 
(33b). Publicity is effected in this case by publication of the loan 
agreement in an official gazette (33c), permitting the scope of the 
privilege to be specified more exactly. 56 
This special law was originally due to expire in 1959 (33d). It has not 
yet finally become clear whether it has been extended, but there are no 
indications that it has. 
II. CREDIT ON GOODS 
1. The general rule applicable to sales 
Under the general rule of Italian law the buyer of a specified individual 
movable object (species) acquires the title to it directly upon conclusion 
of the contract of sale without any requirements as to form and without 
physical transmission of the object being necessary (34). The separation 
principle and therefore also the abstraction principle of German law are 
foreign to Italian law (35). Instead, "creation of obligation" and 
"disposition" constitute a single, complex legal act (36). 
Acquisition of title takes place in this way not only in the case of 
specified individual movable objects but also in the case of objects en 
bloc, even if the objects must be counted, weighed or measured to achieve 
certain effects (for example, in order to determine the amount of the 
purchase price) (37)· With objects determined by generic description the 
principle of immediate passing of title can naturally only apply subject to 
the proviso that the title does not pass to the purchaser until the moment 
the goods are "individualised" (38), 
Transactions of this type thus fall under the cases set out in Article 1476 
No. 2 of the Codice Civile, in which the buyer does not acquire the title 
upon the conclusion of the contract of sale, but where the seller must 
provide him with the title. To this group belong also the sale of a future 
object and the sale of an object belonging to a third-party. In all these 
cases, although the buyer does not acquire the title immediately upon 
conclusion of the contract, no special additional legal act is required 
for the title to pass. Rather, the rights are acquired ipso facto upon 
individualisation (39), upon the coming into being of the object (40) or 
upon acquisition by the seller (41). 
The buyer can thus already be the owner of goods which are to be delivered 
to him while they are still in the possession of the seller. There is no 
real danger in this for the seller; he can oppose the claim for delivery 
(42) by adducing the fact that the purchase price has not been paid (43). 
This also applies if the buyer goes bankrupt and the trustee in 
bankruptcy sues for delivery (44). In the bankruptcy of the seller, on 
the other hand, the buyer can segregate the goods, which already belong 
to him, from the rest of the bankrupt's assets (45), and in the case of 
seizure he can demand the release of his property (46). A prerequisite 
for this is however that the acquisition of the property should already 
have received "data certa" (47) or been entered in the appropriate 
register (48) before seizure or commencement of the bankruptcy as the case 
may be. -57-
2. The right to restitution 
The real danger to the security of the purchase price debt does not arise 
until the buyer has acquired possession of the goods. Should the buyer 
fail to make payment on delivery, despite the fact that payment is due, 
the seller can institute an action for the return of the goods if he does 
so within 15 days of delivery, under Article 1519 Codice Civile and thus 
restore the status quo (49). 
In the event of the bankruptcy of the buyer this rule undergoes a 
modification (50). The right to reclaim the goods in this case is not 
dependent on a cash sale having been agreed but applies to every type of 
contract of sale. On the other hand, the seller cannot demand the return 
of the goods once they have reached their destination and come under the 
power of disposition of the bankrupt or the trustee in bankruptcy; he can 
only do this while they remain in transit. In this way the seller can 
"at the last moment" have the contract regarded as unfulfilled by either 
side and therefore subject to special rules (51)· 
3. Rescission of contract in the event of non-payment 
If the purchase price remains unpaid the seller may, by virtue of a special 
provision of the law of sale, rescind the contract within 8 days after 
payment falls due by a unilateral declaration (52). If he fails to act 
during this period he can still bring an action for rescission 
("risoluzione") under the general law of contract (53). 
If the contract of sale contains the appropriate clause, rescission can 
even take place ipso jure (54). Rescission is no longer possible after 
the commencement of bankruptcy, however (55)· 
A valid rescission has a retroactive effect (56), making the seller once 
more the owner and obliging the buyer to make restitution of the goods 
(57). 
4. General rule t no seller's privilege 
Unlike French, Belgian and Dutch law, Italian law does not as a general 
rule give the seller a preferential right (privilege) (58). 
5. Exception : privilege on machinery 
a) A person selling machinery at a price of over 30,000 Lire can obtain a 
privilege on the machinery delivered, by virtue of Article 2762 Codice 
Civile. This privilege does not require special agreement between the 
parties but arises from the law. In order to be valid however, entry 
in a register at the office of the regional court for the district in 
which the machinery is installed is necessary (59)· 
The privilege is only valid for three years after the conclusion of the 
contract of sale and in addition - except in the case of fraudulent 
removal of the machinery - only so long as the machinery remains in the 
buyer's possession and in the district in question (6o). The privilege 
confers the right to preferential satisfaction in an individual 
execution (6l) and also, more importantly, in a bankruptcy (62). It has 
precedence over the lessor's privilege (63). On the other hand, in spite 58 -
of its publicity, it does not offer any protection against third-party 
purchasers (64). 
The machinery privilege here described is also available to specially 
authorised banks which have financed the purchase price, if they 
register in the appropriate manner (65). 
b) These rules only give the seller a very limited degree of security. 
For this reason a law promulgated in 1965 (66) attempts to widen the 
scope of the privilege applying to machinery priced at 500,000 Lire and 
over and also to link it to greater publicity requirements. This 
special rule (67) only applies to new and unused machine tools and 
manufacturing machinery. If the seller wishes to make use of the 
special form of machinery privilege, the contract of sale requires 
official authentication (68). A sign must be affixed in a clearly 
visible place on the machine, showing the name of the seller, the type 
and serial number of the machine, the year of its make and the name of 
the competent court of registration (69). 
Upon entry in the register of the competent court this special form of 
machinery privilege of the seller or a financing third-party (70) 
becomes valid even against third-party purchasers (71). 
The privilege lasts for 6 years (72) and it does not terminate on 
removal of the machine from the district covered by the court (73). 
6. Retention of title 
a) The legal construction 
The rule under Article 1376 Codice Civile, whereby the buyer becomes 
ovmer of the object purchased immediately on conclusion of the contract 
of sale, is not mandatory. The parties may agree that the title shall 
not pass to the purchaser until a later point in time (74)· But even 
in this case the fact remains that no special further legal act is 
required to make the property pass (75)· Nor is there any question of 
a conditional sale as prescribed by Articles 1353-1361 CC; for the sale 
must be unconditional (76) and it is only the transfer of title that is 
postponed. Change of ownership is valid - and here again it differs 
from the doctrine applicable to conditional sales - not retroactively, 
but ex nunc. Sale with retention of title ("riserva di proprieta") 
under Articles 1523-1526 CC is a particularly important application of 
this type of sale contract (77). Articles 1523-1526 CC mention 
retention of title in connection vrith instalment purchases; but it is 
possible in every type of sale contract (78). 
b) Moment of agreement 
Retention of title must be agreed directly upon conclusion of the 
contract of sale. Later agreement as to retention of title is viewed 
very critically by the courts, even when the parties come to such an 
arrangement by mutual agreement. The question arises as to whether an 
agreement of this type relating to sales of specified objects (species) 
is invalid from the outset because the buyer is already the owner. For 
since Italian law does not recognise an isolated, abstract passing of 
title, it is doubtful whether the seller could recover ownership through 
a subsequent agreement that he would be able to retain his title. In 
any case it is the rule that subsequently agreed retention of title -59-
oannot be effective in a bankruptcy, whether because it ranks as a 
gratuitous disposition (79) or because it constitutes "performance for 
inadequate consideration" (80). 
c) Efficacity inter partes 
For validity against the buyer it is sufficient if there is agreement; 
there are no requirements as to form. But in relation to the buyer 
retention of title has no practical value. Even vrithout this clause 
the seller would retroactively become the owner of the goods again 
after rescission ("risoluzione") of the contract (8l). In this 
respect, therefore, the seller does not require retention of title as 
a means of security. 
d) Efficacity against third-party creditors 
The interests of the seller (82) are assured against third-party 
creditors of the buyer if the retention of title is based on a 
document which received "data certa" (83) before the recourse to 
execution. 
If the retention of title has received its "data certa" before the 
seizure, the seller may demand the release of his property (84). 
Retention of title which received "data certa" before the commencement, 
of bankruptcy (85) gives, above all, the right of segregation of the 
goods in the bankruptcy of the buyer (86), unless the trustee chooses 
complete performance (87). The trustee's right of choice is based on 
the fact that, according to the prevailing - though disputed - view, 
sale vrith retention of title constitutes a contract of sale where there 
has not yet been complete performance on either side (88). 
A very tricky and much-disputed question arises if, although retention 
of title has been agreed immediately upon conclusion of the contract 
of sale, "data certa" has not been obtained until later, for example 
at the same time as the whole, unified document of sale. According to 
the view which has prevailed lately, retention of title should not be 
regarded here as having first been agreed at the time of the "data 
certa", that is, after the contract of sale (89). Instead, following 
Article 1524 II CC, the only question to be decided is whether the 
retention of title can be upheld against third-party creditors and hence 
also against creditors in bankruptcy. But as evidence that retention 
of title was'agreed immediately upon conclusion of the sale all other 
means of proof are admissible (90). 
e) Efficacity against third-party purchasers 
aa) By contrast retention of title as a rule gives no protection against 
bona fide third-party purchasers. Protection of commercial 
transactions has priority (91). 
bb) There is an exception in the case of fittings ("pernitenza") of 
real property or movables which have been entered in public 
registers (92). Normally the legal fate of fittings follows that 
of the main object (93), that is, on the sale of the main object 
to a third-party purchaser they pass to the new owner together with 
the main object. But if the fittings - due to retention of title, 
for instance - belong to a third-party, the latter can uphold his 
rights even against the honest purchaser of the real property or 
the registered object as the case may be if his rights are based on -60-
a document which has received "data certa" before the time of 
acquisition by the third-party (94). 
No publicising of the retention of title is needed in this case. 
This is perhaps based on the consideration that the third-party 
purchaser has acquired the main object and can put up with the 
loss of the missing fittings. It appears doubtful whether this 
solution takes account of modern business situations in which the 
"fittings" of a piece of land are often of enormous value (95)· 
Nor would a restrictive interpretation of the concept of "fittings" 
provide a complete solution. 
cc) Sellers of machinery at prices over 30,000 Lire can (96) to a 
certain extent also uphold their retention of title against 
third-party purchasers. 
It is a prerequisite that the agreement to operate retention of 
title should be entered in a special public register at the office 
of the regional court in whose district the machinery is installed. 
But third parties in good faith need only let this retention be 
used against them if the machine at the moment of acquisition was 
still situated in the district in which it was registered. As 
third-party purchasers otherwise have no opportunity of discovering 
the existence of a retention of title with the help of the register, 
the law in this case gives their interest as a purchaser precedence 
over the interest of the security of the first seller. 
dd) If the seller of machinery at prices from 500,000 Lire upwards has 
observed the special provisions of the 1965 statute (97), his 
retention of title is valid against third parties from the time of 
registration without any limitation (98). 
This security is also available to financing third parties (99). 
ee) It is oonceivable that there could be a case where a retention of 
title in machinery which was eligible for registration was not in 
fact registered but nevertheless obtained "data certa" as provided 
by Article 1524 I CC. The prevailing opinion here is that this 
retention of title, although not opposable against third-party 
purchasers can be upheld against third-party creditors of the 
buyer (100). 
If retention of title is registered as provided by the law it 
simultaneously acquires "data certa" (101) and can be upheld 
against third-party creditors without further action. 
ff) If a retention of title in machinery has been agreed and could have 
been registered but in fact was not, the question arises as to 
whether it could not at least be upheld against third-party 
purchasers acquiring in bad faith. Predominant opinion (102) 
rejects this possibility, pointing out that the wording of the law 
does not differentiate between third-party purchasers acquiring in 
good and bad faith. Furthermore they cite the fact that the 
registration is designated not as "iscrizione" but as "trascrizione", 
This, they say, indicates that the rules normally applicable in the 
case of a "trascrizione" should be applied (103). 61 -
f) Alteration of the goods 
If the goods which are subject to retention of title become (from a 
business point of view) inextricably mixed or joined, a co-ownership 
comes into being in proportion to the value of the parts (104). If 
however the object in question can be regarded as the principle object 
or if it has a much higher value than the rest, then the seller's 
retained title extends to the whole object; he is only required to 
recompense the other owner or owners for the value of their shares of 
the whole (IO5). 
If the object is transformed (106) the seller only loses his retained 
title where the value of the transformed object considerably exceeds 
that of the original material and the person who carried out the 
transformation recompenses the seller for the value of the original 
material (107). 
g) Installation of the object into real property. 
Installation of the object causes the retained title to lapse if the 
object cannot be moved without severe damage to the building (108). 
If the seller does remain in ownership, he has 6 months from the time 
of learning of the installation in which to institute an action for 
restitution (109). 
If specially marked machines of a total price of not less than 500,000 
Lire are involved, they qualify as movables in spite of being installed 
into a piece of real property (lio). 
h) "Extended" retention of title 
There is a substantial limitation of the scope of retention of title 
deriving from the fact that under Italian law all forms of extension 
by means of which the seller attempts to secure for himself the 
"surrogate" of the original object sold are denied recognition (ill). 
If an extending clause of this nature is agreed, then not only is the 
extension as such held to be ineffective but in addition the retention 
of title itself - on account of internal contradiction. For it would 
be illogical for seller and purchaser to agree that on the one hand the 
seller should retain the title to the property while on the other hand 
the buyer, either expressly or in certain circumstances, should have 
the power to deal with the property as owner - to resell, transform or 
consume it (112). Judicial practice and jurisprudence have not however 
concerned themselves very deeply or comprehensively with this matter. 
One of the reasons for this may be that the enlargement of retention of 
title through assignment in advance of debts arising on resale does not, 
for other reasons, have as great a practical importance as it does in 
Germany for instance. One explanation for this could be that retention 
of title chiefly occurs in Italy in the case of sales to final consumers. 
Where wholesalers and retailers obtain a large part of their goods not 
by simple purchase but by means of commission and other devices, there 
is no room for retention of title. 
Judged from the prevailing Italian point of view, there is from the 
outset no place for any "extended" form of retention of title. For if 
the authority to resell or to transform the goods is invalid due to 
internal contradiction, the agreement that the new product or the debt 
arising from the resale should take the place of the (in fact invalidly) -62-
retained property ceases to have any meaning. Even if one 
disregarded this, there vrould still be a further objection to 
recognition of an extended retention of title : the so-called 
extension of retention of title presupposes not only the recognition 
of actual retention of title by existing law, but more than this. 
Thus the extension of retention of title to debts due from customers 
constitutes an assignment of future debts for the purpose of security. 
But Italian law does not admit an abstract assignment as such, only 
the sale of debts, the release of debts, etc. An assignment for the 
purposes of security however is still rejected by most authorities in 
Italy, as well as all trusts created with the same purpose in mind 
(fiducia cum creditore) (113). 
7. Relationship between retention of title and machinery privilege 
Where the seller has retained his property in a way that is valid against 
third-party creditors, it is questionable whether, in place of the 
release of his property in an individual execution (114) or the 
segregation of his property in a bankruptcy (115), he can demand 
preferential satisfaction by invoking the seller's privilege (116). The 
doubt arises because a privilege can in principle only attach to the 
assets of the debtor whereas the goods sold under retention of title 
still belong to the seller. 
The question is however largely theoretical, since there is no obvious 
advantage to the seller in applying his privilege rather than relying 
on his legal position as conferred by retention of title. Moreover the 
buyer or his trustee in bankruptcy might very well agree to such a 
demand by the seller and there vrould then be nothing to prevent the 
seller receiving satisfaction according to the rules governing the 
seller's privilege. So for all these reasons vre may leave the question 
as to the relationship between retention of title and seller's privilege 
unanswered (117 ) · 
8. The motor vehicle mortgage 
The seller of motor vehicles has a special form of security at his 
disposal, namely a mortgage. For a better understanding of the problems 
involved, a few general observations must first be made, particularly 
since this legal material has not been fully incorporated into the 
Codice Civile of 1942. The main relevant provisions are contained in a 
royal decree of 15.3.1927, no. 436 (118), the details of vrhich have since 
been revised. Since then Italy has had a transcription system for motor 
vehicles analogous to that for real property (119)· It is based on the 
Publico Registro Automobilistico (P.R.A.) maintained by the Italian 
motoring organisation ACI. 
Every change of ownership must be entered in this register. The register 
enjoys the confidence of the public : all third parties can rely on its 
contents and must accept that its contents are valid against themselves. 
Therefore acquisition on the strength of mere possession by a person not 
entitled to acquire is not possible (120). Registration of change of 
ownership has a declaratory rather than a constitutive force (121). - 63 -
The existence of this public register enables motor vehicles to be used 
as a basis for credit without being pledged in the strict sense of the 
word. The vehicle serves as security for the debt due to the seller or 
to a financing third-party in respect of the purchase price or the 
balance of the purchase price (122). No special agreement between the 
parties is required; the right derives from the law itself, although 
it does not come into existence until registration in the P.R.A. has 
been effected (123).The right lasts 5 years initially and can then be 
renevred for a further period of 5 years (124). 
In contrast to French law, Italian law permits the motor vehicle to be 
used as security not only for its own purchase price but also for any 
other debt (125), even debts to third parties. There can be no question 
of a title conferred by the law itself here. Applying Article 2821 CC 
what is needed is an act which is at least supported by a private 
document (in vrhich case a unilateral declaration by the giver of the 
security is sufficient) and registration in the P.R.A. 
R.D.L. 1927 describes this form of security as a "privilege". This is 
incorrect (126 ) . A special privilege (127) is only valid so long as the 
object in question still belongs to the debtor. The motor vehicle 
mortgage is valid even against all third parties (128). Accordingly it 
has the character of a real security ("garanzia reale"). For this 
reason it is unanimously accepted that it is not a privilege but a 
mortgage on movables (129). 
It is worth mentioning, bearing in mind the international aspect, that a 
mortgage under R.D.L. 1927 can only be created on motor vehicles 
licensed by the Italian authorities. 
9. Relationship between the motor vehicle mortgage and retention of title 
With the form given to retention of title by Articles 1523 ff. of the CC 
1942 it seems doubtful whether it has been sensible to retain R.D.L. 1927 
alongside it as an institution for securing the purchase price. Por under 
Article 1524 II OC a retention of title publicly registered in a certain way 
can be upheld not only against third-party creditors but also against 
third-party purchasers. A seller covered in this way would have just as 
much security as through a vehicle mortgage. No doubt the second use vrhich 
the vehicle mortgage provides, that is, creation of security for any other 
debts, has been a decisive factor in favour of the preservation of the R.D.L. 
1927 provisions. The introduction of this use of the vehicle mortgage may 
have been greatly influenced by the fact that a motor vehicle is often the 
only item available as security and that credit vrith out security is 
virtually unobtainable. 
In the present legal situation the question arises as to whether a person 
selling a vehicle, instead of using the special mortgage provided by R.D.L. 
1927, can make use of a retention of title under Articles 1523 ff. CC to 
secure his debt for the purchase price. Until recently the general opinion 
held that in the case of motor vehicles the only means of obtaining 
security lay by way of the special provisions of R.D.L. 1927 (130). 
However, according to the latest decisions of the Italian appeal court a 
retention of title is also possible in the case of motor vehicles. It does 
not have to be registered as provided by Articles 1524 II CC but must be 
entered in the vehicle register (P.R.A.) (131). Por validity against 
third-party creditors a document vrith "data certa" (132) ought to be 
sufficient in this case (133). -64-
10. Hire purchase 
Although mentioned in legislation (134) hire purchase does not play a very 
large practical part in Italian law. This is evidently because retention 
of title goes some way towards satisfying the seller's need for security -
even though subject to certain conditions. 
11. Particularities of instalment purchase 
The Italian instalment-purchase law (135) applies to sales of certain new 
and unused articles by traders to private persons. It covers hire purchase 
and also applies to third parties providing finance. The law contains 
mandatory provisions for the protection of the debtor which go beyond 
Articles 1525-1526 CC and which deal particularly with the amount of the 
payments and the repayment period. The law does not however contain any 
special provisions regarding property relationships or security for the 
seller. - 65 -
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SCIALOJA/BRANCA, Arts. I5OO-I5O3, n. 1, and SIEHR, footnote 8. 
(22) Art. 1344 CC. 
(23) Art. 2744 CC. 
(24) See Cass. 20.4.1968, n. 1221, in Giur. it., I969, I, 1, 1169; Cass., II.2.I969, 
n. 465; 6.5.1969, η. 19δθ, in Foro it., Rep., "Patto commissorio", η. 1 and 2; 
Cass., I7.5.I969, η. 1712; 6.6.I969, η. 198θ, in Foro it., I969, Rep., 
"Vendita", η. 135/136, I37/I38; TRABUCCHI, p. 159. According to these 
authorities sale with repurchase is valid when the property is transferred 
immediately to the "buyer", but invalid when passing of title does not occur 
until non-payment supervenes. For general invalidity : BIANCA, Il divieto del 
patto commissorio, Milan (Giuffrè), 1957, PP. 145 ff. 
(25) Thus in Germany the prohibition of the lex commissoria (s. 1229 BGB) applies 
by - admittedly disputed (see F I 4k ) - analogy also to the transfer of 
title by way of security. But if the object serving as security should be 
realised in a manner analogous to the provisions governing pledges, the 
prohibition of the lex commissoria cannot stand in the way of the transfer of 
title by way of security. - 66 
(26) As footnote 21. 
(27) Arts. 2741 II, 2745, 2747 II, 2755 ff. CC 
(28) Art. 2762 IV CC For greater detail see II 5a, 
(29) Art. 2762 V CC. 
(30) Art. 6 II of the law of 28.II.I965, n. 1329 (G.U. 14.12.1965, n. 3II). For 
greater detail on this special law, see II 5b. 
(31) Art. 2766 together with the law of 29-7-1927, n. I509, particularly Arts. 8 and 
9 (see MURE, in Enciclopedia del diritto, XI, I962, "Credito agrario", n. 1, 2, 
6.). 
(32) Art. 2766 II CC. 
(33) Art. 2766 III CC. 
(33a) Art. 40 of the law of 25-7-1952, n. 949 (G.U. 29.7.1952, n. 174). 
(33b) Art. 5 of the law of 16.4.1954, n. I35 (G.U. 5.5-1954, n. 102). 
(33c) Art. 5 I 3 of the law. 
(33d) Art. 4 of the law. 
(34) Arts. 922, I376, I47O CC. See TRABUCCHI, pp. 708, 773; BARBERO I, p. 486; II, 
Ρ- 271. 
(35) See A III-
(36) MENGONI/REALMONTE, Dispositione (Atto di), in : Enciclopedia del diritto, XIII, 
Milan (Giuffre), 1964, p. I90. 
(37) Art. 1377 CC 
(38) Art. I378 CC. For delimitation between Art. 1377 and Art. I378 CC, see Cass., 
2I.4.I95I, n. 988, in Foro it.. Rep. 1951, "Vendita", nn. 328-332; TRABUCCHI, 
p. 709; BARBERO I, pp. 483 ff. Under Art. I378 CC individualisation takes 
place on the mutual agreement of the parties or in the manner arranged by them. 
(39) Art. I378 CC 
(40) Art. 1472 I CC 
(41) Art. 1478 II CC 
(42) Art. 1476 No. 1 CC. 
(43) See details of Arts. 1460, 1461 CC. These provisions only relate to actions 
prescribed by law. But this is sufficient for the buyer cannot apply the rei 
vindicatio (Art. 948 CC) here since the latter is excluded in contractual 
relationships. 
(44) See Cass., I8.II.I96I, n. 2684, in Giur. it., I963, I, 1, 543 = Dir. fall. I962, 
II, 59- When the seller has not yet made delivery and the buyer has not yet 
made payment, the sale has not yet been fulfilled on either side, although the 
buyer has already gained the title by virtue of Art. I376 CC The trustee in 
bankruptcy must then choose between rescission of the contract or full 
performance by both sides, Art. 72 II 1st case. 
(45) By virtue of Art. IO3 1st case. Although in this case, too, the sale has not 
yet been fulfilled by either side, the trustee in bankruptcy has no right 
to elect (Art. 72 II 1st case) - see Art. 72 IV, I, 1st case). 
(46) Arts. 619 ff. CPC 
(47) "data certa" under Arts. 2702-2704 CC has been obtained when the signatures to 
the document have been officially authenticated; the document also has "data 
certa" from the date of submission to the "Ufficio del Registro" and from the 
death or other evident impossibility of signing by one of the signatories. 
The "data certa" requirement is not designed for the purpose of publicising the 
legal act in question but only for the purpose of proof. It is intended to 
prevent subsequent manipulations by simulation of the legal act. In connection 
with "data certa" see GIACOBBE, in Enciclopedia del diritto, XI, I962, pp. 700 
ff. 
(48) Arts. 2914 No. 4, 2915 II, 2683 CC; Art. 45 1st case. See RUISI, pp. 514-517 
with further references. 67 
(49) This claim for the return of the goods does not however affect preferential 
rights of lessors and landlords which have come into being in the meantime, 
Art. I5I9 II together with Arts. 2764, 2765 CC, nor the lien of bona fide 
third parties which they have acquired by seizure, Art. 1519 III CC 
(50) Art. 75 1st case. In this connection see RUISI, pp. 510-514. 
(51) Namely Arts. 72, 73 1st case; see Cass., 13.7-1954, n. 2458, in Foro it., 
Mass., 1954, 494. 
(52) Art. 1517 CC 
(53) Art. 1517 III, 2nd half-sentence, together with Art. 1453 CC 
(54) Art. 1456 CC 
(55) PROVINCIALI I, pp. 912 ff. It is questionable whether this also applies in 
the case of seizure. 
(56) Art. 1458 I. But by virtue of para. 2 of this provision rights of third 
parties acquired in the interim remain unaffected. 
(57) There is no room for the rei vindicatio alongside this provision, Cass. 
I3.5.I969, n. 2101, Foro it., Rep. I969, "Rivendicazione", n. I7. 
(58) For the privilege on the sale of certain machinery, see 5. 
(59) Art. 2762 II CC 
(60) Art. 2762 III CC. (Installation of the machinery into real estate does not, 
by virtue of Art. 2762 I CC, lead to extinguishment of the privilege). 
(61) See Arts. 2741, 2776 No. 11 CC, Art. 5IO II CPC 
(62) See Art. 54 1st case. 
(63) See Art. 2778 Nos. 11 and I3 CC 
(64) See BARBERO II p. 154. 
(65) A similar equality of treatment of the financing third-party with treatment of 
the seller is evident in Art. 1 last para, of the instalment-purchase law of 
15.9.I964, n. 757 (G.U., 22.9-1964, n. 233). 
(66) Law of 28.II.I965, n. I329 (G.U. 14.12.1965, n. 3II). 
(67) For greater detail see the text of the law itself, which is self-explanatory, 
and also Special Publication No. I/67 of the Verein deutscher 
Maschinenbauanstalten. 
(68) Art. 2 I of the law. 
(69) Art. 1 of the law. 
(70) There is no restriction to specially authorised banks as in Art. 2762 IV CC in 
Art. 6 II of the law. 
(71) Art. 3 IV of the law. 
(72) Art. 6 I 1st alternative of the law. 
(73) Art. 6 I 2nd alternative as against Art. 2762 III 2nd alternative CC For the 
fact that the corresponding reciprocal debts can benefit from this privilege, 
see Arts. 10 ff. of the law and also GASSNER/WOLFF Item II 3 (at the end). 
(74) Cass., 3.3.1969, n. 676, in Giur. it., I969, I, 1, 2162-2164; Cass., 4.3.1969, 
n. 692, in Giur. it., I969, I, 1, 2162; Cass., 9-5-1969, n. I606, in Foro it., 
Rep. 1969, "Vendita", n. 10. 
(75) Trib. Roma, 29.II.I968, in Foro it., Rep. I969, "Vendita", n. I58. 
(76) Cass., 4.3.1968, n. 708, in Foro it., Rep. I968, "Vendita", nn. I5/I6. 
(77) BARBERO II, pp. 308/309; TRABUCCHI p. 788; MIRABELLI, Arts. 1523-1526 CC, n. 1; 
DISTASO, I contratti in generale, Vol. II, Turin (UTET), I966, p. 974. 
(78) MIRABELLI, Arts. 1523-1526 CC, n. 2; GRECO/COTTINO in SCIALOJA/BRANCA, sub 
Art. I523 CC, p. 366. 
(79) Art. 64 1st case. 
(80) Art. 67 1st case. Cass., I.2.I967, n. 292, in Foro it., I967, I, 983; Cass., 
5.5.1967, n. 863, in Giur. it., I968, I, 1, I62 with BUCOLO's note; App. 
Bologna, 22.5.19¿5, in Giur. it. I965, I, 1, 792; TRABUCCHI, p. 789; MIGNOLI, 
pp. 345 ff., SCHETTINI, Sull'opponibilita al fallimento del patto di riserva di 
proprieta nella vendita a rate, in Riv. dir. fall., I965, II, 242 ff.; BONDONI, 
Patto di riservato dominio, registrazione non contestuale alla vendita, -68-
e sua opponibilita al fallimento, in Riv. dir. fall., 1965, II, 636. 
(81) By virtue of Art. 1517, Arts. 1453-1458 CC 
(82) By virtue of Art. 1524 I CC 
(83) See footnote 47. 
(84) Arts. 619 ff. CPC, corresponding to the provisions of s. 771 of the German ZPO 
on third parties' right of action in opposition ("Drittwiderspruchsklage"). 
(85) "Data certa" as provided by Art. 1524 I CC is sufficient, registration under 
Art. 1524 II CC is not necessary. See MIGNOLI, pp. 342 ff., 348-350. 
(86) Art. 103 1st case. See Cass. I5.5.I966, n. 1249, in Foro it., 1967, I, 808; 
IO.8.I966, n. 2179, in Giur. it., I967, Γ, 1, 1θ43. See also FERRI, 
L'opposabilité de la reserve de propriété en droit italien des faillites, in : 
Idées nouvelles dans le droit de la faillite, Brussels (Bruylant), I969, p. 273· 
This is a particularity of Italian law in comparison with that of France, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, which do not recognise retention of title in 
bankruptcy. Moreover, as no publicity is required, Italian law comes close to 
German law with regard to third creditors, although in the matter of the 
position of third purchasers it goes its own way (see e ). 
(87) Art. 72 II, III 1st case. The possibility of the seller himself offering 
complete performance against partial satisfaction (Art. 72 I 1st case) should 
not have any practical importance. 
(88) Art. 72 1st case. See MIGNOLI, pp. 332-338; RUISI, pp. 522 f; SAUVEPLANNE, 
p. 36, is incorrect in thinking that the bankruptcy of the buyer is subsumed 
under Art. 73 1st case. This provision only deals with the bankruptcy of the 
seller. 
(89) If this was the case, the problems described in b would arise. 
(90) See the references under footnote 80 above, esp. BUC0L0. 
(91) Art. II53 CC The protection of commercial transactions by Italian law 
exceeds that given by German law in that it extends to objects that have been 
lost. The erroneous belief in good faith that the previous owner had for his 
part acquired the property in good faith is not sufficient however if the 
person acquiring it was aware of the illegal origin of the property, Art. 1154 
CC It is disputed whether the protection of good faith also extends to 
gratuitous acquisition (refuted by BARBERO I, pp. 3I6 f., similarly DE MARTINO 
in SCIALOJA/BRANCA, Art. 1153 CC, n. 4, each with further refs.; see also 
UNIDROIT, L'unification du droit, Annuaire I967-I968, Vol. I, Rome (Unidroit), 
1969, PP. 142-147). 
(92) Ships, aircraft, motor vehicles . 
(93) Art. 818 I CC 
(94) Art. 819 2nd sentence CC; see DE MARTINO in SCIALOJA/BRANCA, Arts. 818/819 CC, 
n. 4, p. 49. There is doubt whether Art. 818 2nd sentence also applies to the 
machinery detailed in Art. 1524 II CC - see cc . If one adopts the 
prevailing view, according to which if there is failure to register under 
Art. I524 II CC retention of title cannot be opposed even to third parties 
acquiring in bad faith (see f f ), one would suppose that in the case of 
Art. 818 2nd sentence CC "data certa" would not be sufficient against 
third-party purchasers acquiring in good faith; contrary opinion : DE MARTINO 
in SCIALOJA/BRANCA, Art. 818/819 CC, n. 4, p. 49, who sees Art. 818 2nd 
sentence CC as a lex specialis in relation to Art. 1524 CC 
(95) E.g. a gravel-pit with machinery and vehicle-fleet. 
(96) By virtue of Art. 1524 CC, see also Art. II56, 2nd alternative CC. 
(97) See 5b. 
(98) Art. 3 IV of the law. This provision does not contain the limitation of Art. 
1524 II CC, under which retention of title only applies as long as the machine 
remains in the original district. Apparently coming to a different conclusion : 
SIEHR (in footnote 34). - 69 
(99) Art. 6 of the law. 
(100) Cass., 10.11.1955, n. 3698, in Giur. it., 1956, I, 1, 902; Cass. 14.4.1961, 
n. 809 in Foro it., Rep. I96I, "Vendita", nn. 124/125; MIGNOLI, p. 350; 
BARBERO II, pp. 309/3IO; COING is incorrect - p. 77, footnote 27 - in not 
distinguishing between third-party creditors and third-party purchasers and in 
considering that in the case of machinery over 30,000 Lire registration as 
provided by Art. 1524 II CC is also required for the efficacity of acquisition 
of title against third-party creditors. 
(101) By virtue of Art. 1524 I CC. 
(102) Cass., 23.IO.I956, n. 3835, in Foro it., 1957, I, 1219; Trib. Salerno, 
I.2.I966, in Foro nap., I966, I, 223, quoted in Foro it., Rep. I966, "Vendita", 
n. I67; App. Milano, 14.3.1952, in Riv. dir. corran., 1952, II, 273 with a 
concurring note by SACCO, (with a note in disagreement L. FERRI in Giur. it., 
1952, I, 2, 607); GRECO/COTTINO in SCIALOJA/BRANCA, sub. Art. 1524 CC, pp. 
368 f. 
(103) Thus Arts. 2996, 2685 II, 2644 I CC. 
(104) Art. 939 I 2 CC. 
(105) Art. 939 II CC 
(106) The purchaser may not transform the object and the seller cannot allow him to 
do so without losing his retention of title. See h. 
(107) Art. 940 CC. 
(IOS) Art. 935 I CC; MERTENS appears to be incorrect, p. 154. He is of the opinion 
that, if the retention of title has acquired "data certa", it does not lapse 
even if the object cannot be separated again without severe damage to the main 
object. MERTENS bases his argument solely on the wording of Art. 816 CC, 
which does not however provide a basis for such a view. (For the significance 
of this provision, see the end of e ). 
(109) Art. 935 II CC 
(110) Art. 5 of the law of 28.11.1965, n. 1329 (G.U., 14.12.1965, n. 3II). 
(111) In the case of transformation, the new object (with reference to the different 
constructions existing under German law, see BAUR, s. 53 b III 3), in the case 
of resale, the resultant purchase price debt by way of an anticipated 
assignment. 
(112) Cass., 2I.5.I949, n. 1298, in Foro it., Rep. 1949, "Vendita" No. 265. App. 
Napoli, 5.7.I955, in Foro it., I956, I, 101; Trib. Salerno, 30.7-1954, in Foro 
it., 1955, I, 618 = Giur. it., 1955, I, 2, 143; GRECO/COTTINO in SCIALOJA/ 
BRANCA sub Art. 1523 CC, pp. 365 ff.; Mirabelli, Arts. 1523-I526 CC, n. 2. 
MERTENS (pp. 42 and 149) and WUNNER (in NJW i960, 1846, 1847, Item II) rightly 
criticise the view prevailing in Italy as too theoretical and not taking 
sufficient account of actual interests. 
(113) In fact a transfer by way of providing security has nevertheless developed 
under the cover of a sale with repurchase clause. (See I 3 for greater 
detail). One might therefore think that the seller was retaining his title 
and the buyer for his part was "selling" him the future debt from the customer 
in advance (with rep\irchase clause), in order to achieve an extension of the 
retention of title in this way. But Italian legal practice knows of no 
attempts of this kind. They would presuppose that such clauses were not - as 
stated - considered invalid on account of internal contradiction. With 
reference to this whole problem, see MANCINI's recent work, La cessione dei 
crediti futuri a scopo di garanzia, Milan (Giuffrè), I968. 
(114) Arts. 619 ff. CPC. 
(115) Art. 103 1st case. 
(116) See Arts. 2741, 2776 No. 11 CC, Art. 510 II CPC; Art. 54 1st case. -70-
(117) SIEHR is of the opinion (in footnote 30) that the seller has a choice. He 
bases his argument on judicial decisions dating from before the new CC was 
introduced and also, especially, on ANDRIOLI in SCIALOJA/BRANCA, Art. 2762 CC 
n. 2 (p. 190) who however is of exactly the opposite opinion (even though 
based on the rather theoretical grounds that a privilege is one's own 
property is not possible). In footnote 3I SIEHR further asserts that the law 
of 28.II.I965 (see footnote 66) recognises the co-existence of retention 
of title and seller's privilege. This view cannot be accepted. The wording 
of Art. 1, which SIEHR invokes, gives no support for such an interpretation. 
Art. 3 IV, although it deals with retention of title and seller's privilege 
together, is silent on whether a seller, in addition to retention of title, 
can also and at the same time rely on seller's privilege. 
(118) Hereafter abbreviated to R.D.L. 1927. 
(119) See Arts. 2643, 2644 CC on the one hand and Arts. 2683, n. 3, 2685 II CC on 
the other. 
(120) See Art. 1153, H56, 2nd alternative CC In the case of certain agricultural 
vehicles registration is optional. For other details see the complete 
description in UNIDROIT, Vente à tempérament, pp. 140 ff. and FERRARA F. jr. 
in Novissimo Digesto Italiano, Vol. XV., Turin (UTET) I968, pp. I72 ff. 
(121) Cass., 3.7.1967, n. 2527, in Foro it., Rep. I968, "Autoveicolo", n. 11; 
Cass., 22.3.1968, n. 915, in Foro it., Rep. I968, "Autoveicolo", n. 12. 
(122) Art. 2 I, II R.D.L. 1927. 
(123) Cass., 27.4.1968, n. 1303, in Giur. it., I968, I, 1, 1931, 1933. So contrary 
to the case with change of ownership registration is constitutive in the case 
of the vehicle mortgage. 
(124) Art. 2 I, V R.D.L. 1927. For sales of new vehicles to private persons the 
provisions of the instalment-purchase law of 15.9.1964, n. 755 (G.U., 
22.9.1964, n. 233) must be observed. Under these, instalment purchases have 
a maximum term of 24 months and deferred purchases a maximum term of 12 
months (Art. 2 II, III of the law). 
(125) Art. 2 III R.D.L. I927. 
(126) See RAISER, Das Kraftfahrzeugregister in Italien, in RabelsZ 3 (1929), 4l8, 
419. 
(127) Arts. 2755-2766 CC 
(128) Art. 2 R.D.L. 1927. 
(129) See Art. 28IO III CC, also TRABUCCHI, p. 659; BARBERO II, p. 174; UNIDROIT, 
Vente à ptempérament, p. I60. 
(130) See UNIDROIT, Vente à tempérament, pp. I83-I9I : WAELBROECK, p. 150. 
Retention of title could be admitted, even according to this view, if it 
related not to the vehicle as a whole but to separately delivered parts in 
the sense of Art. 939 I, 1 ->C e.g. special lorry bodies (refrigerated 
containers etc.). 
(131) Cass., IO.9.I969, n. 3089, in Foro it., I97O, I, 149. 
(132) Art. 1524 I CC. 
(133) See SIEHR (footnote 38) with further references. 
(134) Art. 1526 III CC, Art. 1 II of the Italian instalment purchase law of 
I5.7.I964, n. 755 (G.U. 22.9.1964, n. 233), Art. 1 of the law of 28.II.I965, 
n. 1329 (G.U. 14.12.1965, n. 311).· 
(135) Law of 15.7-1964, n. 755 (G.U. 22.9.1964, n. 233). 71 -
F. GERMANY 
I. CREDIT IN THE FORM OF LOANS 
1. The pledge 
a) Largely supplanted by the fiduciary transfer of title by way of security, 
the classical pledge now enjoys only very limited application. It occurs 
mainly in the following forms : 
aa) Security for small loans from professional pawnbrokers (l) 
bb) Security for bank loans in the form of the pledging of securities, 
precious metals and goods ("Lombarddarlehen"). 
cc) The banks' lien, based on their "general conditions of business" (?), 
particularly on securities and on goods represented by documents of 
title (3). 
Regarding the pledging of securities which have been entrusted to a 
professional depositary or have been acquired by a buying agent, there are 
various provisions to protect the owner or principal (4). They are 
designed to prevent third parties being able to acquire pledging rights 
in the securities through good faith in respect of debts which have 
nothing to do with the principal or owner. 
b) The charge is accessory, but can also be created in respect of future or 
conditional debts (5)· 
c) To oréate the charge the pledgor must usually deliver the object to the 
pledgee(6). Where the object is already in the possession of the would-be 
pledgee, simple agreement between the parties that the property shall pass 
is sufficient (7). If the object is in the possession of a third party, the 
transfer of indirect possession to the pledgee (8) and the giving of notice 
of the charge to the third party (9) are sufficient. It is not necessary to 
obtain the agreement of the third party that henceforth he holds the 
property on behalf of the pledgee. 
Although creation of a charge by constructive possession is excluded (10), it 
is possible, in contrast to the position in other legal systems, for pledgor 
and pledgee to establish qualified co-possession. By this is meant that 
neither one of the two parties alone is able effectively to dispose of the 
object (11). In this way both parties have a great degree of protection 
against a disposition by the other party which would violate the contract. 
It is mandatory that any return of the pledged object to the pledgor has the 
effect of extinguishing the charge(12). 
d) The pledging contract is not subject to any requirements as to form. 
e) On repayment falling due the pledgee can give warning that he will realise 
the object and after one month carry out the realisation without further -72-
action bçing necessary (13). No judicial or other authorisation is required 
for realisation. As a rule realisation takes place by means of public 
auction (i4), though agreements to the contrary are admissible (15)· 
2. The registered charge on ocean cables 
As physical delivery of ocean cables is impossible, the possibility of creating 
a registered charge has been provided by legislation (16), 
a) To create the charge there must be consent and entry must be made in a 
special register; the approval of the Federal Minister of Posts is also 
required. Unlike the land register, for example, the register does not 
enjoy public confidence as far as property relationships are concerned. 
The registration of an existing charge merely precludes the possibility of 
a third party acquiring the title to the cable in question in good faith 
and free of encumbrances. 
b) The objects charged are ocean cables which have obtained the necessary 
approval of the Federal postal authorities. The charge covers debts due to 
the owner arising from a transfer of the cable business to third parties, 
i.e. usually debts from leasing; it can be extended to fittings. 
c) Realisation follows the principles of immovable property execution. 
3. The charge under the law on loans to tenant farmers (Pachtkreditgesetz) (17). 
a) With the aid of this special non-possessory registered charge agricultural 
credit institutions authorised by the state can obtain security for their 
loans to tenant farmers 0-8). 
b) The charge is created by the deposit of a detailed written pledging contract 
at the district court for the district where the farming business is carried 
on (19)· By this means the existence of the charge is publicised. 
c) The object charged consists of the total net assets of the tenant farmer(20). 
Exceptions may be agreed(21). 
d) It might be asked why the legislators created a registered charge in 1951 
when fiduciary transfer of title by way of security was fully accepted in 
Germany. The significance of the Pachtkreditgesetz (22) lies in the fact 
that the charge can be acquired in good faith from non-owners(23), 
partially with precedence even over other rights(24). Agricultural credit 
Institutions have a further guarantee beyond that conferred by fiduciary 
transfer of title by way of security in that third parties cannot 
acquire the assets in good faith and free of encumbrances from the tenant 
farmer outside normal business (25). But if the purchaser then resells to 
a third party the latter acquires a title free of encumbrances if the 
purchase was made in good faith. This is justified because the third-party 
purchaser cannot be expected to investigate whether or not the assets he 
has purchased belonged previously to a tenant farmer and had been pledged by 
him. 
e) Realisation of the assets charged takes place by sale(26). -73-
4. Fiduciary transfer of title by way of security ("Sicherungsübereignung")(27) 
This method of providing security is now widespread and of great practical 
importance, particularly with regard to bank credit. Here the giver of 
security transfers the property in the object constituting the security to the 
creditor. The contractual security agreement lays down when and how the 
creditor may realise the security. Prevailing opinion holds that transfer of 
title by way of security is a fiduciary act(28), a trust for the benefit of 
its creator. 
a) This legal form has a strange history which is worth brief examination from 
the standpoint of comparative law(29). Transfer of title by way of security 
is not dealt with in the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (30). But it would be 
wrong to suppose that this formula was still unknown at the end of the 19th 
century or had been indirectly rejected by the acceptance of the existence 
of the pledge principle(31) and could only exist praeter or contra legem (32). 
Some early decisions of the Reichsgericht - influenced to some extent by 
local laws - are certainly based on the ancient doctrine of titulus and 
modus acquirendi with regard to acquisition of title(33). As the security 
agreement, particularly under the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht, was not 
recognised as a valid titulus, resort was made to describing transfer of 
title by way of security as a sale (for the purpose of security)(34). 
Nevertheless there are numerous decisions even before 1900 - especially in 
common law - which recognise "pure" transfer of title by way of security in 
the modern sense (35). This line of judicial thinking continued undaunted 
after the coming into force of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 06). Neither did 
the legislators who brought in the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch wish to forbid 
the transfer of title by way of security through constructive possession and 
they rejected a proposal which would have had this effect(37). Later moves 
towards legislative reform, in particular towards the introduction of a 
general registered charge have hitherto all foundered(38). 
b) The creation of fiduciary ownership normally comes about through the passing 
of property in the object serving as security by means of constructive 
possession (39); here the rights and duties of the parties arise from the 
contractual obligations of the security agreement (40). There are no 
requirements as to form, nor any need for publicity such as affixing notices 
of the charge to the object constituting the security. Such a step would 
certainly give the creditor a measure of protection against otherwise bona 
fide third-party purchasers, but it is unusual except where it is necessary 
for the individualisation of certain sections of goods in a warehouse (4l). 
It is disputed whether in cases of doubt the transfer is one which is subject 
to a resolutive condition which is brought about by the extinguishment of the 
secured debt (4?) or a transfer which is unconditional and merely carries 
with it a contractual right to restitution (43). What is not disputed 
however is that the transfer of title by way of security involves a 
non-accessory security which neither necessarily presupposes the existence 
of the debt which is to be secured nor automatically passes with the 
secured debt to an assignee (44). 
c) Where the security consists of a single movable object which is still subject 
to retention of title by a third party, then the recipient of the security 
cannot as a rule acquire the ownership of the object in good faith(45); but 
he does acquire the giver of security's so-called right of expectation - 74 
arising from the sale under retention of title(46). On payment of the last 
instalment of the purchase price to the title-retaining seller this 
fiduciary right of expectation becomes a normal fiduciary ownership and 
without any intermediate acquisition by the giver of security ^7). 
d) Motor vehicles provide a particularly good security in that the recipient of 
security can to a large extent protect himself against acquisition in good 
faith by third parties. For if he has the motor vehicle certificate 
("Kfz.-Brief") handed over to him the third-party purchaser will generally 
be regarded (48) as grossly negligent(49). 
Moreover with the help of the official register the vehicle can usually be 
quickly traced, so that the secured creditor can also realise his security. 
Thus the case of the motor vehicle is one where the German system of 
fiduciary transfer of title by way of security functions particularly well. 
A mortgage system according to, say, the Italian model, which in any case 
requires a certain amount of administrative expenditure, can be dispensed 
with(50). It could be regarded as a shortcoming that the creditor cannot 
acquire the object forming the security in good faith from someone not 
having a good title (51). But this contains a danger for the creditor only 
in the very rare case of a non-owner being in possession of a motor vehicle 
certificate. If the certificate is missing on the other hand the creditor 
receives clear enough warning from this fact and does not require protection. 
e) If the object serving as security is the subject of a document of title 
(a transferable title-conferring instrument)(52) there is a distinction 
between the transfer of rights arising from the document under the rules 
governing securities ("Wertpapiere") and the acquisition of ownership of 
the object itself(53). The transferring effect of the transmission of an 
endorsed document of title only indicates that the transfer of title by way 
of security does not take place through assignment of the right to 
restitution (54) but is to be regarded as the product of consent and delivery 
(55). The recipient of security thus also acquires fiduciary ownership (56) 
when the giver of security is not the indirect possessor of the object 
serving as security (57). 
The existence of a document of title does not, it is true, preclude the 
possibility of transfer of title by simply assigning the right to 
restitution, that is, without endorsing the document; but the document must 
be handed over in every case to make the assignment of the right to 
restitution effective(58). 
f) If the security consists of goods which are in the hands of the railways as 
carriers, transfer of title occurs in the normal manner by consent (as to 
the passing of the title) and informal assignment of the right to. 
restitution (59)· Yet it is useful for the creditor to be given the duplicate 
consignment note, for only then can he give the railways instructions 
concerning the goods and at the same time be sure that the giver of security 
is not making arrangements in other quarters (60). 
g) With the transfer of title to stocks the law of property principle of 
speciality demands attention. While the giver of security may certainly 
commit himself contractually to the creation of a security with an abstract 
value of, say, DM 10,000, in the law of property the transfer of title to -75-
a portion of stocks according to description by volume, value or proportion 
is void (6l). The goods forming the security must be exactly determined in 
a real contract, not merely be capable of being determined. 
The requirement as to exact determination is deemed to be complied with if 
all goods stored in a particular area are transferred 
("Raumsicherungsvertrag") or if the goods to be transferred out of the stock 
are individually marked ("Markierungsverträge"). 
Legal characterisation for each individual item as being in the complete 
ownership of the giver of security and goods under retention of title is not 
required (62) (63). 
h) As with retention of title (64) transfer of title by way of security also 
has its extended forms. 
Admittedly a real subrogation does not occur ipso Jure(65); nevertheless 
there is nothing to prevent the substitute for the goods forming the 
security being legally included. In particular, in the case of fluctuating 
stocks of goods, future goods which have not yet been acquired can serve as 
security(66). 
Apart from such replacements transfer of title by way of security can be 
extended to debts arising from a resale of the goods serving as security (67). 
Finally the goods forming the security are often raw materials or 
semi-finished products which the giver of security intends to transform and 
must transform. Usually he does not become the owner until he has 
transformed them (68). In this case the recipient of security can have his 
security extended to the finished products by means of the so-called 
transformation clause(69)· 
i) As regards its scope transfer of title by way of security is subject to 
certain restrictions (70). 
Both the contractual security agreement and, despite the abstraction 
principle(71), disposition as a real act of transfer are void if they 
conflict with public morality (72). This may give rise to claims for 
damages (73). A valid transfer of title by way of security may furthermore 
be declared void both outside(74) and within(75) a bankruptcy (actio 
Pauliana)(76). Finally, the recipient of.security who has all the assets of 
the giver of security or vital parts of them transferred to him by way of 
security may lay himself open to liability on account of his legal duty to 
the creditors of the transferor(77) and may thus gain additional creditors 
instead of security (78). 
j) In the case of individual execution of the security prevailing opinion holds 
that the recipient of security has the right to action In opposition to the 
execution as a third party ("Drittwiderspruchsklage")(79) and does not have 
to be content with preferential satisfaction (80)(8l). 
In the bankruptcy of the giver of the security the creditor cannot however 
segregate the goods forming the security (32) as would normally be 
appropriate to his formal status as owner. The purely securing function of 
this ownership means that it merely confers a right to preferential 
satisfaction (83). -76-
On the other hand the giver of security does have the right to segregation of 
the goods in the bankruptcy of the creditor (84), against which however the 
trustee in bankruptcy can set up a right to possession in accordance with the 
security contract (85). 
Similar principles apply in composition proceedings (86) (87). 
k) Realisation of the security is usually governed by contractual provisions (88). 
Only in exceptional cases therefore does the controversial question of 
whether or not the provisions of pledge law are to be applied by analogy 
arise (89). 
II.CREDIT ON GOODS 
1. The general rule applicable to sales 
Poliowing the separation principle (90) there is a distinction between the 
contractual agreement of sale which merely creates obligations (91) and 
transfer of title as a real fulfilling disposition (9°). 
Under the normal rule the seller can protect himself against an unpaid delivery 
by exercising a right of retention (9^)· If the buyer becomes bankrupt the 
trustee in bankruptcy can only demand delivery against full payment of the 
purchase price (94). 
2. The right of pursuit 
Exceptionally it can happen that the buyer is already the owner of the goods 
before they are delivered to him (9^)· If the buyer or his trustee in 
bankruptcy does not obtain direct possession of the goods until after the 
commencement of bankruptcy, the seller may claim to have the title transferred 
back to him if the trustee does not make payment in full (96). In view of the 
fact that it is almost always agreed that there shall be retention of title, 
this case has even less practical importance than that of unrestricted 
performance in advance by the seller. 
3. General rule ; no seller's privilege 
German law does not recognise a seller's privilege in respect of the proceeds 
of realisation of the object sold either in an individual execution or in a 
bankruptcy. 
4. Exception : the charge on agricultural products 
A kind of seller's privilege is granted to the seller of seed-corn and 
fertilisers and to financing third parties (97). German law has however chosen 
the form of a statutory charge. The charge arises ipso Jure on the fruits of 
the next harvest without any requirements as to publicity. -77-
5. Retention of title 
a) The legal construction. The right of expectation 
Contrary to the situation where the principle of consent applies, no 
difficulties arise with the legal construction under German law. The 
separation principle (98) makes it possible to conclude the contractual 
agreement of sale unconditionally without further action - but with a 
transfer of title subject to a condition precedent (99). With the transfer 
of title subject to a condition precedent the buyer acquires a so-called 
right of expectation which is converted into full ownership on payment of 
the last instalment of the purchase price. This right of expectation can 
itself be transferred, even by way of security, and can be subject to an 
execution (100). 
b) Form and moment of agreement 
Neither the contract of sale nor the conditional transfer of title need be 
clothed with any kind of form. Instead they are valid in every respect (101) 
without formal expression. Accordingly the retention of title clause can 
even be agreed tacitly. Despite the widespread use of retention of title 
it cannot be assumed that it is a rule (102). If it is established that 
retention of title was agreed in the contract of sale, then in cases of 
doubt the transfer of title will proceed on this basis. If on the other 
hand the contract of sale was concluded without this clause and if the 
seller does not declare unilaterally until the time of delivery that he is 
unwilling to make delivery except under retention of title, this is 
regarded as a proposal for alteration of the contract of sale. If the buyer 
does not agree to this he does not have to refuse to accept the goods. 
Instead he may accept the insufficient offer and demand complete performance 
as provided by the contract, if necessary through action in the courts. 
Sometimes a sale and transfer of title takes place initially without 
retention of title (because the parties assume immediate payment) and only 
later does the necessity arise for the contract to be converted by mutual 
consent into a credit sale with retention of title. This is possible both 
from the point of view of personal and property law (103). 
c) Alterations to the retained property 
If the retained goods are Joined with another object in such a way that they 
form vital components (104) of a single new object, or if the retained goods 
are mixed with other goods, co-possession generally arises; but if one 
object can be regarded as the principal object its owner acquires sole 
ownership (105). The same applies in the case of transformation (106) 
unless the contract specifies otherwise (107). If the object is installed in 
a piece of real property as a vital component retention of title is similarly 
extinguished (108). 
d) Extended forms (109) 
Extension of retention of title to substitutes for the goods in question is 
possible under the contract and is widespread in practice. Problems arise 
here which are analogous to those met with in the case of transfer of title 
by way of security (110). -78-
Protection against loss of ownership as a result of transformation (ill) is 
provided by the so-called transformation clause. The seller can allow the 
person purchasing the goods which are subject to retention of title to 
resell them and have the future debts due from customers assigned to him in 
advance for security purposes. This involves an anticipatory assignment 
by way of security (112). 
When extended retention of title and other assignments by way of security 
come into collision, problems of considerable commercial significance arise 
(113). The terminology used here could cause confusion. It is not 
retention of title itself but only one of its extended forms, namely the 
anticipatory assignment by way of security to the original supplier of debts 
due from customers to the buyer which could come into conflict with another 
assignment of the same debts by way of security to a third party, usually 
a bank. Two assignments for security purposes are thus in competition. 
Judicial practice has granted preference to extended retention of title (ll4). 
Retention of title can not only be extended, as in the forms described, i.e. 
made to cover substitutes, but can also be enlarged. The force of this is 
that the retention of title is not extinguished until the buyer has settled 
other liabilities besides the purchase price debt which are outstanding from 
him to the supplier (115) (ll6). 
e) Effect of execution and bankruptcy on retention of title 
If goods subject to retention of title are seized by third-party creditors of 
the buyer, the seller has a right of action in opposition as a third party 
("Drittwiderspruchsklage") (117). In the buyer's bankruptcy the prevailing 
view is that the seller may have the goods segregated (ll8) unless the 
trustee in bankruptcy opts for performance of the contract (119) and makes 
full payment (120) (l^l). In the event of unauthorised resale the right of 
segregation extends to the proceeds of this transaction (122). 
In the bankruptcy of the seller it is doubtful whether the trustee in 
bankruptcy has the usual right of choice (123) In respect of a contract which 
has not been completely performed by either side (124). Parallel problems 
arise in composition proceedings supervised by the court (l
?5). 
f) "Realisation" 
If the person buying goods subject to retention of title makes default in 
payment, the seller can withdraw from the contract without further action 
(126). He can also stipulate a period of grace and then demand compensation 
(l
P7). In both cases retention of title has the advantage that the seller 
is not forced to reply on a contractual claim for transfer of the property 
back to himself but can demand the restitution of the goods as owner. The 
security from the seller's point of view lies in the fact that the buyer 
would not have the right to make any disposition of the goods (128) and, 
especially, in the fact that the seller has such an advantageous position 
in the event of execution on or bankruptcy of the buyer - as described 
above (129). Unless provided by a clause in the contract, the seller does 
not have the right, on default of payment by the buyer, to retake the 
goods to himself provisionally by way of additional security nor to sell the 
goods and to recoup the purchase price from the proceeds. The buyer continues 
to have the right to possession so long as the contract of sale continues in 
existence (1^0). -79-
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THE NETHERLANDS 
I. CREDIT IN THE FORM OF LOANS 
1. The pledge 
a) As regards the creation of a pledge Dutch law follows the separation principle, 
that is to say it differentiates between the contractual obligation to create 
a pledge and the real act of creation itself (l). Verbal agreement is 
sufficient for both acts (2). 
In addition, physical transmission of the object to the creditor or to a 
third party as pledge-holder is required (3). Creation of a pledge by 
constructive possession is excluded (4), and qualified co-possession is not 
deemed to be sufficient either. A substitute for physical transmission in 
the form of assignment of the right to restitution, although not provided 
for by law, is accepted by judicial theory and practice at least in the case 
of the transition of ownership (5). There should therefore be no objection 
to this procedure in the case of creation of a pledge, 
b) On default by the debtor the creditor has the right to realise the pledge. 
This takes place without the need for execution or other authorisation by 
means of a public sale (6), and in the case of commercial goods the 
creditor may sell without restriction through the medium of two brokers (7). 
Contrary agreements are permissible but not until the debt has fallen due (8). 
In particular any forfeiture clause agreed before the debt has fallen due is 
void (9). 
After the debt has fallen due the court may, on application from the creditor, 
order a different type of realisation from the usual or allot the pledged 
object to him, its estimated value being set against the debt (10). 
c) In practice the area of application of the pledge is very small(ll), chiefly 
because Dutch law recognises fiduciary transfer of title by way of security 
(12). So the pledge is mainly used only in the pledging of securities and in 
small loans by the pawnbroking trade (13). 
2. Fiduciary transfer of title by way of security 
a) In the Netherlands transfer of title by way of security has evolved and 
established itself praeter legem in the same way as in Germany (l4) (15). 
The principal reasons for this parallel development are as follows : 
First of all a connection became established in legal doctrine and judicial 
practice between the separation and transmission principles (l6) which -
where ownership is to be transferred - require, in the case of the first-
mentioned principle, a distinction to be made between the contractual 
creation of obligations and the real disposition and, in the case of the 
second, the physical transmission of the object. Both assignment of the 
right to recover the property and constructive possession are admitted as 
substitutes for physical delivery (17)· Then, due to the recognition of -86-
fiduciary acts (l8) by Dutch law, nothing stood in the way of the 
interpretation of transfer of title by way of security as a .trust for the 
purpose of security. Finally, in 1929 (19) the Supreme Court set aside the 
objections arising from the principle of the pledge against a transfer of 
title by way of security through constructive possession. 
b) Accessory nature of transfer of title by way of security. Dutch law differs 
slightly from German in that, although it follows the separation and 
transmission principles, it does not apply the abstraction principle (20). 
The transfer of title by way of security is therefore only effective if 
there has been a valid agreement concerning the security. This does not 
mean to say that it is accessory to the extent of depending on the 
existence of the debt which is to be secured; for the debt to be secured and 
the agreement as to security are two different things. 
It is disputed whether the property in the object serving as security Is 
accessory to the extent that it is extinguished with the secured debt or 
whether it must first be transferred back to the giver of security on the 
basis of the security agreement (2l). Similarly it is not completely clear 
whether on assignment of the secured debt the property in the object passes 
ipso jure to the assignee as an accessory right (22). 
c) It is important, particularly in the case of fluctuating stocks of goods, 
to decide whether goods which will not be acquired until a future time can 
also be the object of a transfer of title by way of security. According 
to Judicial practice the recipient of security acquires the title at the 
moment of delivery of the goods to the giver of security, unless the latter 
lets it be known clearly that he does not wish to hold the goods for 
the recipient of security (23). 
d) Acquisition of the title to the security by a person not entitled to do so 
by means of constructive possession is not possible. Acquisition in good 
faith (
Q4) is excluded, since a person possessing on behalf of someone else 
cannot make himself the actual owner by a mere act of will (25) and therefore 
cannot transfer (indirect) possession to the (new) recipient of security 
either (26). This question is of particular significance when the goods 
forming the security are still subject to retention of title or have previously 
been transferred by way of security to another person. The seller's privilege 
(27) is not adversely affected by a transfer of title by way of security by 
means of constructive possessio.. (28). 
e) Extended forms evidently do not play so great a role as in Germany. It is 
questionable in particular whether possible debts from customers arising 
from the sale of the goods forming the security can be assigned in advance 
(29). 
f) The effect of transfer of title by way of security in the bankruptcy of the 
giver of security is that the recipient of security, like a pledgee (30), can 
obtain prior satisfaction (31). The claim of the recipient of security 
however - unlike that of the pledgee - ranks behind the seller's privilege 
which in Dutch law is proof against bankruptcy (3?) (33). 
Whether in an individual execution of the goods serving as security the 
recipient of security can demand their release (34) or can only claim__ -87-
preferential satisfaction is not certain (35). 
g) It is disputed whether realisation must follow the pledge provisions strictly 
or whether the parties are free to make their own arrangements (36). 
3. Sale with repurchase clause 
The economic result of transfer of title by way of security was in earlier 
years obtained by means of the sale with repurchase clause (37). Once transfer 
of title by way of security became fully accepted this makeshift formula 
became superfluous, but it still lives on in guarantee practice (38). 
4. In the course of preliminary work towards a reform of the Dutch civil code 
the possibility of creating a registered charge has been raised both by the 
government side and by well-known authorities on jurisprudence (39)· MEIJERS' 
plan would limit the registered charge to objects belonging to business 
undertakings (40). He suggests that the goods which will not be acquired by 
the giver of security until a future date could also serve as security, 
especially fluctuating stocks of goods (4l). 
He goes on to suggest the possibility of a non-possessory non-registered charge 
on movables belonging to a business concern but only to secure loans to the 
concern in question (42). 
Transfers by way of security would be expressly forbidden: the providing of 
security is not seen as a valid reason for transfer of title (or of any other 
rights) (43). Whether these proposals will become law remains to be seen. 
II.CREDIT ON GOODS 
1. The general rule applicable to sales. Dutch law follows the transmission 
principle and also the separation principle but not the abstraction principle 
(44). The property can thus only pass to the purchaser if there is a valid 
contract of sale. Therefore the seller, in the absence of a valid causa, does 
not as in Germany have to rely on a contractual right of re-transfer of title 
(45). Although the parties are at liberty to agree otherwise, the normal rule 
is that the property passes to the buyer with delivery (46). 
Thus in the case of debts incurred in respect of items determined by generic 
description, individualisation does not result in passing of title as it does 
under French law, but only in the passing of the risks of performance and price 
to the buyer (47). Here individualisation has a somewhat different (mainly 
less important) meaning than "Konkretisierung" (putting into concrete form) 
under German law (48). 
2. The right to restitution 
a) Where a sale takes place without any agreement permitting deferred payment, 
the seller can demand the return of the goods within 30 days from delivery if 
the buyer fails to pay ("recht van reclame") (49). It is disputed whether this constitutes a real claim to restitution (50) or merely a contractual 
claim which leaves the contract of sale undisturbed and only restores the 
status quo (51). 
The right to reclaim the goods only subsists as long as the goods remain 
unchanged (52) and in the hands of (53) the buyer (54). 
b) If the buyer has resold the goods in the meantime, the right of reclaim can 
also be directed against the third-party purchaser, if the latter has 
acquired in bad faith (55). If the third party has acquired in good faith 
(56) the seller can recover the outstanding debt from the original 
purchaser (57). 
c) It is a striking particularity of Dutch law that this right of reclaim is 
also valid in bankruptcy and moreover to an enlarged degree, in that even 
sellers who have sold on credit have this right (58). 
The seller is thus not dependent on the protection of retention of title. 
3. Rescission of contract in the event of non-payment 
a) Like French law (59), Dutch law gives the seller, as a party to a mutually-
agreed contract, the right to demand rescission of the contract if payment 
is not made in due time (60) (6l). 
The law initially assumes the fiction that the necessary resolutory 
condition has been agreed (62). However, dissolution does not come about 
ipso Jure but requires intervention by the court (63) - even where the 
condition is not fictional but has really been agreed (64). This is what 
in modern terminology is called a right to sue for reconstitution 
("Gestaltungsklagerecht") (65). 
b) Nevertheless, it Is the unanimous view, especially In practice, that the 
parties can validly agree, over and above the mere condition, that the sale 
contract shall be rescinded for non-payment without the intervention of the 
court (66). But even here the construction of a condition (which ought to 
take effect ipso jure) is not fully adhered to. Instead the seller must 
call for rescission (67); in other words: he has a right to reconstitution 
("Gestaltungsrecht") (68). 
c) As the cancellation of the contract is construed according to the French 
pattern as a resolutory condition, its initial effect is that the contract 
of sale is voided ex tunc (69). In this study however we are chiefly 
interested in the legal fate of the object being sold. In effect Dutch law 
agrees with French law here too: ownership reverts ipso jure to the seller, 
although Dutch law, unlike French law, is following not the contract 
principle but the separation principle (70). But the liquidation of the 
contract also nullifies the transfer of title as the latter is conceived 
of not as an abstract but as a causal act of disposition (71). So 
rescission of contract also has a real effect (72). The seller thus does 
not need to have recourse to retention of title (73). 
d) It Is noteworthy that the right to (sue for) reconstitution Just described 
can still be exercised after the commencement of bankruptcy and even then 
has its full real effect. (74). In this way the seller can recover his -89-
goods even without retention of title. The seller is therefore only forced 
to rank as an ordinary creditor in bankruptcy if the goods have been 
consumed, lost or sold in the meantime. 
4. The seller's privilege 
a) The seller has a privilege in the delivered movable goods as security for 
the debt due to him in respect of the purchase price (75)· But the goods 
must still be "in the hands of" the huyer, i.e. they must still be in his 
ownership (76). If the goods are resold the privilege continues, attaching 
to the debt arising from the resale (77). 
Contrary to the case with the right to reclaim the goods (78) the creation 
of the privilege is not dependent on whether the sale is on credit or on 
cash terms (79). Nor is the valid enforcement of the privilege linked to 
the observation of a time scale. 
b) On the basis of his privilege the seller may claim preferential satisfaction 
(80). Again in deviation from the French pattern this right is applicable not 
only in an individual execution but also in a bankruptcy (8l). 
So to enforce the payment of the debt due to him for the purchase price the 
seller need not rely upon retention of title either. 
5. Retention of title 
a) The preceding paragraphs have shown that the seller is granted fairly 
comprehensive safeguards in the shape of the rights of reclaiming of the 
goods, rescission of contract and preferential satisfaction, rights which 
can actually be upheld in the face of bankruptcy and which can equally 
well secure for him either the dissolution of the failed contract or the 
enforcement of the purchase price debt. With these safeguards, which are 
provided by the law itself, the position of the seller in the bankruptcy 
of the buyer is singularly secure in comparison to that of his counterpart 
in the other member states of the European Communities. 
One might wonder whether retention of title still had any importance at all 
as a means of security in such a system. It certainly does not play anything 
like such a decisive role as it does in Italy, say, or even in Germany. 
b) Despite the existence of the types of security available to the seller as 
described above, retention of title is possible (82), although the only 
provision for retention of title actually laid down by law is that occurring 
in the statute governing instalment purchases (83). It is also held to be 
admissible in other situations. Except as regards instalment purchases it is 
valid without any requirements as to form. 
c) In comparison with the seller's other forms of security, the function of 
retention of title seems to be basically that it forbids the buyer to resell it 
or transform the goods without the seller's permission (84). This 
prohibition is reinforced by a penal sanction (85). -90-
Retention of title does not have any great significance in Dutch law beyond 
what has already been mentioned. It would therefore be inappropriate to 
embark on a detailed analysis in this study (86). 
6. The particularities of instalment purchase 
a) Instalment purchase subject to seller's retention of title is designated 
under the law in question by the confusing name of "huurkoop" (87). This 
nomenclature is merely intended to convey that the property does not pass 
on delivery (88) but at a later point in time - in cases of doubt, on 
completion of payment of the purchase price (89). 
b) A "huurkoop" agreement requires documentary confirmation or the signature 
of the purchaser (90). If this is lacking the transaction is deemed to be 
a normal instalment purchase not a "huurkoop" (91). Another stipulation 
is that the seller's copy of the document must be on pre-stamped duty-paid 
paper or must have had a duty stamp affixed to it (92); if these stamp-duty 
stipulations have not been observed the "huurkoop" agreement will not be 
recognised by the courts (93)· 
c) On default of payment the seller can only demand the return of the goods if 
there is an express agreement to this effect (94). The retaking of the 
goods leads to dissolution of the contract, unless express agreement to the 
contrary has been made (95). The purchaser has however the right to regain 
the goods by paying the overdue instalments; if default occurs more than 
once the buyer can only regain the goods by paying up the whole balance 
of the purchase price still outstanding (96). Dissolution of the contract 
is revoked if the buyer regains the goods in the manner just described (97). - 91 -
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H. COMPARATIVE SUMMARY AND 
CONCLUSIONS (Γ) 
1. The need for security for credit 
a) The jurist must base his considerations on the economic fact of the 
escalating credit requirements which are evident in our present-day national 
economies. Any comment on the possible instability of an economic situation 
such as this would be out of place. 
b) The striving to obtain real safeguards for every credit is understandable 
and deserving of legal protection. 
The obtaining of security for credit is primarily of course in the interest 
of the creditor; he will not wish to find that in a bankruptcy, for 
instance - the most serious crisis that can occur in this connection - he 
must content himself with a low divident (2). On the other hand, the 
ability to create a real security is equally in the interest of the debtor. 
For without security he will either obtain no credit at all or will only 
obtain it on substantially less favourable terms: unsecured "personal" 
loans are necessarily dearer than first-class mortgages. 
The great risk of unsecured credit and hence its high cost (if not the 
impossibility of obtaining it at all) lies in the fact that real types of 
security are readily available. Anyone who can call upon assets as security 
will do so rather than have recourse to expensive unsecured credit. The 
situation would be different if the rule of the equality of all creditors 
were to be taken seriously and to be treated as a legal principle. Imagine 
the following system for example : real security for credit not to be 
recognised in the legal system, preferential rights to be reduced to the 
absolute minimum, and in particular preferential claims of the tax 
authorities to be abolished; further, debts above a certain size only to be 
effective if entered in a public register (3); in a bankruptcy all creditors 
to be paid pro rata (4). In such a system the dividends from the bankrupt 
estate would usually be very high and the credit risk relatively low (5)· 
The individual creditor would thus not have such a pressing need to secure 
himself. Under the present system, by contrast, anyone who relies on the 
principle of the equality of all creditors and neglects to obtain a real 
security for himself must, if the worst comes to the worst, bear the 
negative balance between the debtor's liabilities and assets almost alone. 
The alternative scheme sketched out above, which is purely theoretical, Is 
merely intended to underline the causes for the often-quoted Irresistible 
urge of business to find security for credit. The causes lie in the fact 
that the different systems of law have violated the principle of equality 
of treatment for creditors by admitting a host of preferential rights. 
Faced with the alternative of either obtaining a preferential right which 
will give him full satisfaction or losing almost his entire debt, the 
creditor is forced to make every effort to procure a suitable security for 
himself. So we see attemps made in practice to extend the existing methods 
of security ever further and to establish new methods. The legislators are -96-
continually under pressure to legalise such efforts, mainly the result of 
specific crises in the economic sphere. In this connection the greatest 
success goes to those groups of creditors whose particular sector of 
industry is exceptionally Important for the national economy at the time 
or whose interests are especially well organised. Thus there are no obvious 
reasons of principle for permitting the creation of non-possessory security 
on stocks of coal for instance but not on stocks of mineral oil or on motor 
vehicles (as in Belgium), or for permitting the reverse to apply (as in 
France). 
Apart from these differing commercial and political factors, economic 
objectives also play a significant role in causing divergences in the type 
and form of security in the form of movables which are permitted. So we find 
in a number of countries a certain coolness towards consumer credit while 
loans for productive purposes are clearly regarded as particularly worthy 
of support. Lastly, divergent opinions in legal doctrine and theory have 
left their traces in the law now applicable, especially, for example, with 
regard to the admissibility of transfers of full rights for purposes of 
security. In the face of these influential factors the countless fortuitous 
occurrences of a more technical nature lose their significance. 
Before entering on a comparative summary of the different types of security 
which are available to different types of creditor (6), we must first examine 
the legal foundation and all possible areas of application of the various 
security rights in movables. 
2. The pledge 
a) One general advantage of the classical pledge is thought to be its publicity. 
Through this publicity the debtor's other creditors are supposed to be 
protected from overestimating his creditworthiness. This publicity aspect 
has only limited value however (7). It is not completely appropriate in the 
case where pledgor and debtor are different persons and is even less so in the 
case of qualified co-possession of pledgor and pledgee as allowed in Germany 
and Italy. But above all only one side of the coin as it were is visible: 
the loss of possession by the debtor. It is overlooked that, as an inevitable 
corollary of the foregoing, the creditors of the pledgee for their part may 
now have an unreliable security (8). The purpose of the pledge 
principle can hardly be intended to protect the creditors of one party by 
misleading the creditors of the other party. Moreover, the mere holding 
of an object does not, either in theory or in practice, constitute an 
acceptable basis for credit, because of the possible existence not only of 
non-possessory charges but of rental, lending or leasing arrangements or 
possession by a person as agent. 
Nevertheless the publicity of the pledge still has a valuable use even today: 
its function as evidence. Possession makes it possible to prove instantly 
that it is this object and no other that has been pledged. 
b) But the real value of the pledge principle lies probably in the fact that it 
guarantees the creditor that he can put into effect his right of realisation. 
The creditor has the certainty that in the event of the debt falling due the 
goods serving as security are really at his disposal as the pledgor cannot 
in the meantime either tamper with them or sell them to third parties. He 97 
even has this certainty in the case of qualified co-possession by pledgor 
and creditor as allowed under Italian and German law. This is no doubt the 
reason for the admission of this legal formula. Apart from this the 
pledgor has no need to demand the return of the object in order to realise 
it since it is already at his disposal. This circumstance makes possible 
the realisation of the pledge without the intervention of the court or 
execution institutions. 
Against this the risk of misuse, sale or unjustified realisation by the 
pledgee is of little importance, for the debtor has the counter-value 
(as a rule the amount of the loan) as security (9)· 
c) Despite these indisputable advantages the pledge has only a modest area 
of application especially when compared to the other types of material 
security based on movables. This is because the pledge is suited to simple 
and static business relationships. In the present day on the other hand not 
only jewellery and similar assets but all movables are used as a basis for 
credit. This applies above all to the debtor's indispensable production 
requisites and stocks which the creditor moreover can hardly take Into his 
custody. 
d) The area of application of the pledge has been expanded somewhat by the 
device of creating the so-called document of title, which represents the 
goods in question. Here the transmission of the relevant document carries 
the fiction of the transmission of the object itself. The decisive factor 
is not the theoretical formula but the fact that in business practice the 
transmission of the document has exactly the same effects as the physical 
transmission of the object itself. 
This is possible because legal relationships in certain situations must be, 
and are, based on the existence of such transferable documents. The 
recipient is safeguarded against legal dispositions of the object itself 
because third-party purchasers are always regarded as being in bad faith as 
everyone is assumed to know about the workings of the document of title 
system. Thus it is universally known that goods in the course of 
transportation by sea-going or inland-waterway vessels or in warehouses car. 
only be disposed of by means of such documents. Against actual disappearance 
or deterioration of the goods serving as security there is the safeguard 
that the warehouses are either state-owned or else operated by organisations 
under concession from and subject to inspection by the state. Also there is 
little likelihood of collusion between the giver of security and the transport 
undertaking to the detriment of the recipient of security (10). Finally, 
there is a further safeguard for the creditor In that in consequence of the 
fiction of transmission he can acquire a charge in good faith from someone 
without a good title. 
To a certain extent the fiduciary transfer of title by way of security and the 
retention of title in motor vehicles, especially under German law, fall into 
this category. Although the official document which every motor vehicle must 
have, the motor vehicle certificate, is not regarded as a document of title 
under the prevailing opinion de lege lata (11 ), but is considered to be 
merely ancillary to the vehicle in property law (12), nevertheless possession 
of the appropriate vehicle certificate is in practice used as a means of 
publicity (13) and is generally recognised by the courts as well (l4). The 
recipient of security who is in possession of the motor vehicle certificate -98-
is In practical terms just as well secured against legal dispositions of 
the security as is a pledgee. But only insurance can protect him against 
the actual loss of the object which has remained in the hands of the 
giver of security himself. 
All these pledges which are effected by means of documents are thus 
characterised by publicity, by protection against legal dispositions and 
to a certain extent by protection against actual loss, in other words by 
almost all the benefits of a genuine pledge. They thus enjoy the chief 
advantage of the non-possessory charges; the giver of security can 
continue to use the goods, while the recipient of security has no need to 
store them. Hence this method of providing security for credit in the 
form of movables can be regarded as extremely successful, especially as it 
avoids the cumbersome and expensive procedure of the public register. 
3. Non-possessory real security based on movables: the instruments available 
a) Apart from the security rights just described (15) which are effected by 
means of documents and have been classed with pledges, the simplest and 
clearest solution from the legal point of view is to be found in the 
genuine mortgages on movables. They have however only a very limited 
application. 
A prerequisite for the creation of a mortgage of this type is the existence 
of relatively long-lived business assets which, in addition, can be 
identified either by individual characteristics of their own or with the 
help of official registration documents. Every person to whom the object 
is offered, either for sale or as security, must be able to establish 
immediately and without difficulty which register he must consult in order 
to check the legal status of the object. This degree of publicity makes 
it possible to exclude acquisition in good faith by third parties outside 
the register. This protection against loss through bona fide acquisition 
of freedom from encumbrances further makes it possible to allow the giver of 
security to sell the object serving as security to third parties. The 
imposition of a ban on sale is thus superfluous. 
The mortgage on movables is mainly suited to officially registered objects 
such as aircraft and ships. With these usually very valuable objects a 
mortgage system has the additional advantage that it is easy to use the 
value of the object to secure several different loans. By contrast a 
transfer of title by way of security for instance can generally only be 
made to a single creditor (l6), which makes it difficult if not impossible 
to use the full value of the object (17). 
The following charges can be characterised as genuine mortgages on movables: 
the French charge on cinema films (l8), the charge on a "fonds de commerce" 
under French (19), Belgian (20) and Luxembourg (21) law, the German charge 
on ocean cables (22) and the Italian charges on motor vehicles (23). 
The French "gage automobile" (24) can only be mentioned in this connection 
with reservations. For whereas mortgages can normally secure money debts 
of any kind, the French "gage automobile" - unlike its Italian counterpart -
can only be used towards the purchase of the object serving as security. 
The limited application of this method can be explained by its origin: in -99-
1934 the government wished to counter the sales crisis in the automobile 
industry following the Cour de Cassation's refusal to recognise retention 
of title in bankruptcy. Moreover further problems arise if one wishes to 
describe the "gage automobile" as a mortgage on movables, due to the fact 
that it is disputed in French judicial practice and Jurisprudence (25) 
whether acquisition in good faith free of encumbrances is possible outside 
the public register (26). 
b) Although not designed as mortgages certain special forms of retention of 
title with publicity (27) have the same practical effects as mortgages 
on movables. 
The chief example under this heading is the retention of title in machinery 
worth over 500,000 Lire under the special Italian law of 1965 (28). This is 
another method characterised by the fact that it cannot be used to secure 
any debt desired but only the debt arising on the purchase of the actual 
object serving as security. The publicity of this charge and hence its 
efficacity against all other parties is not obtained by means of a register 
but through a notice affixed to the machinery on the authority of the 
court. 
The formula of the "nantissement de l'outillage et du matériel d'équipement 
professionnel" found in French law (29) fulfils the same function. Unlike 
the special retention of title under Italian law just described this 
seller's security is dependent on entry in a public register. But this 
register does not serve to give protection against third party purchasers 
as does the publicity of the mortgage. For this the facultative marking 
of the actual pieces of equipment themselves on the request of the seller 
is required. Thus as a rule the charge is a normal registered charge 
effective only against third party creditors, but it has the capability of 
being upgraded to a right against all parties. 
c) Some registered charges, in spite of their publicity, are not effective 
against third parties purchasing in good faith but are only unrestrictedly 
effective against third-party creditors of the giver of security. They are 
therefore not genuine mortgages on movables. To this type of registered 
charge belong the "warrant hôtelier", the "warrant pétrolier", the "warrant 
sur stocks de guerre" and the "warrant industriel" of French law, the 
"warrant charbonnier" of Belgian law and the "warrant agricole" of French, 
Belgian and Luxembourg law. The efficacity of the French "gage automobile" 
is disputed in this respect (30). 
d) The charge under German law on credit for tenant farmers (Pachtkreditgesetz) 
(3l) belongs among the legal formulas which occupy a peculiar position 
between the genuine mortgage on movables and the registered charge without 
effect against third-party purchasers. This means of security has a 
relatively small field of application; but the statute, thanks to its 
extremely logical drafting, shows up the typical problems of non-possessory 
types of security on movables with exemplary clarity. 
A creditor can only be said to have a genuine guarantee if he can acquire 
the charge in good faith from a person not having a good title and if his 
rights are valid against all parties. On the other hand the rights of third 
parties in legal relationships can only be expected to be maintained if 
there is an opportunity to discover the existence of these rights. In the - 100 -
case of non-possessory types of security on movables this publicity is brought 
about, as already discussed, by the marking of the object itself (32) or by 
means of a document appertaining to the goods forming the security (33). 
If these ways are not open the only solution is the creation of a register. 
No problems arise with those business assets where it is Immediately obvious 
which register must be examined for the purpose of verification (34). 
In all other cases the only course is to base the register not directly 
on the actual goods serving as security but on the person of the giver of 
security (35). But if this is done the protection of the recipient of 
security is only effective to the extent that third parties cannot acquire 
a valid title from the giver of security himself. If these third parties 
resell the goods the register can no longer exclude acquisition in good 
faith as the further purchasers cannot know what register they ought to 
have examined. This is the solution adopted by the Packtkredltgesetz (36). 
In this intermediate region between the mortgage on movables and the 
registered charge without effect against bona fide third-party purchasers 
there also belongs the Italian retention of title in machinery worth over 
TO,000 Lire (37)· Here third-party purchasers have only to undertake a 
search in the local register for the district in which the machinery is 
installed. However, if the machinery is used in a different location they 
can acquire in good faith. So here again the publicity afforded by a 
register has only limited effect against third parties. 
At this point one must also mention the security rights in respect of 
agricultural loans introduced in Belgian law, a contractual charge which is 
called - not quite correctly - a privilege (38). Here the registered charge 
can be upheld against third-party purchasers; but it must be put into effect 
within very short periods of time, which can often be said to be the same 
as complete lack of validity against third parties. 
e) Fxamples of genuine "secret" charges without any publicity are fiduciary 
transfer of title by way of security under German and Dutch law and the 
regular form of retention of title (39)· 
In the author's opinion these two forms of security rights have completely 
identical functions: both secure a pecuniary debt by giving a right of 
realisation in the form of non-possessory "temporary ownership". To a 
certain extent the differing nomenclatures merely reflect the differing 
histories of the goods serving as security: in one the recipient of 
security obtains them, in the other he retains them (40). 
The proposition that retention of title and transfer of title by way of 
security are basically identical does not however accord with the prevailing 
view. Instead the two forms of security are ordinarily treated as different 
legal concepts. Retention of title is recognised in preference to transfer 
of title by way of security which is only admitted in Germany and the 
Netherlands and is strictly rejected in the other countries. The reason for 
the generally less critical attitude to retention of title may be that 
retention of ownership is only a variant of a movement of goods which takes 
place anyway, whereas transfer of title by way of security constitutes an 
additional transfer of rights made specially for the purposes of security. 
In addition it may be that in the case of retention of title there is the 
guarantee that a productive credit is involved which directly assists the 
selling of goods; with a loan secured by transfer of title this is not 101 -
necessarily the case - it may merely serve to facilitate the settlement 
of existing debts. Finally, a part may be played by the irrational 
consideration that a person "deserves" a security right more if the goods 
serving as security were formerly his goods than if he has hitherto had no 
legal relationship to them. But none of this justifies the different 
treatment of two means of security - retention of title and transfer of 
title by way of security - which are identical both in their function and 
even in the details of their legal structure. Since a distinction is 
nevertheless made In statute law, particularly that of France and Italy, 
the two concepts will be treated separately in the discussion which 
follows. 
aa) Retention of title still encounters stiff resistance in some quarters, 
most of all in Belgium and Luxembourg where its validity is admitted 
only Inter partes (4l). 
In France on the other hand retention of title is effective against 
both third-party purchasers and third-party creditors, the legal 
position here being no different to that in Germany. There is however 
one very important limitation: in the bankruptcy of the buyer retention 
of title is not recognised in principle (42). This is due less to the 
absence of publicity (which indeed is also lacking In an individual 
execution) than to the greater emphasis placed upon the principle of 
"égalité des créanciers dans la faillite". 
In Italy retention of title as a secret security right is only 
successful In relation to third-party creditors, though here it is 
also valid in bankruptcy (43). Against other third parties it is 
only effective in certain cases where there is special publicity (44). 
Retention of title is most widespread and important in Germany. It is 
valid without any requirements as to form and its efficacity is only 
limited by the possibility of acquisition in good faith. In the 
important practical sphere of the motor trade we are however no longer 
dealing with a secret right, since withholding of the motor vehicle 
certificate has the practical effect of giving publicity. Acquisition 
in good faith by third parties, though theoretically possible, is thus 
in reality as good as excluded (45). 
In the Netherlands, too, non-formal retention of title is recognised 
as a secret right valid against all parties. It has nothing like the 
same significance as in Germany however. The seller has less need of 
such protection as statute law already provides him with sufficient -
even bankruptcy-proof - safeguards (right of reclaim, rescission of 
contract, seller's privilege) (46). 
The legal position regarding retention of title as described here will 
perhaps change within the foreseeable future. The preliminary draft 
of a convention on bankruptcy within the European Communities (47) 
contains a stipulation (48) that the national legal systems must 
recognise that "the retention of title, which relates to the object 
sold and provides security for the payment of the purchase price, is 
effective against the buyer's creditors insofar as the retention of 
title Is supported by a simple document issued before delivery. This 
document is not subject to any requirements as to form". The trustee - 102 -
in bankruptcy would however be able to offer evidence by any means 
available that the document or its date were drawn up with the 
intention of deceit or were incorrect. 
In the present legal state of affairs the countries most affected by 
these provisions would be Belgium and Luxembourg. For if retention 
of title is to be recognised as effective in bankruptcy, it will hardly 
be possible to exclude it in an individual execution. For France the 
projected arrangement would ease formal requirements, but above all 
would make retention of title a bankruptcy-proof security. In Italy, 
besides relaxing formal requirements, it would widen the field of 
application beyond machinery valued at 30,000 Lires and upwards. 
The planned harmonisation of the national laws would not however imply 
a total adoption of the German position. The wording of the draft does 
not contain an unequivocal commitment to admit the subtle and ramified 
forms of enlargement and extention of retention of title as evolved in 
Germany. Nor would the draft commit the member states either to a 
recognition of the so-called subsequent retention of title or to the 
introduction of validity against third-party purchasers. Above all it 
is not clear from the draft whether or not this "seller's security" is 
meant to be available to a financing third party. This is essential 
unless it is desired to vitiate a decisive practical aspect of the 
harmonisation right from the beginning (49). 
The provisions envisaged would not only be of great importance within 
the national legal systems, they would also put at the disposal of 
exporters a universally recognised and - apart from the difficulties 
mentioned - simple means of security. It would put an end to at least 
the majority of the large number of disagreements (50) which have 
existed in this field. 
bb) Fiduciary transfer of title by way of security per constitutum 
possessorium as the second main type of "secret" security right has not 
taken on as many differentiated forms in the individual countries as 
has retention of title. 
In Germany and the Netherlands transfer of title by way of security is 
held to be fully valid. Acquisition of title in good faith by 
constructive possession from a person not having a good title is excluded. 
The acquisition of apparent legal rights by third parties is possible on 
the other hand. These two , jints somewhat diminish the guarantee given 
to the creditor by this form of security, but this minor weakness has 
not been sufficient to halt Its triumphant advance. 
In the four other countries on the other hand transfer of title by way 
of security has been firmly rejected (51). The reasons given range 
from the presumption of a fictitious act through characterisation as an 
act designed to circumvent the law (by evading the prohibition of the 
lex commissoria) to its rejection as a fiduciary transaction. However, 
the obvious criticism that by constitutum possessorium the transfer of 
title is circumventing the precept of physical delivery of a pledge is 
rarely made. An explanation, though certainly not a justification, for 
the rejection of transfer of title by way of security could further 
be found in the fact that the countries in question do not recognise 
the principle of separation between the contractual act giving rise to - 103 -
obligations and the fulfilling disposition. This could make it somewhat 
harder to accept the security agreement alongside the classic types of 
contract of sale, gift, etc. as being a valid legal basis for the 
transfer of full rights. The preliminary draft of the convention on 
bankruptcy which has been mentioned (52) does not provide for a general 
Introduction of transfer of title by way of security. This may on the 
one hand be due to the fact that the misgivings felt in many countries 
about this form of security are more deeply rooted than in the case of 
retention of title. On the other hand transfer of title by way of 
security does not play such a prominent role in the conduct of 
international transactions as does retention of title. A harmonisation 
of this aspect of the law may therefore not be so urgent for the cause 
of the uniform development of a common market. But at some time in the 
future the necessity will be seen for the harmonisation of this aspect 
too, especially as there are really no differences in principle between 
retention of title and transfer of title by way of security (53). 
cc) The total picture would not be complete were mention not to be made, 
alongside the legal concepts of retention of title and transfer of title 
by way of security - usually termed secret charges - of certain other 
means of obtaining security for credit. The first concepts to be 
considered under this heading are the privileges. These are in principle 
(54) preferential rights which are conferred on a debt by law on the 
grounds of Its legal quality and which are a charge on the object serving 
as security only so long as the latter is numbered among the debtor's 
assets. From the outset therefore this means of security does not lay 
claim to efficacity against third-party purchasers. In the case of 
credit on goods a charge of this kind plays a significant role as a 
seller's privilege. In Germany however it is not met with at all, which 
is possibly the reason why retention of title has acquired such major 
importance there. By contrast the seller's privilege is a particularly 
efficient instrument in the Netherlands, where it is even deemed to be 
a security valid in bankruptcy (55) and thus makes retention of title 
superfluous. In France, Belgium and Luxembourg on the other hand the 
seller's privilege has to yield to the principle of "égalité des 
créanciers dans la faillite". 
In Italian law the seller's privilege in machinery (56) cannot be 
classified under secret rights because of its publicity. 
The German charge on the fruits of the harvest (57) however, because of 
its function, does fall under this heading. As a statutory charge its 
legal construction corresponds almost exactly to that of the privilege 
and in its practical effects one could say it was identical. The charge 
on the fruits of the harvest is not however based on the actual objects 
sold but on the objects produced with their help. According to its 
function therefore one could describe it as a legally ordained 
"transformation clause". 
f) Compared with the questions of principle regarding the legal structure and 
possible area of application of non-possessory forms of security on movables 
which have been discussed above, the remaining problems are of minor 
importance. The rules which have been made and the judicial decisions which - 104 -
establish precedents are often quite random in their effects - and this 
applies not only to purely technical problems of law. In this category of 
problems belong, for instance, the formalities and the moment in time of 
the act creating the charge, the duration of the security rights, the 
detailed regulation of the relationship between creditor and giver of 
the security before the debt falls due, the commencement of the right of 
realisation, the procedures for realisation, the relationship between the 
charge and the debt (the question of the accessory nature of types of 
securities) and similar matters. These points have largely been dealt with 
in the sections devoted to the individual countries and a comparative 
summary can be dispensed with here. Just one particularly important problem 
of universal relevance still requires more detailed investigation: the 
determination of the object to be charged. 
Determination of the object to be charged involves no problems in the case 
of credit on goods sold to the final consumer. The object sold serves as 
security. The problem of the extension of the security right to 
substitutes for the original security is of merely subordinate importance. 
In the case of loans to private individuals too this question should 
seldom arise. But this situation is different in the case of credit granted 
to business concerns, especially when the latter wish to resell or transform 
the goods serving as security. The charge on the actual goods serving as 
security can then only be of very short duration and is therefore relatively 
valueless. If no other security can be obtained, the only possibility 
remaining is to have recourse to the substitutes for the original goods. It 
is already open to question in the case of the so-called transformation clause 
(58) whether the provisions governing original acquisition of title through 
transformation are non-mandatory law. If one denies that they are 
non-mandatory there can no longer be any question of the original security 
being maintained but instead one must admit the creation of a new security 
on the new object - one might say a transfer of title by way of security. 
The transformation clause must then be rejected in those countries which do 
not recognise a transfer of title by way of security; Furthermore with 
every kind of registered charge on single individually-specified objects 
the transformation clause is impracticable because the new product cannot 
usually be individualised in the manner required for registration before 
its actual manufacture. But the situation is completely different if an 
aggregate of objects can serve as security in the state in which it is at 
any given time, since it is then only a matter of describing the aggregate 
of objects (59)· 
Anticipatory assignment by way of security and pledging of the debt arising 
on resale cause difficulties to the extent that they generally presuppose 
notice to a third-party debtor and in addition anticipatory assignments 
tend to encounter other objections of principle. Also the problem arises, 
much discussed in Germany in particular, of the conflict of such future 
assignments arising from a credit on goods on the one hand and a bank loan 
on the other (60). But these are matters which go beyond the boundaries 
of security in the form of movables and thus exceed the scope of this study. 
They deserved mention however on account of their close correlation. 
Whereas in the case of credit on goods the delivered goods themselves serve 
as security, in the case of credit in the form of loans there is often the 
additional problem of determining the original security. This gives rise to 
problems particularly where a large aggregate of objects is security for a 
debt which by no means exhausts the full value of this aggregate. - 105 -
The simplest solution of this problem is where a registered charge is 
available in respect of the aggregate (if possible in the state in which 
it is at any given time). Here the aggregate of objects is charged as a 
single unit in respect of a relatively low debt and further securities, 
ranking subordinate to the first, can be created. Contrary to the position 
with real property however realisation would not require the sale of the 
entire object charged. Instead successive sales could take place until all 
secured creditors were satisfied. 
If there is no such registered charge available but for example only transfer 
of title by way of security as in German and Dutch law, difficulties arise. 
If the title to the entire stock is transferred, there is the danger of 
incurring nullity on the grounds of excessive security. If individual 
items are marked the security can be undermined by continuing transformation 
work or sales and would have to be continually renewed (-6l). 
For these reasons it will often be more sensible to designate as security a 
spatially defined portion of the aggregate in the state in which it is at 
any time (anticipatory creation of security in goods which are not to be 
taken in until a future time) (62). 
Even this solution cannot always be carried out, where for instance the 
only available security is a giant storage tank containing oil or other 
liquids or a heap of coal. Transfer of title by way of security with its 
principle of determination appears to fail in this situation. One answer -
though not one which is much put into practice - is to create fractional 
fiduciary ownership of the total stocks at any time as co-ownership. This 
solution has an obvious disadvantage compared with charging the entire 
stock mortgage-fashion: if the value of the total stock declines, the 
security diminishes in proportion to the co-ownership fraction. The 
creditor runs the risk of partial loss even though the proceeds of 
realisation of the whole stock far exceeds his debt. 
4. The instruments available and the needs to be fulfilled. 
In conclusion we will briefly review the kinds of credit that can be secured 
by creating non-possessory forms of security on movables in the various 
countries concerned. Ignoring most matters of detail - for example the degree 
of guarantee obtained or the legal construction - we will concentrate simply 
on the question as to whether any forms of security on movables exist at all 
and what importance the individual forms have within the individual national 
legal systems. Once again we shall adopt the distinction between credit in 
the form of loans and credit on goods which is made in statute law, without 
thereby signifying our approval of the continuance of this distinction. Loans 
in the form of finance for (instalment) purchases will be classified under 
credit on goods - in accordance with certain laws in force. 
a) In considering credit in the form of loans it will be appropriate in view 
of the precepts set out above to give separate treatment to farmers, other 
"non-traders"("Nichtkaufleute") and traders. 
aa) Farmers can use the assets of their business as security for loans in all 
the countries (63). In most cases special legislation to this effect has 
been in existence for a long time. This clearly reflects the extent 
to which the position of agriculture has always been regarded as a social - 106 -
and political problem. 
In France and Luxembourg the "warrant agricole" is available (64), in 
Belgium a specially-registered "privilege" (so-called) which must be 
agreed contractually (65). In Italy too there is a special privilege 
(66). In Germany and the Netherlands farmers can make use of the 
general transfer of title by way of security. While in the Netherlands -
so far as one can discern - the matter was carried no further, in Germany 
there Is in addition the special registered charge under the 
Pachtkreditgesetz (67) that provides a better guarantee than transfer of 
title by way of security and thus makes it easier for farmers to obtain 
credit. 
bb) "Non-traders" other than farmers do not have such good opportunities. 
In Germany and the Netherlands alone transfer of title by way of security 
is open to them to the same extent as to their colleagues in other 
occupations. In France, Relgium and Luxembourg on the other hand there 
are no non-possessory forms of security on movables for this sector. 
This is no doubt the expression of a generally unfavourable attitude 
towards "non-productive" credits. In Italy, in contrast, there exists 
the motor vehicle mortgage, a very significant Instrument in practical 
terms (68). 
cc) For traders there is a whole series of special instruments introduced 
by statute, especially in France. This demonstrates how the legislators 
feel themselves impelled to take positive action when it comes to the 
furtherance of credits for industry and commerce. 
Nevertheless the "warrant hôtelier" (69), the "warrant industriel" (70) 
and indeed the "warrant pétrolier" (71) lead a shadowy existence in 
French law. The mortgage on films (7°), although functional within its 
own sphere, is only used by a minute proportion of the total number of 
those engaged in all sectors of Industry. Only the formula of the 
"nantissement d'un fonds de commerce" has been able to some extent to 
fulfil the functions allotted to it in France, Belgium and Luxembourg 
(73). 
The Belgian "warrant charbonnier" and the French warrants are the 
expression of an ad hoc intervention by the governments concerned and 
only serve to highlight the general lack of security on movables to 
secure loans to the industrial sector. 
The same comment applies to Italy. Here too the creation of a special 
privilege for certain loans to small traders and craftsmen and to sectors 
of industry lacking in capital resources (74) merely underlines the 
great lack of a general means of providing security for credit (75). 
Possibly this lack is one of the reasons for the revival which is 
becoming apparent of sale and repurchase as a means of obtaining security 
for credit; this formula is basically nothing less than a poorly 
disguised transfer of title by way of security and could gain the great 
practical importance of the latter as it were by stealth. 
In Germany and the Netherlands transfer of title by way of security (76) 
offers a relatively easily manageable means of security. Its 
weaknesses, namely the exclusion of acquisition of the security right - 107 -
in good faith and the danger of acquisition of the object serving as 
security by third parties in good faith, evidently do not prevent Its 
use in practice. The special form of providing security for credit in 
Germany in the shape of the mortgage on ocean cables remains to be 
mentioned (77); in its exclusiveness and structure it is comparable to 
the French film mortgage. 
b) In the case of credit on goods the picture is to a great extent one of 
uniformity, at least If one takes into account the provisions contained in 
the preliminary draft of the convention on bankruptcy (78) which has already 
been mentioned several times. These provisions give the seller the (simple) 
right of retention of title as a bankruptcy-proof means of security, requiring 
no registration but merely written agreement before delivery. But the 
position of a third party financing the transaction in the goods, extremely 
important for practical purposes, remains problematical (79). 
In the survey that follows the envisaged alteration of the law will be left 
out of account and only the current legal situation will be considered. 
Germany and the Netherlands can be dealt with first, while in the case of 
the other countries separate consideration of sales to private consumers, 
to industrial consumers and to persons reselling the goods has been thought 
appropriate. 
aa) Firstly, Germany and the Netherlands enjoy a comprehensive means of 
security in the form of retention of title (80). In Germany it is the 
sole effective practical security for sellers, as the right to 
restitution, rescission of contract with a real ("dinglich") effect and 
seller's privilege are all unknown. In the Netherlands on the other 
hand these three legal securities for the seller - contrary to the case 
in other countries - are actually proof against bankruptcy. Retention 
of title does not therefore have the same outstanding importance as in 
Germany, merely a supplementary function. In the Netherlands there 
appears to be no sign of any further special statutory forms of 
security for sellers, and in Germany only the charge under the 
fertiliser security law (8l). 
bb) In the case of sales to private consumers all the countries provide 
sufficient security for the seller in the shape of the right to 
restitution, rescission of contract and - with the exception of Italy -
a statutory seller's privilege. The limitations on the efficacity of 
these rights in bankruptcy in Italy, France and Luxembourg do not apply 
in the case of private consumers since the latter cannot go bankrupt under 
the bankruptcy laws of these countries. 
Although Italy has no general seller's privilege in addition to her right 
of restitution and rescission of contract (82), it can be created for 
machinery from 30,000 Lire upwards by registration (83). 
The motor vehicle mortgage has a somewhat different function with regard 
to sales to private individuals in France (84) compared with Italy (85). 
Whereas in France it only provides additional protection against 
third-party purchasers, in Italy it also renders registration of a 
retention of title (86) or a machinery privilege (87) superfluous. 
Thus the only complete gap in security for credit in the case of sales 108 -
to private consumers Is in Italy for those goods not covered by the 
description "machinery". 
cc) For credit on goods for industrial consumers in France, Belgium and 
Luxembourg the general methods of security consisting of the right of 
restitution, rescission of contract and the seller's privilege have, 
with a few exceptions, no effect in a bankruptcy. Retention of title 
is similary valueless. Consequently the legislators in France have 
provided a remedy in the form of a special registered charge for 
capital goods (88) and their counterparts in Belgium have done the 
same (89). In France there Is also the motor vehicle mortgage (90). 
In Belgium motor vehicles may fall into the category of capital goods. 
There is thus only a gap in Luxembourg. In Italy the machinery privilege 
(91), the retention of title in machinery over 30,000 or 500,000 Lire 
as the case may be (92) and the motor vehicle mortgage (93) provide the 
corresponding securities for the buyer. 
The main gap here is that no security that is effective in bankruptcy 
is available to sellers for sales of raw materials and supplies. 
dd) In the case of deliveries to persons reselling the goods not all the 
same legal devices are available as for sales to consumers. Thus the 
French "nantissement de l'outillage et du matériel d'équipement" (94) 
cannot be applied in respect of objects which do not become "equipment 
for professional purposes" until they reach the hands of third-party 
purchasers but which from the trader's point of view are simply goods 
in which he trades. The same comment applies to the analogous Belgian 
formula (95). 
But even in situations where the use of the same means of security as in 
sales to industrial consumers is theoretically possible, such use is 
often inappropriate on practical grounds. Thus all registered charges 
for use in connection with ordinary merchandise are too expensive and too 
cumbersome. Where registered charges are valid even against 
third-party purchasers in good faith, as in the case of the Italian 
motor mortgage, their use could also be dangerous for the buyer. In 
order to acquire the object free of encumbrances he would have to 
settle the purchase price debt due from the trader to the manufacturer. 
For these different reasons the manufacturers will therefore avoid the 
use of such securities. Consequently they can only safeguard themselves 
by not selling the goods to the trader but by consigning them to him as 
agent (by way of "dépôt" or "consignation"). - 109 -
Hôtes 
(1) Interesting points relevant to this in FARGAUD, esp. Nos. 271 ff.; COING, 
Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung, 1967, 65 ff.; KAY, pp. 9 ff., 28 ff., 
51 ff·, 58 ff. most recently K. SIMITIS, Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 
171 (1971), 94 ff. 
(2) This also applies in those countries like France where bankruptcy is restricted 
to traders and where the priority principle does not apply In individual 
execution but where a proportional distribution of the proceeds takes place 
("distribution par contribution"). 
(3) Possibly showing a running cumulative balance. Advantage of such a system: only 
one simple register at the debtor's place of business/residence; the difficulty 
of clearly determining the object serving as security is obviated. 
(4) One could also envisage the settlement of debts in the order in which they are 
entered in the register. According to the amount of prior registered debts 
the credit risk would increase and with it the rate of interest. 
(5) Perhaps greatest for long-term credit, which would justify an exception for 
mortgages on real estate. 
(6) 4. 
(7) Also critical: KAY, p. 59, with further references. 
(8) Publicity as a means of publicising the pledging to the whole world would only 
be complete if the professional pledge-holders or public services were included, 
so that everyone would be aware that the objects were merely in their possession 
by way of custody. 
(9) If debtor and pledgor are not the same person, the pledgor - who as a rule stands 
in a relationship of trust to the debtor - may secure himself by making the 
latter undertake only to make repayment against restitution of the pledge intact. 
The debtor is unlikely to have cause to infringe this obligation. 
(10) In addition the recipient of security is usually covered by insurance. 
(11) See BGH NJW 1970, 653. 
(12) By analogy with s. 952, German BGB. 
(13) Even if not for the purposes of a pledging in the strict sense of ss. 1204 ff. 
BGB, then at least for transfer of title by way of security and retention of title 
which do have the same function as a pledge. While these security rights are 
generally "secret charges", with the help of the motor vehicle certificate they 
become clearly recognisable by everyone. 
(14) See F I 4 di. But acquisition of the security right in good faith from a 
person not having a good title is not possible (for that the vehicle certificate 
would have to be a document of title). This does not give rise to practical 
difficulties however as the holder of a vehicle certificate in his own name is 
also in almost every case the true owner. 
(15) 2d. 
(16) Ownership of fractional parts of an object by way of security belongs mainly 
to the realm of theory. 
(17) The so-called expectation ("Anwartschaft") of the debtor of the return of the 
goods serving as security would hardly be accepted in practice as a fully-valuable 
basis of credit. 
(18) See Β I 10. 
(19) See Β I 9, II 4c . The charge has a different form according to whether 
it is securing the debt arising from the sale of the "fonds de commerce" or 
another debt. 
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(25) See Β II 8c. 
(26) Italian law differs again: here publicity by means of the register Is linked 
to the exclusion of acquisition of apparent legal title outside the register. 
See E II 8 , esp. footnote ll6. 
(27) Not the normal form without publicity. 
(28) See E II 6e (dd). 
(29) See Β II 10. 
(30) See footnotes 24 and 25. 
(31) See F I 3d. 
(32) As with the Italian retention of title in machinery worth 500,000 Lire and 
upwards and optionally with the French "nantissement de l'outillage et du 
matériel d'équipement", see b. 
(33) As with retention of title and transfer of title by way of security of motor 
vehicles, particularly under German law. 
(34) As with films and trading organisations in France, ocean cables in Germany, 
motor vehicles in France and Italy, and aircraft and ships in all countries. 
(35) To a certain extent a "personal roll" instead of a "property roll". 
(36) s. 5 I PKrG. By contrast the registers of the French warrants and the Belgian 
■"warrant charbonnier" and enlarged seller's privilege for business assets are 
only effective against third-party creditors; according to a disputed view this 
would also apply to the register of the French "gage automobile" (see Β II 8c). 
(37) Art. 1524 II CC. See E II 6 . As credit on goods is involved, the 
question of an acquisition of the. charge in good faith does not arise as the 
recipient of security himself is the predecessor in title· 
(38) See C I 4. 
(39) Excluding the special forms introduced by Italian law in respect of machinery 
worth over 30,000 and 500,000 Lire (E II 6 ). 
(40) Because of the differing origins of the goods serving as security the problem 
of an acquisition of the charge in good faith does not arise with retention of 
title; for the goods serving as security come from the recipient of security 
himself. 
(41) See C II 4 
(42) See Β II 5d 
(43) See E II 6d . The "data certa" requirement (partly applicable also in 
France for purposes of proof, see end of Β II 5d above) does not provide 
publicity but is intended to give protection against manipulation after the 
onset of a crisis situation. 
(44) See b and e,, also E II 6e. 
(45) See end of 2d. 
(46) See G II 2-5. 
(47) According to the position at 4.7.1969 published in: Idées nouvelles dans le 
droit de la faillite, Travaux de la Quatrième Journée d'études juridiques 
Jean Dabin, Brussels (Bruylant), 1969, pp. 397 ff. 
(48) Art. 39 I 2-4 of the preliminary draft. 
(49) Opposing view: FARGAUD, Nos. 277-279. The difficulties of construction thrown 
up only prove how little sense there is in differentiating between retention of 
title and transfer of title by way of security, in admitting one formula and 
rejecting the other. Basically it is a question of a single security right. 
(50) In this connection see COING, Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung, 1967, 65 ff.; 
KEGEL, JuS 1968, 162 ff. 
(51) Italy appears to be an exception to a certain extent (see Ξ 13'). But the 
real import of the revival of the formula of the sale with repurchase clause as 
a means of obtaining security for credit must be regarded as uncertain. - Ill -
(52) See footnote 47. 
(53) See also footnote 49. 
(5^) There are some exceptions laid down by statute law. Thus for example the 
charge in respect of agricultural loans under Belgian law is also called a 
"privilege" (see C I 4 ) although it requires contractual agreement and, 
by virtue of the publicity provided by registration, is valid even against 
third-party purchasers. 
(55) See G II 4. 
(^6) See E II 5. 
(57) See F II 2. 
(58) It is intended to preserve the object serving as security for the benefit of the 
recipient of security even in the event of transformation into a new object. 
See F 11 5d. 
(59) For example: all items of equipment or all goods of a "fonds de commerce" or the 
entire net assets of a farming business or of a hotel. 
(60) Soe E II 5d. 
(61) Even in the case of a transformation clause and anticipatory assignment of the 
debts arising from the sale of security being permissible the surety gradually 
diminishes as the customers pay up the purchase price. 
(62) It is necessary here too for the creditor to ensure that the giver of security 
does in fact keep the location in question continually filled. 
(63) In this connection see CAPELLI, La legislatione europea sul credito agrario, 
Milan i960 (to which the author did not have access); JACOBI, Absicherungsformen 
des Mobiliarkredits im europaischen Agrarrecht, in: Recht der Landwirtschaft, 
1968, 197 ff.; by the same author, Le garanzie del credito mobiliare nella 
legislazione agraria di alcuni paesi europei, in: Rivista di diritto agrario, 
1969, I, 48l. 
(64) See Β I 4 and D 1. 
(65) See C I 4. 
(66) See E I 4c. 
(67) See F I 3. 
(68) See E I 2. 
(69) Β I 5-
(70) Β I 8. 
(71) Β I 6. 
(72) Β I 10. 
(73) FARGAUD, No. 19. Critical: KUNZLER, Das nantissement du fonds de commerce, 
Frankfurt/Berlin (Metzner), I960, pp. 106 ff. 
(74) See E I 4d, e. 
(75) The motor vehicle mortgage which is open to all (EI?) is a noteworthy 
step, but a very small one In relation to the total problem. 
F I 4 and G I 2, 3. 
F I 2. 
Footnote 47. 
In this connection see 3e (aa). 
See F II 5 and G II 5. 













See F II 4. 
E II 5. 
See Β II 8. 
See D II 6. 
E II 6d and e (cc). 
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Chapter It INTRODUCTION 
TERMINOLOGY 
The purpose of this report is to discuss the basic principles of the law, and 
since the use of technical legal terms can cause difficulties when the report is 
translated, an attempt will be made to use non-technical language whenever 
possible. It is, of course, impossible to write about law without using some 
technical terms but when it is not unified legally and it is therefore desirable 
to describe briefly a term used for the first time its meaning will be 
explained. There is also a glossary at the end of the report in which the meaning 
of the terms used will be given. 
TERRITORIES COVERED BY THE STUDY 
This study covers the United Kingdom and Ireland. Although the United Kingdom is 
politically a unitary state, different countries make up the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. These countries are England, 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. England and Wales were integrated in 1536 
and have the same system of law and the same system of courts. They may, 
therefore, be treated as one unit for the purpose of this study. Scotland was 
originally a separate state with its own king, parliament and legal system. In 
I6O3, however, James VI of Scotland became king of England (where he was known 
as James I of England) and there was consequently a personal union between the 
two countries. In 1707 England and Scotland were united (as the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain) and their parliaments were merged into the British Parliament. 
Scotland, however, retained its own legal system, which was distinct from 
English Common Law, and its own system of courts. This is still the position 
today, though there is an appeal in certain circumstances from the Scottish 
courts to the House of Lords (in its judicial capacity). Although there is no 
separate parliament for Scotland, the U.K. Parliament often passes statutes which 
apply only to Scotland so that the Scottish legal system is still quite distinct 
in many matters from that of England. 
Ireland was united with Britain in I8OI (though it had been ruled by the English 
kings for centuries) but the southern part was separated from the United Kingdom 
in 1922 and is now the independent Republic of Ireland. Northern Ireland, however, 
remains part of the United Kingdom but it has its own Parliament (though this was 
suspended in 1972). It also has its own system of courts with a right of appeal 
to the House of Lords. Although both parts of Ireland have separate legal systems, 
they are both based on the Common Law and are therefore fundamentally the same as 
that of England. Differences occur where there has been different legislation. 
The legal systems covered by this study are, therefore, as follows: 
1. England and Wales; 
2. Scotland; 
3. Northern Ireland; and 
4. The Republic of Ireland. - 122 -
The study will not be concerned with those dependencies of the British Crown 
which are not part of the United Kingdom. In Europe these are the Channel 
Islands, the Isle of Man and the Colony of Gibraltar. 
As Ireland had its own parliament from the thirteenth centry until l800 the legal 
systems of Northern Ireland and the Republic have a great deal in common and it 
will often be possible to deal with both parts of Ireland together. The term 
"Ireland" will, therefore, be used where it is wished to refer to both parts of 
Ireland. 
THE COMMON LAW 
The term "Common Law" is used in a number of different senses: 
1. Originally it referred to those rules of law that were common to the whole 
Kingdom of England as distinct from local customs. It is only rarely used 
in this sense today. 
2. It is also used to refer to the body of law developed by the courts as 
distinct from that laid down by Parliament in statutes. In this sense it 
distinguishes judge-made law from legislation. 
3. Finally, it is used in a narrow and more technical sense in contrast to 
Equity. The meaning of Equity will be explained shortly, but it is 
sufficient to say that historically it was the system of rules administered 
by the Court of Chancery; while Common Law (in this sense) was the law 
administered by the Courts of Common Law. 
SCOTTISH LAW 
Like English law, Scottish law is largely uncodified. The most important 
difference between the two systems is that, while English law was influenced only 
marginally by Roman law, Scottish law is based to an important extent on the 
principles of Roman law. The reception of Roman law in Scotland began in the 
sixteenth century and from this time until the latter part of the eighteenth 
century Scottish students often went abroad, mainly to France and the Low 
Countries, to study law. Civil law principles, as expounded in European 
universities at this time, were brought back to Scotland by these students and 
they formed the foundation for the development of Scottish law by the great legal 
writers of this period. At a later time English law was also an important 
influence, especially after the introduction of an appeal in civil matters to the 
House of Lords. It may, therefore, be best to classify Scottish law as a mixed 
system, based partly on Romanistic and partly on Common Law principles. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITY 
The origin of Equity can best be explained historically. At the end of the 
thirteenth century the principal English courts were : (i) various local courts; 
and (ii) the Royal Courts, which consisted of the courts of Kings Bench, of 
Common Pleas and of Exchequer. These Royal Courts administed the Common Law and were 
consequently known as the Courts of Common Law. - 123 
For various reasons, however, these courts were not always able to provide a 
remedy and litigants therefore turned to the King to obtain justice. 
The King was regarded as having a residual judicial power and he was able to 
grant a remedy where he considered that injustice had occurred. These petitions 
were initially heard by the King in his Council but subsequently they were often 
referred to the Chancellor who was an important member of the Council. The 
Chancellor, who was usually an ecclesiastic, was the head of the King's 
Secretarial Department and was Secretary of State for all Departments. The next 
step was for petitions to be addressed directly to the Chancellor who in time 
began to grant a remedy on his own authority. Thus during the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries the Chancellor came to be regarded as a court. 
This new court was known as the Court of Chancery. It did not administer the 
Common Law but granted remedies on the basis of justice in those cases where the 
Common Law courts were unable to provide a satisfactory remedy. These principles 
of justice were known as Equity and, though they initially varied with different 
Chancellors, they gradually developed into a well-established body of rules. Thus 
two parallel systems of judge-made law grew up in England, Common Law and Equity: 
the one administered by the Common Law Courts and the other by the Court of 
Chancery. However, English lawyers often used the word "Law" to refer to the 
Common Law alone and therefore drew a distinction between "law" and "equity", 
even though equity was part of the law of England. This distinction still applies 
today so that the word "law" can be used in two senses: the wide sense meaning 
law in general and the narrow sense in which it is contrasted with equity. The 
same ambiguity applies to the adjective "legal" which can be used in a general 
sense or in contrast to "equitable". 
In 1875 the Court of Chancery was merged with the Courts of Common Law to form 
the Supreme Court of Judicature. The position today is that there is one court, 
the Supreme Court, which has various Divisions, including the Chancery Division. 
All Divisions can apply both Common Law and Equity but the two systems are still 
analytically distinct, (l) The reason for this is that rights created by the 
Common Law (legal rights) are different from rights created by equity (equitable 
rights). 
Equitable Rights 
The difference between legal and equitable rights is sometimes expressed by 
saying that legal rights are in rem while equitable rights are only in personam. 
While it is true that legal rights in property are rights in rem (droits reels) 
it is not accurate to regard equitable rights as being mere rights in personam 
(droits personnels). This is because an equitable right in property will in 
general be enforced against anyone except a bona fide purchaser of the property 
for value, i.e. someone who purchases the property for value in good faith and 
without notice of the equitable rights in question. The position can be made 
clear by an example. Assume that A is the legal owner of land and Β has an 
equitable servitude over it. If A sells the land to C, who takes without notice 
of B's right, C is not bound by the servitude. If A had given the land to C or 
if C had had notice of B's rights, then he would take the land subject to the 
servitude. Moreover, B's rights would also prevail against someone who acquires 
the land by succession from A or against A's creditors if he went bankrupt. If, 
however, Β had a legal servitude, it would be good against anyone, including the 
bona fide purchaser for value. 
The rule regarding notice applies to both actual and constructive notice. 
Constructive notice applies to any facts which the purchaser would have found out 
if he had made those enquiries that a prudent purchaser would make. If he 
deliberately or carelessly fails to make such enquiries he is bound by any 
equitable rights which he would have discovered had he made those enquiries. 124-
This rule increases the protection for equitable rights in land. However, there 
is also a rule that if a purchaser takes without notice, and is therefore not 
bound by the equitable right, anyone to whom he transfers the property is likewise 
not bound, even if such subsequent owner does have notice of the equitable right 
(2). The only exception is where the property is sold back to someone who had 
previously owned it and had been bound by the equitable right (3). This can be 
illustrated by another example. Assume that Β has an equitable right over A's 
land. A transfers the land to C, who has notice of B's right. C is therefore 
bound by the right. C sells the land to D, who has no notice and is not bound by 
B's right. If D sells the land to E, E will not be bound either, even if he did 
have notice; but if it is sold back to C, the latter would be bound. 
Important changes to the doctrine of notice have been brought about by statute, 
especially the Land Charges Act 1925 (applicable only in England). Under this 
Act a number of equitable rights can now be registered in a public register. 
These rights include estate contracts (contracts to purchase land) restrictive 
covenants made after 1925 and equitable easements created after 1925 (4). Where 
an equitable right is registrable, registration takes the place of notice: if 
the right is registered it is good against the whole world and if it is not 
registered it is usually not binding on third parties. Notice is irrelevant. 
The doctrine of notice still applies to non-registrable equitable rights. 
It will be apparent from what has been said that an equitable right is superior 
to a normal right in personam. Whether it is truly a right in rem is a matter of 
some controversy: some writers feel that it is, others say that since it is not 
valid against a purchaser without notice it is not a right in rem. One solution 
would be to refer to it as a right quasi in rem, thus indicating its special 
character. A registered equitable right is clearly a right in rem. 
Trusts 
The best known and most important creation of equity is the trust. 
The trust is a mechanism whereby the management and control of property can be 
separated from the beneficial enjoyment of the property. The parties involved 
are usually the settlor (who is the person who creates the trust), the trustee 
(who is the person who manages and controls the property), and the beneficiary 
(who is the person for whose benefit the property is held). The settlor is the 
original owner of the property and he gives it to the trustee in trust for the 
beneficiary. The powers and duties of the trustee depend on the terms of the 
trust. If the trustee fails to carry out the trust the beneficiary has a number 
of remedies. He can obtain an order from the court against the trustee to carry 
out the trust or he can even have the trustee replaced by someone else. If the 
trustee sells the trust property the trust will attach to the proceeds so that 
whatever the trustee does with it, the trust will still apply. 
Even though the trustee is the legal owner, the beneficiary has equitable rights 
over the property and these will prevail over the rights of any subsequent legal 
owner to whom the property is transferred contrary to the terms of the trust, 
except for a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. If the trustee goes 
bankrupt the beneficiary's rights prevail over those of the trustee's creditors; 
they also prevail over the successors on death of the trustee. It is, of course, 
quite possible that the trustee will have the power under the trust to sell the 
property and in this case the purchaser will take free from the trust irrespective 
of notice. A trust for sale is in fact a common kind of trust that is often used 
to provide for one's family after one's death. Thus, for example, a man might 
provide in his will that his property is to be held by trustees who are to pay the 
income from the property to his wife for her life and then to give the capital to 
the children when they reach the age of 21. The property in question may be a 
number of houses or a block of flats which are let to tenants. If the trust is a 125-
trust for sale the trustees have the power to postpone the sale for as long as 
they like and they may retain the property for many years if they think that this 
will be most advantageous for the beneficiaries. On the other hand they might 
sell the land fairly early on and invest the proceeds in securities. 
Equitable Remedies 
One important difference between legal and equitable remedies is that equitable 
remedies are always discretionary. Thus, while a person who asks a court for a 
legal remedy will always be granted it (provided he is entitled to the remedy), 
a court will not grant an equitable remedy unless it considers that it is fair 
and proper in the circumstances that it should be granted. The principal 
equitable remedies are specific performance and injunction. Specific performance 
is an order to someone to carry out his contractual obligations and an injunction 
is an order to a person not to do something (or, more rarely, to put right 
something already done). The sanction for disobedience to these orders is 
imprisonment for contempt of court. Damages on the other hand, is a common law 
remedy and originally could not be granted by a court of equity. Thus at one 
time if a plaintiff wanted damages to compensate him for a trespass to his land 
and an injunction to prevent the defendant from trespassing on the land in future, 
he had to apply to the Common Law Courts for the first remedy and the Court of 
Chancery for the second. This is no longer the case today. 
Ireland 
Equity applies in Ireland in the same way as it does in England. There was a 
Court of Chancery which administered equity in the same way as the English one 
and the principles developed in England were followed in Ireland. A Supreme 
Court of Judicature was created in Ireland at the same time as in England. Today 
there is still a Chancery Division of the High Court in Northern Ireland but in 
the Republic the High Court is undivided and law and equity are administered by 
the same court. 
Scotland 
Equity in the English sense does not exist in Scotland. Equity in the sense of 
fairness and natural justice is applied in Scotland by all courts but it is not 
in any way a separate body of rules. What has been said above does not, therefore, 
apply to Scotland. Trusts are known to Scottish law but their legal basis is 
somewhat different. 
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY: ENGLISH AND IRISH LAW 
The main classification adopted by English law is that between Real Property 
(Realty) and Personal Property (Personalty). This distinction used to be of 
fundamental importance but it is much less important today. Its origin is 
historical. The distinction was originally based on the remedies that the courts 
would grant an owner if he was dispossessed. In the early law property was 
considered real if the courts would restore to a dispossessed owner the thing 
(res) itself; if the only remedy he could obtain was damages, the property was 
considered personal. In the early law if a person was dispossessed of his freehold 
land (5) he could bring a real action by means of which he would be put in 
possession of the land again. This was not, however, possible in the case of 
movable property and the only remedy available was a personal action against the 
dispossessor in which the latter would be given a choice by the court either to 
return the property or pay damages. - 126 
In general, rights in land are classified as real property. The main exception 
to this is that leaseholds (the right to occupy land for a fixed length of time) 
are classified as personalty. The reason for this is that it was not until the 
end of the fifteenth century that a leaseholder (the owner of a leasehold) was 
able to recover the land from a third party, and by this time the classification 
of leaseholds as personalty was too firmly established to be changed. However, 
because of their special nature, they are referred to as chattels real and are 
always dealt with in books on the law of real property. 
Objects attached to the soil are in law regarded as part of the land. Thus trees, 
crops and buildings are all part of the land and belong to the owner of it. If, 
for example, X steals bricks from A and builds a house with them on the land of 
B, the house belongs to Β (7). In English law the term "fixtures" is used to 
designate anything which has become so attached to the land as to form part of the 
land. It is not, of course, always easy in practice to decide whether a 
particular object is a fixture and in answering this question there are two main 
elements to be considered: the degree of annexation, and the purpose of 
annexation. In general, in order for an object to be a fixture, there must be a 
substantial connection between it and the land (or a building on the land). Thus 
an article which merely rests on the ground by its own weight is usually not a 
fixture, while something attached to a building will normally be a fixture even 
if it can be removed with little difficulty. 
In modern law, however, the purpose of the annexation is very important: if it 
was to effect a permanent improvement to the land or a building, the object will 
be regarded as a fixture; if, on the other hand, the purpose was to effect a 
merely temporary improvement or it was to allow the enjoyment of the object, it 
will not be regarded as a fixture. Thus, it has been held by the courts that 
statues forming part of a general architectural design were fixtures, even though 
they were only attached by their own weight; (8) while a tapestry attached by 
tacks to wooden strips fastened to the wall by two inch nails was held not to be 
a fixture because the only way it could be enjoyed was to attach it to the house 
in this way (9)· 
There is no equivalent in English law to the French concept of "movables by 
anticipation". There is a rule that in certain circumstances crops sown by a 
tenant can be reaped by him after the tenancy has come to an end; he can also 
remove certain fixtures. In neither case, however, are the objects concerned 
considered to be personal property until after they have been separated. There 
is no English equivalent to the French doctrine of "immovables by destination". 
Thus cattle on a farm or machinery on a farm or in a factory are considered to 
be personal property unless, in the case of machinery, it is a fixture. 
The common law rules on the division between realty and personalty are modified 
to a certain extent by the equitable doctrine of conversion. Under this doctrine 
in certain cases land is regarded as personalty and money is regarded as realty. 
The doctrine is an application of the maxim of equity that what ought to be done 
is deemed to have been done and it applies where there is a legal duty to sell 
land or to use money to buy land. Thus if land is given to trustees on trust for 
sale the rights of the beneficiaries are deemed to be rights in personalty even 
before the land is sold and if money is given to trustees to be used to buy land 
the rights of the beneficiaries are deemed to be rights in land even before the 
land is bought. Another situation in which the doctrine applies is where a 
contract for the sale of land has been entered into but the land has not yet been 
transferred to the buyer. Here the rights of the buyer are regarded as being 
realty. 
The doctrine of conversion was evolved at a time when the rules of intestate 
succession differed according to whether the property in question was real or - 127 -
personal. The most important application of the doctrine was in the field of 
succession and if, for example, the beneficiary under a trust for sale of land 
died, his rights in the trust property were treated as personal property, even if 
the land had not in fact been sold. Today the same rules of intestate succession 
apply to all property (lO) and the doctrine has consequently lost much of its 
importance. 
Individual items of personal property are known as chattels. Chattels are 
divided into two classes - chattels real and chattels personal or pure personalty. 
The only important example of the former today is a leasehold. Chattels personal 
are themselves divided into two classes - choses in action and choses in 
possession. Choses in action are intangible property. The term was first applied 
to debts but today it is often applied to other forms of intangible property such 
as industrial property (patents, registered designs, trade marks and trade names, 
and copyright). Choses in possession are tangible movables. 
The classification of property in English law may be shown diagramatically as 
follows: 
PROPERTY 
REAL PROPERTY  PERSONAL PROPERTY 
CHATTELS REAL  CHATTELS PERSONAL 
CHOSES IN ACTION  CHOSES IN POSSESSION 
It should finally be mentioned that in conflict of laws the distinction between 
realty and personalty does not apply. Instead, the distinction between 
movables and immovables is adopted. This will be considered in chapter 4. 
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY: SCOTTISH LAW 
The main distinction in Scottish law is between heritable and movable property 
Heritable property is immovable property and it is called "heritable" because 
prior to the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 the rules of intestate succession 
were different for these two classes of property: the principle of primo-
geniture applied to heritable but not to movable property. Today the same rules 
of intestate succession apply to heritable and movable property, although the 
distinction is still of importance for certain purposes. 
Heritable property consists of land, buildings and crops. The rules concerning 
fixtures discussed previously in the context of English law apply also to Scotland. 
In certain cases, however, corporeal (tangible) movables have been held to have 
become heritable property for succession purposes even without being annexed to 
the land. This occurs where the owner of the land before his death manifested a 
clear intention to annex them to the land but this was not done before he died. 
In these circumstances the movables are considered to be heritable "by 
destination". Thus, for example, window-frames and building material collected on - 128 -
the ground for use in a building in the course of erection by the deceased, and 
the funds necessary to complete the building, have been held to be heritable for 
the purpose of succession to his estate, (ll) 
What has been said about the doctrine of conversion in the section on English law 
also applies to Scotland. 
Another distinction applicable in Scottish law is that between corporeal 
(tangible) and incorporeal (intangible) property. Corporeal property consists of 
material things while incorporeal property consists of rights. This distinction 
cuts across the division between heritable and movable property, and incorporeal 
property can be either heritable or movable. Thus jura in re aliena, for example 
servitudes, are incorporeal heritable property. Rents are heritable since they 
are the product of heritable property but in questions of succession arrears of 
rent (i.e. rent which should have been already paid but has not) are classified 
as movable; in other words the law treats arrears of rent as if they have already 
been paid and are therefore money. A lease is also heritable property. Rights 
"having a tract of future time" are heritable. These are rights such as pensions 
and annuities which cannot be immediately paid by the debtor but which carry on 
for a number of years without relation to any capital sum. Where there is a 
capital sum, however, its character will determine the character of the income; 
thus the income from a sum of money is always movable. All claims to money are 
movable, including damages for injury to immovable property. Shares in a company 
and an interest in a partnership are movable even if the property of the company 
or partnership includes land. Patents and copyright are also movable. 
As in English law, the distinction between movables and immovables is adopted for 
purposes of conflict of laws. This distinction is not very different from that 
between heritable and movable property but some of the rules of the latter 
distinction which are based on history rather than logic - for example the 
classification of an annuity as heritable - may not be applied for purposes of 
conflict of laws. This question is discussed further in chapter 4. - 129 
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Chapter 2: IMMOVABLES IN THE INTERNAL LAW OF ENGLAND AND IRELAND 
INTRODUCTION 
English land law is one of the most technical and complicated branches of 
English law. It also contains many concepts which are peculiar to English law 
and for this reason it is more difficult to describe in general terms than other 
branches of the law. History plays a very large part in English land law; this is 
partly because, unlike most Continental legal systems, English law has developed 
continuously and without any abrupt transformation (such as codification) from 
the Norman conquest of England in 1066 until the present time. Many principles 
and rules of English law (especially land law) can only be explained by reference 
to the historical development of the law and for this reason it will occasionally 
be necessary to make a short digression into legal history. 
Some very important reforms of English land law (which were not, however, a 
codification) were brought about by a series of statutes passed in 1925 and which 
came into force on 1 January 1926. These statutes were : the Settled Land Act, 
the Trustee Act, the Law of Property Act, the Land Registration Act, the Land 
Charges Act and the Administration of Estates Act. These statutes do not, 
however, apply in either Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland. The law 
will therefore be described both as it existed before 1926 and after 1925· The 
pre-1926 law will represent the position in Ireland and the post-1925 law will 
represent the position in England today. 
Tenure 
Although in everyday speech Englishmen talk about buying a house or owning land, 
in strict law nobody can own land in England except the Crown. The origin of this 
doctrine can be traced back to the Norman conquest of England in 1066 William I, 
the Norman King, regarded the whole of England as his by right of conquest. He 
granted land to his followers (and some of the English) but they were not given 
absolute ownership of the land: they held the land from the Crown on certain 
conditions, e.g. that they should provide a certain number of men to fight for 
the king. The person holding the land was called a tenant and these conditions 
were referred to as the t enure on which the land was held. Tenure is no longer 
of any practical importance but the term "tenant" is still used today. 
ESTATES IN LAND 
Since absolute ownership of land is impossible in English law (except in the case 
of the Crown), it follows that all rights in land must be rights less than 
ownership. Some of these rights, however, come very close to the concept of 
ownership and these are known as estates (l) in land. There are various different 
kinds of estates and the difference between them is based on the length of time 
for which the tenant (or his successors) can hold the land. When an estate 
terminates the land reverts to the person who granted the estate. The important 
point to note, however, is that in English land law the subjects of ownership are 
rights in land, not the land itself. This is one important difference between the - 132-
law of immovables and movables: in the case of tangible movables (chattels) one 
can own the thing itself; this is never possible in the law of immovables. 
The Law before 1926 
Estates in land were divided into two classes: estates of freehold and estates 
less than freehold. The estates of freehold were: 
(i) fee simple; 
(ii) fee tail; and 
(iii) life estate. 
Fee simple was originally an estate which lasted as long as the tenant or any of 
his heirs (blood relations) survived. Thus the estate would terminate if the 
tenant died without leaving blood relations even if before death he had conveyed 
(transferred) his estate to someone else who was still alive. By the fourteenth 
century, however, it was settled that where the estate had been conveyed to 
someone else it would continue as long as there were heirs of the new tenant. 
Today a fee simple will last until the tenant for the time being dies intestate 
and without any relatives to succeed to the land. (2) It has therefore become 
virtually permanent and thus corresponds most closely with the concept of 
ownership in Continental legal systems. 
A fee tail was an estate which continued for as long as the original tenant or 
any of his descendants (as distinct from other blood relatives) survived. Thus 
if the original tenant died leaving a brother but no descendants (children, 
grandchildren, etc.) the estate would terminate if it was in fee tail but not if 
it was in fee simple. The way a fee tail was normally created was that a person 
with the fee simple in the land (the grantor) would convey the land in fee tail 
to another person (such as his son or daughter's husband). This person (the 
original tenant) would hold the land for life and on his death it would pass to 
his descendants. 
If any tenant died without descendants the land would revert to the grantor (or 
his heirs) who would hold the land in fee simple again. 
If a tenant in fee tail alienated his estate the original position was that the 
transferee's rights in the land would terminate on the death of the transferor and 
the land would then pass to the transferor's descendants or, if there were none, 
to the grantor and his heirs. At an early date, however, it became possible to 
"bar the entail" and once this was done the tenant in fee tail could convey an 
estate in fee simple to a third party and thus defeat the rights of his descendants 
and of the grantor and his heirs. The procedure for barring the tail was 
originally rather complex and was based on a fictitious law suit but the position 
was considerably simplified by the Fines and Recoveries Act 1833. 
A life estate lasted for life only. This was normally the life of the tenant but 
it could be for the life of some other person, in which case it was called an 
estate pur autre vie. This could arise either if the estate was granted to A for 
the life of B, or if it was granted to A for life (i.e. his own life) and A 
conveyed it to X. In this case X would have an estate pur autre vie and his right 
to the possession of the land would cease when A died. 
Originally the three estates of freehold were the sole estates recognised by law 
but by the sixteenth century leaseholds were also recognised as estates (but not 
estates of freehold). The most important kinds of leaseholds were as follows: 
1. A fixed term of certain duration. Here the land was held for a definite length 
of time, usually a certain number of years. It could be for any length of time 
and 99 and 999 years were common forms of leasehold. When the period came to - 133-
an end the estate terminated but in the case of a lease for a very long time 
there was not very much practical difference between a leasehold and a fee 
simple in this regard. 
2. A fixed term with duration capable of being made certain. 
This was also known as a periodical tenancy and ran from week to week, month 
to month or year to year. The tenancy was ended if either landlord or tenant 
gave notice to end it but would continue indefinitely in the absence of notice. 
The length of notice required depended on the period of the tenancy. 
The main difference between leaseholds, on the one hand, and fee tails and 
life estates, on the other, was that the latter were usually used for the 
purpose of providing for one's family while the former was normally used in a 
commercial relationship. The tenant either bought the leasehold for a lump 
sum, or paid a periodic rent, or both. 
It will be seen from what has been said above that a fee simple was the 
greatest estate that could exist and the other estates were all less than fee 
simple. The difference between these estates lay primarily in the time 
element: what happened was that the owner of the fee simple transferred the 
right to possess the land for a certain length of time. He retained the right 
to possess the land once this time was up. Thus the doctrine of estates 
allowed rights in land to be divided up in time. 
If the owner of the fee simple granted a lesser estate to another person, the 
right that he retained was known as the reversion and he was called the 
reversioner. When he granted the estate, however, he might give this residual 
right to another person. When this was done the residual right was known as 
a remainder and the person to whom it was given was called the remainderman. 
Thus A, the grantor who owned the fee simple, might grant the land to Β for 
life with remainder to C in fee simple. A had now disposed of his entire 
interest in the land: Β would possess the land (3) for his lifetime and on his 
death it would go to C. A more complex grant would be to Β for life remainder 
to C in fee tail remainder to D in fee simple. Here the land would pass to C 
on B's death but would only go to D if the estate in fee tail terminated. If 
the entail was barred D would lose his rights entirely. 
It should also be mentioned that a fee simple could be either absolute 
(unconditional) or modified. Thus it was possible to create a fee simple that 
would terminate on the happening of some uncertain future event or one which 
would not commence unless such an event occurred. In this way it was possible 
for English lawyers to make extremely complicated dispositions of land in which 
provision was made for every possible contingency. The creation of future 
interests in land (i.e. rights to the possession of land at some future time) 
was however, controlled by a number of rules and any disposition which was 
contrary to these rules was void. (4) 
In the history of English land law there have always been two conflicting 
forces: on the one hand the desire of individuals to tie up land for the 
benefit of their families and on the other hand the public interest that land 
should be freely alienable. The courts and Parliament have at various times 
intervened in order to promote the free alienability of land: the development 
by the courts of the procedure for barring the entail is one example of this. 
A more recent example is the Settled Land Acts, of which the most important 
was the Settled Land Act of 1882. Settled land was land which belonged to two 
or more persons in succession, e.g. to A for life remainder to B. In this case 
the life tenant (A) could not give a greater interest in the land than he had; 
therefore if he wanted to sell the land all he could give the purchaser was an 
estate pur autre vie, i.e. an interest only lasting as long as A lived, which 
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The Settled Land Acts solved this problem by allowing the tenant for life to 
convey the fee simple to a purchaser provided the latter paid the purchase 
money to trustees. The settlement would then be transferred to the purchase 
money, that is to say the trustees would hold the money in trust for A during 
his life and then for B. The money would be invested and A would be entitled 
to the income and on his death the money would be paid to B. It was also 
provided that the purchase money should for all purposes be treated as if it 
were land. In other words, the interests of the various parties were simply 
transferred from the land to the money, or rather to a fund since the money 
would be invested to provide an income for the life tenant. The Acts contained 
various safeguards for the rights of the parties and since the purpose of 
making a settlement was usually to make financial provision for one's family 
it was not unfair to transfer their rights to a trust fund in this way. The 
technical term to describe the process whereby interests in land were 
transferred to a trust fund is "overreaching". The effect of the Settled Land 
Acts was to reduce the classes of people who could have real rights (droits 
réels) in land: their rights were not extinguished but since they could be 
overreached they were not real rights in the land. 
The 1925 Legislation 
Radical changes were brought about by the reforms of 1925· The only legal estates 
that can now exist in England are a fee simple absolute in possession and a 
leasehold (5)· A fee simple absolute in possession is a fee simple which is 
unconditional and in which the owner has a right to immediate possession of the 
land. There is, however, a rule that if the owner of the fee simple absolute in 
possession gives a lease over the land to another person, the owner of the fee 
simple is still regarded as being in possession of the land. Thus if A, the 
owner of the fee simple, gives Β a lease for 99 years, both A and Β have legal 
estates in the land: A is still regarded as having a fee simple absolute in 
possession and Β has a leasehold estate. 
All the other estates and interests in land which have previously been discussed 
can now exist only in equity. These include estates in fee tail, life estates, 
conditional fee simples and interests in reversion. These estates are now 
created by means of a trust: the fee simple is given to a trustee on trust, e.g. 
for A for life with remainder to B. The rules relating to settled land are, 
however, continued under the Settled Land Act 1925· 
CO-OWNERSHIP 
There are two main kinds of co-ownership in English law. These are joint tenancy 
and tenancy in common. The difference between the two is expressed in theoretical 
terms by saying that while tenants in common hold undivided shares in the land, 
joint tenants do not own shares but each owns the whole subject to the concurrent 
ownership of the other or others. In practical terms the most important difference 
is that if a tenant in common dies his share passes to his successors either by 
will or on an intestacy but if a joint tenant dies his share passes to the other 
joint tenants. (6) If there is only one other joint tenant, the latter takes as 
sole owner. A joint tenancy cannot pass under a will or intestacy. (7) 
Joint tenancy is the more advantageous form of co-ownership in the case of 
trustees since if one trustee dies the others can carry on as before; it is also 
sometimes desirable in the case of husband and wife. In other cases, however, it 
is rather unfair since it is a matter of chance which co-owner will die first. - 135-
If the land is sold to a third party the process of transferring the land is less 
complicated in the case of a joint tenancy because there is only one title to 
the land. In the case of tenancy in common each tenant has a separate title to 
the land and a purchaser would have to investigate the validity of each title. 
For this reason it was provided in England by the Law of Property Act 1925 that a 
legal estate cannot be held by tenants in common but only by joint tenants. 
Tenancy in common can still exist in equity so that if two people wish to own 
land as tenants in common, the land must be conveyed to them as joint tenants in 
trust for themselves as tenants in common. If one co-owner dies the other will 
be sole owner in law but will hold a half share in the land in trust for the 
successors of the deceased co-owner. It was also provided by the 1925 Act that 
joint tenants hold the land subject to a trust for sale. Consequently if the 
land is sold the purchaser will take the land free from the rights of all co-
owners in equity provided he pays the purchase money to at least two trustees. 
All equitable rights over the land are then transferred to the purchase money. 
Ireland 
The position in Ireland is the same as that in England prior to the reforms of 
1925. 
INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS 
Incorporeal hereditaments can best be regarded as rights in the property of 
another person. The most important are rentcr.arges, easements and profits à 
prendre. They can exist both in law or in equity. 
Rentcharges 
A rentcharge is a right to a sum of money payable periodically at specified 
intervals, for example, annually, which is charged upon land. It is payable by 
the person who is for the time being owner (8) of the land and is sometimes used 
to finance the purchase of land. Various remedies are provided both at common 
law and by statute if the rentcharge is not paid when it is due. Under section 1 
of the Law of Property Act 1925 a rentcharge can exist as a legal estate only if 
it is either perpetual or for a fixed length of time. 
Easements 
Easements are similar to servitudes. They exist in favour of a dominant tenement 
and against a servient tenement. They are real rights and run with the land, i.e. 
they bind the servient tenement irrespective of who owns it and they benefit the 
dominant tenement irrespective of who owns it. Easements are of two kinds: 
positive and negative. A positive easement gives the owner of a dominant tenement 
the right to go into the servient tenement and do something (but not to take 
anything from it); a negative easement prevents the owner of the servient tenement 
from doing certain things. There is no numerus clausus of positive easements. 
Examples are: a right of way, a right to divert the course of a stream on the 
servient tenement for irrigation purposes, and the right to lay electric cables 
together with the right to repair them. There is a numerus clausus of negative 
easements. Examples are: a right to light (i.e. that the flow of light to a 
window on the dominant tenement shall not be unreasonably obstructed); a similar 
right to the free flow of air through a defined aperture; and a right to the 
support of a building. - 136 -
Profits à prendre 
A profit is similar to an easement. It is the right to go onto the land of 
another (servient tenement) and take some produce of the land. Examples are: the 
right to take fish or game; the right to cut turf; and the right to pasture 
cattle. One difference between a profit and an easement is that there does not 
always have to be a dominant tenement in the case of a profit: a profit can belong 
to a person who is not the owner of a dominant tenement (9)· A profit of this 
kind is known as a profit in gross and the owner of it can alienate it freely. 
Shooting and fishing rights are probably the most common examples. 
Ireland 
The above applies also to Ireland. 
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 
A restrictive covenant is similar in many ways to a negative easement except that 
it operates in equity and not in law. There is also a dominant and a servient 
tenement and it also binds the owners of each for the time being. It is created 
by a promise contained in a deed (lO) in which the owner or purchaser of land 
promises the owner of another piece of land not to do certain things on his land, 
e.g. not to use it for industrial or commercial purposes. It must be a negative 
promise and it must be a promise which benefits the dominant tenement. As it 
operates against subsequent purchasers only in equity, it will not bind a 
subsequent purchaser unless he had notice of it. In England (but not Ireland) a 
restrictive covenant created after 1925 is, however, registrable under the Land 
Charges Act 1925 and registration then takes the place of notice. The doctrine 
of notice still applies, however, to restrictive covenants created before 1926 
and to all restrictive covenants in Ireland. 
MORTGAGES 
A mortgage is a transaction by which an interest in land is used as a security for 
the repayment of a loan of money. The parties to a mortgage are the mortgagor 
(the owner of the land and the borrower of the money) and the mortgagee"Xthe 
lender of the money). Important changes were made in the law of mortgages in 
England by the 1925 legislation and it is again necessary to consider the position 
both before and after this date. 
Before 1926 
Before 1926 a mortgage of a fee simple estate in land was normally effected in two 
parts. First, the mortgagor would enter into a personal covenant (promise 
contained in a deed (4)) with the mortgagee to repay the loan with interest on a 
fixed date, generally six months from the date of the mortgage deed, and to pay 
interest after this date should the capital not be repaid. This simply gave the 
mortgagee a right in personam against the mortgagor: the land was not affected. 
The second part was a formal transfer of the fee simple to the mortgagee who then 
became the owner in law of the fee simple. There was also, however, a proviso 
for redemption under which the mortgagee agreed to transfer the land back to the 
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At common law the mortgagor lost the right of redemption (right to have the 
property transferred back to him) if he failed to repay the loan by the due date; 
but equity considered that the right of redemption should continue so that if the 
capital and interest were repaid at any future time the mortgagee was obliged in 
equity to retransfer the land (l2). This equitable right to redeem was enforced 
by the Court of Chancery by means of a redemption action. The result was that 
there were two rights of redemption: a legal right to redeem which expired on the 
date stipulated in the personal covenant, and an equitable right to redeem which 
continued indefinitely. Normally mortgages were intended to last much longer 
than the six months stipulated in the personal covenant, so the equitable right 
was the most important feature of a mortgage in practice. 
The position of a mortgagor once the legal right of redemption was lost was as 
follows: he retained possession of the land but in law the mortgagee was the 
owner of the fee simple. His equitable right of redemption, however, gave him an 
equitable right in the land, corresponding to his original fee simple, which was 
called the equity of redemption. This equity of redemption could be sold, could 
pass under a will or could even be mortgaged in turn. It was, however, no more 
than an equitable right and consequently was not binding on a purchaser for value 
without notice but, since the mortgage would be an essential link in the 
mortgagee's title, it would be almost impossible for him to sell the land without 
the purchaser learning of the mortgage. 
The remedies which the mortgagee had to obtain repayment of his loan were as 
follows. First, he could bring a personal action against the mortgagor. 
Secondly, he could sell the property - provided he first gave notice to the 
mortgagee - and take the money owed to him out of the purchase price, giving what 
was left to the mortgagor. The purchaser took the property free of the equity of 
redemption. Thirdly, the mortgagee could apply to court for an order of 
foreclosure. The effect of this was to extinguish the equity of redemption and 
make the mortgagee full owner of the property. Fourthly, the mortgagee could 
take possession of the land and receive the rents and profits. Finally, he could 
appoint an agent to take possession of the land and receive the rents and profits. 
The rights of the mortgagee could be restricted by agreement between the parties 
but he could not be given the right to foreclosure without a court order. 
If the mortgagor wished to obtain a second mortgage on the land this could be 
done in a similar way but as he was no longer owner of the fee simple in law, the 
second mortgage (which was a mortgage of his equity of redemption) could only 
exist in equity. The rights of the second mortgagee were, of course, subject to 
those of the first. An equitable mortgage could also be created as a first 
mortgage in certain situations in which there was no formal transfer of the 
property to the mortgagor. 
After 1925 
The Law of Property Act 1925 provides for two ways of creating a legal mortgage. 
The first is for the mortgagor to give the mortgagee a leasehold estate for a 
long period of time, usually 3000 years, subject to a proviso that the leasehold 
will cease when the loan is repaid. Otherwise the position is similar to that 
before 1926: there is a fixed redemption date, still usually after six months, 
and after that the mortgagor has only an equitable right of redemption. Since 
the mortgagor still has the legal fee simple, it is possible, however, for second 
and subsequent mortgages to be legal. This is done by granting further leaseholds, 
each being usually one day longer than the last: i.e. three thousand years and one 
day. 
The second method is a charge by way of legal mortgage. Here no legal estate is 
transferred to the mortgagee but the statute provides that he has the same - 138-
protection, powers and remedies as if he had been given a leasehold for 3000 
years. 
In both cases the rights of the mortgagee are similar to those of a mortgagee 
before 1926. (13) 
Ireland 
The position in Ireland is in general the same as that in England before 1926. 
TRANSFER 
Estates in land are normally transferred inter vivos by means of a deed of 
conveyance. This is a document in which the transferor conveys (transfers) the 
property to the transferee. The deed must be signed by the transferer and sealed 
by him. The seal need not be his personal seal and today it is normally 
represented by a piece of red paper gummed to the document. The deed must be 
delivered to the transferee. 
Registration 
There are two forms of registration at present found in England, registration of 
incumbrances and registration of title: but a third form of registration, 
registration of deeds, was until recently in force in the county of Yorkshire 
and is still in force in Ireland and Scotland. Registration of incumbrances is 
not concerned with estates in land but only with certain rights less than 
ownership. The most important examples include restrictive covenants, estate 
contracts (see below), certain kinds of mortgages, and equitable easements 
created after 1925· Failure to register may mean that subsequent purchasers of 
the land are not bound by the right. Registration of incumbrances is governed by 
the Land Charges Act 1925 and applies to all land in England, except that subject 
to the system of registration of title. 
Registration of title is a system where each piece of land is described in a 
register together with the name of the owner. The state guarantees the title of 
the person registered as owner and will compensate anyone who suffers on account 
of a mistake in registration. The only estates in respect of which the proprietor 
can be registered are legal estates (not equitable estates) but incumbrances can 
also be registered. Registration of land is compulsory only in certain areas 
(including most big cities) but is optional elsewhere. Once land has been 
registered it can only be transferred by registering the name of the new owner. 
Unregistered land can be transferred by deed without registration. 
Estate Contracts 
Where land is sold the conveyance (transfer) of the land is normally preceded by 
a contract of sale (which must be in writing) (14). This is a contract in which 
the owner of the land agrees to sell it to the purchaser. 
The legal title still remains with the seller until the conveyance of the land 
takes place but since equity will normally enforce the contract by means of a 
decree of specific performance (i.e. an order to the seller to convey the land to 
the buyer) the purchaser is the owner of the land in equity as soon as the contract 
is made. In England before 1926 and in Ireland today the equitable rights of the 
purchaser would prevail against any third party except the bona fide purchaser for 
value without notice; in England since 1925 an estate contract (contract for the 
sale of land) can be registered under the Land Charges Act 1925 and is then good 
against the whole world. Thus if A enters into a contract to sell land to Β and 139 
then, in breach of that contract, transfers it to C, B's rights will prevail over 
those of C in English law provided the contract is registered. In Irish law B's 
rights will prevail unless C had no notice, actual or constructive, of the sale 
to B. On the other hand, as from the date of the contract, the purchaser must 
bear the risk of any damage suffered by the property, for example by fire. 
Capacity 
A disposition by a minor of any right in land is voidable at the option of the 
minor on his attaining majority or within a reasonable time thereafter. Since 
1925 in England a minor cannot hold a legal estate in land though he can hold an 
equitable interest. If it is wished to transfer land to a minor the land is, 
therefore, conveyed to trustees in trust for the minor. Married women suffer no 
disability with regard to the ownership of land. 
Ireland 
Registration of title is found in Ireland but there is no equivalent to the Land 
Charges Act 1925. Registration of title is similar to that in England and is 
compulsory in certain cases and voluntary in all others. As in England, once 
land is registered it can only be transferred by changing the register. 
Incumbrances on registered land are also registrable. Registration of deeds 
applies to all unregistered land. Under this system all deeds relating to land 
must be registered or they are void against subsequent purchasers. In other 
words an unregistered transfer does not give a real right. The registration of 
a deed transferring land is not any guarantee of the title of the transferor. - 140-
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Notes. 
(1) The word "estate" in English has two other meanings in addition to that 
given in the text: (i) it can refer to a large piece of land owned by a 
single person (though parts of it may often be leased to other people); (ii) 
it can also mean the sum total of a person's assets, especially on death. 
The word will not normally be used in either of these senses in this report. 
(2) It then reverts to the Crown. 
(3) While Β was alive C would have a fee simple estate in remainder. He would 
have no right to possession of the land but he could sell or otherwise 
alienate his fee simple in remainder. 
(4) For a consideration of the rules governing future interests, see Megarry, 
A Manual of the Law of Real Property, chap. 4; Megarry and Wade, The Law 
of Real Property, chap. 5· 
(5) Law of Property Act 1925, section 1. 
(6) This is known as the right of survivorship. 
(7) A joint tenancy can, however, be converted into a tenancy in common if the 
joint tenant wishes to claim his share. This is known as severance and it 
can only take place during the lifetime of the joint tenant. 
(8) More accurately, the freehold tenant in possession of the land. 
(9) In other words, it is equivalent to a personal, as distinct from a praedial, 
servitude, 
(10) A deed is a document under seal: see p. 31, below. 
(11) See below, p. 31. 
(12) The right to redeem could be extinguished if the mortgagee exercised his 
right to sell the land in order to recover his loan or if he obtained an 
order of foreclosure from the court. The rights of the mortgagee are 
discussed below. 
(13) Certain kinds of mortgages must be registered, otherwise they will not be 
valid as against purchasers for value of an interest in the land. 
(14) England: Law of Property Act 1925, s. 40; Ireland: Statute of Frauds 
(Ireland) 1695, s. 2. If the contract is not in writing it is not void but 
it cannot be enforced by action unless part performance has taken place. - 143 -
Chapter 3: IMMOVABLES IN THE INTERNAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 
The Scottish law of immovables, like that of England, was originally based on feudal 
principles. However, unlike in England, these principles are still of some practical 
importance and it is therefore necessary to consider them briefly. The basic 
principle of the feudal system was that all land belonged to the king and all rights 
in land were derived from his grant. The persons to whom the king granted land (the 
tenants of the king) would in turn grant some of it to their tenants so that the 
whole structure of feudal society was built up on the relation between a lord and 
his vassal (or tenant). In return for a grant of land the tenant would be obliged 
to perform services for his lord; and the nature of these services would vary with 
the tenure on which the land was held. A common example in England was knight 
service, in which the tenant was required to provide mounted soldiers to fight for 
his lord. 
These feudal principles are no longer of practical importance in England for two 
reasons: today all freehold land is held directly from the Crown - there is no 
intervening tenant in chief - and the feudal services have been abolished. For 
these reasons an Englishman who owns a fee simple estate in land may for all 
practical purposes be considered the owner of the land. In Scotland, however, 
most land is held on a tenure known as feu tenure (l). Such land is not held 
directly from the Crown but from a feudal superior and the tenant is still obliged 
to pay him a periodic sum of money, known as feu duty, which is the modern 
equivalent of the feudal services. Thus feudalism is still of some practical 
importance in Scottish law: but the Government has announced its intention of 
abolishing the feudal system in Scottish land law in the near future and when 
this is done feu duty will also be abolished. 
Another difference between English and Scottish law is that Scotland never adopted 
the doctrine of estates. Instead Scottish lawyers sought to fit feudal land law 
into the structure of Roman Law. The problem in doing this was to decide who had 
dominium, the Roman concept of ownership. The solution eventually adopted was 
that of divided ownership: the feudal superior has dominium directum in the land 
and the tenant has dominium utile. Thus the latter, though he is still burdened 
with the obligation to pay feu duty, is said to own the land; while his English 
counterpart, the fee simple owner, owns a mere estate in the land. Except for 
his feudal obligations, however, the owner of land in Scotland is in a similar 
position to the owner of a fee simple estate in England or the owner of land in 
Continental systems. 
The Scottish equivalent of an estate for life is a liferent. The person with 
residual ownership in the land is known as the fiar and the person who has the 
liferent is called the liferenter. Liferent involves the division of ownership 
in time and the liferenter is in fact a temporary owner. 
At one time Scots lawyers thought of a liferent as a personal servitude but this 
view is no longer adopted and it is now regarded as an independent right in 
property. The liferenter is entitled to the possession of the property and to 
its fruits but he must leave the substance intact. He is obliged to pay feu dues 
and taxes and he is responsible for normal repairs. He can take crops in the 
case of agricultural land and if the land is leased he can take the rent. 
A liferent normally lasts for the life of a liferenter (2) and is created either 
by constitution or by reservation. A liferent is created by constitution when the 
owner of the land grants a liferent over it in favour of another person (in which 
case the original owner is the fiar) or when he grants a liferent to one person 
and grants the ownership to a second person (who then becomes the fiar). In the - 144-
latter case the original owner has disposed of his entire interest in the 
property. A liferent by reservation is created where the original owner 
transfers the ownership of the land to another person but reserves the liferent 
to himself. He is then the liferenter and the other person is the fiar. 
A liferent of the kind described (known as a proper liferent) creates a real 
right. A more common form of liferent today, however, is a trust liferent in 
which the full ownership is vested in trustees in trust for a beneficiary 
liferenter with directions to transfer full ownership to the fiar on the death 
of the liferenter. In this situation the beneficiaries under the trust have no 
real rights (equitable rights are unknown in Scottish law and the beneficiary 
under a Scottish trust has a personal right only). 
A lease in Scottish law originally conferred only a personal right on the tenant 
so that if the property was sold he had no rights against the new owner. This 
rule was changed by a statute, the Leases Act 1449, which provided that the 
lease would give the tenant a real right once he had entered into possession (3). 
Under a later statute, the Registration of Leases Act 1857, a tenant under a 
lease of 31 years or more can obtain a real right without entering into 
possession provided he registers the lease in a public register (4). A lease in 
Scottish law is heritable property (5)· 
As in English law, there are two kinds of co-ownership in Scottish law: common 
ownership and joint ownership. They are similar to their equivalents in English 
law but joint ownership can only exist in Scottish law if there is some special 
relationship between the co-owners based on trust or some contractual or quasi-
contractual bond. Examples of joint owners are co-trustees, members of a 
partnership or members of an unincorporated association (6) such as a club. 
As in English law, each common owner has a separate title to the property. He 
can alienate his share and on death it passes to his successors. Each common 
owner has the right to demand the division of the property but if this is 
impracticable or unfair to the other common owners the property will be sold 
instead. In the case of joint ownership there is only one title and a joint 
owner does not have the right to alienate his share. On his death his share 
passes to the other joint owners and does not go to his successors. A joint 
owner has no right to demand the division of the property. 
The law of servitudes in Scotland is similar to that in England. The term 
"servitude" is, however, used in Scotland and Scottish servitudes are the 
equivalent of easements and profits à prendre in English law. All Scottish 
servitudes are praedial: they burden the servient tenement and benefit the 
dominant tenement (7). As in England, they are classified as either negative 
or positive. In a negative servitude the owner of the servient tenement is 
prohibited from doing something; in a positive servitude the owner of the 
dominant tenement is entitled to do something on the other's land. Most of the 
specific kinds of servitudes found in England exist also in Scotland, for example 
right of way, right of support for buildings, the right to pasture cattle and the 
right to light. Unlike most real rights in Scottish law, servitudes do not have 
to be registered. 
The law relating to mortgages in Scotland is now governed by statute, the 
Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970. This act created a new kind 
of security in land known as the standard security which supersedes all existing 
forms of security in immovable property. It is recorded in the Register of 
Sasines (see below) and gives the creditor a real right. As in England, the 
creditor cannot foreclose (take the land as his if the debt is not paid) unless 
he first obtains a court order. Besides foreclosure, the creditor has the right 
to sell the land provided he first gives notice to the debtor so that the latter 
can pay off the debt. If the land is sold the buyer takes it free of the - 145-
debtor's right to redeem and the creditor is obliged to pay the balance of the 
purchase money to the debtor after he has deducted the amount of the debt, the 
costs of the sale, and any other debts secured over the land. The creditor also 
has the right to enter into possession of the property and take any income, e.g. 
rents. The rights of the parties can be varied by agreement except in the case 
of foreclosure and sale. 
Registration is an important feature of Scottish land law and as a general rule 
real rights in land cannot be created or transferred without the registration of 
the transaction (8). The register is known as the Register of Sasines and was 
created by statute in 1617 (9)· It is, however, a register of deeds, not of 
title: registration is no guarantee of the validity of the title of the 
transferor. Failure to register, however, means that the transferee does not 
have a real right. His right will not, therefore, prevail against third parties. 
Thus if the owner of land agrees to sell it to X but the transfer is not 
registered, and he subsequently agrees to sell it to Y and registers the transfer, 
Y will be the owner of the land. 
The Government has announced its intention of introducing a system of 
registration of title in Scotland on the same lines as the English system. It 
will probably be introduced gradually in certain parts of the country but will 
eventualis cover the whole of Scotland. The Register of Sasines will be replaced 
by a new Land Register. The State will guarantee all titles on the register and 
will indemnify anyone who suffers because a mistake is made in registration. 
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Notes 
(1) Some land is held directly from the Crown on a tenure known as "blench 
tenure" and there is also some allodial land, i.e. land not held of any 
feudal superior, such as ecclesiastical property of the Church of Scotland 
In the Shetland and Orkney Islands there is a tenure known as "udal tenure' 
which is also non-feudal. These islands were settled by Vikings and they 
originally belonged to the Kings of Norway. In 1468-9 Christian I of 
Norway pledged them in security for the unpaid balance of Princess 
Margaret's dowry upon her marriage to James HI of Scotland. The pledge 
was never redeemed and the islands were annexed by Scotland in l6l2. 
(2) According to Professor T.B. Smith, Scotland: The Development of its Laws 
and Constitution, p. 486 a liferent can also exist until the happening of 
some event, e.g. marriage, or for a fixed number of years. However, the 
normal case is where it lasts for the life of the liferenter. 
(3) The statue did not apply unless: (l) the lease was in writing (if it was 
for more than a year); (ii) a specific rent was agreed upon; and (iii) the 
lease was for a definite term. 
(4) This is the Register of Sasines; it is discussed. 
(5) In English law a leasehold is personal property: a chattel real, 
(6) An unincorporated association is a group of people lacking a corporate 
personality. 
(7) The only possible exception to this is a liferent, which older writers 
regarded as a personal servitude. Today, however, it is not regarded as a 
servitude at all. 
(8) Servitudes are an exception. 
(9) The Registration Act I617. - 149 
Chapter 4: IMMOVABLES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
English, Irish and Scottish private international law are all very similar. 
Except where special mention is made of Scottish or Irish law, it can be assumed 
that what is said below concerning English law applies also to Scotland and 
Ireland. 
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MOVABLES AND IMMOVABLES 
Although English and Irish law adopt the distinction between personalty and 
realty for domestic purposes, the distinction between movables and immovables is 
applied for the purpose of private international law. Likewise, Scotland adopts 
the distinction between movable and heritable property for internal purposes, 
but that of movables and immovables for private international law. 
Confusion can sometimes arise in discussing the distinction between movables and 
immovables if the difference between things and rights is not kept clearly in 
mind. This confusion can arise because some legal systems talk of ownershin of 
land while others talk of ownership of a right (or estate) in land. This 
difference is one of terminology rather than substance but it is probably desirable 
to give separate consideration to the classification of things and of rights. 
English conflict of laws applies the rule that the question whether a thing is 
movable or immovable is decided by the law of the place where the thing is situate 
(lex situs). Thus the lex situs will decide whether a building or some other 
object attached to the soil is movable or immovable. It will also decide whether 
an object which is physically movable (movable by nature) is deemed by the law to 
be immovable or vice versa. Thus if under the law of country X agricultural 
machinery is deemed to be part of the land on which it is normally used, and 
therefore an immovable, an English court will accept this classification with 
regard to such machinery situate in country X. If the physically movable object 
is not actually situate on the land in question, it is nrobable that an English 
court would look to the law of the place where the object is situate, not where 
the land is situate. For example: 
Assume that under the law of country X agricultural machinery is deemed to be part 
of the land where it is normally used. If a tractor is normally used on land in 
country X but is temporarily in country Y for repairs, the question whether the 
tractor is movable or immovable will be decided by the law of country Y. (l) 
The question whether a right or obligation connected with a thing is movable or 
immovable is decided by the lex situs of the thing. Likewise the classiiication 
of a document connected with a thing (for example, a title deed) probably depends 
on the lex situs of the thing (for example, the land) rather than the lex situs of 
the document. The classification of a right or obligation not connected with a 
material thing (for example a debt which is not connected with property, or a patent) 
probably depends on the lex situs of the right. To ascribe a situation to a right 
of this nature is obviously a fiction but there are various rules in English conflict 
of laws which determine the situation of intangible property (2). 
If the property is situate in England, English law will decide whether it is 
movable or immovable. It is important to note that English law regards the 
distinction between movables and immovables to be different from that between 
personalty and realty. The fact that property is nersonalty does -not mean that - 150 
it is movable. Likewise in Scotland the fact that property is heritable does not 
mean that it is immovable. 
In general any right connected with English land is considered immovable while a 
right connected with movable property or unconnected with any material thing is 
considered movable. This applies to both legal and equitable rights. The 
following are examples of rights in immovables (immovable rights); leaseholds 
(which are personal property in the domestic classification), mortgages (i.e. the 
interest of the mortgagee in the land including his right to the repayment of the 
debt) and rentcharges. It is interesting to note that courts in Australia and 
New Zealand have classified mortgages on land in those countries as movables (3). 
The equitable doctrine of conversion (see above, p. 126) does not apply to the 
distinction between movables and immovables. This is illustrated by the case of 
Re Berchtold (4) in which the facts were as follows. A Hungarian count owned 
freehold lands in England and on his death he left a will in which he divised this 
land to English trustees on trust for sale with the power to postpone the sale for 
so long as they should think fit. The main beneficiary under the trust was the 
testator's son. The land was never in fact sold and after the death intestate of 
the son the question arose which law should govern the devolution of the son's 
interest in the land. The rule of English conflict of laws is that succession to 
movables is governed by the law of the domicile of the deceased (in this case 
Hungarian); while succession to immovables is governed by the lex situs. 
It was argued by one of the parties to the case that under the doctrine of 
conversion the beneficiary's interest in the lands was to be regarded as 
personalty even though they had not been sold and that therefore the interest was 
movable and governed by Hungarian law. This was rejected by the court which held 
that: 
this equitable doctrine of conversion only arises and comes into 
play where the question for consideration arises as between real estate and 
personal estate. It has no relation to the question whether property is 
movable or immovable (5). 
The decision of the court was that the son's interest in the lands was immovable 
and consequently s-overned by the lex situs. 
Difficult problems arise under the Settled Land Act 1925. This deals with the 
sale of settled land and provides that where such land is sold the rights of the 
beneficiaries attach to the purchase money (regarded as capital money) (See 
p. 133 above). Section 75 (5) °f this Act provides: 
Capital money arising undei this Act while remaining uninvested or 
unapplied, and securities on which an investment of any such capital money 
is made, shall for all purposes of disposition, transmission and devolution 
be treated as land ... 
In Re Cutcliffe (6) English land was sold under the Act and the proceeds invested 
in the stock of a British company. The question before the court was whether the 
interest of a beneficiary was movable or immovable. 
The court held it was immovable on the basis of the statute. The difference 
between this statute and the equitable rules of conversion is that the statute 
did not say that the money and the securities in which it might be invested should 
be treated as realty; it said they should be treated as land. Since land is 
immovable the securities must also be immovable. 
In Ireland there is an identical provision to the above in section 22(5) of the 
Settled Land Act 1882. However, if Irish land were sold under the Irish Act and - 151 -
invested in English securities an English court might hold the interest of a 
beneficiary to be movable. The reasons are as follows. The securities are 
situate in England and therefore the lex situs - English law - decides whether 
they are movable or immovable. The Irish Act cannot apply because it is not part 
of the lex situs. The English Act cannot apply either because its provisions are 
limited to money "arising under this Act", i.e. the proceeds of the sale of 
English land. Therefore neither Act would apply and the common law classification 
of the securities as movable would prevail (7). 
If, however, the proceeds of the sale of English settled land were invested in 
Irish securities and the case came before an English court the result might be 
different. This is because the court might interpret the English Act as 
overruling the normal conflict of laws rule that the lex situs classifies the 
property as movable or immovable. Since the securities would come within the 
terms of the English Act (being investments of money "arising under this Act") 
the court would have to apply it even though the securities were in Ireland. It 
is, of course, possible that the court would consider that the Act was not 
intended to abrogate the normal conflict of laws rule but this is unlikely. 
JURISDICTION 
Law in England 
All actions concerning land in English law are actions in personam (8). The basic 
principle of English private international law is chat the jurisdiction of an 
English court in an action in personam depends on either the submission of the 
defendant to the jurisdiction of the court or on the service of a writ on the 
defendant. There is no difficulty in serving a writ on the defendant if he is in 
England but if he is in a foreign country the leave of the court must first be 
obtained. The court will only grant leave if the case comes within one of the 
provisions of the Rules of Court (9). In fact the Rules provide that service of 
the writ may be allowed outside England if the subject matter of the action is land 
situate in England (10). It is also provided that the writ may be served outside 
England if an act, deed, will, contract, obligation, or liability affecting land 
situate in England is sought to be construed, rectified, set aside, or enforced in 
the action begun by the writ (11). It will be seen from this that the court can 
always obtain jurisdiction over English land though, where the defendant is not in 
England, the court may in its discretion decide not to allow service of the writ. 
In Scotland the fact that the subject matter of the action is Scottish land in 
itself gives the courts Jurisdiction in any possessory or propriatory action (l2); 
in addition the fact that the defendant owns land in Scotland (or has a beneficial 
interest in such land) also gives the Scottish courts jurisdiction to hear an 
action in personam against him even if it is unconnected with the land (13). 
Foreign Land 
As a general rule an English court has no jurisdiction to hear an action 
concerning title to, or the right to the possession of, foreign land. In addition 
the court lacks jurisdiction to hear certain actions in tort (delict) concerning 
foreign land. The most important decision on this point is the case of British 
South Africa Co, Ltd. v. Companhia de Moçambique (l4). This concerned a dispute 
between a British company (the British South Africa Co.) and a Portuguese company 
(the Companhia de Moçambique) over land in Africa. The Portuguese company was the 
plaintiff and it claimed that the British company had wrongfully entered their - 152-
land and ejected them from it. They claimed three remedies: 1. a declaration (l5) 
that they were lawfully in possession of the land; 2. an injunction (l6) 
restraining the defendants from asserting any title to the land; and 3. damages 
for trespass (l7) on the land in the sum of £ 250,000. When the case reached the 
House of Lords (the highest court of appeal in England) the plaintiffs dropped 
their first two claims and merely asked for damages. Nevertheless the court held 
that there was no jurisdiction to hear the claim. 
It is not clear exactly what the scope of this rule is. There is some controversy 
whether it is limited to actions for the tort of trespass or whether it extends to 
all torts (delicts) concerning foreign land. The Canadian courts have interpreted 
the Moçambique case as prohibiting all actions in tort concerning foreign land. 
The following example illustrates the position taken in Canada: 
X owns land in Canada; Y owns land across the border in the USA. Due to X's 
negligence a fire started on his land spreads across the border and destroys 
trees on Y's land. Y sues X in Canada for the tort of negligence, claiming 
damages for the destruction of his trees. The Canadian courts have no 
jurisdiction (l8). It is not clear whether the English courts would adopt the 
same approach. The rule in the Moçambique case has been criticised and the courts 
may try to limit its application; on the other hand there are reasons for 
believing that they might interpret it in the same way as the Candían courts have 
done (19). 
There are three exceptions to the Moçambique rule. First, if the English court 
has jurisdiction to administer an estate or trust, and the property includes 
movables or immovables in England and immovables in a foreign country, the court 
has jurisdiction to determine questions of title to the foreign immovables for 
the purposes of the administration. Secondly, English courts have jurisdiction 
to hear an action in rem against a ship to enforce a maritime lien on the ship 
for damage to foreign immovables. The case which established this exception 
concerned a ship which had damaged a wharf in Nigeria (20). 
The third exception is more important for the purpose of this report. Under this 
exception the court can hear an action relating to foreign land if the action is 
based on either a contract or an equity between the parties to the action. This 
exception was developed by the Court of Chancery and is based on equitable 
principles. The idea is that there must be some personal link between the parties 
and the defendant must have acted in a way which equity considers to be 
unconscionable. If this is so the court can hear the case even though rights in 
foreign land are involved. 
It is, of course, essential that there should be jurisdiction in personam over 
the defendant (2l) but if this exists the court may order him to deal with the 
land in the way that the court directs. Thus if X enters into a contract with Y 
to sell him land in a foreign country and then fails to transfer the land, the 
court will, if it has jurisdiction over X, make an order of specific performance 
against him, that is an order that he do whatever is necessary according to the 
lex situs to transfer the land to Y. Likewise, if A fraudulently induces Β to 
transfer land to him (or a right in land, such as a mortgage), the court will, if 
it has jurisdiction in personam over A, have jurisdiction to order him 'to transfer 
the land back to B. 
The effectiveness of a judgment in a case of this kind depends on the circumstances. 
If the defendant is present in England he can be imprisoned for contempt of court 
if he refuses to obey the court's order. If he has assets in England, these can 
be sequestrated. Otherwise the judgment may not be effective unless it is enforced 
by a foreign court. Since all equitable remedies are discretionary, however, the 
court may decide not to make an order if it cannot be enforced. - 153 -
This jurisdiction has been criticised as being excessive and it is doubtful 
whether an English court would recognise a foreign judgment given in similar 
circumstances. This question has never arisen in England but there is a Canadian 
case in point. The facts were as follows: 
A had agreed with Β in California to sell him land situated in the Canadian 
province of British Columbia. A and Β were both residents of California. A 
transferred the land to Β in accordance with the provisions of British Columbia 
law. Subsequently A brought an action against Β in a Californian court to have 
the transfer set aside on the ground that Β was guilty of fraud. The Californian 
court ordered Β to transfer the land back to A and, when he refused to do so, the 
clerk of the court purported to transfer the land in B's name. Later A brought 
an action in Canada for a declaration that he was the owner of the land, but the 
court refused to grant such a declaration (22). 
CHOICE OF LAW 
The general rule with regard to choice of law is that the lex situs governs (23). 
It is not easy, however, to determine the exact scope of this rule because t>iere 
are not many judicial decisions on the point. It seems likely that most questions 
concerning real rights (droits réels) will be decided by the lex situs (24). This 
will probably include: the kinds of estates and rights that can exist in land; the 
rights flowing from ownership and other real rights in land; the creation and 
transfer of such rights (including the form of deeds and other documents creating 
or transferring rights in land); the classes of persons who are incapable of 
owning land or rights in it; and the rights of third parties. It is not certain 
what law governs capacity to transfer land. It may be governed by the lex situs 
but some writers think that capacity to transfer land (as distinct from capacity 
to own land) should be governed by the personal law of the transferor, which in 
English private international law is the law of the domicile (25). 
It is important to distinguish a contract relating to land from a conveyance 
(transfer) of land. A contract for the sale of land is governed by the proper 
law (26) of contract. This will normally be the lex situs of the land but this 
will not always be the case. For example: 
A and Β are both domiciled and resident in England. They enter into a contract 
in which A agrees to sell Β some land in France. The contract is made in Enp-land, 
is in the English language and uses English legal terminology. An English court 
would probably decide that the parties intended English law to govern the contract. 
The rights of the parties under the contract would then be governed by English 
law but the transfer of the land would be governed by French law. 
If the seller fails to carry out the contract an English court may, if it has 
jurisdiction over him, order him to do whatever is necessary under the lex situs 
to transfer the land. 
There are some exceptions to the rule that a contract relating to land is 
governed by its proper^law. If the contract involves dealing with the land in a 
way that is illegal by the lex situs (i.e. involves doing something in the 
country where the land is situate which is a criminal offence by that law), the 
contract will be void irrespective of the proper law. If the contract involves 
doing something that is not legally possible by the lex situs, the position is 
less clear. Specific performance will not, of course, be ordered but damages 
may be awarded. - 154 
It is also unclear what law governs capacity to make a contract relating to land. 
There is a decision of the Court of Appeal (28) that the lex situs governs this 
question, but this has been strongly criticised by writers. The other 
possibilities are the proper law of the contract or the law of the domicile of 
the person concerned (29). A contract relating to land is probably valid as to 
form if it complies with the requirements of either the proper law or the law of 
the place where the contract is made (30). The question as to what remedies are 
available - damages or specific performance, for example - is a question of 
procedure to be decided by the law of the forum (3l). 
In English domestic law it is provided by section 40(l) of the law of Property 
Act 1925 that: 
No action may be brought upon any contract for the sale or other disposition of 
land or any interest in land, unless the agreement upon which such action is 
brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing, and signed by the 
party to be charged or by some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorised. 
This provision was originally found in section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677 (3l) 
(32). It does not say that a contract which is not in writing is invalid but 
merely that it cannot be enforced by action (33). For this reason it was decided 
in the case of Leroux v. Brown (34) that this provision relates to procedure and 
not substance. Since procedure is governed by the lex fori the provision would 
be applicable in all cases before an English court irrespective of the proper law 
or the lex situs. This characterisation (qualification) of the provision has, 
however, been criticised by writers; a better characterisation, it is felt, would 
be that it relates to the formal requirements for such a contract (35)· - 155 -
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MOVABLE PROPERTY 
AND REAL SECURITIES - 159-
Chapter 5. MOVABLE PROPERTY IN INTERNAL LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
The English, Scottish and Northern Irish law relating to tangible movable 
property is much less complex than that concerning immovables. The 
concepts and general approach will not be unfamiliar to a Continental 
lawyer and most of the legal principles in this branch of the law have 
their analogues in Continental systems. The differences between the 
various legal systems covered in this report are not great. The law 
relating to the sale of goods has been codified in the Sale of Goods 
Act 1893 and this applies throughout the United Kingdom. The same is 
true of another important statute, the Factors Act 1889 (1). This chapter 
will, therefore, describe the law in England. Where there are differences 
in the other countries covered by the report, these will be noted; other-
wise it may be assumed that what is said regarding England applies to the 
other countries as well. 
It should also be mentioned that there is no separate system of commercial 
law in England. However, the term "commercial law" is sometimes used to 
refer to those branches of the law of special interest to businessmen, 
e.g. sale of goods or negotiable instruments. 
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION 
The doctrine of estates does not apply to movable property. One normally 
talks of owning a chattel and the concept of ownership of movables in 
English law is similar to that in Continental legal systems. It is, 
however, possible to create successive interests in movable property by 
means of a trust. A trust can, of course, apply to movables just as 
much as to immovables. Movable property, usually money or stocks and 
shares, can be given to a trustee on trust for X for life and then for 
Y. The trustee will invest the money and pay the income to X for his 
life and then give the capital to Y on X's death (2). 
Possession is important in English law for a number of reasons. It is 
evidence of ownership; most of the remedies that the law gives to protect 
rights in property are based on possession or the right to possession, 
rather than title; and, as will be seen below, a person in possession of 
property can in certain circumstances make an innocent third person owner 
of the goods even though the possessor has no title at all to the goods. 
The concept of possession is based on both a physical and a mental 
element. The mental element is to hold the property for one's own 
benefit (3). The physical element is that of control over the property. 
Its exact nature will depend on the circumstances: a greater degree of 
control is normally possible in the case of a wrist watch than in the - 160-
case of a sunken ship. Various factors are taken into account by the 
courts in deciding who has possession of a chattel and it is possible 
that the concept of possession varies depending on the purpose for which 
it is used. 
BAILMENT 
It is not easy to give an exact definition of bailment in English law 
but it can be said that in general a bailment occurs whenever one person 
gives possession of a chattel to another with the intention that it 
should be returned at a later date. The essence of bailment is, there-
fore, the transfer of possession (but not ownership) for a limited 
purpose. The person who transfers possession is the bailor and the 
person to whom possession is transferred is the bailee. Examples of 
bailment are: the loan of a book to a friend; hiring a motor car; giving 
a watch to a jeweller for repair; depositing furniture in a warehouse 
for safekeeping; or handing goods to a pawnbroker as security for a 
loan (pledge). 
The rights and duties of the bailee can be laid down by contract between 
the parties but in the absence of such an agreement the common law rules 
apply. Under these rules the bailee is not, subject to two exceptions, 
liable if the property is damaged or destroyed unless the damage or 
destruction was caused by his negligence. The question of whether the 
bailee is guilty of negligence depends largely on whether he took reason-
able care of the property. The degree of care required depends on the 
circumstances. Some authorities say that if the bailment is for the 
sole benefit of the bailee (for example, if I lend a book to a friend 
free of charge) the bailee must take the highest degree of care of it; 
if, on the other hand, the bailment is for the sole benefit of the 
bailor (e.g., if I look after your watch while you go for a swim) the 
degree of care is much less. If the bailment is for the benefit of both 
parties (e.g. if I hire a car in return for a payment) then a normal 
degree of care must be exercised. This approach has, however, been 
criticised as being too rigid: who benefits from the bailment should be 
only one of the factors taken into account and the degree of care should 
depend on what a reasonable man would expect in the circumstances. 
The two exceptions to the above rules are common carriers and innkeepers. 
A common carrier is someone who holds himself out as being willing to 
carry for reward the goods of anyone who employs him and he is liable 
for damage to the goods (subject to certain exceptions) irrespective 
of negligence unless he contracts out of this liability. Most firms 
in the transport industry today, however, reserve the right to choose 
what goods they accept and are not common carriers. The common law 
also made innkeepers (hotel proprietors) liable for the goods of guests 
irrespective of negligence but this has now been modified by the Hotel 
Proprietors Act 1956 which allows hotel proprietors to limit their 
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Scotland 
The terms bailment, bailor and bailee are not normally used in Scotland 
and the terms used normally relate to the specific kind of transaction, 
e.g. lender or hirer. The term "custodier" is, however, used as the 
Scottish equivalent of "bailee" in the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (see 
section 62 (1) of that Act). The law stated above does, however, apply 
to Scotland, including the Hotel Proprietors Act 1956. 
TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP BY A NON-OWNER 
All modern legal systems have to reconcile two conflicting policies. 
On the one hand there is the desire to protect the security of ownership, 
on the other there is the desire to protect the security of commercial 
transactions. If property is sold to a bona fide purchaser by someone 
who is not the owner of it and has no right to sell it, the question 
arises whether the law should protect the rights of the original owner 
by holding that the purchaser obtains no title to the property, or 
whether the bona fide purchaser should be protected by recognising him 
as owner. In situations such as this it is likely that one or other 
of two innocent people will have to bear the loss and it is not easy 
to decide what the best solution is. 
Most legal systems effect some kind of compromise by upholding the title 
of the original owner in certain situations and that of the bona fide 
purchaser in others; but they tend to draw the line in different places. 
In English law somewhat greater protection is given to the original 
owner than in many Continental legal systems. 
The rules in English law for the transfer of title are rather complicated. 
The basic rule (which is subject to very important exceptions) is that 
no one can give a better title than he has. In other words, a purchaser 
from a non-owner gains no title to the goods. This rule is usually 
referred to by the Latin maxim, Nemo dat quod non habet, which is often 
shortened to nemo dat. This rule, of course, involves giving the fullest 
protection to the rights of the original owner at the expense of the 
bona fide purchaser. In addition to this, the general rule (which will 
be considered in more detail below) as to the passing of property between 
buyer and seller (who is owner) is that when there is a sale of specific 
goods property passes to the buyer when the parties intend that it should 
pass and this is assumed, in the absence of indications to the contrary, 
to be when the contract is made. 
Ownership of goods can pass from seller to buyer by mere agreement 
without the necessity of delivery. This rule, coupled with the nemo dat 
rule could completely undermine the security of commercial transactions. 
However, the nemo dat rule is subject to very important exceptions and 
these largely (but not completely) nullify the rule concerning the 
passing of property between buyer and seller in so far as third parties 
are concerned and also give protection to innocent purchasers in other 
situations as well. However, these exceptions do not destroy the nemo 
dat rule: there is no general principle that a person in possession of 
goods, even with the owner's consent, can give a good title to a bona - 162 -
fide purchaser. Thus if a bona fide purchaser buys the goods from a 
person who borrowed or hired them from the original owner, the purchaser 
generally acquires no title. 
The principle of nemo dat is a basic principle of the common law but 
it has been given statutory recognition in section 21 (1) of the Sale 
of Goods Act: 
Subject to the provisions of this Act, where goods are sold by 
a person who is not the owner thereof and who does not sell 
them under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the 
buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller 
had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded 
from denying the seller's authority to sell. 
This provision,of course, only applies to sales, but the principle is in 
fact one of general application and applies to all transactions which 
purport to transfer ownership or some lesser real right such as a pledge. 
As was said previously, the exceptions to the nemo dat rule are almost 
as important as the rule itself. The most important of these exceptions 
will now be considered in detail. 
Estoppel 
This exception is referred to in the provision just quoted (section 21 
(1) of the Sale of Goods Act). This ends with the words: "...unless the 
owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's 
authority to sell". Estoppel is a general principle of the common law 
and its application is not limited to questions of transfer of title; 
it will, however, be considered here only insofar as it concerns this 
question. The basic idea of estoppel is that if someone leads another 
person to believe that a certain state of affairs exists, he cannot 
subsequently deny this if the other person has acted in reliance on what 
he was led to believe. 
There are two kinds of estoppel. The first is called estoppel by 
representation and arises where the true owner by his words represents 
to the buyer that a third party (the seller) either is the true owner 
or has the owner's authority to sell. The second is called estoppel 
by conduct and it arises where the true owner by his conduct allows the 
seller to appear as the owner or as having the owner's authority to sell. 
In both cases, however, the doctrine cannot operate unless the owner 
either intended to mislead (i.e. was guilty of fraud) or was negligent. 
In other words there must be some blameworthiness on the part of the 
true owner; he must have been responsible for the creation of a deceptive 
situation which misled the buyer. 
It is important to realise the limits of this doctrine. The mere fact 
that the owner gives possession of the goods to another person is not 
considered to be a representation that that person is the owner or has 
authority to sell the goods. Thus the owner is not prevented from 
denying the authority to sell of the person to whom he gave possession 
of the goods. The position might, however, be different if the owner 
knew that the person in possession was holding himself out to third 
parties as being the owner or if the owner also gave him documents of 
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Scotland 
In Scotland the term "personal bar" is used instead of "estoppel" but 
what has been said above applies to Scotland as well as England. 
Dispositions by a Mercantile Agent 
Dispositions by a mercantile agent (factor) come under section 2 of the 
Factors Act 1889. Section 21 of the Sale of Goods Act (this is the 
provision which embodies the nemo dat principle) expressly preserves 
the Factors Act as an exception to the nemo dat principle. Section 21 
(2)(a) reads: 
Provided also that nothing in this Act shall affect the 
provisions of the Factors Acts, or any enactment (1) enabling 
the apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he were 
the true owner thereof. 
Various Factors Acts were passed by Parliament from 1823 onwards and the 
present Act is that of 1889. Section 2 (1) of the Factors Act 1889 
reads: 
Where a mercantile agent is, with the consent of the owner, in 
possession of goods or of the documents of title to goods, any 
sale, pledge, or other disposition of the goods, made by him 
when acting in the ordinary course of business of a mercantile 
agent, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be as 
valid ad if he were expressly authorised by the owner of the 
goods to make the same; provided that the person taking under 
the disposition acts in good faith, and has not at the time of 
the disposition notice that the person making the disposition 
has not authority to make the same. 
This provision may be summarised by saying that if the owner gives 
possession of the goods to a mercantile agent, a sale by the latter will 
give a good title to a bona fide buyer provided that the requirements of 
the Act are complied with. The first point to consider is the meaning 
of the term "mercantile agent". This is defined in section 1 (4) of the 
Factors Act as "a mercantile agent having in the customary course of his 
business as such agent authority either to sell goods, or to consign 
goods for the purpose of sale, or to buy goods, or to raise money on the 
security of goods". It is not always an easy question whether a person 
is a mercantile agent for the purpose of this section. A common example 
of someone who would come within the section is a car dealer who sells cars 
on behalf of the owners for a commission. A person may be a mercantile 
agent even though he is acting for only one principal and, since every 
business must have a beginning, a person may be a mercantile agent in 
respect of a transaction even though he has never acted as such before. 
On the other hand a mere servant of the owner is not a mercantile agent. 
It is a requirement of the Act that the goods must be in the possession 
of the mercantile agent with the consent of the owner. Thus the section 
would not apply if the goods had been stolen or if the owner gave 
possession to a third party who in turn passed them on to the mercantile 
agent without the owner's consent. If, however, the owner did give his - 164-
consent it seems that the case would come within the section even if the 
owner's consent was obtained by fraud (5). 
It is provided by section 2 (2) of the Factors Act that if the agent 
obtains possession with the consent of the owner, the rights of the 
purchaser will not be affected by the withdrawal of consent, unless the 
purchaser had notice of this. It is also provided by section 2 (6) 
that if the agent is in possession of the documents of title by virtue 
of his possession of the goods, he is deemed to have possession of the 
documents with the owner's consent. Finally, section 2 (4) states that 
"For the purpose of this Act the consent of the owner shall be presumed 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary". 
The section will not, however, apply if the owner gives the goods to 
the agent for some purpose which has nothing to do with his business 
as a mercantile agent: 
The owner must consent to the agent having them for a purpose 
which is in some way or other connected with his business as 
a mercantile agent. It may not actually be for sale. It may 
be for display, or to get offers, or merely to put in his 
showroom; but there must be a consent to something of that 
kind before the owner can be deprived of his goods. (2) 
A buyer will obtain a good title under the section only if he is in 
good faith and if the mercantile agent was acting in the ordinary 
course of his business when the sale was made. These provisions overlap 
to some extent because if the sale is not in the ordinary course of 
business it might be argued that the buyer could not be in good faith 
since he should have known that the transaction was not entirely honest. 
What the Act requires is that the sale should appear, as far as the 
buyer is concerned, to be a normal business transaction. The phrase 
"acting in the ordinary course of business of a mercantile agent" means: 
"... acting in such a way as a mercantile agent in the ordinary 
course of business as a mercantile agent would act, that is to 
say, within business hours, at a proper place of business, and 
in other respects in the ordinary way in which a mercantile 
agent would act, so that there is nothing to lead the pledgee 
(7) to suppose that anything is done wrong, or to give notice 
that the disposition is one which the mercantile agent had not 
authority for."(8) 
Finally it should be mentioned that, although a pledge is expressly 
included within the protection of the section, section 4 of the Factors 
Act excludes a pledge for an antecedent debt. In other words, the loan 
secured by the pledge must be given at the same time as the pledge, not 
at an earlier time. 
Sale in Market Overt 
This exception is constituted by section 22 (1) of the Sale of 
Goods Act: 
Where goods are sold in market overt, according to the usage of 
the market, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, 165 
provided he buys them in good faith and without notice of any 
defect or want of title on the part of the seller. 
A sale in market overt is a sale in an open, public, legally-constituted 
market. Such a market may be constituted by statute, charter or long-
standing custom. Markets are held in many English towns and by custom 
every shop in the City of London is considered to be a market overt for 
the purpose of this rule. (The City of London is not the whole of London 
but only the small area which constituted the medieval city.) The 
goods must be of a kind normally sold in the market in question and the 
goods must be in the market at the time of the sale. The sale must 
conform to the normal usage of the market and must take place at the normal time 
vihen the market is held, if these conditions are all fulfilled the seller 
obtains a good title, provided he is in good faith, even if the goods 
were stolen. The Sale of Goods Act originally contained a provision in 
section 22 (2) to the effect that if the goods were stolen and the thief 
was convicted of the theft, the title would re-vest in the original 
owner; but this was repealed by the Theft Act 1968, as. 33 (3), 36 (3) 
and Sch. 3, Part III (for England) and the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 
1969, S.31 (2) and Sch. 3 (for Northern Ireland). 
The rules concerning market overt do not apply in Scotland (9) and 
Wales (10). 
Sale under a Voidable Title 
If goods are "sold" under a void contract ownership will not pass from 
seller to buyer even if there is delivery (11). A void contract is one 
which in the eyes of the law is deemed never to have existed. On the 
other hand if the contract is not void but merely voidable, ownership 
of the goods will pass to the buyer. A voidable contract is one which 
can be avoided (set aside) by one of the parties. If the party concern-
ed does not avoid the contract it is regarded as valid; but if the 
contract is avoided the buyer will be divested of his title and the 
ownership will re-vest in the seller. The buyer's title is, therefore, 
voidable because it is liable to be divested if the sale is set aside. 
What happens if a buyer who has a voidable title sells the goods to a 
second buyer? This question is dealt with by section 23 of the Sale of 
Goods Act: 
When the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto but his 
title has not been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer 
acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in 
good faith and without notice of the seller's defect of title. 
The important points to note with regard to this section are: first, 
when is the sale voidable and when is it void? And secondly, what does 
the original owner have to do to avoid the sale? 
The distinction between void and voidable contracts concerns the law of 
contracts, rather than that of property, and will not be considered in 
detail. The most important situation in which the distinction can 
operate should, however, be mentioned. Assume that B induces S to sell 
him goods by falsely leading him to think that he (E) is a creditworthly - 166 
person. Here the sale is voidable by reason of B's fraud but Β has a 
good title until S discovers his mistake and sets the contract aside. 
Assume, on the other hand, that Β represents to S that he (B) is not 
Β at all but C, who is a creditworthy person. If S would be prepared 
to give credit to C but not to B, the sale is void because S thinks 
he is selling to C, not to B. The first case is an example of a contract 
vitiated by fraud (and therefore voidable), the second is the case where 
no contract comes into existence at all because the parties were never 
in agreement about a basic aspect of the contract. If Β re-sells to X 
before S realises his mistake, X's title to the goods will depend 
whether the original sale between S and Β fell into the first or the 
second category. 
The normal way in which a seller avoids a voidable contract is by notice 
to the buyer. If this takes place before the buyer re-sells to a third 
party, the latter will not be protected. Thus the second buyer's rights 
may depend on whether the original seller communicated with the first 
buyer. If the original seller communicated with the second buyer before 
the sale, the latter would cease to be in good faith and would not, 
therefore, be protected if he still bought the goods. It has been held, 
however, in the case of Car & Universal Finance Ltd. v. Caldwell (12) 
that the contract can be avoided without informing either of these 
persons (which the seller might, of course, be unable to do if he cannot 
trace the first buyer and is unaware of the existence of the second). 
In this case S sold his car to Β and was paid by cheque. He gave 
possession of the car to B. The following day S discovered that the 
cheque was worthless and immediately informed the police. Β was 
eventually found and arrested but meanwhile the car had been sold 
several times and was eventually found in the hands of X. The court 
held that title vested in S, not X, because S had avoided the contract 
by informing the police and otherwise taking all steps open to him in 
the circumstances to set aside the contract. In this case the fraudulent 
party had deliberately avoided contact with the original owner and the 
court left open the question whether the same rule would apply if the 
original owner's inability to inform the buyer is not due to deliberate 
evasion by the latter. The rule will not, of course, apply if it is 
possible for the original owner to contact the first buyer. 
Caldwell's case might seem at first sight to cut down considerably the 
protection given to an innocent purchaser and a similar case in Scotland 
was in fact decided in the opposite way (13) . However, it will be 
shown below that in practice i gldwell's case will be of limited applica­
tion because normally the facts will come within another exception to 
the nemo dat rule, namely that of a buyer in possession (Section 25 (2) 
of the Sale of Goods Act). 
It should finally be mentioned that although section 23 of the Sale of 
Goods Act refers only to a sale, the same rule would probably apply 
under the common law to the case where the buyer pledges the goods to 
an innocent person. 
Sale by a Seller in Possession 
It was mentioned earlier that when goods are sold, title passes to the 
buyer by agreement between the parties (provided the goods are ascertain­
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possible that the seller might retain possession of the goods even 
though title has passed to the buyer. This is the situation dealt with 
by section 8 of the Factors Act 1889, which was reproduced with the 
omission of a few words in section 25 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act. 
Section 8 of the Factors Act reads as follows (the words underlined are 
omitted from the corresponding section of the Sale of Goods Act (14): 
Where a person, having sold goods, continues, or is, in possess­
ion of the goods or of the documents of title to the goods, the 
delivery or transfer by that person, or by a mercantile agent 
acting for him, of the goods or documents of title under any 
sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof, or under any 
agreement for sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof, to 
any person receiving the same in good faith and without 
notice of the previous sale, shall have the same effect as if 
the person making the delivery or transfer were expressly 
authorised by the owner of the goods to make the same. 
The effect of this is that if a seller retains possession of the goods 
and re-sells them to a second buyer (and delivers them), the second 
buyer obtains title to the goods provided he is in good faith. 
A number of older cases have held that the section only applies if the 
seller is in possession as seller and not in some other capacity. This 
approach can be illustrated by the case of Staffs Motor Guarantee Ltd. 
v. British Wagon Company Ltd (15) in which S sold a lorry to Β and then 
hired it back from him under a hire-purchase (16)contract, the lorry 
having .remained all the time in S's possession. Later S sold it to X 
and when S fell into arrears with his hire-purchase payments, Β claimed 
the lorry. The court held that Β had title to the lorry: X was not 
protected by the provision under discussion because when the sale to X 
was made, S held the lorry as hirer and not seller. 
This decision was, however, rejected by the Privy Council (17) in the 
important case of Pacific Motor Auctions Pty., Ltd. v. Motor Credits 
(Hire Finance) Ltd. (18). This was a case from Australia where a 
provision identical with the English provision was in force. It was 
held in this case that it does not matter in what capacity the seller 
retains possession so long as there is no break in his possession. The 
only case in which the second buyer would not be protected, in the view 
of the Privy Council, is where the goods are actually delivered to the 
buyer and later returned to the seller as hirer. This seems the prefer­
able approach since under the doctrine laid down in the Staffs Motor 
Guarantee case the rights of the second purchaser could be affected by 
a private agreement between the seller and the first buyer. It should 
finally be noted that in one important respect a buyer has less protect­
ion under this section than in the case of the exceptions to the nemo 
dat rule previously discussed: in this section the goods or documents 
of title must be delivered to the buyer. Thus if a seller sells goods 
first to one buyer and then to a second, retaining possession himself 
throughout, the rights of the first buyer will prevail over those of 
the second unless the case comes within one of the other exceptions. 
However, in another respect this section goes further than section 2 of 
the Factors Act: it applies even if the sale is not in the ordinary 
course of business - so long as the second buyer retains his bona fides. - 168 -
Sale by a Buyer in Possession 
Since the transfer of ownership of specific goods as between buyer and 
seller depends on the intention of the parties and not on delivery, it 
is quite possible that the seller may remain owner of the goods even 
though they have passed into the possession of the buyer. The rights 
of third parties in this situation are protected by section 9 of the 
Factors Act 1889, which was reproduced, with the omission of a few 
words, in section 25 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act. Section 9 of the 
Factors Act reads as follows (the words underlined are omitted from the 
corresponding section of the Sale of Goods Act): 
Where a person, having bought or agreed to buy goods, obtains 
with the consent of the seller possession of the goods or the 
documents of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer, by 
that person or by a mercantile agent acting for him, of the 
goods or documents of title, under any sale, pledge, or other 
disposition thereof, or under any agreement for sale, pledge 
or other disposition thereof, to any person receiving the same 
in good faith and without notice of any lien or other right 
of the original seller in respect of the goods, shall have the 
same effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer 
were a mercantile agent in possession of the goods or documents 
of title with the consent of the owner. 
Section 25 (3) of the Sale of Goods Act provides the term "mercantile 
agent" is to have the same meaning as in the Factors Act. The meaning 
of this term in the Factors Act has already been explained (19). 
Section 9 only applies where a person has "bought or agreed to buy 
goods", in other words there must be a contract of sale. Thus if the 
"buyer" has a mere option to purchase the goods, there is no sale until 
the option is exercised. This is important because under a hire-purchase 
contract the "buyer" normally hires the goods with the option to purchase 
after a certain number of payments have been made. Such a transaction 
would not come within the section until the option is exercised and a 
third party who bought the goods from the "buyer" would not be protected 
by the section. On the other hand, if the transfer of ownership is, 
under the terms of the contract, conditional on the price being paid, 
the transaction is nevertheless a sale and should come within the section. 
This was originally so, but the position has now been altered by the 
Hire-Purchase Act 1965 (2). Section 54 of this Act provides that for the 
purpose of section 9 of the Factors Act and section 25 (20) of the Sale 
of Goods Act "the buyer under a conditional sale agreement shall be 
deemed not to be a person who has bought or agreed to buy goods". The 
term "conditional sale agreement" is defined by section 1 (1) of the 
Hire-Purchase Act 1965 as follows: 
"conditional sale agreement" means an agreement for the sale of 
goods under which the purchase price or part of it is payable 
by instalments, and the property in the goods is to remain in 
the seller (notwithstanding that the buyer is to be in possession 
of the goods) until such conditions as to the payment of instal-
ments or otherwise as may be specified in the agreement are 
fulfilled. - 169 
The Hire Purchase Act, therefore, only applies where the price is 
payable by instalments; where this is not the case the Act will not 
apply. Thus if the price is payable in one lump sum and the buyer is 
given credit, the transaction would come within section 9 of the Factors 
Act where the buyer is given possession of the goods. Moreover, there 
are two other important limitations on the application of the Hire-
Purchase Act 1965. First, it is provided by section 2 (2) that the 
Act does not apply when the price exceeds £ 2.000. Secondly, section 4 
provides that the Act will not apply where the buyer is a corporation 
(company), as distinct from a private person. 
Section 9 of the Factors Act only applies if the goods were in the 
possession of the buyer with the consent of the seller. This is a 
similar requirement to that in section 2 of the Factors Act. As was 
pointed out when that section was being discussed (21), the seller's 
consent would probably still be considered to have been given if the 
buyer obtained it by fraud. The importance of this lies in its effect 
on the decision in Car & Universal Financial Company v. Caldwell (22). 
It will be remembered that under section 23 of the Sale of Goods Act if 
the sale is voidable (for example, by reason of the buyer's fraud) a 
re-sale by the buyer to an innocent third party will give the latter a 
good title provided that the original seller has not avoided the contract 
before the second sale. Caldwell's case, however, held that if the 
original seller could not contact the buyer, he could nevertheless avoid 
the sale by actions such as informing the police. This decision severely 
restricted the protection afforded by section 23. However, it was held 
in the case of Newtons of Wembley Ltd. v. Williams (23) that section 9 
of the Factors Act can apply even if the sale was voidable and was 
avoided by the seller before the buyer re-sells. 
The decision in the Newtons of Wembley case largely nullifies the effect 
of that in the Caldwell case since the innocent second buyer is protect­
ed by section 9 of the Factors Act instead of section 23 of the Sale of 
Goods Act. There is, however, one difference between these two 
provisions: section 23 of the Sale of Goods Act will protect any bona 
fide purchaser but section 9 of the Factors Act will only protect someone 
who buys from the original buyer. For this reason the actual decision 
in Caldwell's case doen not conflict with that in the Newtons of Wembley 
case. The facts in Caldwell's case were that the seller (S) sold the 
car to the buyer (B), who in turn sold it to C, who in turn sold it to 
D. The original sale between S and Β was voidable on account of B's 
fraud. C would have been protected under section 9 of the Factors Act 
if he had been in good faith; but he was not in good faith and therefore 
obtained no title to the car. D was in good faith but he was not 
protected by section 9 because C was not in possession of the goods with 
the consent of the original owner (S). (24) If, on the other hand, S had 
not avoided the contract with Β before the sale to D, section 23 of the 
Sale of Goods Act would have protected D: B's title would have been 
voidable and he would have passed this on to C, who would therefore be 
a seller with a voidable title within section 23. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that, as in the case of section 8 
of the Factors Act, the second buyer is protected only if the goods 
(or the documents of title) are delivered to him. Assume for example 
that S sells goods to B, subject to the condition that title will not 170 — 
pass until the price is paid, and delivers them to Β. Β sells them 
to C but retains possession of the goods. S is still the owner of the 
goods and if he regains possession his rights will not be affected by 
the sale to C. 
The Hire-Purchase Act 1964 
Some of the provisions of the Hire-Purchase Act 1965 have already been 
mentioned. The Hire-Purchase Act 1964 was an earlier statute which was 
largely replaced by the 1965 Act. Part III of the 1964 Act is, however, 
still in force and this contains an important exception to the nemo dat 
rule. It provides that if a person in possession of a motor car under 
a hire-purchase or conditional sale agreement sells it to a bona fide 
purchaser for value, the latter obtains a good title. It has already 
been shown (25) that the rule concerning a sale by a buyer in possession 
(section 9 of the Factors Act) does not apply to a hire-purchase 
contract because it is not a sale; while a conditional sale (which is 
a sale) has, subject to certain exceptions, been excluded from the 
scope of section 9 of the Factors Act (and section 25 (2) of the Sale 
of Goods Act) by virtue of section 54 of the Hire-Purchase Act 1965 (26). 
In these cases, therefore, a sale to a bona fide third party will not 
normally pass a good title. The importance of the Hire-Purchase Act 
1964 is that it gives direct protection to such a third party in the 
very important case of a sale of a motor car. 
Section 27 (1) and (2) of the Hire-Purchase Act 1964 reads: 
(1) The provisions of this section shall have effect where a 
motor vehicle has been let under a hire-purchase agreement, 
or has been agreed to be sold under a conditional sale 
agreement, and at a time before the property in the vehicle 
has become vested in the hirer or buyer, he disposes of 
the vehicle to another person. 
(2) Where the disposition referred to in the preceding sub­
section is to a private purchaser, and he is a purchaser 
of the motor vehicle in good faith and without notice of 
the hire-purchase agreement or conditional sale agreement, 
that disposition shall have effect as if the title of the 
owner or seller to the vehicle had been vested in the 
hirer or buyer immediately before that disposition. 
It is important to note that the protection of this section is limited 
to a disposition to a "private purchaser" who is anyone other than a 
"trade or finance purchaser". Section 29 (2) of the Act defines this 
term as follows: 
In this Part of this Act "trade or finance purchaser" means a 
purchaser who, at the time of the disposition made to him, 
carries on a business which consists, wholly or partly, -
(a) of purchasing motor vehicles for the purpose of offering 
or exposing them for sale, or - 171 
(b) of providing finance by purchasing motor vehicles for the 
purpose of letting them under hire-purchase agreements or 
agreeing to sell them under conditional sale agreements, 
and "private purchaser" means a purchaser who, at the time of 
the disposition made to him, does not carry on any such business. 
In other words, car dealers and finance companies are outside the 
protection of the section. However, if a "trade or finance purchaser" 
acquires a car from a hirer in possession under a hire-purchase agree-
ment and then disposes of it to a private purchaser, the latter will be 
protected by section 27 (3), 
This provides: 
Where the person to whom the disposition referred to in sub-
section (1) of this section is made (in this subsection referred 
to as "the original purchaser") is a trade or finance purchaser, 
then if the person who is the first private purchaser of the 
motor vehicle after that disposition (in this section referred 
to as "the first private purchaser") is a purchaser of the 
vehicle in good faith and without notice of the hire-purchase 
agreement or conditional sale agreement, the disposition of 
the vehicle to the first private purchaser shall have effect 
as if the title of the owner or seller to the vehicle had been 
vested in the hirer or buyer immediately before he disposed of 
it to the original purchaser. 
It is important to note that these provisions apply to the case where 
the vehicle has been hired under a hire-purchase agreement (i.e. where 
the hirer has the option to purchase); they do not apply to a simple 
hiring of a car. Finally it should be mentioned that "disposition" is 
defined in section 29 (1) to include a sale or letting under a hire-
purchase agreement. 
The definition is as follows: 
"disposition" means any sale or contract of sale (including a 
conditional sale agreement), any letting under a hire-purchase 
agreement and any transfer of the property in goods in pursuance 
of a provision in that behalf contained in a hire-purchase 
agreement, and includes any transaction purporting to be a 
disposition (as so defined), and "dispose of" shall be construed 
accordingly; 
A pledge is not covered by this definition. 
Scotland and Northern Ireland 
The provisions of the 1964 Act discussed above apply in Scotland. The 
Act does not apply in Northern Ireland but similar provisions are found 
in sections 62-4 of the Hire-Purchase Act 1966, a statute of the Northern 
Ireland Parliament. - 172-
Other Exceptions 
The exceptions to the nemo dat rule which have been mentioned are the 
most important ones for the purposes of this report. There are, 
however, a number of other exceptions and the more important ones should 
be mentioned briefly. These exceptions are recognised by section 21 (2) 
of the Sale of Goods Act which provides: 
Provided also that nothing in this Act shall affect -
(a) The provisions of the Factors Acts, or any enactment 
enabling the apparent owner of goods to dispose of them 
as if he were the true owner thereof; 
(b) The validity of any contract of sale under any special 
common law or statutory power of sale or under the order 
of a court of competent jurisdiction. 
The more important of these miscellaneous exceptions are: 
1. A sheriff (an officer of the court) has the power to seize and 
sell goods of a defendant under a writ of execution. (See 
section 15 of the Bankruptcy and Deeds of Arrangement Act 1913). 
The buyer acquires a good title even if the goods did not belong 
to the person against whom execution issued. 
2. A pledge can in certain circumstances sell the pledged proper-
ty (27) . 
3. An innkeeper (hotelier) can in certain cases sell goods brought 
into the inn (hotel) by guests who fail to pay their bill (28. 
4. Certain powers of sale in respect of uncollected goods are 
conferred by the Disposal of Uncollected Goods Act 1952. 
5. The Supreme Court has wide powers to order the sale of goods in 
various circumstances under the rules of the Supreme Court. 
6. Under section 29 of the Sale of Goods Act an unpaid seller can 
re-sell the goods and by section 48 (2) the second buyer obtains 
a good title (29). 
7. Finally it should be mentioned that landlords, trustees in 
bankruptcy, warehousemen and the liquidators of companies have 
certain powers of sale (30). 173 
TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP BETWEEN SELLER AND BUYER 
The transfer of property as between buyer and seller depends on whether 
the goods are ascertained (or specific) on the one hand, or unascertain-
ed, on the other. The terms "ascertained" and "specific" mean the same 
thing. The Act defines "specific goods" in section 62 as "goods 
identified and agreed upon at the time a contract of sale is made". 
In other words, if the purchaser agrees to buy a particular car or bag 
of grain or picture, the sale is one of specific (or ascertained) 
goods. If this is not the case the goods are unascertained. Thus if 
the buyer agrees to buy goods that are to be manufactured or grown by 
the seller at some future time, or if he agrees to buy purely generic 
goods (e.g. 100 tons of wheat of a specified quality), or an unidentified 
part of a specified whole (e.g. 100 tons out of a specified load of 
wheat which is greater than 100 tons), in all these cases the goods are 
unascertained. 
The basic rule as regards specific goods is laid down in section 17 
of the Act. This provides: 
(1) Where there is a contract for the sale of specific or 
ascertained goods the property in them is transferred to 
the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract 
intend it to be transferred. 
(2) For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the 
parties regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, 
the conduct of the parties, and the circumstances of the 
case. 
In practice, however, the parties do not usually form any clear intent-
ion as to when the property shall pass. In this case section 18 of 
the Act comes into play. It provides: 
Unless a different intention appears, the following are rules 
for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time 
at which the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer. 
Five rules are then laid down. The first four of these concern 
specific goods and the fifth concerns unascertained goods. The first rule 
states: 
Rule 1. - Where there is an unconditional contract for the sale 
of specific goods, in a deliverable state, the property in the 
goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and it is 
immaterial whether the time of payment or the time of delivery, 
or both, be postponed. 
It will be seen that this rule only applies if the contract is uncondi-
tional, in other words the effectiveness of the contract must not be 
dependent on some uncertain future event. Secondly, it only applies - 174 -
in the case of specific goods. Thirdly, the goods must be in a 
deliverable state. Section 62 (4) of the Act states: 
Goods are in a "deliverable state" within the meaning of this 
Act when they are in such a state that the buyer would under 
the contract be bound to take delivery of them. 
This provision was probably put into the Act to cover the case where 
the buyer has agreed to accept goods as they are even though they would 
not normally be considered to be in a deliverable state. It should be 
noted that the provision does not purport to be a complete definition; 
it does not say that goods are in a "deliverable state" only when the 
buyer is bound to take delivery of them (31. There may, therefore, be 
circumstances in which the goods would be in a deliverable state for 
the purpose of Rule 1 even though the buyer was not bound to take 
delivery. 
Rules 2 and 3 state: 
Rule 2. - Where there is a contract for the sale of specific 
goods and the seller is bound to do something to the goods, 
for the purpose of putting them into a deliverable state, the 
property does not pass until such thing be done, and the buyer 
has notice thereof. 
Rule 3. - Where there is a contract for the sale of specific 
goods in a deliverable state, but the seller is bound to weigh, 
measure, test, or do some other act or thing with reference to 
the goods for the purpose of ascertaining the price, the 
property does not pass until such act or thing be done, and the 
buyer has notice thereof. 
Rule 3 would apply, for example, where A agrees to buy three specific 
sacks of corn from Β at a price of so much per pound, it being under­
stood that Β will weigh the sacks. The property passes under this 
rule when Β has weighed them and told A the weight. It should be noted, 
however, that the rule only applies where the seller has to weigh them. 
If the buyer is to do this, the rule is not applicable (32). 
Rule 4 reads as follows: 
Rule 4. - When goods are delivered to the buyer on approval or 
"on sale or return" or other similar terms the property there­
in passes to the buyer:-
(a) When he signifies his approval or acceptance to the seller 
or does any other act adopting the transaction: 
(b) If he does not signify his approval or acceptance to the 
seller but retains the goods without giving notice of 
rejection, then, if a time has been fixed for the return 
of the goods, on the expiration of such time, and, if no 
time has been fixed, on the expiration of a reasonable 
time. What is a reasonable time is a question of fact. 
Paragraph (a) of this rule applies not only when the buyer communicates 
his acceptance of the goods to the seller but also where he does "any 
other act adopting the transaction". This includes any act inconsistent 
with his ability to return the goods to the seller. Thus if the buyer - 175-
pledges the goods or re-sells them to a third party this will be an 
adoption of the transaction. The rights of the third party will 
consequently be protected as against the original seller. Under 
paragraph (b) the property can also pass to the buyer without any 
communication from him to the seller: merely by retaining the goods 
beyond a certain length of time he loses his right to return the goods. 
It should be pointed out, however, that this only applies where the 
buyer and seller have previously agreed on the terms of the sale: if 
unsolicited goods are sent with an offer to sell them, the person to 
whom the goods are delivered will not be committed to buying the goods 
merely because he does not return them (33). 
If property in the goods does not pass to the buyer, in other words, 
if the sale does not take place the "buyer" is in the position of a 
bailee and is not liable for damage to the goods unless this is caused 
by his negligence. Again it should be emphasised that these rules 
can be altered by express agreement. 
Where the goods are unascertained the position is somewhat different. 
The basic rule is laid down in section 16: 
Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained goods 
no property in the goods is transferred to the buyer unless 
and until the.goods are ascertained. 
This is a negative rule. Section 18, rule 5, indicates when property 
does pass. This states that, subject to a contrary intention: 
Rule 5. - (ï) Where there is a contract for the sale of 
unascertained or future goods by description, and goods of that 
description and in a deliverable state are unconditionally 
appropriated to the contract, either by the seller with the 
assent of the buyer, or by the buyer with the assent of the 
seller, the property in the goods thereupon passes to the buyer. 
Such assent may be express or implied, and may be given either 
before or after the appropriation is made. 
(2) Where, in pursuance of the contract, the seller delivers 
the goods to the buyer or to a carrier or other bailee or 
custodier (whether named by the buyer or not) for the purpose 
of transmission to the buyer, and does not reserve the right 
of disposal, he is deemed to have unconditionally appropriated 
the goods to the contract. 
Paragraph 2 of this rule is an example of one situation in which an 
unconditional appropriation of the goods takes place. It should be 
noted, however, that in view of section 16, paragraph 2 cannot apply 
where the seller delivers the goods to a carrier still mixed with other 
goods. Thus if the seller gives 190 boxes of fish to a carrier with 
instructions to deliver 20 to a particular buyer (without indicating 
which 20) property will not pass until the carrier sets aside the 20 
boxes for the buyer (34). 
Where the goods are to be manufactured by the seller, the general 
presumption is that property will not pass until the article in question 
has been completed. This rule can, however, be altered by express - 176-
agreeraent. Thus in one case S agreed to build a ship for Β and the 
contract provided that the price would be paid in instalments as the 
work proceeded. The contract provided that on the payment of the first 
instalment "the vessel and all materials and things appropriated for 
her should thenceforth... become and remain the absolute property of 
the purchaser." S went bankrupt after the first instalment had been 
paid but before the ship had been completed. The court held that the 
property in the unfinished ship passed to the buyers but this did not 
apply to the materials which S had obtained to complete the ship: they 
had not been sufficiently appropriated (35). 
As has been said previously, all these rules apply only in the absence 
of specific agreement. Section 19 (1) emphasises this point: 
(1) Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods 
or where goods are subsequently appropriated to the contract, 
the seller may, by the terms of the contract or appropriat­
ion, reserve the right of disposal of the goods until 
certain conditions are fulfilled. In such case, notwith­
standing the delivery of the goods to the buyer, or to a 
carrier or other bailee or custodier for the purpose of 
transmission to the buyer, the property in the goods does 
not pass to the buyer until the conditions imposed by the 
seller are fulfilled. 
This is important in the case where the passing of the property is 
conditional on the payment of the price. The goods will be delivered 
to the buyer but he will not be owner of them until he has paid for 
them. 
THE EFFECT OF THE TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP 
It has already been pointed out that the rules concerning the transfer 
of ownership from seller to buyer do not affect third parties to a 
very great extent since either a buyer or seller in possession of the 
goods can give a good title to a bona fide third party irrespective 
of whether ownership has passed from seller to buyer. However, where 
none of the exceptions to the nemo dat rule applies, the rights of 
third parties will depend on whether property has passed from the seller 
to the buyer. 
The following is an example of such a case: 
S sells goods to Β and delivers them. Subsequently Β returns 
them to S for alteration and then S sells them to C and delivers 
them to him. The question whether Β or C has the better title 
depends on whether property in the goods passed to B. This 
would normally be the case unless the contract between S and Β 
provided otherwise (36). 
The most important effect of the passing of the property is that this 
usually determines who must bear the loss if the property is damaged 
or destroyed; it can also be important when one of the parties goes 
bankrupt. These matters will be considered briefly. — 177 — 
TRANSFER OF THE RISK 
The question of "risk" is concerned with the question who should bear 
the loss if the goods are damaged or destroyed without any fault on 
either side. In these circumstances the person at whose risk the goods 
are must bear the loss. 
The goods are initially at the seller's risk but the risk is transfer-
red to the buyer at a certain point in the transaction. The basic rule 
is that this is a question to be agreed upon by the parties but if no 
agreement is reached on this point the risk follows the property in 
the goods. In other words, the person who is owner must bear the risk. 
This is the most important application of the rules discussed above for 
the transfer of property in the goods between seller and buyer. The 
general rule that the risk passes with the goods is laid down in section 
20 of the Sale of Goods Act: 
Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the seller's risk 
until the property therein is transferred to the buyer, but 
when the property therein is transferred to the buyer, the goods 
are at the buyer's risk whether delivery has been made or not. 
There are, however, two provisos to this. These are: 
Provided that where delivery has been delayed through the fault 
of either buyer or seller the goods are at the risk of the party 
in fault as regards any loss which might not have occurred but 
for such fault. 
Provided also that nothing in this section shall affect the 
duties or liabilities of either seller or buyer as a bailee 
or custodier of the goods of the other party. 
Since the concept of "risk" is concerned only with accidental damage 
or destruction it is natural that where one party is at fault that 
party should bear the loss. The first proviso therefore deals with the 
case where delivery is delayed through the fault of one party. The 
second proviso permits the common law rules concerning the liability 
of a bailee (in English and Irish law) and a custodier (in Scottish 
law) to continue as before. It will be remembered (37) that under 
these rules a bailee or custodier is liable for negligent or deliber-
ate damage to the goods. Consequently if one party remains in possess-
ion of goods which belong to the other party, the person in possession 
could be liable as a bailee if the goods are damaged through his fault. 
Finally, section 33 should be mentioned. This provides: 
Where the seller of goods agrees to deliver them at his own 
risk at a place other than that where they are when sold, the 
buyer must, nevertheless, unless otherwise agreed, take any 
risk of deterioration in the goods necessarily incident to the 
course of transit. - 178-
This means that if deterioration is inevitable when goods of the kind in 
question are transported, the buyer bears the risk of this even if the 
goods are delivered at the seller's risk, unless the contrary is 
specifically agreed. 
RIGHTS OF AN UNPAID SELLER AGAINST THE GOODS 
Besides the various personal remedies that a seller has against a 
buyer, a seller also has certain remedies (sometimes called "real 
remedies") against the goods. These rights only belong to an "unpaid 
seller" and they are three in number (38). First, there is a lien 
over the goods. A lien is a right that a creditor may have over goods 
belonging to a person who owes him money. It gives him the right to 
retain goods already in his possession which belong to the debtor 
until the latter pays him the debt (39). In the case of a contract of 
sale an unpaid seller has the right to retain the goods even if the 
ownership of the goods has passed to the buyer. The second right is 
that of stoppage in transitu. This arises where the goods have been 
sent off to the buyer but have not yet reached him. If the buyer 
becomes insolvent while the goods are still in transit, the unpaid 
seller has the right to retake possession of the goods and hold them 
until he is paid. Finally, in certain cases an unpaid seller has the 
right to re-sell the goods. 
Since the rights belong only to an "unpaid seller" it is necessary to 
define this term. This is done in section 38 of the Sale of Goods Act: 
(1) The seller of goods is deemed to be an "unpaid seller" 
within the meaning of this Act -
(a) When the whole of the price has not been paid or 
tendered: 
(b) When a bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument 
has been received as conditional payment, and the 
condition on which it was received has not been ful-
filled by reason of the dishonour of the instrument 
or otherwise 
(2) In this Part of this Act the term "seller" includes any 
person who is in the position of a seller, as, for instance, 
an agent of the seller to whom the bill of lading has been 
indorsed, or a consignor or agent who has himself paid, or 
is directly responsible for, the price. 
The only comment that needs to be made on these provisions concerns 
subsection 1 (b). The seller's acceptance of a cheque (or other 
negotiable instrument) in payment for the goods may be conditional on 
the cheque being honoured. If it is dishonoured he remains an unpaid 
seller. On the other hand the acceptance of the cheque may be uncondi-
tional (or absolute) in which case he loses his rights against the 
goods, though he can sue the buyer on the cheque. Whether the accept-- 179 -
ance of the cheque is conditional is a question of fact. It should be 
noted that the fact that credit was given does not affect the question 
whether the seller is "unpaid". 
Unpaid Seller's Lien 
This right only applies when the seller is still in possession of the 
goods: once they have left his possession the lien is lost. The lien 
only exists if the seller is "unpaid" as defined above and, in addition, 
the case must come within one or other of the three cases set out in 
section 41 (1). The relevant provisions are sections 41, 42 and 43 of 
the Sale of Goods Act: 
41. Seller's lien 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the unpaid 
seller of goods who is in possession of them is 
entitled to retain possession of them until payment 
or tender of the price in the following cases, namely:-
(a) Where the goods have been sold without any 
stipulation as to credit; 
(b) Where the goods have been sold on credit, but the 
term of credit has expired; 
(c) Where the buyer becomes insolvent. 
(2) The seller may exercise his right of lien notwith-
standing that he is in possession of the goods as 
agent or bailee or custodier for the buyer. 
42. Part delivery 
Where an unpaid seller has made part delivery of the goods, 
he may exercise his right of lien or retention on the 
remainder, unless such part delivery has been made under 
such circumstances as to show an agreement to waive the 
lien or right of retention. 
43. Termination of lien 
(1) The unpaid seller of goods loses his lien or right 
of retention thereon-
(a) When he delivers the goods to a carrier or other 
bailee or custodier for the purpose of transmis-
sion to the buyer without reserving the right of 
disposal of the goods; 
(b) When the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains 
possession of the goods; 
(c) By waiver thereof. 
(2) The unpaid seller of goods, having a lien or right 
of retention thereon, does not lose his lien or 
right of retention by reason only that he has obtained 
judgment or decree for the price of the goods. 180 -
There are several comments which should be made on these provisions. 
First of all, the lien only operates where the ownership of the goods 
has passed to the buyer. If the seller is still owner he does not 
obtain a lien (since the goods are still his) but he can retain 
possession until he is paid. In fact it is provided by section 39 (2) 
that he has the same rights as in the case where ownership has passed 
to the buyer: 
Where the property in goods has not passed to the buyer, the 
unpaid seller has, in addition to his other remedies, a right 
of withholding delivery similar to and co-extensive with his 
rights of lien and stoppage in transitu where the property has 
passed to the buyer. 
It is important to note that a seller is "unpaid" until the whole price 
is tendered or paid; consequently if the price is to be paid by instal-
ments the lien continues until the last payment is made. (Of course, 
if the buyer is given possession the lien is lost). 
The situation where section 41 (2)(above) would apply is where the buyer 
asks the seller to store the goods for him or effect repairs or altera-
tions. In this situation the seller is holding the goods as bailee (or 
in Scotland custodier) of the buyer; nevertheless the seller can still 
exercise his right of lien. If, however, the seller gives possession 
to the buyer he loses his lien and it is not regained if he later gets 
possession of the goods again (40). The only exception is where he 
exercises his right of stoppage in transitu. If, however, the buyer 
takes possession without the seller's consent, for example by theft, 
the lien is not lost: this follows from the word "lawfully" in section 
43 (1) (b) . 
If the buyer re-sells the goods while they are subject to the seller's lien 
(or right of stoppage in transitu), the rights in the second buyer are 
subject to the lien unless the seller consented to the re-sale. The 
only exception is where the seller gives the buyer a document of title 
to the goods and the latter is transferred to the second buyer. If the 
latter takes the document in good faith he will not be bound by the 
seller's lien. 
The relevant section here is section 47 : 
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the unpaid seller's 
right of lien or retention or stoppage in transitu is not 
affected by any sale, or other disposition of the goods which 
the buyer may have made, unless the seller has assented thereto. 
Provided that where a document of title to goods has been 
lawfully transferred to any person as buyer or owner of the 
goods, and that person transfers the document to a person who 
takes the document in good faith and for valuable consideration, 
then, if such last-mentioned transfer was by way of sale the 
unpaid seller's right of lien or retention or stoppage in 
transitu is defeated, and if such last-mentioned transfer was 
by way of pledge or other disposition for value, the unpaid 
seller's right or lien or retention or stoppage in transitu can 
only be exercised subject to the rights of the transferee. - 181 -
Stoppage in Transitu 
This is the right of the seller to retake possession of the goods after 
they have been sent off to the buyer but before they have reached him. 
The circumstances in which it can be exercised are, however, narrower 
than in the case of the lien: the right exists only if the buyer is 
insolvent. The general rule is laid down by section 44: 
Subject to the provisions of this Act, when the buyer of goods 
becomes insolvent, the unpaid seller who has parted with the 
possession of the goods has the right of stopping them in 
transitu, that is to say, he may resume possession of the goods 
as long as they are in course of transit, and may retain them 
until payment or tender of the price. 
The meaning of "insolvency" both with regard to stoppage in transitu 
and the unpaid seller's lien is explained by section 62 (3): 
A person is deemed to be insolvent within the meaning of this 
Act who either has ceased to pay his debt in the ordinary 
course of business, or cannot pay his debts as they become due, 
whether he has committed an act of bankruptcy or not, and whether 
he has become bankrupt or not. 
Thus insolvency (as the term is used in the Act) is a wider concept 
than bankruptcy and a buyer can be insolvent even though he has not been 
declared bankrupt. 
Since the right of stoppage only exists while the goods are in transit, 
it is important to know when transit begins and ends. This is covered 
by section 45: 
(1) Goods are deemed to be in course of transit from the time 
when they are delivered to a carrier by land or water, or 
other bailee or custodier for the purpose of transmission 
to the buyer, until the buyer, or his agent in that behalf, 
takes delivery of them from such carrier or other bailee 
or custodier, 
(2) If the buyer or his agent in that behalf obtains delivery 
of the goods before their arrival at the appointed destinat-
ion, the transit is at an end. 
(3) If, after the arrival of the goods at the appointed 
destination, the carrier or other bailee or custodier 
acknowledges to the buyer, or his agent, that he holds the 
goods on his behalf and continues in possession of them as . 
bailee or custodier for the buyer, or his agent, the transit 
is at an end, and it is immaterial that a further destin-
ation for the goods may have been indicated by the buyer. 
(4) If the goods are rejected by the buyer, and the carrier or 
other bailee or custodier continues in possession of them, 
the transit is not deemed to be at an end, even if the 
seller has refused to receive them back. 182 
(5) When goods are delivered to a ship chartered by the buyer 
it is a question depending on the circumstances of the 
particular case, whether they are in the possession of the 
master as a carrier, or as agent to the buyer. 
(6) Where the carrier or other bailee or custodier wrongfully 
refuses to deliver the goods to the buyer, or his agent 
in that behalf, the transit is deemed to be at an end. 
(7) Where part delivery of the goods has been made to the 
buyer, or his agent in that behalf, the remainder of the 
goods may be stopped in transitu, unless such part delivery 
has been made under such -circumstances as to show an 
agreement to give up possession of the whole of the goods. 
This right is exercised by the seller retaking possession of the goods 
or by giving notice of his claim to the carrier. Once this is done 
the seller is in the same position as if he had never parted with 
possession and the goods were subject to his lien. 
Section 46 provides: 
(1) The unpaid seller may exercise his right of stoppage in 
transitu either by taking actual possession of the goods, 
or by giving notice of his claim to the carrier or other 
bailee or custodier in whose possession the goods are. 
Such notice may be given either to the person in actual 
possession of the goods or to his principal. In the latter 
case the notice, to be effectual, must be given at such 
time and under such circumstances that the principal, by 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, may communicate it 
to his servant or agent in time to prevent a delivery to 
the buyer. 
(2) When notice of stoppage in transitu is given by the seller 
to the carrier, or other bailee or custodier in possession 
of the goods, he must re-deliver the goods to, or according 
to the directions of, the seller. The expenses of such 
re-delivery must be borne by the seller. 
Once the seller has regained possession he is in the same position as 
he was before he sent the goods off; in other words, he has a lien over 
the goods. The position whe: Ì the buyer re-sells goods subject to a 
right of stoppage in transitu is covered by section 47, which has 
already been dealt with (41). 
Re-sale by the Seller 
It has already been shown that a seller in possession of the goods can 
pass a good title to a bona fide third party even though the ownership 
of the goods has passed to the original buyer (42). A similar rule 
applies under section 48 (2) where the seller has exercised his right 
of lien or stoppage in transitu: 183 -
Where an unpaid seller who has exercised his right of lien or 
retention or stoppage in transitu re-sells the goods, the 
buyer acquires a good title thereto as against the original 
buyer. 
This provision to a large extent overlaps with that in section 8 of 
the Factors Act and section 25 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act; but it 
is wider than these provisions in that it does not require that the 
seller be in possession (though normally he will lose his lien if he 
parts with possession to the buyer) or that the new buyer be in good 
faith. 
If a seller in possession re-sells the goods to a second buyer the 
seller will normally be liable to the original buyer in damages; in 
other words, the fact that the seller has the power to give a good 
title to the second buyer does not mean that he has the right to do 
so as regards the first buyer. An unpaid seller does, however, have 
the right to re-sell the goods in three cases: if the goods are of a 
perishable nature; if he gives reasonable notice to the buyer of his 
intention to re-sell and the latter does not pay the price; and if 
this right is expressly reserved in the original contract. This is 
provided in section 48 (3) and (4) : 
(3) Where the goods are of a perishable nature, or where the 
unpaid seller gives notice to the buyer of his intention 
to re-sell, and the buyer dof.s not within a reasonable 
time pay or tender the pricfj the unpaid seller may re-
sell the goods and recover from the original buyer damages 
for any loss occasioned by his breach of contract. 
(4) Where the seller expressly reserves a right of re-sale 
in case the buyer should make default, and on the buyer 
making default, re-sells the goods, the original contract 
of sale is thereby rescinded, but without prejudice to 
any claim the seller may have for damages. 
BANKRUPTCY OF BUYER OR SELLER 
The rights of a seller on the bankruptcy of the buyer or of the buyer 
on the bankruptcy of the seller normally depend on whether property 
has passed from the seller to the buyer. There are, however, two 
exceptions to this. First, if the seller has a lien or a right of 
stoppage in transitu his position will be protected on the bankruptcy 
of the buyer even if property has passed to the buyer. He cannot be 
forced to surrender the goods unless he is paid in full and he can 
always recover his money through his right of re-sale. 
Secondly, under section 38 (2)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1914 goods in 
the possession of the bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy 
will vest in the trustee in bankruptcy for the benefit of the creditors 
if the following conditions are fulfilled even if the goods are the 
property of someone else. The conditions are: - 184 
1. the goods must be in the possession of the bankrupt in his trade 
or business; 
2. they must be in his possession with the consent of the true owner; 
3. they must be in his possession in circumstances such that he is 
the reputed owner of them. 
If these conditions are fulfilled the true owner loses his rights over 
the goods. These conditions could quite often be fulfilled when the 
seller goes bankrupt if he is a trader in the goods in question. The 
buyer's ownership of the goods might, therefore, be defeated if the 
seller retains possession after property has passed to the buyer (43). 
These rules only apply, however, to the bankruptcy of an individual: 
they do not apply when a company goes into liquidation. 
Scotland 
The Bankruptcy Act 1914 does not apply in Scotland and there is no 
equivalent provision to section 38 (2)(c). 
Northern Ireland 
The Bankruptcy Act 1914 does not apply in Northern Ireland. There is 
a slightly different provision in section 313 of the Irish Bankrupt 
and Insolvent Act 1857. 
HIRE-PURCHASE 
Hire-Purchase is a contract for the hire of goods in which the hirer 
has an option to purchase the goods. This option may be either passive, 
in which case the goods automatically become the property of the hirer 
after a certain number of instalments unless he decides to terminate 
the agreement, or it may be an active option, in which case he will 
have the right to purchase the goods for a nominal payment after a 
certain number of instalments have been paid. It is the main form of 
consumer credit in the U.K. today. Economically - and as far as the 
man in the street is concerned - it is no different from a credit sale 
in which the price is paid in instalments and the buyer is given 
immediate possession of the goods, but legally it is very different. 
This form of contract was originally devised in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century to avoid the consequences of section 9 of the Factors 
Act 1889. Before this statute was passed it was common, especially in 
the furniture trade, to use a conditional sale as a vehicle for consumer 
credit. Under this transaction the buyer was given immediate possession 
of the goods and was allowed to pay the price in instalments. It was 
provided in the contract that ownership would not pass until the final 
instalment was paid. The drawback of this transaction from the seller's 
point of view was, however, that under section 9 of the Factors Act the 
buyer could re-sell the goods before he had paid all the instalments 
and give a good title to the second buyer provided the latter was in 
good faith (44). - 185-
The crucial difference between a conditional sale and a hire-purchase 
contract is that in the case of the latter the hirer merely has an 
option to buy. He is not obliged to buy and was therefore not a 
person who had "bought or agreed to buy" the goods within the meaning 
of section 9 of the Factors Act and section 25(2) of the Sale of Goods 
Act. Consequently the rule of nemo dat applied and the second buyer 
did not obtain a good title (45). This made the hire-purchase transact-
ion very advantageous for the "seller". In addition to this he was 
protected on the bankruptcy of the hirer since he was still the owner 
of the goods (although this also applied in the case of a conditional 
sale). The only case where the "seller" could lose his rights on the 
bankruptcy of the hirer was where the hirer had the goods in his 
possession in his trade or business in which case the reputed ownership 
provision of the Bankruptcy Act might apply (46) . In view of these 
advantages it is not surprising that hire-purchase became so popular. 
The important differences between hire-purchase and conditional sale 
have, however, been considerably lessened by section 54 of the Hire-
Purchase Act 1965. The effect of this is that, provided the transaction 
comes within the scope of the Act, a sale by the buyer under a condition-
al sale no longer gives a good title (47). The Hire-Purchase Act 1964, 
however, provides that in the case of a motor car a hirer under a hire-
purchase contract or a buyer under a conditional sale can give a good 
title to a private buyer in good faith (48). 
The partial assimilation of hire-purchase and conditional sale contracts 
which has been brought about by the Hire-Purchase Acts is fully justified 
from the economic point of view. In a hire-purchase contract the 
payments made by the hirer bear little relation to the value of the hire 
of the goods but are based on the normal sale price of the goods plus 
interest. It should also be pointed out that in practice a hire-purchase 
transaction is usually much more complicated than has been indicated. 
Thus in the motor trade the seller, i.e. the car dealer, normally 
obtains finance from a finance company. The dealer sells the car to 
the finance company and the finance company then enters into a hire-
purchase agreement with the buyer (hirer). The car is, of course, 
delivered directly by the dealer to the hirer who is probably unaware 
that he is not dealing directly with the dealer. The price that the 
hirer pays is the cash price plus "hire purchase charges". From the 
economic point of view the transaction is a sale by the dealer to the 
buyer financed by a loan from the finance company to the buyer. The 
hire-purchase charges are the interest charged by the finance company. 
This is not, however, the legal position. A final complication is that 
the finance company usually requires the dealer to guarantee the hire-
purchase contract and if the hirer defaults the dealer may be obliged 
to pay off the outstanding instalments to the finance company and then 
seek to recover his money by retaking possession of the car from the 
hirer. 
In the period up to the beginning of the Second World War unscrupulous 
firms used hire-purchase contracts to exploit consumers, especially 
those who were poorer and less well educated. Doorstep salesmen tried 
to talk wives into signing contracts which they did not understand while 
their husbands were at work. The contracts were so worded as to minimise 
the rights of the hirer and if there was any delay in payments the seller 186 
took possession of the goods so that the hirer lost both the goods 
and the instalments already paid. Legislation was introduced in 1938 
to curb these malpractices and this has now been replaced by the Hire-
Purchase Act 1965. This Act only applies where the hire-purchase 
price is not greater than £ 2000 and where the hirer is a private 
individual (not a company). Where the contract comes within the scope 
of the Act the hirer is given important rights. 
First of all the Act lays down various formal requirements designed 
to enable the hirer to understand his rights. The agreement must be 
in writing and signed by the hirer. There are detailed regulations 
about the form of the document including the size of the type and the 
exact wording of certain notices that inform the hirer of his rights. 
The hirer must also be told the cash price of the goods and the total 
hire-purchase price (so that he knows how much more it will cost him 
to obtain the goods on hire-purchase). The hirer must also be given 
a copy of the agreement. If these requirements are not complied with 
the owner (seller) cannot enforce the agreement nor does he have the 
right to recover the goods from the hirer. The latter can, therefore, 
enjoy possession of the property without having to pay for it. However, 
the court has power to dispense with certain of the requirements if it 
considers that the hirer has not been prejudiced by the failure of the 
owner to comply with them. 
Secondly, where the agreement was signed elsewhere than at "appropriate 
trade premises" (the normal business premises of the owner) the hirer 
has the right to cancel the agreement within four days after he has 
received a copy of the agreement. This is popularly known as the 
"cooling-off period" and is designed to operate where the hirer is 
talked into signing by a door-to-door salesman. This right is exercised 
by notice sent to the owner. The hirer has to return the goods 
(provided the owner comes to collect them) and he is entitled to have 
all payments made by him returned. The hirer is not obliged to allow 
the owner to regain possession of the goods until any money paid by 
him has been returned. The hire-purchase contract must contain a 
notice informing the hirer of this right. 
Thirdly, the owner cannot repossess the goods without a court order 
(even if the hirer has defaulted on the payments or has otherwise 
acted in breach of the contract) once one third of the total price has 
been paid. If the owner recovers the goods in contravention of this 
provision, the hirer is released from all liability under the contract 
and can recover all payments made by him. If the owner goes to court, 
the court has various powers: it may, for example, order the return 
of the goods but postpone the operation of the order on condition that 
the hirer pays the balance of the price in such instalments as the 
court thinks just. A notice informing the hirer of these provisions 
must also be included in the contract. 
Fourthly, the owner may not in any case terminate the contract by 
reason of the hirer's failure to pay the instalments unless he sends 
the hirer a notice of default which sets out the amount which has 
become due and gives the hirer at least seven days to pay this. If 
payment is not made within the period specified in the notice the 
agreement may be terminated. - 187-
Finally, the hirer has the right to terminate the agreement at any 
time before the final instalment has been paid. If he does so, however, 
he must pay all instalments that are due up to the date when he 
exercises this right. If the total sum paid by him is then less than 
half the full price, he must also pay an additional sum to bring the 
total amount he has paid up to half the full price. However, if the 
loss of the owner is less than this, the court has power to reduce 
the amount payable so that the owner receives no more than the amount 
of his loss. The contract may give the hirer the right to terminate 
on more favourable terms than these but it cannot impose on the hirer 
any greater liability. This in fact applies to all the provisions 
that have been mentioned to protect the hirer : none of them can be 
excluded by the contract. 
The Hire-Purchase Act 1965 also applies to conditional sales if the 
price is less than £ 2000 and the buyer is not a company (that is, the 
same conditions as in the case of a hire-purchase agreement.) The 
provisions mentioned above also apply to conditional sales. Credit 
sales (i.e. where the buyer is given credit but ownership does pass 
to him) are also within the scope of the Act subject to the above 
conditions and provided also that the price is payable by five or more 
instalments. However, the various provisions mentioned above do not 
apply except for the provisions concerning formalities and the "cooling-
off period" and these apply only if the price is above £ 30. 
Scotland 
The 1964 Act applies to Scotland but the 1965 Act does not. Similar 
provisions are, however, contained in the Hire-Purchase (Scotland) 
Act 1965. 
Northern Ireland 
Neither the 1964 nor the 1965 Act applies in Northern Ireland but 
similar provisions are found in the Hire-Purchase Act 1966 (a statute 
of the Northern Ireland Parliament). 
LIENS 
A lien is a right given to a creditor in certain situations to retain 
possession of the property of a person who owes him money. It usually 
arises where the property is already in the creditor's possession 
before the debt is due. At common law there is no power to sell the 
property: it is simply retained as a means of bringing pressure on the 
debtor to pay (49). Certain statutes do, however, give the right of 
sale. A lien can arise by operation of law or by agreement. A lien 
may be either general or particular. A general lien is one that allows 
the creditor to retain possession of the goods until all the claims he 
has against the debtor are satisfied; a particular lien only relates 
to claims of a certain kind, usually claims connected with the chattel 
in some way. 188 -
A general lien can exist only as a result of a special agreement or 
by the custom of particular trades. There is often a term in a ware­
housing contract giving the warehouseman a lien over the goods stored 
in the warehouse. An example of a lien resulting from custom is the 
lien which a solicitor has over papers belonging to his client. He 
can retain these until his costs are paid. 
Examples of particular liens are: first, the lien which anyone has 
who does work on a chattel, e.g. repairs; he can retain the chattel 
until his charge is paid. Secondly, an innkeeper (hotelier) has a 
lien over the goods which a guest brings into the hotel. This lien 
is for the hotel charges. It cannot be exercised over the guest's 
motor car (50)but the innkeeper does in certain circumstances have the 
right of sale: see the Innkeepers Act 187 8. The lien which an unpaid 
seller has over the goods has already been discussed. 
A lien does not arise if possession of the goods was wrongfully obtained, 
and if possession was obtained from someone other than the owner the 
lien will not normally prevail against the owner unless the owner gave 
his consent. For example: If A lends his car to Β who takes it to a 
garage owned by C for repairs, C cannot claim a lien against A unless 
A expressly or impliedly gave his consent to Β to have the car repaired. 
This is an application of the rule, nemo dat quod non habet. Most of 
the exceptions to this rule apply to liens other than market overt and 
the Hire-Purchase Act 1964. The innkeeper's lien is also an exception: 
it applies even to goods that have been stolen provided the innkeeper 
did not know this. 
A lien is normally lost if possession is voluntarily given up and it 
does not revive if possession is re-obtained. It also ceases if pay­
ment is made or offered. 
Scotland 
The law is generally the same but there are differences of detail. The 
Innkeepers Act and the Hotel Proprietors Act both apply to Scotland. 
PLEDGES 
A pledge is a delivery of goods by a debtor to his creditor as security 
for the debt. The original owner of the goods is the pledgor and the 
person to whom they are delivered is the pledgee. The delivery of the 
goods into the possession of the pledgee is an essential element of a 
pledge. Delivery of documents of title to the goods does not operate 
as a pledge of the goods unless the person holding the goods (a third 
party) is informed and agrees to hold the goods for the pledgee (51). 
Bills of lading are an exception to this rule; another exception is 
created by section 3 of the Factors Act 1889, which applies to all 
documents of title but only where the pledge is made by a mercantile 
agent. 
The pledgee is under a duty to take care of the goods. He is liable 
if they are damaged or destroyed due to his negligence but he is not - 189 
liable if they are accidentally destroyed. The same applies if the 
goods are stolen. The pledgee has a real right in the goods and he can 
recover tham from the pledgor or a third party if they are wrongly 
taken from him. He must, however, redeliver them to the pledgor when 
the loan is repaid. If the pledgee voluntarily gives up possession he 
loses his rights in the goods, except that he may return them to the 
pledgor for a limited purpose. 
The pledgee has the right to sell the goods if the debt is not paid 
by the date agreed upon or, if no date for repayment was agreed upon, 
after the pledgor has been asked to repay and he has not done so 
within a reasonable time. The pledgee can deduct from the price 
obtained from the sale the amount of the loan together with interest (52) 
and expenses. The balance must be returned to the pledgor. If the 
sale does not provide enough money to satisfy the pledgee's claim, he 
still has a right of action against the pledgor for the balance. 
The rule nenio dat quod non habet applies to pledge as much as to other 
transactions. Therefore, if the pledgor is not the owner, the rights 
of the pledgee will be subject to those of the owner unless the 
transaction falls within one of the exceptions to the rule of nemo dat. 
(Most of the exceptions mentioned previously apply to pledge except 
market overt and the provisions of the Hire-Purchase Act 1964). If the 
pledgor is the owner he can transfer his rights to a third party, e.g. 
sell the property, but the rights of the new owner will be subject to 
the pledge: he will have to repay the debt to get the property. 
If the pledgee is a pawnbroker, that is a person who carries on the 
business of taking goods in pawn (pledge), and if the loan is £ 50 
or less, the Pawnbrokers Acts 1872 and 1960 will apply. These Acts 
provide for the licensing of pawnbrokers and lay down various rules that 
apply to the transaction. Pledges covered by the Acts are redeemable 
within six months and seven days. If not redeemed, the pledge becomes 
the property of the pledgee if its value is £ 2 or less; if it is more 
than this the article must be sold at a public auction. If the property 
is destroyed by fire the pawnbroker is liable to pay the value of the 
pledge, less the amount of the loan and expenses, to the pledgor 
provided he applies within the period during which the pledge would 
have been redeemable. If the loan is over £ 5 the parties may contract 
out of the provisions of the Acts provided a "special contract" is 
signed by the pledgor. 
Scotland 
The Pawnbrokers Acts apply in Scotland as they do in England but the 
position where the Acts do not apply is not quite the same: the most 
important difference is that the pledgee does not have a right of sale 
without first applying to court unless the contract expressly gives 
him this right. 
Northern Ireland 
The Pawnbrokers Acts do not apply in Northern Ireland. Similar, but 
not identical, provisions are contained in the Pawnbrokers Act 1954. 
This is a statute of the Norther^ Ireland Parliament. The common law 
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BILLS OF SALE ACTS 
There are two principal Bills of Sale Acts, those of 1878 and 1882 (53). 
These Acts do not apply in either Scotland or Northern Ireland but 
similar provisions have been introduced into Northern Ireland by the 
Bills of Sale (Ireland) Acts 1879 and 1883. What follows, applies to 
England and Northern Ireland but not Scotland. 
A bill of sale is a document which transfers the ownership of goods 
from one person to another. The transfer may be by way of sale, gift 
or any other means but the Acts only apply where the goods remain in 
the possession of the transferor. A bill of sale may be either 
absolute or conditional; an absolute bill of sale is an outright trans-
fer, while a conditional bill of sale is one given by way of security 
for a loan. The Act of 1878 originally applied to both absolute and 
conditional (security) bills of sale but it was considerably amended, 
and largely replaced, by the Act of 1882 in so far as conditional bills 
of sale are concerned. The latter are, therefore, largely governed by 
the Act of 1882, while the former are governed entirely by the earlier 
Act. 
The objects of the two Acts were very different. The situation which 
the Act of 187 8 was intended to cover was where the grantor of the bill 
(the original owner of the goods) transferred ownership of the goods to 
the grantee (transferee) but retained possession of them. Where this 
occurs other persons might give credit to the transferor on the supposit-
ion that he was the owner of the goods and was consequently a man of 
substance. If, however, they tried to recover the money owing to them 
either by means of execution (54) or in bankruptcy proceedings the 
grantee of the bill would step in to claim the goods and produce the 
bill as proof of his ownership. Such a bill might be completely 
fraudulent or it might be genuine, but the creditors would find that 
they could not recover what was owing to them. It, was, therefore, 
provided by the Act of 1878 that the bill would be void as against the 
creditors unless it was registered within seven days after it was made. 
The Act of 1882, on the other hand, only applies to bills of sale given 
by way of security for the payment of money, i.e. security bills of 
sale. It covers all transactions where the owner of goods borrows 
money on the security of goods - provided the transaction is put into 
writing - whether it is in the form of a sale to the lender with a 
right to buy the property back or in any other form. It does not, 
however, apply to a pledge, that is where the possession of the proper-
ty is given to the lender. The purpose of the Act is to protect the 
borrower from undue exploitation and in certain cases the transaction 
will be void as between lender and borrower. The other creditors of 
the borrower, however, get the same protection as in the case of an 
absolute bill. 
A definition of a bill of sale is given in section 4 of the Act of 1878 
and this applies to the later Act as well. It is drafted in very wide - 191 -
terms but it excludes a number of documents including a marriage 
settlement, a transfer of goods in the ordinary course of trade, a 
warehouse keeper's certificate and a bill of lading. Bills of sale 
relating to goods in a foreign country or at sea are also excluded. More-
over, since the Acts are concerned only with documents, their provisions 
do not apply to any oral transactions. However, since the Acts are 
concerned with the situation where the goods remain in the possession 
of the transferor, the transferee would normally desire a written 
document as proof of his ownership. The formalities of registration 
are, subject to one exception, the same under both Acts. Registration 
must take place within seven days of the making of the bill. A copy 
of the bill and an affidavit must be filed with the registrar. 
Registration must be renewed every five years but assignments of the 
bill need not be registered. There are provisions for searching the 
register and taking copies of bills; thus persons intending to lend 
money to someone can discover whether any bills of sale are registered 
against his name. The bill itself must set forth the consideration 
for which it was given and any condition to which it may be subject. 
If two or more bills are registered with regard to the same property, 
priority is determined by the date of registration. Absolute bills 
must have their execution attested by a solicitor who must state that 
he explained the meaning of it to the grantor, but security bills may 
be attested by any credible witness. 
If an absolute bill is not properly registered it is void as against 
the grantor's creditors if they levy execution against him or if he 
becomes bankrupt, provided the goods in question are in the possession 
of the grantor at the time of execution or bankruptcy. In other words, 
the property can be taken to satisfy the grantor's debts if it remains 
in his possession. However, if an absolute bill is registered the 
property concerned will not fall within the reputed ownership clause 
of the Bankruptcy Act 1914 (55) . This last provision does not apply 
to security (conditional) bills. 
If a security bill is not duly registered as described above (e.g. if 
it does not truly set forth the consideration for which it was given) 
it is void not only as regards the creditors of the grantor but also 
as between the grantor and grantee insofar as it gives the grantee a 
security interest in the goods; the personal obligation to repay the 
loan with interest remains. In other words, the grantee can bring a 
personal action against the grantor but he has no rights in the goods. 
There are a number of other provisions that apply only to security 
bills. First, the bill must follow the form of words laid down in the 
Act: it must produce the precise legal effect - neither more nor less -
of the form. Secondly, the consideration (sum borrowed) must not be 
less than £ 30. If either of these provisions is not complied with the 
bill is absolutely void not only as regards the lender's interest in 
the goods but also as regards the personal obligation. The lender can, 
however, recover the money lent, plus a reasonable rate of interest 
(five per cent). Thirdly, the bill must contain a list of the goods 
to which it relates and the bill is void as against third parties (but 
not between grantor and grantee) as regards any property of which the 
grantor was not the owner at the 'time the bill was made. - 192 -
The Act of 1882 lays down the circumstances under which the grantee 
of a security bill of sale can seize the goods. These provisions 
cannot be changed by the parties. The circumstances include a default 
in payment by the grantor if the grantor becomes bankrupt, if execution 
is levied against the grantor, or if he fraudulently removes the goods 
from his premises. The grantor may apply to the court for relief within 
five days of the seizure and the court may restrain the grantee from 
removing or selling the goods if the cause of the seizure no longer 
exists, for example if the grantor pays the money owing. 
It should also be mentioned that a sale which is intended merely to 
operate as a security transaction will not come within the scope of 
the Sale of Goods Act. This is provided by section 61 (4) of the 
Sale of Goods Act which states: 
The provisions of the Act relating to contracts of sale do not 
apply to any transaction in the form of a contract of sale which 
is intended to operate by way of mortgage, pledge, charge, or 
other security. 
People who lend money sometimes try to get round the provisions of the 
Bills of Sale Acts by means of a hire-purchase agreement. Assume that 
the borrower has a chattel, for example a motor car, which he is 
prepared to offer as security for the loan provided he retains possess-
ion. The parties may then enter into a transaction in which the 
borrower "sells" the car to the lender and is paid cash for it (the 
loan). The lender then enters into a hire-purchase agreement with the 
borrower under which he hires the car for agreed monthly payments and 
is given the option to purchase it after a certain number of payments. 
These payments represent the repayment of the loan together with 
interest. If the borrower defaults on the payments the lender can take 
possession of the car. Transactions of this kind have caused difficult-
ies for the courts. In many cases they have been prepared to look 
behind the form of the agreement and hold it void as a security bill 
of sale that does not comply with the Act. In other cases, however, 
such transactions have been upheld (56). 
FLOATING CHARGES 
A floating charge is a security interest in the property of a company. 
It exists over all the property for the time being belonging to the 
company but while it is still floating it does not prevent the company 
disposing of its property in the ordinary course of business. Once 
the property has been disposed of by the company the floating charge 
ceases to affect it, but it does apply to any new property acquired by 
the company. The fact that the charge does not prevent the company 
from dealing with its property makes this a very useful security in the 
case of companies which have a large stock in trade which is constantly 
turning over. If the company is wound up the charge crystallises, i.e. 
becomes fixed and applies to all the property belonging to the company 
at that time. Debts secured by a floating charge take priority over 
most unsecured debts but not normally over a fixed charge (mortgage). 193-
Part III of the Companies Act 1948 provides that floating charges must 
be registered (57). If they are unregistered they are void as against 
the liquidator and the other creditors. 
Floating charges were unknown in Scotland until they were introduced 
by the Companies (Floating Charges) Scotland) Act 1961. The position 
under floating charges are only possible in the case of companies 
(which are excluded from the Bills of Sale Acts). In England and 
Northern Ireland a floating charge over the property of an individual 
would be contrary to the Bills of Sale Acts; in Scotland floating 
charges are prohibited by the Scottish Common Law and can only exist 
when statutory provision is expressly made for them. 
AGRICULTURAL CHARGES 
Under the Agricultural Credits Act 1928 a farmer can charge his 
farming stock as security for a loan. The term "farming stock" is 
widely defined and includes crops, livestock and agricultural machinery. 
The charge may be either fixed or floating and must be registered in 
a central register to be valid against third parties. 
MORTGAGES OF MOVABLES 
Mortgages of movables (chattel mortgages) are possible under the 
English common law and the same basic rules apply to them as in the 
case of a mortgage of land. (The legislation of 1925 does not, however, 
apply to movables.) Basically, what happens is that the mortgagor 
(owner of the property and borrower) transfers ownership of the chattel 
to the mortgagee (lender) and it is agreed that the latter will re-
transfer it when the debt is repaid. Chattel mortgages today, however, 
normally come within the terms of the Bills of Sale Acts since the 
document setting out the mortgage agreement will be a security bill of 
sale. The common law could still apply, however, in those cases which 
do not come within the Bills of Sale Acts. One example of this would 
be where no document is given; but this would be extremely unlikely 
in practice. The Acts do not apply where a company is the mortgagor 
and companies do give chattel mortgages (fixed charges) but they have 
to be registered under the provisions of the Companies Act discussed 
above. In practice, therefore, common law chattel mortgages are 
extremely rare. 
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Notes 
(1) Originally the Factors Act did not apply to Scotland but is was 
extended to Scotland by the Factors (Scotland) Act 1890. 
(2) The beneficiary, of course, only has an equitable right in the 
property: see pp. 7-9. In Scotland the beneficiary has 
only a personal right. 
(3) Thus a servant (or agent) may hold something on behalf of his 
master (or principal); in this case the latter, not the former, 
possesses it. 
(4) This appears to be a reference to the reputed ownership clause 
of the Bankruptcy Act 1914. See p.93. 
(5) See Pearson v. Rose & Young (1951) 1 K.B. 275; Folkes v. King 
(1923) 1 K.B. 282. See also Du Jardin v. Beadman Brothers 
Limited (1952) 2 Q.B. 712, which was decided on the basis of a 
similar provision in s.9 of the Factors Act. 
(6) Pearson v. Rose & Young (1951) 1 K.B. 275 at 288 per Denning L.J. 
(7) This case concerned a pledge by the agent but the same would 
apply in the case of a sale. 
(8) Oppenheimer v. Attenborough (1908) 1 K.B. 221 at 230-1 per 
Buckley L.J. 
(9) S.22 (3) of the Act. 
(10) Laws in Wales Act 1542, s.47 
(11) The relationship between the contract of sale and the transfer 
of ownership is not absolutely clear in English law. If the 
contract is void for mistake as to the identity of the buyer, 
ownership does not pass: Cundy v. Lindsay (1878) 3 App. Cas. 459. 
On the other hand there is an obiter dictum by Lush J. in Stocks 
v. Wilson (1913) 2 K.B. 235 at 246 to the effect that if the 
contract is void because the buyer is a minor, ownership would 
pas's by delivery. Moreover, if the contract is illegal owner-
ship can still pass notwithstanding the illegality: Elder v. 
Kelly (1919) 2 K.B. 179; Singh v. Ali (1960) A.C. 167. It should, 
however, be said that minors' contracts and illegal contracts are 
not absolutely void in the sense of being regarded as non-existent. 
(12) (1965) 1 Q.B. 525 
(13) McLeod v. Kerr 1965 S.C. 253. 
(14) It is not very clear why Parliament omitted these words. 
(15) (1934) 2 K.B. 305. 
(16) Hire-purchase contracts are discussed. 
(17) The Privy Council is a court which hears appeals from certain 
Commonwealth countries. Most of the judges are the same as those 
who sit in the House of Lords (in its judicial capacity) and 
decisions of the Privy Council are consequently accorded a great 
deal of respect, though they are not, strictly speaking, binding 
on English courts. 196 -
(18) (1965) A.C. 867. 
(19) See , p.59 
(20) This Act does not apply in Scotland or Northern Ireland but 
similar provisions are found in section 50 of the Hire-Purchase 
(Scotland) Act 1965 and in section 54 of the Hire-Purchase Act 
1966. The latter statute is an Act of the Northern Ireland 
Parliament. 
(21) See , p. 60 
(22) (1965) 1 Q.B. 525; discussed , p.64. 
(23) (1965) 1 Q.B. 560. Note this case was decided shortly after 
Caldwell's case. 
(24) For a further discussion of this point, which seems at first 
sight to be contrary to the actual words of section 9, see 
P.S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods (4th ed. 1971) pp. 206-7 and 
W.L. Cornish, "Rescission without Notice" 27 Modern Law Review 
472. 
(25) See pp. 68-9. 
(26) Ibid. 
(27) See, pp. 102-104 
(28) See, pp. 100-101 
(29) See , p.91 
(30) See J.C. Vaines, Personal Property (4th ed.1967) pp. 189-190;193-6. 
(31) See P.S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods (4th ed. 1971) p.146 
(32) Nanka Bruce v. Commonwealth Trust Ltd. (1926) A.C. 77. 
(33) See the Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971 under which the 
recipient is in certain circumstances allowed to keep unsolicited 
goods as an unconditional gift. 
(34) Healey v. Howlett and Sons (1917) 1 K.B. 337. 
(35) Re Blyth Shipbuilding Co. (1926) Ch. 494. 
(36) Section 8 of the Factors Act does not apply because S's possession 
of the goods was broken by the delivery to B: see p.66. 
It is assumed that S is not a mercantile agent and that the sale 
to C was not in market overt. 
(37) See , pp. 54-55., 
(38) See section 39 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act. In Scotland the 
seller can also attach the goods while they are in his hands: 
section 40 of the Sale of Goods Act. 
(39) See, pp. 100-101. 
(40) Valpy v. Gibson (1847) 4 C.B. 837; Pennington v. Motor Reliance 
Works Ltd. (1923) 1 K.B. 127. 
(41) See , p. 88. 
(42) See , pp. 65-67 - 197-
(43) The same result would follow, even if the seller is not a trader, 
if he gave the buyer a bill of sale for the goods and if the 
buyer did not register it as provided by the Bills of Sale Acts 
1878 and 1882. If it is registered, however, the provisions of 
of the Bankruptcy Act will not apply provided it is an absolute 
bill of sale: see, pp. 105-109. 
(44) See .. p. 67 et. seq. 
(45) The case in which this was first decided was Helby v. Matthews 
(1895) A.C. 471. 
(46) See, p. 93. 
(47) See , pp. 68-69. 
(48) See ,pp. 72-74. 
(49) An application can, however, be made to court for an order to 
sell. 
(50) The Hotel Proprietors Act 1956; s.2(2). For Northern Ireland 
see the Hotel Proprietors Act 1958, s.2(2). This is a statute 
of the Northern Ireland Parliament. The Innkeepers Act 1878 
applies in Northern Ireland. 
(51) J.C. Vaines, Personal Property (4th ed. 1967), pp. 411-12. 
(52) If provided for in the contract. 
(53) The Bills of Sale Acts of 1890 and 1891 are not important. 
(54) If a judgment creditor (a person who has obtained judgment from 
a court for a sum of money) cannot obtain the money from the 
debtor he may take proceedings to have the judgment executed. 
Normally an officer of the court will seize and sell the property 
of the debtor to satisfy the judgment. 
(55) Section 38 (2)(c). See, p.93. 
(56) See A.L. Diamond, Introduction to Hire-Purchase Law (2nd ed. 
1971), pp. 77-82. 
(57) For Northern Ireland see the Companies Act 1960 (Northern Ireland 
Parliament) s.93. 199 
Chapter 6. MOVABLES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
JURISDICTION 
Unlike in the case of immovables, there is no rule preventing an 
English court from taking jurisdiction in an action in personam 
concerning movables in a foreign country, even if the plaintiff's cause 
of action raises the question of title to the goods. There is also no 
reason in principle why an English court should not grant a decree of 
specific performance in the case of a contract for the sale of goods 
situated in a foreign country, though there appears to be no reported 
case of this having been done. However, though an English court can 
in domestic law grant a decree of specific performance in the case of 
a sale of movable property, it would be only in fairly rare cases that 
it would do so. This is because movable property, unlike land, is not 
often of peculiar or unique value to the plaintiff and damages will 
normally be a sufficient remedy. Nevertheless, since English courts 
are prepared to grant a decree of specific performance in the case of 
foreign land, there seems to be no reason why they should not have the 
power to do this in the case of movables (1). 
CHOICE OF LAW 
There have been very few cases decided by the English courts on the 
subject of choice of law with regard to the transfer of tangible 
movables and for this reason the law is not very certain on many points. 
It seems clear, however, that in principle the lex situs governs: 
earlier theories in favour of a different law have been discarded (2). 
Thus Diplock L.J. said in the Court of Appeal in the case of Hardwick 
Game Farm v. Suffolk Agricultural Poultry Producers Association (3). 
The proper law governing the transfer of corporeal movable 
property is the lex situs. A contract made in England and 
governed by English law for the sale of specific goods situated 
in Germany, although it would be effective to pass the property 
in the goods at the moment the contract was made if the goods 
were situate in England would not have that effect if under 
German law...delivery of the goods was required in order to 
transfer the property in them. 
Although most of the cases concern the transfer of ownership, the same 
rule would apply to the creation, transfer or extinction of any real 
right. Thus in Inglis v. Robertson (4) it was applied to the creation 
of a pledge. In this case A, a wine merchant in London, bought whisky 
from B, a wine and spirit merchant in Glasgow (Scotland). The whisky 
was stored in a warehouse in Glasgow and it was transferred to A's name 200 
in the books of the warehouse company and delivery orders were given 
to A. Later A borrowed money from C, another English merchant, and 
purported to pledge the whisky as security for the loan. A endorsed 
the delivery warrants to C, who did not, however, give notice of his 
interest to the warehouse company. The court held that the question 
whether this created a valid pledge (i.e. a real right that would be 
valid against A's creditors) should be decided by the law of Scotland, 
the lex situs. 
If the goods are moved from one country to another any real rights 
validly acquired under the law of the former situs at the time when the 
goods were there will be recognised in the country of the new situs. 
This applies, for example, to the question of when a non-owner can give 
a good title to a bona fide purchaser. Thus in a Scottish case (5) 
a horse had been stolen in Ireland and sold to a bona fide purchaser 
in an open market in Ireland and subsequently brought to Scotland where 
it was claimed by the original owner. The court upheld the title of 
the purchaser even though a sale in market overt does not give a good 
title in Scotland (6). The result would probably have been the same 
if the horse had been stolen in Scotland and then sold in an open market 
in Ireland. If, therefore, goods were stolen in France and sold in an 
open market in England, an English court would hold that the purchaser 
obtained a good title. 
Another case which illustrates this is C aitimeli v. Sewell (7). In this 
case a cargo of timber was shipped from Russia to England in a Prussian 
ship which was wrecked off the coast of Norway. The captain of the 
ship had the cargo sold by public auction in Norway. Under Norwegian 
law this gave a good title to the buyer and this was recognised when 
the goods were subsequently brought to England even though under English 
law the buyer would not have obtained a good title. 
A problem could arise with regard to the doctrine of estoppel (8). In 
strict theory this is a doctrine of evidence, not substantive law. In 
other words, the person against whom it operates is not permitted to 
bring evidence to prove that the sale to the bona fide third party was 
not with his consent. In spite of this, of course, its effect is that 
of a rule of substantive law but if it is classified (qualifié) as a 
rule of evidence for conflict of laws purposes the governing law would 
be the lex fori not the lex situs. It is to be hoped that an English 
court would not adopt such a classification (9). 
In the case of a sale it is important to distinguish those questions 
concerned with real rights (which are governed by the lex situs) and 
those concerned with contractual or personal rights (which are governed 
by the proper law of the contract). Thus the transfer of ownership 
between seller and buyer will be decided by the lex situs. The English 
rule (10) is that this depends on the intention of the parties and 
section 17 (11) of the Sale of Goods Act provides that to ascertain 
this "regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of 
the parties, and the circumstances of the case." If the goods are 
situated in England an English court will, therefore, look to the 
contract to see whether any intention as to the passing of property is 
expressed in it. - 201 -
The way this would work in practice may be illustrated by the following 
examples in which it is assumed that the lex situs is English law but 
that the contract is governed by German law (12). First, if there is 
an express clause providing that ownership will not pass until delivery, 
or until the price is paid, this will be upheld. Secondly, if there is 
an express clause that German law is to govern the passing of the 
property, this will also be followed. Thirdly, if there is no express 
agreement the court will look to see whether there is any implied 
agreement that can be deduced from the factors mentioned in section 17 
(2) (above). It is only if the court can discover no agreement, express 
or implied, that it will apply the five rules set out in section 18. 
The fact that the parties intended the contract to be governed by 
German law will not be regarded as automatically proving that they 
intended the German rules for the transfer of property to be applied; 
but this will be one factor taken into account by the English court in 
deciding what their intention was (13). This is shown by the following 
quotation from the judgment of Lord Parker in The Parchim:(14) 
The (Sale of Goods Act) codifies the rules by which that 
intention is to be ascertained, but the inferences based on 
the rules may always be displaced by the terms of the contract 
itself or the surrounding circumstances including the conduct 
of the parties. No doubt the municipal law with reference to 
which the parties entered into the particular transaction is 
material in considering their intention as to the passing of 
property, and if it appears that they contracted with reference 
to a municipal law other than English, and it be further proved 
that that municipal law is different in any respect from the 
English law, this rule of course has to be taken into account, 
in determining their intention. 
It is hardly necessary to add that if the lex situs is the law of a 
foreign country, an English court will not look to the contract unless 
it is required to do so by the foreign law. 
There is no English authority on the law governing the passing of the 
risk but this would probably be regarded as a contractual matter 
governed by the proper law of the contract (15). Under English law 
the passing of the risk is primarily a matter to be agreed upon by the 
parties but in the absence of such agreement the risk passes with the 
property: res perit domino (see section 20 of the Sale of Goods Act) 
(16). If the contract was governed by English law the court would, 
in the absence of an agreement, look to the lex situs to see when the 
property passed to the buyer. 
The rights of an unpaid seller against the goods (17) could give rise 
to difficult problems and there is no satisfactory English authority 
on the way they should be treated in conflict of laws (18). The rights 
of an unpaid seller against the goods in English law are effective not 
only against the buyer but also against third parties and should there-
fore be regarded as real rights. If this is correct the lex situs 
should govern, but difficulties could arise in the case of stoppage 
in transitu if the seller seeks to exercise his right after the goods 
have entered another country or while the goods are on a ship on the 
high seas. Analogous rights in foreign legal systems might, of course, 
be merely personal and in such a case a conflict of classification 
could arise (19). - 202-
Where documents of title to goods are situated in a different country 
from the goods themselves the normal rule seems to be that the lex 
situs of the goods, not the documents, decides whether real rights in 
the goods can be created or transferred by a delivery of the documents 
(20). One situation which may be an exception to this is where the 
goods are on a ship on the high seas. Here there is no actual lex situs 
of the goods (21) and it may be that the lex situs of the document 
governs, at least if the document is regarded as representing the goods 
under the law of the country in which the ship was loaded. In North 
Western Bank v. Poynter (22) a cargo on board a ship bound for Glasgow 
(Scotland) from Liverpool (England)was pledged by a delivery in 
Liverpool of the bills of lading. English and Scottish law were in 
fact the same as regards the validity of the pledge but the court 
appeared to consider that if there had been a difference the law of 
England would have applied (though this seems to have been based 
partly on the domicile of the parties) (23). 
Finally it should be mentioned that most English writers consider that 
if the lex situs is a foreign law the theory of total renvoi should be 
applied where appropriate. The object of this is to ensure uniformity 
of decision with courts of the situs (24). There are, however, no 
decisions on the point. 
SECURITY INTERESTS WITHOUT TRANSFER OF POSSESSION 
The problem to be considered here is that dealt with in paragraphs 
13-15 of Professor Arndt's report and in the Draft Convention of the 
Banking Federation of the EEC, that is the extent to which security 
interests without transfer of possession constituted in a foreign 
country would be recognised in England if the property were brought 
to England. This is, of course, only one aspect of the wider problem 
of the recognition in one country of real rights created in another 
which are of a kind unknown in the country to which the property is 
brought. However, the most important examples in practice seem to be 
security interests in which the debtor remains in possession of the 
property, such as a sale with reservation of title under German law 
or a pledge of a motor vehicle under French law. 
It will be recalled that the most important security interests of this 
kind in English law are hire-purchase and conditional sale. These 
transactions are normally to secure vendor credit (i.e. the price of 
the article in question) and security interests to secure lender credit 
would normally come under the Bills of Sale Acts if the debtor remains 
in possession. There are no provisions for registration in the case 
of hire-purchase and conditional sale and since the seller/creditor 
is still the owner of the property his interests are well protected. 
The extent to which his rights can be defeated by a transfer to a bona 
fide third party or on the bankruptcy of the buyer/debtor have already 
been considered (25). Where a bill of sale is given, registration is 
necessary but if this is done the creditor is also well protected (26). 
The Bills of Sale Acts do not apply to companies but there are other 
provisions requiring charges over the assets of a company to be 
registered (27). 203 -
There are no cases in which the question of recognising a foreign 
security interest of this kind has come before the English courts (28) 
and it is not, therefore, certain what the attitude of the courts 
would be. However, there seems no reason in principle why a real right 
of this kind, validly created under the lex situs when the chattel was 
in a foreign country, would not be recognised in England if the chattel 
were subsequently brought to England. The English court would probably 
try to find an analogous English transaction and, at least in questions 
such as priorities, treat the parties to the foreign transaction as if 
they had entered into the analogous English transaction. 
Thus the question whether the rights of the creditor in the property 
would be defeated by a transfer to a bona fide third party would depend 
on whether any of the exceptions to the nemo dat rule were applicable. 
A sale with reservation of title under German law would be regarded as 
a conditional sale in England which would come within section 9 of the 
Factors Act (and section 25 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act) unless 
section 54 of the Hire-Purchase Act 1965 were applicable (29). If a 
motor vehicle were involved the Hire-Purchase Act of 1964 would apply 
(30). However, it is not clear how far a court would hold that the 
Hire-Purchase Acts would apply to a transaction entered into a foreign 
country. In particular it is unclear whether those provisions designed 
to protect the buyer - for example those limiting the right of a 
conditional seller to retake possession of the goods - would apply to 
a foreign transaction. 
There is nothing in the common law to prevent a mortgage of movables 
(chattel mortgage) but normally such a transaction would be subject 
to the Bills of Sale Acts. These Acts do not, however, apply if the 
goods are outside England at the time of the transaction. This is 
because the term "bill of sale" is defined by section 4 of the Act of 
1878 not to include "bills of sale of goods in foreign parts or at sea". 
The Acts would not, therefore, apply if the goods were in a foreign 
country at the time of the transaction and it would probably make no 
difference if the goods were subsequently brought to England. If this 
is correct, a foreign transaction analogous to a mortgage of movable 
property would be recognised in England. It should be mentioned that 
under an English mortgage the debtor transfers ownership of the proper-
ty to the creditor and the creditor agrees to re-transfer it on payment 
of the debt. The debtor normally retains possession. 
Special provisions apply to security interests created by a company 
over its property. Section 95 (1) of the Companies Act 1948 provides: 
" every charge created....by a company registered in 
England and being a charge to which this section applies shall, 
so far as any security in the company's property or undertaking 
is conferred thereby, be void against the liquidator and any 
creditor of the company, unless...(it is registered). 
This provision applies to a charge (security interest) over property 
in a foreign country of an English company even if the charge is 
created in the foreign country, and there are provisions for the 
registration of such charges (31). Section 95 (2) defines the charges 
to which the section applies and includes a charge created by an - 204-
instrument which, if executed by an individual, would require 
registration as a bill of sale. It also includes floating charges. 
It will be seen from this that under the present law if the French 
branch of an English company created a security interest under French 
law over its French property, this would not be valid in England if it 
was not registered in England. 
If an English company created a security interest (charge) over its 
property in a foreign country, it would be recognised in England if it 
is valid by English law and registered in England even though it is 
invalid by the lex situs. This applies to movable and immovable 
property. Thus in the case of In re The Anchor Line (Henderson 
Brothers) Ltd. (32) an English company which owned movable and immovable 
property in Scotland executed a charge in Scotland in favour of a 
Scottish bank whereby the bank was given a floating security (33) over 
all the company's property wherever situated. The charge was registered 
in England. At that time floating charges were unknown to Scottish 
law but the English court nevertheless held that it was valid as 
regards both movable and immovable property in Scotland. This decision 
has been criticised in Scotland and if the case had come before a 
Scottish court the floating charge would not have been recognised (34). 
It is provided by section 106 of the Companies Act that the provisions 
regarding the registration of charges also apply to charges on property 
in England created by companies incorporated outside England which 
have an established place of business in England. 
THE DRAFT CONVENTION OF THE BANKING FEDERATION 
The relevant provisions of English law have already been considered. 
I assume that the Draft Convention would apply to security interests 
granted by companies. If this is so, the provisions of the Companies 
Act considered above would have to be altered insofar as they apply 
to property outside England. (The same would apply, of course, if the 
UK became a party to the Draft Convention on Private International 
Law.) It would also be necessary to make clear what English security 
interests would come within Article 2 of the Convention. I assume 
that the convention applies to vendor credit as well as lender credit. 
It is especially important that hire-purchase and conditional sales 
should come within the scope of the convention since these are most 
important security interests in the United Kingdom. The rights of 
the lender under these transactions are, of course, based on the fact 
that he is still owner of the property. - 205-
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Notes 
(1) For a discussion of this point in relation to foreign land, see 
above pp. 46-7. 
(2) The only modern writer who has not supported the lex situs is 
Dr. Cheshire. He put forward the view that the lex situs applied 
only when third parties were involved; in questions between the 
parties to the transfer he considered that the lex actus (the 
law of the country with which the transfer has the most real 
connection) should be applied: see G.C. Cheshire, Private Inter-
national Law (7th ed. 1965), pp. 404-19. In the latest edition 
of this book, however, (which is edited by P.M. North) this view 
has been abandoned and the orthodox approach adopted: Cheshire's 
Private International Law (8th ed. by G.C. Cheshire and P.M. North 
1970) pp. 507-23. 
(3) (1966) 1 W.L.R. 287 at 330; affirmed by the House of Lords (1969) 
2 A.C. 31. 
(4) (1898) A.C. 616 (House of Lords on appeal from the Court of 
Session in Scotland). 
(5) Todd v. Armour (1882) 9 R. (Court of Session) 901. 
(6) For the law of market overt, see above pp. 61-2. 
(7) (1860) 5 H. & N. 728 (Court of Exchequer Chamber). 
(8) For a discussion of estoppel, see above, pp. 57-8. 
(9) See Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws (8th ed. 1967)p. 1102. 
(10) See the quotation by Diplock L.J. at p. 114, above. 
(11) See above, pp. 77-82. 
(12) For a fuller discussion, see G.A. Zaphiriou, The Transfer of 
Chattels in Private International Law (1956) at pp. 53-65. 
(13) Zaphiriou, op. cit. p.59. 
(14) (1918) A.C. 157 at 161. 
(15) Zaphiriou, op. cit. , pp. 97-102. 
(16) See above, pp. 83-4. 
(17) See above, pp. 85-92. 
(18) The old case of Inglis v. Usherwood (1801) East 515 seems to 
support the lex situs as the law governing stoppage in transitu 
but the reasoning of the court is not clear. 
(19) For a general discussion of the question dealt with in.this 
paragraph, see Zaphiriou, op. cit., chap. XIII. 
(20) See Inglis v. Robertson, above p. 114-115. 
(21) It would be arbitrary to apply the law of the nationality of the 
ship since businessmen normally choose the most convenient ship 
without regard to its nationality. 
(22) (1895) A.C. 56 (House of the Lords on appeal from Scotland). 207 
(23) For a full discussion of this topic, see Zaphiriou, op. cit. 
pp. 199-208. 
(24) See, for example, Cheshire's Private International Law (8th ed. 
1970) p. 517 and Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws (8th ed. 
1967) pp. 547-8. The English doctrine of renvoi - total renvoi, 
or the foreign court theory - is different from the doctrine 
applied in Continental countries. For a discussion of the 
differences, see Cheshire, op. cit. pp. 54-75 and Dicey and 
Morris, op. cit. pp. 55-71. 
(25) Above pp. 68-9, 72-4, 93, 95-6. 
(26) Above pp. 105-9. 
(27) See above, pp. 110-1. 
(28) The only exception is a series of decisions concerning security 
interests over ships. These cases do not lay down any clear 
principle but in one of them, The Colorado (1923) p. 102, a 
French Hypothèque was recognised. For a discussion of these 
cases, see Zaphiriou, chap. XIV. 
(29) See above, pp. 67-71. 
(30) See above, pp. 7 2-4. 
(31) S. 95(3) and (4). 
(32) (1937) Ch. 483. 
(33) For a discussion of floating charges, see above, pp. 110-1. 
(34) See A.E. Anton, Private International Law (1967), pp. 256-7, 
397, and 406-7. It should be noted that today floating charges 
are recognised in Scotland: the Companies (Floating Charges) 
(Scotland) Act 1961. The willingness of the English court to 
apply English law to foreign property may have been due to the 
fact that a floating charge is an equitable right. PART III 
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Chapter 7 : PATENTS, INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS, TRADE MARKS AND COPYRIGHT 
INTRODUCTION 
The law on the matters to he dealt with in this chapter is almost entirely a 
matter of statute and these statutes are the same throughout the United Kingdom. 
The principal statutes are the Patents Act 1949 ( as amended), the Registered 
Designs Act 1949, the Trade Marks Act 1938, and the Copyright Act 1956 (as 
amended by the Design Copyright Act 1968). The discussion that follows will he 
concerned only with the hasic principles of the law. - 212 -
PATENTS 
In order to ohtain a patent it is necessary to make an application to the Patent 
Office in London. A patent can he obtained for any invention - which means any 
improvement in manufacturing technique - so long as it has not already been 
patented and comes within the rules to be discussed. The application can either 
be made by the inventor (or, in the case of a foreign invention, by the importer) 
or by the owner but in the latter case the inventor or importer must give his 
consent. If the invention is made by the employee of a firm - as is normally the 
case - the question whether the invention belongs to the employee or the employer 
depends on the terms of the contract of employment. If the contract does not 
specifically deal with this question, it depends on the kind of work normally done 
by the employee - in other words, whether it is part of his job to make that sort 
of invention. If it is not part of his work, the invention belongs to the 
employee even if it was done in his employer's time or with his materials. 
The complete specification filed with the Patent Office as part of the patent 
application must contain a description of the article, process or apparatus to be 
patented and a description of how it is made or worked (ï). It must also contain 
what are called claims. A claim is a description of the exact scope of the 
monopoly right that is claimed by the applicant. When the patent is obtained, 
anyone wanting to know whether anything will be a breach of the patent will look 
at the claims in order to see whether his product, etc. fits within the 
description of one of the claims (2). 
The complete specification will be examined by expert examiners at the Patent 
Office before it is accepted. The examiner will not pass it if he considers that 
the invention is not something that can be patented - that it describes no 
"manner of manufacture". A patent cannot be granted for an idea as such : there 
must be something concrete that can be manufactured. For example, it has been 
held that the idea of extinguishing incendiary bombs by spraying them with a 
particular liquid, already used for other purposes, could not he patented (3). 
The examiner will also ascertain whether the specification is in the proper form 
and contains sufficient instructions for working the invention. He must also make 
sure that the "claims" describe things that are new - they must not have been 
described before in any document published in the U.K. (4)· It is also necessary 
that the invention he a sufficient advance over what was previouflly known, i.e. it 
must not be something which would be obvious to a skilled but uninventive worker 
in the field in question. 
It will be seen from the above that it may not always be easy to get the 
specification accepted by the Patent Office. However, the mere fact that the 
specification has been accepted does not mean that the patent will be granted. 
Shortly after the specification has been accepted it is published and there is 
then a three month period during which anybody can oppose the application. If it 
is opposed the case is heard by a senior official at the Patent Office. To a 
large extent the grounds on which it may be opposed are the same as those on which 
it can be rejected by the examiner, but there are certain additional grounds. - 213-
If there is no opposition or if the opposition fails, "letters patent" will be 
granted to the applicant (now called the patentee). This, however, does not 
prevent the validity of the patent from being attacked subsequently in the courts. 
If the patentee brings an infringement action against someone whom he accuses of 
infringing his rights, the defendant may attack the validity of the patent and if 
he is successful not only will the action fail, but the patent will be revoked. 
There are a number of grounds on which the court can declare a patent invalid and 
it is common for the defendant in an infringement action to attack the validity 
of the patent as well as arguing that what he has done is not a breach of it. 
Some of these grounds correspond broadly to those on which the application could 
have been rejected by the examiner at the Patent Office but others are different. 
These include the following : that the invention will not work in the way that 
the specification says that it will or lacks the special advantage claimed for it; 
that at the date when the complete specification was filed the applicant knew a 
better way of carrying out the invention (one of the objects of the patent system 
is to induce inventors to make their inventions public in exchange for being given 
a monopoly for a certain length of time); that the intended use of the invention 
is contrary to law (e.g. a process for forging banknotes); and that the patentee 
has unreasonably refused to supply his invention to the Government. 
A patent granted in London is valid for the whole UK and remains in force for 
four years from the date when the complete specification is filed. It can be 
renewed annually after this for a total of 16 years from that date. Beyond this 
it can be extended only in special cases. 
The owner of a patent can be found from a register kept at the Patent Office and 
ownership of a patent can be transferred by deed followed by the registration of 
the name of the new owner in the register. 
TRADE MARKS 
A trade mark is a word or design which is used to indicate a connection in the 
course of business between the owner of the mark and his goods (5). Trade marks 
can be registered and this gives the owner the right to prevent other persons 
using the mark. There is, however, a difference between marks registered under 
Part A of the register and those under Part B. The protection given to marks 
registered under Part Β is slightly less in that, if the owner of the mark brings 
an action for infringement, it will be a good defence if the defendant can shovr 
that the way he used the trade mark was not likely to mislead the public. This is 
not a defence in the case of a Part A mark (6). 
Trade marks are always registered in relation to certain kinds of goods and 
registration gives the owner of the mark the exclusive right to use it in relation 
to those goods; it does not, however, give him the right to prevent others using 
it in relation to other kinds of goods. 
An infringement will take place not only if the same mark is used but also if any 
other mark is used which is so similar that it is likely to mislead the public. 
Infringement will not, however, take place unless the mark was used in the course 
of trade. - 214-
There are a number of special exceptions to the general infringement rules. A 
trade mark can be used in relation to accessories and spares intended to be used 
in connection with the goods of the trade mark owner, provided that there is no 
suggestion that they are made by the owner of the trade mark : for example I can 
say that my make of brake-lining is intended to be used on an Austin car. 
Another exception is that a businessman cannot be guilty of infringement if he is 
bona fide using his own name; if he is using it to deceive, however, he may be 
liable in a passing-off action. (This action is not dependent on registered trade 
marks : anyone who so conducts his business as to mislead the public into 
believing that his goods are someone else's is liable to be sued for passing-off). 
Finally, registration will not prevent someone else from using the mark if he was 
using it before its registration and before the registered owner first used it. 
If infringement takes place, the owner can sue anyone who put the mark on to the 
goods, or who imported the goods (if the mark was put on them in a foreign 
country) or anyone who trades in them. As in the case of a patent, the defendant 
in an infringement action is entitled to challenge the validity of the 
registration and if he succeeds in this the court will cancel the registration. 
To be registrable a mark must be intended to be used as a trade mark (either by 
the manufacturer, importer, distributor, etc.) and it must be distinctive. Words 
which are merely descriptive of the goods cannot be registered nor can common 
words such as the name of a well known town or a common surname. In one case it 
was held that the name "Electrix" could not be used because it sounded the same 
as "electrics" - it was in fact used for electrical goods (7). It must also not 
be so similar to other trade marks as to mislead the public. 
Applications for registrations are made to the Registrar of Trade Marks (in the 
Patent Office). As stated previously, a mark can only be registered in relation 
to a particular class of goods, that is thosegoods on which the applicant intends 
using it (and goods of the same description). The application must normally be 
made by the person or company using or intending to use the mark. The Registrar 
may object to the application on various grounds, for example that it is not 
distinctive, that the class of goods for which it is wished to register it is too 
wide, that the mark is immoral, illegal or misleading, or that it is too similar 
to existing marks. The standard of distinctiveness for a Part Β mark is lower 
than that for a Part A mark, and the Registrar may, therefore, allow a mark to be 
registered on Part Β of the register but not Part A. 
If the Registrar has no objections, the mark will then be advertised in The Trade 
Marks Journal to allow members of the public to oppose registration. Opposition 
may be based on any of the grounds on vrhich the Registrar could have opposed it 
but the most common ground is tha it is too similar to a mark used by someone 
else. In certain special cases where there is likely to be confusion, the 
Registrar may impose limitations on the use of the mark, e.g. by restricting it 
to goods sold in a particular area. If the opposition is unsuccessful, the mark 
will then be registered. Even after registration, application can be made for 
the removal of the mark from the register but such an application is less likely 
to succeed than one made before registration. Once seven years have elapsed from 
the date of registration, a Part A mark can only be removed from the register on 
very limited grounds, e.g. that it was obtained by fraud or is likely to deceive 
or cause confusion through the blameworthy act of the registered proprietor (8). 
A mark that was validly registered in the first place may lose its validity in 
certain circumstances. For example, if a mark is not used for five years it can 
be removed from the register unless the owner can prove that special circumstances 
in the trade were responsible for the non-use. Moreover, if the mark has been 
used only for some of the goods covered by the registration, an application can be 
used to limit the goods for which it is registered to the kind of goods for which - 215-
it has actually been used. Finally, if the owner of a mark wants to transfer it 
to someone else and he does not at the same time transfer his whole business to 
that person, the new owner must apply to the Registrar within six months for 
directions and must comply with any directions that are given. Normally he will 
be told that he must advertise the change in ownership of the mark so that the 
public will not be misled into thinking that the goods are still made by the firm. 
Likewise if he wishes to grant another person a licence to use the trade mark 
there must be provision for some kind of quality control of the goods produced by 
the licencee. 
GOODWILL 
In English law goodwill is usually regarded as a form of incorporeal property. 
Goodwill is the reputation which a man's business or goods have with the public; 
it is what distinguishes an established business from a new one. Trademarks are 
closely connected with goodwill because a trademark allows the public to identify 
a product with a particular manufacturer. Goodwill, however, can exist without a 
registered trademark. It is protected by means of an action for passing-off (9). 
If anyone conducts his business so as to mislead the public into thinking that his 
products or services are the products or services of some other person, he will be 
liable for passing-off. It does not matter whether his actions were deliberate 
or accidental so long as confusion results (10). 
Anyone who has suffered financial loss as a result of passing-off can sue the 
person responsible and obtain damages to compensate him for his loss and an 
injunction. He must, however, prove that his goods were sufficiently well known 
to the public for the public to be deceived. In other words he must have 
goodwill. A passing-off action therefore will protect an established business 
which has already got extensive goodwill but will not be of any assistance in 
building up goodwill in the first place. One of the advantages of registering 
a trade mark is that it is then not necessary to prove that it is known to the 
public. 
COPYRIGHT 
Copyright is given to protect the author of a literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic work. There is also a separate copyright in cinematograph films, sound 
recordings, the typography of published books and music (i.e. the form of the 
printing as distinct from the contents) and radio and television broadcasts. The 
owner of the copyright has the right to prevent anyone from reproducing the work 
without his consent. There is no system of registration of copyright in the U.K. 
and copyright attaches automatically in appropriate circumstances. Foreign 
copyrights are protected in the UK under the provisions of the Berne Convention 
and the Universal Copyright Convention. 
There are various different kinds of works that may be the subject of copyright 
and the period of copyright is not the same for all of them. There are also 
differences as regards the acts that constitute a breach of copyright. Thus the 
period of copyright for literary and dramatic works is 50 years from the death of 
the author or the date of publication, whichever is later. The following are an 
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public, broadcasting, an offer for sale of records of the work, or an adaptation 
of the work (e.g. a strip cartoon based on a book). There are similar provisions 
for musical words. The position is slightly, different in the case of artistic 
works. The copyright period for photographs is 50 years from the date of 
publication; for an engraving it is 50 years from the date of publication or the 
death of the author (whichever is the later); and for other artistic works it is 
50 years from the death of the author. 
Copyright can only exist in a "work" : an idea cannot be copyright. Thus the 
plot of a novel cannot be copyright (though the words in which it is expressed can 
be) and a painter who has painted a particular view cannot prevent other artists 
from painting the same view. The merit of the work is not, however, significant, 
but illegal or immoral works - such as a libellous article or an obscene 
picture - will not be protected. Copyright can exist in a translation, 
independent of the copyright in the original, since the translator will have 
expended skill and work in making the translation. The translator, of course, 
will be guilty of a breach of copyright unless he obtains the author's consent. 
The original owner of a copyright is normally the author, that is the person who 
has created the work in question. In the case of a photograph, however, the 
author is the person who owns the negative at the time when the photograph is 
taken (not necessarily the man who actually takes it) and in the case of a 
sound-recording it is the person who owns the original record when the recording 
is made. There are two important exceptions to the rule that the owner of the 
copyright is the author : first, if the author is an employee, the copyright will 
belong to his employer if the work was made in the course of his employment. 
This only applies if the author is employed under a contract of service and would 
not apply, for example, where an author is commissioned by a publisher to write 
a book. (Of course, this rule may be varied by the terms of the contract). 
Secondly, if an engraving, photograph, portrait or sound-recording is commissioned 
by someone who nays for it, copyright in it belongs to the person who commissions 
it. 
Copyright is infringed only if the work is copied : if the same result is created 
independently there is no infringement. It is also necessary that a substantial 
part of the work be copied. Exactly what is a "substantial part" will depend 
very much on the circumstances. However, copyright will not be infringed by "fair 
dealing" with a work for the purposes of research or private study. Thus a 
student could make notes from a textbook as part of his studies. Fair dealing 
for the purpose of criticism or review is also permitted : a critic could quote 
a passage from the book he is reviewing in order to illustrate his point. 
Copyright can be assigned (transferred) by an agreement in writing. The transfer 
can be limited to a particular field - e.g. the film rights in a novel can be 
transferred separately from the right to print and publish it - and the copyright 
in one country can, of course, be transferred separately from that in another. 
There is a distinction between a transfer of the copyright itself and a licence 
to do something that would otherwise be an infringement, e.g. publishing a book. 
There is also a distinction between a licence and a mere consent to do something 
that is covered by the copyright. If consent is given there is no breach of 
copyright but the difference is that a consent can be withdrawn at any time (but 
this cannot affect acts done before it was withdrawn) and if the copyright is 
transferred to someone else the consent does not bind the new owner - i.e. there 
will be a breach of copyright unless the new owner gives his consent. 
There are special rules relating to copyright in industrial designs. These will 
now be considered. - 217 -
INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS 
An industrial design is the artistic element in a manufactured product. The law 
relating to industrial designs has been changed in various important ways by the 
Design Copyright Act 1968. Under this Act the owner of an industrial design can 
protect it by means of artistic copyright under the Copyright Act 1956 for a 
period of 15 years after it was first marketed by him. Copyright does not depend 
on registration but protection is only given against copies of the design : 
someone who creates the same design independently will not be guilty of a breach 
of copyright. It is also possible to register an industrial design and if this 
is done it is protected from any design that resembles it even if it was 
independently created. However, the registration will be invalid unless it shows 
substantial novelty over its predecessors. A design registration lasts for five 
years in the first instance and may be renewed for two further periods each of 
five years. It is not very widely used in practice and copyright has now 
probably become more important as a means of protection. It seems that a design 
which is not capable of being registered may be the subject of artistic copyright 
for a term of the author's life and 50 years (11 ). 
In order for copyright to arise there must be an artistic creation to vrhich 
copyright can apply. This will normally be the original model on which the 
article is based or the drawings made by the designer. In order for the model to 
have copyright it must be classified either as a "sculpture" or as a "work of 
artistic craftsmanship". If the drawings are copyright an infringement will occur 
if the defendant's article "would appear, to persons who are not experts in 
relation to objects of that description, to be a reproduction" of the drawing (12). 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
Copyright only prevents the reproduction of the work, it does not prevent another 
person making use of the ideas in it. For example, if a businessman obtains a 
letter or other document from a competitor which contains confidential information 
(e.g. a list of customers or of some special technique that is not patented) he 
will not be guilty of a breach of copyright if he makes use of it. English law, 
however, also protects information given in confidence. Thus if information is 
given in circumstances giving rise to a bond of confidence - for example, if the 
person given the information is told that it is in confidence - then that 
information cannot normally be used without the consent of the person who gave it. 
If the information is used, an action for breach of confidence can be brought. 
There are, however, certain exceptions : thus a person cannot be prevented from 
informing the authorities that a criminal offence has been committed even if he 
obtained the information in confidence. The remedies obtainable are similar to 
those in the case of copyrights, patents etc. 
The existence of these remedies gives rise to the question whether confidential 
information is a species of property in English law. Businessmen often make 
contracts for the sale of "know-how" - i.e. unpatented technical information -
and it seems that confidential information may be a form of property in English 
law - at least for certain purposes. 218 -
REMEDIES 
The object of the rights covered in this chapter is to secure for the owner a 
monopoly of some kind, for example the exclusive right to manufacture and sell 
products of a certain kind or to use trade names and marks of a particular 
description. The essence of these rights is that other people — especially 
competitors - can be prevented from infringing this monopoly. This is done by 
an action in the courts for the infringement of the right in question. There are 
various possible remedies. An injunction can normally be obtained, that is an 
order by the court forbidding the person to whom it is addressed to do something -
in this case to continue to infringe the right in question. The ultimate sanction 
to enforce an injunction is imprisonment for contempt of court. 
An injunction can be obtained by bringing an action either after the infringement 
has taken place or as soon as it is threatened. In the former case it is possible 
to obtain compensation as well as an injunction. In an action for infringement 
the question of liability is normally decided first. If the plaintiff wins on 
this point, the court then considers the question of compensation. Normally there 
are two possible ways of measuring the compensation and the plaintiff can choose 
whichever one he prefers. The first (damages) is based on the loss that the 
plaintiff has suffered throiigh the infringement and the second (account of 
profits) is based on the profit that the defendant has obtained from the 
infringement. 
If the plaintiff chooses damages for the loss he has suffered, the coiirt will 
order an investigation to assess how much he has been injured. In the case of 
patents, designs and copyright, however, no damages can be obtained if the 
defendant was not aware, and had no reasonable grounds for supposing, that the 
right was infringed. (An injunction can still be obtained in these circumstances). 
In the case of a patent or registered design it is not necessary that the 
infringer should have actually copied anything from the plaintiff's invention or 
design : it may have been discovered independently. In the case of copyright, 
however, there is no infringement if the same thing is produced independently. 
There is, however, an additional remedy in the case of copyright : that is an 
action for conversion. The plaintiff can claim that he be treated as owner of all 
the copies of the work that infringe his copyright and he can obtain damages from 
anyone who has destroyed or disposed of them. It is thus possible to sue a dealer 
who was not himself responsible for copying the work. However, this rule does not 
allow the plaintiff to get damages twice for the same loss; moreover a dealer will 
be protected from an action in conversion if he did not know that the copies in 
his possession were an infringement of copyright; but any copies still in his 
possession will have to be handed over to the owner of the copyright. 
If the plaintiff chooses profits instead of damages the court will order an 
investigation to assess how much profit the defendant has made from the 
infringement. This is often rather difficult because it may not be possible to 
discover exactly what part of the defendant's profits result from the infringement, 
e.g. if only a small part of a book is a breach of copyright. It should also be 
said that the plaintiff has to make his choice between damages and profits before 
the investigation takes place; he cannot, therefore, be sure exactly how much the 
profits are likely to be. - 219-
CONFLICT OF LAWS 
Patents, registered designs, trade marks, goodwill, and copyright are all 
regarded as intangible (incorporeal) property. The rights in each country are 
regarded as a separate item of property : thus a U.K. patent is a separate item 
of property from a French patent even if they both cover the same invention. 
Likewise a trademark or design is a separate item of property in each country 
where it is registered. Goodwill is also regarded as property and, though it is 
not registered, is a separate piece of property in each country where business 
is done and the goodwill exists (13). Copyright is also not registered in the 
U.K. but the U.K. rights are separate from the rights in other countries. 
It is also settled that these rights are classified as movable property even 
though, strictly speaking, they can exist only in the country where they are 
granted : i.e. a British patent or copyright is of no effect outside the U.K. 
(14). The situs is the country granting the right. Being movable property, 
these rights devolve on death according to the law of the domicile of the owner 
though, in the case of a foreign right, an English court would probably respect 
any rule of the foreign law that would be applied by the foreign court : it 
would not normally be possible for an English court to enforce a judgment 
regarding a foreign patent or other right if it was in conflict with the foreign 
law. 
One of the consequences of the territoriality of these rights is that foreign law 
could not normally affect a U.K. patent (except in the case of devolution on 
death). Thus a law passed in the country where the owner of the right is 
domiciled (or of which he is a national) which had the effect of confiscating all 
his property could not affect his U.K. rights. One example of this is the case 
of Lecouturier v. Rey (15)· This case concerned goodwill and trademarks in 
Britain connected with Chartreuse liqueur. These belonged to the Order of 
Carthusian Monks who had their monastery in France. Under the French Law of 
Associations passed in 1901 their property was confiscated. The monks moved to 
Spain and continued to manufacture their liqueur. It was held by the British 
court that the trademarks and goodwill in Britain continued to belong to the 
monks and was not affected by the French legislation. A similar decision 
concerning copyright was reached in Novello & Co. v. Hinrichsen (16). In this 
case the property of a Jewish firm in Germany had been taken over during the Nazi 
period but the English court held that this did not affect a U.K. musical 
copyright owned by the firm. 
Questions concerning the assignment of these rights will normally be governed by 
the law of the country granting the right (lex situs)« This will apply to the 
essential validity of the assignment (i.e. whether the right can be assigned at 
all) and probably also to the formalities of the assignment, at least where there 
is any question of registration. Even in the case of a non-registrable right, 
such as a copyright, it is probable that an English court would require that U.K. 
formalities be complied with for the transfer of a U.K. right. For example, an 
oral assignment of a U.K. copyright would be invalid irrespective of the lex loci 
actus (17  T. - 220-
A good example of this problem is the case of Campbell Connelly & Co. Ltd. v. 
Noble (18). The facts were that by an English contract an English composer 
assigned to a publisher all rights in all countries in a song. Under American 
law the period of copyright was 28 years but if the composer was still living 
at the end of this time he could renew the copyright for a further 28 years. 
The question before the court was whether the assignment included the renewal 
period in America. The court held that whether a foreign copyright could be 
assigned and under what conditions it was assignable was a matter for the 
foreign law. Under American law the renewal copyright was assignable before the 
beginning of the renewal period. American law also provided that copyrights 
could be assigned by an instrument in writing signed by the owner. Since the 
renewal copyright was capable of being assigned by means of the contract in 
question, the next question was whether the contract should be interpreted as 
including the assignment of the renewal copyright. The court considered that 
this question of interpretation should be decided by English law since that was 
the proper law of the contract. 
In view of the territoriality of all these rights it is not possible for an act 
in the U.K. to constitute an infringement of a foreign right or for an act in a 
foreign country to infringe a U.K. right. It has also been held by the 
Australian courts that an infringement of a foreign patent in a foreign country 
cannot give rise to a legal action in Australia (19)· The reason given by the 
High Court of Australia for this rule - which is a rule of jurisdiction - was 
based on an extension of the principle in Brit i ah South Africa Company v. 
Companhia de Moçambique (20). This principle, it will be remembered, prevents an 
English court from taking jurisdiction to hear cases concerning rights to foreign 
land. This rule has not, however, been adopted in Canada (21 ) and it is not 
clear whether it would be applied in England. 
It has, on the other hand, been held that an action can be brought in England for 
the tort (delict) of passing-off when the wrongful act - in this case, selling 
whiskey under a false lable- occurred in a foreign country (22). The court in 
this case applied the normal English rule concerning torts in the conflict of 
laws, namely that there must be liability by both the lex loci delicti, and the lex 
fori. There was no question in this case of a registered trademark. - 221 -
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CONCLUSIONS 
In general the law of the U.K. does not present any great difficulties as 
regards the proposed convention on private international law, although certain 
changes in U.K. law might be desirable if the U.K. became a party to such a 
convention. These have already been considered. 
One problem that might cause some difficulty, however, is whether equitable 
rights would come within the scope of the convention. It will be remembered 
(23) that rights of this kind bind third parties if they have actual or 
constructive knowledge of them; but not otherwise. It would be unfortunate if 
equitable rights, and especially rights under trusts, were governed exclusively 
by the lex situs. The English rules concerning trusts and equity in conflict 
of laws are rather obscure and confused but the lex situs of the trust property 
does not play a major role (24). This applies even in the case of land and there 
have been a number of decisions in the English courts in which English rules of 
equity have been applied to foreign land without any consideration of the lex 
situs (25). It will be remembered that cases involving equity constitute an 
exception to the rule that an English court has no jurisdiction in questions 
relating to title to foreign land (26). If it were insisted that the lex situs 
be applied to all questions concerning trusts, it would mean that the rights of 
beneficiaries could be prejudiced if the trust property were taken to a foreign 
country. This might make it impossible for trustees to invest trust money in 
Community countries outside the U.K. This could be of some significance 
economically since trusts are quite important in England. For these reasons it 
would be better either to exclude equity and trusts from the scope of the 
convention or to have special rules governing these questions. - 223-
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160 A transfer of possession for a limited 
purpose 
I60 The person who transfers possession under 
a bailment 
I60 The person to whom possession is given 
under a bailment 
124 The person for whose benefit a trustee 
holds property under a trust (q.v.). 
190 Document which transfers ownership in 
goods 
127 Items of personal property (Q.v.) 
127 Leaseholds (Q.v.) and other interests in 
land which are personal property 
127 All other kinds of chattels (= pure 
personalty q.v.) 
127 Intangible (incorporeal) property 
127 Tangible movables 
122 This term has several meanings. The most 
common are : 
1) the traditional system of judge—made 
law in England; 
2) the above but excluding Equity 
136 Promise contained in a deed (q.v.) 
138 Document under seal 
135 Similar to a servitude 
122 Special system of law developed by the 
Court of Chancery to supplement the 
Common Law 
131 Rights in land analogous to ownership 
162 A legal principle that if one person leads 
another person to believe that certain 
facts exist, he cannot subsequently deny 
this if the other person acted in reliance 
on it and suffered loss as a result. 
























132 An estate (q.v.) vrhich continues as long 
as the original tenant (q.v.) or any of 
his descendants live 
126 Things attached to land or buildings 
137 A court order making the mortgagee full 
owner of the land 
132 Certain estates (q.v.) in land are 
estates of freehold. Freehold can also 
refer to tenure (q.v.) 
133 Right to the possession of land at some 
future time 
127 Land and certain other kinds of property 
in Scottish law 
134 A form of co-ownership under which the 
surviving owner takes a full share in 
the property 
132 An estate (q.v.), not freehold (q.v.) 
lasting for a fixed term 
123 In a technical sense, refers to the 
Common Law as distinct from Equity 
178 Right of a creditor to retain possession 
I87-I88 0f goods belonging to a person who owes 
him a debt 
132 An estate (q.v.) in land lasting only for 
life 
143 Interest in land in Scotland lasting for 
life only 
143 The person vrho has a liferent 
143 Form of temire (q.v.) in Scotland 
143 In Scotlaad a person entitled to land 
subject to a liferent (q.v.) in favour 
of another person 
165 A public market. The buyer of goods in 
such a market obtains a good title even 
if they were stolen 
136 Similar to a hypothec. 
136 Owner of land who agrees to a mortgage 
136 Person lending money secured by a 
Mortgage 
134 Process whereby future interests (Q.v.) 
in land are transferred to a trust fund 
on the sale of the property 
215 Anyone who so conducts his business as to 
mislead the public into confusing his 
goods vrith those of another person is 
liable to be sued for passing-off Pape 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 125 
(Personalty) 
PROFIT A PRENDRE 136 
PROFIT IN GROSS 136 
PUR AUTRE VIE 132 
REAL PROPERTY 12 5 
(Realty) 
REDEMPTION, PROVISO FOR 136 




RESTRICTIVE COVENANT 136 
REVERSION 133 
REVERSIONER 133 
SETTLED LAND 133 
SETTLOR 124 
STANDARD SECURITY 144 




Personal property is property which is 
not real property (q.v.). Pure 
personalty is the same except it 
excludes leaseholds (q.v.). It is 
roughly equivalent to movable property. 
Form of easement (servitude) riving the 
right to take produce frou another's 
land 
A form of profit (see above) which does 
not run vrith a. dominant tenement 
Estate (q.v.) in land lasting for the 
life of some person other than the owner 
Real property consists of rights in land 
(except leaseholds (q.v.)) 
Agreement by vrhich a mortgagee (q.v.) 
undertakes to retransfer the land once 
the debt is paid 
Equitable right of mortgagor to obtain 
retransfer of land once debt is paid 
Name for reversion when given to another 
person (not the owner of the original fee 
simple), (q.v.) 
Person owning the remainder 
Right to a periodical sum of money 
charged on land 
Similar to a negative easement (servitude) 
vrhich operates "in equity 
The interest in land retained by the 
o
T.mer of the fee simple (q.v.) when a 
lesser estate (q.v.) is granted to 
another person 
Person owning the reversion 
Land vrhich belongs to two or more persons 
in succession 
The person who creates a trust (q.v.) 
Scottish security on land (mortgage, 
hypothec) 
Form of co-ownership under vrhich the 
share of each co-owner can pass by will 
or intestacj
r 
Terms on vrhich land is held 
Person holding land 
A trust is a legal institution in which 
one person (trustee) has the legal title 
in property vrhich he manages for the 
benefit of another (beneficiary). - 226-
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THE LAW OF PROPERTY 
IN GENERAL - 233 -
I. INTRODUCTION 
DANISH AND NORWEGIAN LAW 
Danish law has been formed by an almost uninterrupted development 
since the earliest times. The oldest legal rules still valid are 
to be found in the casuistically edited "Christian den Femtes 
Danske Lov" of 1683. Many rules of law from the "Land laws" of 
around 1200 AD for Seeland, Schonen and Jutland are however 
repeated in this codification. Danske Lov was introduced in 
Norway in 1687 as Norske Lov and in the process eliminated a 
great part of the older Norwegian common law. Since the 
beginning of the 19th century, most parts of the Danske Lov in 
Denmark and the greater part of the Norske Lov in Norway have 
been rescinded by new laws. 
It was only at a late period that Roman law influenced Danish 
and Norwegian legal developments. Before the Danish writer 
Anders Sandoe Orsted (1778-1860), who is famous in Scandinavia 
and is considered the father of an independent Danish legal 
science, Danish jurists were influenced by Roman and German law. 
Through these authors continental sources influenced Danish and 
Norwegian law. However, this influence was never strong as 
regards the content of Nordic law, and Roman concepts of law, 
such for example as those which formerly existed in the field 
of transfer of property, were later abolished. However, 
continental European law, and thus Roman law, have, even 
according to Orsted, exercised a considerable influence on the 
legal system and language of the two countries. General legal 
thinking in Denmark and Norway is closer to continental legal 
doctrine than to the Anglo-American. Although the Danish and 
Norwegian jurists since Orsted, like the English, work more, 
pragmatically, less theoretically and with greater freedom from 
concepts than, for example, the Germans and French, law has 
essentially developed as a dialogue with continental law and 
legal thinking. 
After the Danske Lov and the Norske Lov of the 17th century no 
new codification of Danish and Norwegian law has been carried 
out. In both countries written law mainly consists of 
individual laws many of which are the result of Scandinavian 
cooperation (for example, the law on purchase, the law on 'settlements, 
and the law pertaining to contracts). In other fields the law of one 
Scandinavian country has influenced the law of the other. Thus, 
for example, the Danish "Tinglysningslov" of 31 March 1926, which 
governs the transfer of real property rights, has influenced the 
new Norwegian legislation in this field. 
The number and the importance of the individual laws are great 
in both countries. However, certain important fields of lav? have - 234-
remained uncodified. For example, neither in Denmark nor in 
Norway, is there any general regulation of property rights. The 
matters which are governed by the second book of the French Code 
Civil and the third book of the German BGB (Bundesgesetzbuch) 
have largely remained unwritten law in Denmark and Norway. The 
law obtaining in this field is the result of reciprocal influence 
between common law, writings and case law. The legal development 
is here also more similar to the continental than to the Anglo 
American model. The influence of writers on jurisprudence has 
been great. However, since the middle of the last century, case 
law has been the most important source for practising lawyers who 
want to know what is valid law. But, with us, as in continental 
Europe, there is no doctrine of stare decisis and, precisely in 
the field of property law, we see that case law, partly under the 
influence of theory, has constantly developed further. 
Continental legal doctrine has influenced the Danish and 
Norwegian methods of interpreting laws. The written law is seen 
as the primary source of law. The tendency of the Anglo-American 
courts to interpret written law narrowly is found as little in 
Scandinavia, as in continental countries. Rather is there a 
tendency to conceive of individual rules of the "central" laws, 
for example, in the field of property law, the law on purchases, 
as general principles of law. As in the continental countries, 
the work preparatory to the laws is also taken into consideration. 
B. PARTICULAR FEATURES OF DANISH AND NORWEGIAN PROPERTY LAW 
1. The transfer of property is "multilateral" 
The particular features of Danish and Norwegian property law 
come out mainly in the way the acquirement and loss of 
property by transfer is governed. As mentioned, there are no 
legal provisions containing general rules on these questions 
such, for example, as Articles 711 and 1138 of the French Code 
Civil and Section 714 of the Swiss Civil Code, which govern 
the question of transfer both between the parties and also in 
relation to third parties. The Scandinavian laws on purchase 
of 1905 - 1907 contain provisions concerning the relationship 
between the parties and practically none concerning the 
transfer of property in relation to third parties. The silence 
of the law has left our authors and courts free to deal with 
the questions of property transfer in an undogmatic fashion. 
According to the opinion of the Scandinavian authors, which 
jurisprudence has accepted, "property transfer" is not a 
unified concept. It consists of a number of different legal 
effects which are settled independently of each other. 
In the first place, the questions of the passage of the risk, 
the acquisition of the products and other component parts 
belonging to the fruits of the property, and the right of lien - 235-
including "stoppage in transitu" of the unpaid seller are not 
dealt with as questions of property transfer. In Scandinavian 
law these questions belong to the law appertaining to debt 
and they are governed in the general laws on purchase as 
regards the buying of personal property. The risk as a rule 
is transferred at the time of delivery (Law on purchase 
Sec. 17) and the fruits of the property which occur before 
delivery belong as a rule to the seller and after delivery to 
the buyer (Law on purchase Sec. 18 - 20). As a rule the seller 
can retain the property and prevent its delivery until such 
time as the good has come into the possession of the buyer at 
the place of delivery (Law on purchase Sec. 39). 
In the event of an international-private law settlement of 
these questions the possibility can therefore not be excluded 
that Danish lawyers, as was the case at the Hague conferences 
in 1951, and in 1955 during the negotiations for a IPR 
Convention on the transfer of property when movables are 
bought, will insist that these questions be dealt with 
separately from those of passage of title. 
Secondly, as far as the passage of title vis-à-vis third 
parties is concerned, the concept in Scandinavia is that this 
question consists of several special questions each of which 
must be dealt with separately. Here, the most important 
questions are: When is the acquirer of a property protected 
against the creditors of the seller who are demanding 
execution by distraint? When is the acquirer protected 
against other purchasers of the same property? Under what 
conditions can a bona fide purchaser of a property become 
owner if the property did not belong to the seller? As is 
shown below, each of these questions is dealt with separately 
and the protection of the acquirer and the seller begins and 
ends in different stages of the process of selling according 
as one or the other of these questions is at issue. This 
separation concerns the selling both of real and movable 
property rights and claims. 
No real contract 
In Danish and Norwegian law the transfer of the property 
occurs solely on the basis of the contract without there 
being any question of a real instrument of execution along 
with the contract. Simple agreement regarding the matter is 
sufficient; the property does not need to be transferred and 
the price does not yet need to be paid. But, as will be seen, 
only a few legal effects occur when the contract is concluded. 
For the occurrence of other effects, which are to protect the 
buyer against third parties, Danish and Norwegian law demand 
what is called a security instrument which can consist either 
of "Tinglysning", of the cession of the property or, when it 
is a question of transfer of claims, in communication to the 
debtor. These security instruments fulfil the function of the 
German real contract in certain respects. - 236-
C. REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RIGHTS TO MOVABLE PROPERTY 
INTANGIBLE PROPERTY RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND SECURITIES 
The difference between "tangible" or material property (things) 
and other intangible properties such as intellectual goods 
(trademarks, patents, etc.) and rights (securities and claims) 
exists in Scandinavia as in other countries. In principle the 
provisions of the law of property are not applicable to 
intangible goods. The transfer of claims and securities has 
been placed under special legal provisions by the law on 
debentures of 1938. 
Since the transfer of rights to landed property has been settled 
by the special provisions of the "Tinglysningslovs", the 
differentiation between movable and immovable goods is of 
fundamental importance. Immovable goods include land and 
buildings, even buildings which are situated on other people's 
land (T.G. Sec. 19). As in other legal systems movable property 
which is considered to be part of, a building or an appartenance 
to a piece of land, is treated in certain respects as real 
property (T.G. Sec. 37 and 38). 
Although ships and aircraft belong to the category of movable 
property, the special rules of the ships'register law (Nr. 93 of 
29 March 1957) and of the aircraft register law (Nr. 135 of 31 
March 1960) apply to the transfer of rights in these means of 
transport. These regulations were modelled in many respects on 
the provisions of the Tinglysnings law on the registration of 
landed property rights. - 237-
Reference literature 
Ross, Alf: Om ret og retfaerdighed, Kjrfbenhavn 1953 
Iuul, Stig: Kodifikation eller kompilation? København 1954 
Jørgensen, Poul Johs.: Dansk retshistorie, København 1965 
Iuul, S., Ross, Α., Trolle, J.: Indledning til retsstudiet, København 
1965 
Ørsted, A.S.: Haandbog over den danske og norske Lovkyndighed.1822-33 - 238-
II. REAL PROPERTY IN DANISH LAW 
A. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULES CONCERNING REAL PROPERTY 
In the days of the Laender laws, i.e. around 1200, the transfer 
of property rights in real estate was effected by conveyance. 
The parties concerned held the cap of the purchaser in their 
hands and the seller threw a handful of earth into it. This act 
was known as "Skodning" ("Schõtung"). The seller designated the 
land which he wanted to sell and in this way transferred the 
property right to the buyer. 
In those days written contracts were little known and the 
"Schötungs" process therefore served the purpose of imprinting 
what had happened on the minds of the participants and thus 
ensuring proof of the transfer. 
It gradually became the rule that the Schötungs process should 
no longer take place on the property itself but in the court 
(the Ting). The purpose was to increase certainty as regards 
conditions of ownership by carrying out the "Schötung" in the 
presence of a wider circle, and thus strengthening the proof 
that a transfer of property had taken place. Even though the 
"Schötung" took place in the Ting, it was possible for the 
contract nevertheless to be invalid in substantive law. 
Meanwhile, the use of the written form imposed itself and the 
oral "Schötung" in the Ting was usually replaced by a 
confirmation in writing (Schote). Legal provisions dating 
roughly from the year 1550 recognize this practice as valid. 
However, in this way, public opinion learned nothing of the 
agreements reached and this led to abuses. As mortgage rights 
on landed property were also gradually recognized, new 
possibilities of abuse arose. The same piece of land could be 
sold or encumbered several times, by the same person. Endeavours 
were made to prevent this by taking the real property relationships 
as the starting point. It was attempted to reintroduce the 
"Schötung" in the Ting or the reading of the written contracts 
in the Ting (Tinglesung). Encumbrances were also made known 
by reading. 
Secret written transfers were gradually pushed into the 
background. Schote protocols, mortgage protocols and registers 
open to the public were introduced. In the Schote protocols and 
in the mortgage protocols the whole content of the documents was 
reproduced, whereas in the register only a note was made referring 
to the Schote and mortgage protocol. In relations with third 
parties the reading in the Ting, the Schote and the mortgage - 239-
protocols were determinant. In relations between the parties 
to the contract oral or written agreement was sufficient. 
The practical emphasis was gradually shifted from the reading 
in the Ting, i.e. reading out in the court, to registration. 
The formal legal effect, however, always remained linked with the 
reading in the Ting, which gradually lost its practical interest. 
With the "Tinglysningsloven" of 31 March 1926, Law No. Ill, which 
entered into force on 1 April 1927, the present "Tinglysning" 
system was introduced. 
B. "TINGLYSNINGSLOVEN" OF 31 MARCH 192 6 - NEW PRINCIPLES 
a) The Tinglysning law (T.L.) introduced the entry of documents 
(Tinglysning) as the decisive act vis-à-vis third parties. 
The documents are now no longer entered in a Schöte and 
mortgage protocol. Instead of this, copies are placed in the 
archives in a dossier for each individual property. The copies 
must be prepared on specially standardized paper by the person 
who notifies the document. The Administrative Court responsible 
for the "Tingslysning" then checks whether the copy conforms 
to the original, which is sent back to the party filing the 
document. In this way the Court is spared elaborate clerical 
work. At the same time, a considerably greater insight is 
achieved into each individual property. All the copies of the 
documents concerning a property are collated in the dossier 
of that property, whereas the old Schöte and mortgage protocols 
were arranged chronologically. 
b) The earlier registers have been replaced by Ting books which 
are kept as loose-leaf registers. Each property has its leaf 
in the Ting book and new leaves can be fitted in accordance 
with the designation of the register of lands (see below under 
D) in the same way as full pages can be copied. 
c) Publication, which was previously done by means of the Ting 
reading is now effected by notification in an official journal -
issued daily as a part of the Statstidende (Official Gazette) 
and by posting up in the Court on "Tingsningslisten" concerning 
sales and encumbrances. 
d) According to the law previously applying, not all rights 
required Ting reading in order to be valid vis-à-vis third 
parties. In particular, rights which were based in acquisition 
under the statute of limitations or through expropriation did 
not require any reading. This naturally led to a reduction of 
security in trade with real property. The greater the certainty 
that the leaf in the Ting book gives accurate and complete 
information concerning the ownership situation, the greater is 
the value attaching to the system of registration. 
Sec. 1 T.L. (see greater detail at C) has therefore set up a 
general claim for Tinglysning of all landed property rights. 
There are only limited exceptions to this main rule. (1) - 240 -
e) With the Tinglysning law an (enlarged) duty of investigation 
was also introduced for the Tinglysning judge. He must now 
check that a private document, in order to be validly entered 
in the Ting book, has been drawn up by the person who, 
according to the Ting book has power to dispose of the right 
in question, or that the document is drawn up with the 
approval of the person having such power. Any public legal 
act, for example a public expropriation, must, if it is to be 
made notifiable to the Ting, concern that person who is 
empowered by the Ting book to dispose of the property. 
f) With the Tinglysning law the credibility of the Ting book has 
been basically confirmed. Under the law applying earlier the 
purchaser who, without any "annotation" from the court and in 
good faith had his right confirmed by Ting reading could not 
be completely certain of this right. The "annotation" was a 
remark by the judge on the document. It shows that another 
person has a real right which in some way is irreconcilable 
with that of the document. After the Tinglysning law of 192 6 
it is now the principal rule that any party who, in good faith, 
has acquired by contract a right to a property notifiable in 
the Ting can no longer have the invalidity of the transfer 
invoiced against him. 
A document which is false or falsified or whose drawing up 
was illegally obtained by force against the person, or was 
made out by an individual incompetent to contract, has no 
validity even if it has been entered in the Ting book. Even 
a bona fide acquirer cannot derive any right from such a 
document. But in such a case the bona fide acquirer is 
entitled to be compensated by the public purse for the loss 
he has incurred. And in the case of lack of or an inexact entry 
in the Ting book the bona fide partner to a contract either 
acquires the right which has been entered or compensation from 
the Treasury. The Tinglysning law in this way tries to provide 
an effective security in real property business without 
requiring as for example under German law - a very thorough 
examination of the identity and legal capacity of the person 
signing the document. 
g) According to the Tinglysning law a document which is made known 
to the Ting has legal effects in relation to third parties as 
from the date on which it is notified to the court. The 
document is then entered in the daily log book. In this way 
the Tinglysning law has shifted the decisive point in the time 
from the day of formulation, which was previously determinant, 
to the day of notification. 
h) The Tinglysning system is under the authority of the "Underret" 
(the Administrative Court) (105 in all). Appeal may be made 
against the decisions of the Tinglysning judge to the 
"Landeretten" (Land Court). 241 
C. THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE TINGSLYSNING 
The most important legal effects of the Tinglysning follow from 
sec. 1 and sec. 27 of the Tinglysning law. 
a) Sec. 1 of the Tinglysning law 
1. Sec. 1 reads: "Rights to a piece of real property have to 
be notified to the Ting in order to have validity vis-à-vis 
contracts concerning the property and court, decisions, in 
particular in the event of distraint concerning the 
property. 
By means of contracts or through execution a right which 
has not been notified to the Ting can only be set aside 
when such contract or execution themselves have been 
notified to the Ting and the acquirer is bona fide on the 
grounds of the contracts". 
Sec. 1 has in mind a transfer of rights which has not been 
notified to the Ting. The situation may be illustrated by 
the following figure 
B 
A 
B and C are the persons who derive their right from A -
possibly through one or more intermediary members. 
Sec. 1 gives C the possibility of demanding a right in 
preference to B to a real property, although B has acquired 
a right to this property by contract, execution, prescript-
ion or any other way at an earlier point. If in fact B 
does not notify his right to the Ting, C, in accordance with 
sec. 1 T.L., can supersede him in this right, where C is a 
prosecuting creditor or a bona fide acquirer under the terms 
of a contract. Sec. 1 (2) lays down the so-called priority 
effect to the Tinglysning. It accords precedence to the 
right which was first notified to the Ting. The way in 
which B's right, which is superseded, was acquired, is of 
no importance, as a rule. It may for example be a matter 
of acquisition by contract, court decision, confiscation 
or prescription. 
According to Sec. 1 of the law; the Tinglysning is 
determinant for enforcing creditors and acquirers by 
contract. However, in the relationship between the partners 
to the contract the latter has legal effect without any 
consideration of the Tinglysning. It is not even necessary 
that there should be a document. Even oral contracts have 
validity inter partes and in relation to others than 
enforcing-creditors and acquirers by contract. - 242-
Only vis-à-vis bona fide "turnover acquirers" and in the 
case of distraint is the Tinglysing necessary. In relation 
to expropriators and the heirs of the partners to a contract, 
contracts concerning real property are valid even when they 
are informally concluded and not notified to the Ting. It 
further follows from Sec. 1 T.L. that an acquirer through 
a contract who is not in good faith must also recognize 
the rights which have not been notified to the Ting. 
The motivation for a general demand for Tinglysning (3) 
of all rights to real property (see Sec. 1 T.L.) is seen 
most clearly in the relationship to the bona fide "turnover 
acquirer". The basic idea of the Tinglysning system is to 
call upon everyone who has rights to notify these to the 
Ting. In this way, the situation regarding property rights 
becomes clear and those who buy land or grant loans against 
real property pledges are protected against disappointments 
which can arise if distraint on the property occurs or the 
owner has previously disposed of it to the advantage of 
others. The Tinglysning guarantees that other - unknown -
rights which might possibly conflict with the right of the 
acquirer cannot be asserted. 
If Sec. 1 T.L. also demands Tinglysning of rights to real 
property so that these rights have to be taken into account 
in the event of distraint, this means a break with the 
general rule of Danish law according to which the creditor 
can only enter into possession of what belongs to the debtor 
at the time of the distraint. The grounds why the demand 
for Tinglysning is made also in relation to the enforcing 
creditor is the need for ascertaining the point in time at 
which the right concerned originated. In this way, any 
predating of documents intended to deceive the enforcing 
creditor is excluded. The Tinglysning further prevents 
the possibilities of carrying out pro forma transactions 
whose purpose is to pretend to withdraw from the debtor 
assets which are threatened by the distraint. 
Particularities concerning the extinction of rights (the 
supplanting of older rights) of bona fide partners to 
contracts 
The priority effect of the Tinglysning operates from the 
day on which the document is notified for Tinglysning and 
entered in the day book. However, after it has been entered 
in the day book, the document must also be recorded in the 
Ting book. A document which, after examination by the judge, 
is considered as not suitable for entry in the Ting book is 
therefore rejected, loses its priority effect as a document 
notified to the Ting. Later distraints or contracts 
concerning the property can supplant rights rejected in this 
way without any consideration for their notification. 
Conflicting rights to the same property which are notified 
on the same day have equal rank. - 243 
Sec. 5 T.L. lays down what is to be understood by bona 
fide. Good faith exists when the acquirer of the right was 
not aware of the unnotified right to the Ting and his 
ignorance was also attributable to gross negligence. The 
good faith must exist at the time of the notification of 
the contract to the Tinglysning and, when mortgage 
debentures (which do not need any Tinglysning) are transfer-
red, at the time of such transfer. It should be pointed 
out that the requirement of good faith applies only for the 
partner to the contract. Creditors who wish to appeal to 
extinction in accordance with Sec. 1 T.L. do not need to be 
in good faith. 
In Danish law distraint means particularly the general 
judicial measures for execution which are implemented by 
creditors: confiscation, seizure, bankruptcy and arrest. 
Even division of the estate without acceptance of the debt 
(in the event of insolvency of the estate) is considered as 
a judicial proceedings. 
In general it is not necessary for extinction that the 
party which has notified its right to the Ting should 
contest the right not notified to the Ting.(4) 
From the angle of property transfer the following should 
be noted on this point: 
The acquirer of a right to a piece of landed property is 
only protected against executing creditors of the seller 
if he has notified his right to the Ting. He is also 
only protected against subsequent bona fide acquirers who 
have come into possession of the same right through a 
contract if he had notified his right to the Ting. 
Vis-à-vis other acquirers and also those contractual 
creditors and acquirers who have not notified their right 
to the Ting the acquirer is protected from the time of the 
origin of his right. This means that the acquirer under a 
contract is protected from the point in time when the 
contract was concluded. 
Rights which are exceptions to the general requirement of 
the Tinglysning in Sec. 1 
There are certain exceptions to the general requirement of 
Tinglysning. The transfer of mortgage debentures, which 
have been notified to the Ting, contracts concerning usual 
rent and lease relationships, which in Danish law establish 
material rights to the property, taxes, payments and fire 
insurance amounts which encumber properties, do not need 
any Tinglysning. In addition, rights established before the 
entry into force of the Tinglysnings law on 1 April 1927 
and which, according to the rules of that time, did not have 
to be read in the Ting, are excepted from Tinglysning. 
This is of particular importance for olderprescription - 244 
rights. Finally, there is the exception to Sec. 1. that 
certain private rights of way do not have to be notified 
to the Ting. The general limitations which apply to the 
exercise of the right of property also do not have to be 
notified. 
Leaving aside these - limited exceptions - the Tinglysning 
requirement under Sec. 1 applies to all rights. 
b) Sec. 27 of the Tinglysning law 
In Sec. 27 T.L. it is laid down: "When a document is entered 
in the Ting book no objection against the validity of this 
document can be advanced against bona fide acquirers of rights 
in the property on the strength of contracts notified to the 
Ting or of endorsements on a mortgage bond. The objection 
that a document is false or has been falsified or that it was 
made out in illegal fashion by the use of force against the 
person or threat of the immediate application of such force, 
or that the person making it out was under age at the time 
continue however to apply even vis-à-vis a bona fide acquirer". 
The situations which are governed by Sec. 27 T.L. can be 
illustrated in the following way: 
A - Β - C 
A originally has the property right to the real estate X. By 
means of an invalid or ineffective contract or the misuse of 
A's name, Β has had a property right to X entered in the Ting 
book. According to Sec. 27 T.L. the Tinglysning of Β's right 
has the effect that a contract concerning X which Β makes with 
the bona fide C will be valid. The objections which A can 
assert against Β can then not be maintained against the bona 
fide C, who notifies his property right to X to the Ting. This 
effect is generally called validity effect, and it is understood 
in such a way that the originally invalid document which 
accords a right to Β is made valid by the Tinglysning in 
relation to third parties. 
The rule in Section 27 T.L. means that a former owner or 
holder of a limited right to the real estate cannot raise 
objection to the material validity of the contract on which 
the right entered in the Ting book rests. Nor can he assert 
that he is entitled to withdraw from the contract because this 
results from the contract or because his partner to the contract who had the 
notifiable right entered has not paid the remuneration agreed upon. The same 
applies when a right later ceases through contract, fulfilment, 
compensation or judgment and is not cancelled in the Ting book. 
Vis-à-vis the subsequent bona fide acquirer the former owner 
can also not assert that the seller was not entitled to dispose 
of the property but was only legitimized according to the Ting 
book. Thus section 27 attributes to the entry in the Ting book 
a so-called legimitation effect. - 245 
Section 27 now applies for the benefit of bona fide partners 
to contracts but not in favour of creditors of the partner 
to the contract who are pursuing distraint proceedings. Should 
the right of a debtor to the real estate be defective, this 
legal defect can also be affirmed vis-à-vis his creditors 
although the debtor can be proven from the Ting book to have 
a perfect notified right. 
Exception from extinction according to the T.L. 
The original holder of the title does not always lose his 
right. The objection that a document is false or falsified 
or that it was made out in illegal fashion through force 
against the person or threat of immediately applying such 
force, or that the person making it out was not capable of 
contracting at the time, continue however to exist even 
vis-à-vis a bona fide acquirer. (Sec. 27 clause 2 T.L.). 
D. THE CADASTRAL SURVEY SYSTEM 
In Denmark a division of all property and land had been undertalcen-
the cadaster survey system. Each piece of property has a cadaster 
number. The pieces have been surveyed and charts and a common 
register concerning them drawn up. The cadaster (official lands 
register) represents an essential precondition for the Tinglysnings 
system. 
If the provisions of the T.L. deal with real property it is 
primarily to the pieces laid down in the cadaster that reference 
is made. To these must be added the buildings standing on a 
property. According to the T.L., on the other hand, the movables 
which are normally included in the contractual sales or 
encumbrances of a property as a rule do not belong to the real 
estate. When it is a matter of stock, warehouses, garden equipment, 
etc., the legal effects, which flow from sections 1 and 27 T.L. 
generally do not find application to such movables. Here the 
rules concerning the acquisition of ownership of movable property 
apply. 
E. The T.L. furthermore contains provisions which lay down what 
belongs to the real property when this is encumbered. Section 37 
T.L. reads as follows: "Where a piece of real estate is permanently 
equipped for the purposes of a particular productivity activity, 
mortgage bonds on such property which have been notified to the 
Ting, unless otherwise agreed, also include the business stock 
and business apparatus, among them machines and technical plant 
of all kinds, and in the case of agricultural properties, also 
the cattle population, fertilizers, yields and other products 
belonging to the property, to the extent that they are not 
separated from the property in question as part of an organized 
exploitation. 
If a piece of real estate is insured, mortgage bonds which have 
been notified to the Ting include, unless otherwise agreed, also - 246-
the insured sum of the bond. The same rule applies to the 
appurtenances mentioned in paragraph 1. 
Section 38 T.L. further lays down: "If a building is completely 
or partially erected and if machines, boilers, ovens or such 
like at the cost of the owner are connected with use for the 
property of for an industrial undertaking situated on it, in 
particular rights to the materials of the building or to the 
appurtenances mentioned cannot be asserted either as property 
rights or in any other way. Mortgage bonds notified to the Ting 
on such property also include these appurtenances without any 
special agreement being necessary. 
This provision has given rise to problems of interpretation. 
When are "appurtenances" bound? 
Before the T.L. decisive importance was attached to whether the 
particular object was actually nailed to the building. The law 
and the subsequent case law however have abandoned this point of 
view and use an industrial operation criterion. Those things 
belong to the landed property which, from an economic point of 
view, normally and naturally have a permanent place upon it. 
There are many decisions concerning this question. Fixed 
appurtenances are treated as real property where propertyless 
seizure rights cannot be exercised on such objects. 
F. THE RIGHTS TO A PIECE OF REAL ESTATE 
As in all known systems of law, the Danish system also makes a 
distinction between different rights to real property. Each of 
these rights has its own nature. However, it is often difficult 
to classify a legal relation under one or other and thus lay down 
its legal effects. 
a) Full ownership 
Full ownership gives its holder the most extensive powers. 
The owner can dispose of the property from every point of view, 
to the extent that no special limits are set to his right by 
law, contract or any c her factors. 
Danish legal theory considers as the most important feature 
of full ownership the fact that this right gives its holder 
the possibility of restoring the original legal situation. If, 
for example, a right of use or a seizure right has been 
constituted in favour of a third party, the right of disposal 
of the holderof full ownership is reduced for as long as the 
limited right continues to exist. But as soon as this right 
expires the powers of the owner are automatically restored to 
their original extent. - 247-
b) Restricted rights 
Contrary to full ownership, restricted rights have a limited 
content which has been determined essentially by legislation 
and common law but which, however, in each individual case can 
be laid down by the contract between the parties. The most 
important restricted rights are usufructuary rights, real 
servitudes, mortgage and perpetual charge. 
1. Usufructuary right 
The right which most resembles full ownership as regards 
its content is usufructuary right. By this is meant the 
right to possess a real property and to draw advantage 
from its exploitation. 
The concrete substance of the usufructuary right in question 
must be defined more closely by verbal arrangement or with 
the aid of the general legal provisions (for example those 
appertaining to rent and leasing). In this way for example 
enjoyment of the property can be limited by excluding certain 
forms of exploitation. 
2. Real servitude 
As in German law, real servitude is related with usufructuary 
right. It entitles the holder to draw the advantages from 
a property which is not his own. The exploitation is 
limited however. The holder of the right can either enjoy 
a form of exploitation which he would not have had according 
to the general legal provisions (positive servitude) or he 
can claim that a state of affairs shall be maintained on 
the property in question to the maintenance of which he 
would otherwise have had no right (negative servitude). 
Among the 'positive" servitudes is the so-called "appropriat-
ion servitude" which allows its possessor to appropriate 
certain fruits of the property under servitude, for example 
the right to cut peat or to pasture cattle. 
Real servitude and usufructuary right have similarities 
which make it difficult,to establish a sharp distinction 
between the two servitudes. It is often a matter of 
appreciation by a judge whether a usufructuary right or a 
real servitude exists, and it is universally recognized 
that differing use is made of this discretion. In this 
field Danish courts work "without concepts". A right can 
be regarded as a real servitude from one angle and from 
another as a usufructuary right. - 248 -
3. Mortgage 
In the creation of a mortgage there arises in Danish as in 
other systems of law a security which an unsecured claim 
does not afford the creditor. A mortgage gives the holder 
of a pledge better possibilities than a simple claim to 
be satisfied if the debtor does not pay up of his own 
free will. The holder of a pledge can demand satisfaction 
from the encumbered propert before other creditors, 
A mortgage can only be granted as a propertyless pledge. 
It is not permitted to give real property as lien. 
The mortgage can be based, in the relationship between the 
pledge creditor and the pledge debtor, on an informal 
contract which may be verbal or written. 
However, in order to be protected vis-à-vis bona fide 
acquirers under contracts and creditors taking proceedings 
for distraint, a mortgage instrument must be drawn up and 
notified to the Ting (see C above). 
The mortgage instrument must be written on a particular 
pro forma which is authorized by the Ministry of Justice. 
The mortgage instrument must show the names of the creditor 
and debtor, the encumbered estate, the amount of money (it 
must mention a specific amount) the interest payments and 
amortization. Although they have so far seldom occurred, 
value clauses (gold value clauses, price index clauses 
and clauses which provide for repayment in accordance with 
the value of a foreign currency) are permissible. 
Mortgages must bear the signatures of two witnesses or of 
a Danish lawyer. These persons must bear witness that the 
writer of the mortgage is capable of contracting and has 
himself signed on the date given. The profession of notary 
does not exist in Denmark. In order to prevent any 
falsification the document of transfer most recently notified 
to the Ting ("Schote") must be lodged along with the notifi-
cation of the mortgage for Tinglysning. 
The mortgage instrument is dealt with by the Tinglysning 
authorities in the same way as other documents notified 
to the Ting. In this way, it is entered in the day book 
and, after the judge has examined the document, also in the 
Ting book, while a copy is placed in the dossier. 
Transfers of negotiable mortgages do not need to be notified 
to the Ting (see above C (2)). Mortgage bonds are often 
ceded in Denmark. By dispensing with Tinglysning in such 
cases turnover of these securities has been facilitated. 249-
As mentioned above under E, the Tinglysning law contains 
special provisions on the extent to which lien includes 
appurtenances of the real estate as such and of the 
buildings. 
The owner retains possession of the real estate. He may 
however not dispose of it in any way which reduces its 
value and would jeopardize the security of the mortgage 
creditor (pledgee). 
The Tinglysnings law lays down that mortgage rights shall 
retain the rank which they had at the time they were 
registered. 
The priority principle applies as between mortgage creditors. 
A subsequent mortgage, however, moves up gradually when a 
prior one is redeemed, or is completely paid back at the 
time determined in advance. If, however, a mortgage expires 
unexpectedly, the next in order does not automatically 
advance. The owner of the property may immediately or 
later conclude a new mortgage in the order of priority and 
for the amount which the earlier one, now expired, possessed. 
Should the amount of the principal mortgage claim, the 
interest or the instalments not be paid on time, the mortgage 
creditor can obtain satisfaction from the property by means 
of distraint. 
If the creditor wishes to make good his claim against the 
debtor he must normally begin by bringing a complaint before 
the court in order to obtain a judgment against the debtor. 
After this, he may turn with the executable judgement to the 
enforcement judge who will have the distraint implemented 
against the debtor. However, if the mortgage claim is due 
because it has not been paid at the date laid down in the 
instrument, the owner of the mortgage notified to the Ting 
can go straight to the enforcement judge and ask for 
distraint on the basis of the mortgage without any prior 
judgement. 
If the claim is then not paid,auction by order of the court 
can be put in hand. This means that the property is 
auctioned by order of the enforcement judge and that in this 
way the mortgage creditors are satisfied, in accordance 
with their priority under the order of mortgage, from the 
proceeds of the sale. Those rights which lie outside the 
sum offered after the auction are cancelled in the Ting 
book as unsatisfied and the unpaid mortgage creditor retains 
his personal claim against the debtor. A mortgage creditor 
whose mortgage is threatened by expiry can make a bid which 
partially covers his mortgage. If this bid is accepted as 
the highest, he can put a stop to the auction and take over 
the property as an "unsatisfied pledgee". 
The pledgee whose claim is not paid on the due date can 
also, with the help of the enforcement judge, take the - 250 -
property into his possession and administer it, i.e. take 
it over under antichresis. In this way, for example, his 
claim would be settled by rents flowing from the property. 
A pledgee who has taken over the property under antichresis 
must see to its administration and account for this to the 
owner. 
4. Perpetual charge 
Perpetual charge is to be understood as the duty to provide 
certain recurring services from the property. This duty 
is encumbent on the owner or possessor of the property at 
any time. 
Since the law of 1918 it has been forbidden to encumber 
real estate with perpetual charges in cash or in kind. 
However, this prohibition concerns only perpetual charges 
which, like the earlier forced labour and other levies of 
the farm to the landed proprietor, could not be denounced 
unilaterally either by the party profiting from them or 
from the owner of the land. It is still permitted as in 
the days prior to the law, to constitute annuity rights. - 251 -
III. FIXATION IN DANISH LAW 
INSTITUTIONS HAVING LEGAL STATUS 
Danish law ignores the transfer of property under the condition 
that the acquirer shall indeed be free to dispose of the object 
acquired, whereas the latter, however, is to be removed from the 
reach of the creditor who is pursuing for distraint. Such 
provisions concerning "partial fixation" cannot be maintained 
against the creditors of the acquirer. 
As against this a donor and, in his will, a testator can determine 
the fixation. Through this the donee of the heirs are prevented 
from disposing of the objects acquired. In addition these objects 
are not exposed to the reach of the creditors of the acquirer. 
How and by whom the administration of the object left is to take 
place is laid down by the donor or the testator. 
Immobilized assets are often invested with the senior court of 
guardianship or in a finance institute. The entitled party cannot 
dispose of the capital in his lifetime - but of course mortis causa. 
He can only draw the interest thereon. In this way, the fixation 
fulfils certain functions of the English trust. 
Moreover, in Danish and Continental law, the rules concerning the 
administration of the assets of persons unable to contract and 
institutions such as foundations, which can contract take over some 
of the functions fulfilled by the trust in common law. These rules 
concerning institutions having legal capacity are not codified. 
Such institutions acquire a certain legal capacity when they are 
founded without any public approval or entry being necessary. The 
founder is fairly free to lay down the content of the foundation 
document. However he can decide that its contents shall be approved 
by public authorities (generally a Ministry). When according such 
an approval the Ministry examines the content of the document to a 
certain extent. Subsequently it will supervise the administration 
and have the resources of the institution checked. 252 -
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Notes 
(1) The Tinglysning law has however - as is the case also in other 
countries - been obliged to renounce any application of Sec. 1 to 
older, validly published rights. The point here is that rights to 
landed property which were validly founded with legal effect vis-
à-vis third parties before the entry into force of the Tinglysning 
law of 1 April 1927 shall retain their validity without Tinglysning 
in the future also. 
(2) In Denmark there are two Land Courts, one in Copenhagen and one in 
Viborg. 
(3) If there has been no Tinglysning, the acquirer of the right runs 
the risk that his right will be superseded by an earlier one (cf. 
Sec. 1 T.L.). This shows how important it is to notify a right to 
the Ting. 
(4) Only in individual cases has the T.L. laid down the requirement that 
the acquirer must assert his right in order to supersede a right not 
notified to the Ting. This obtains for the supplanting of rights 
under prescription not notified to the Ting. Where a right under 
prescription has been established and not notified to the Ting and, 
would, in accordance with Sec. 1 T.L., otherwise cease against bona 
fide partners to a contract or enforcing creditors who have notified 
their rights to the Ting, a right under prescription not notified 
to the Ting will nevertheless remain valid in relation to these 
acquirers if they have not asserted their right vis-à-vis the party 
profiting under the prescription within two years after the Ting-
lysning. The acquirer notified to the Ting can in any case assert 
his right. PART II 
SECURITIES OVER MOVABLES I. CREDIT IN THE FORM OF LOANS 
1. PLEDGING OF MOVABLES UNDER HAND 
a) There is no law in Denmark governing pledges under hand from the general 
aspect. The provisions applying are found in various legal instruments, 
the oldest of these being the "Danske Lov" of 1683, and in case law. 
b) A pledge on movables constitutes a contract (l). The contract Itself is 
evidence of its applicability to the contracting parties. In order that 
the contract embodying the pledge may be secured as regards the pledging 
creditors or other contracting parties it Is customary to require (in good 
faith) the execution of a "guarantee deed" by which the debtor is effectively 
deprived of his freedom to dispose of the object pledged. This protection 
remains effective as long as the position continues to be covered by 
restricted powers of disposal {°). 
The grantor may be deprived of his powers of disposal by the fact that the 
pledging creditor has gained possession of the pledge or by the latter being 
transferred to a third party. 
A creditor under pledge who has taken possession of the object is protected 
vis-a-vis third parties, even if he is unable to dispose of the pledge 
without the debtor's cooperation. The deed of guarantee will remain 
effective even if the grantor and the creditor under the pledge have to 
combine In order to obtain access to the pledge. This may arise where 
access to the object requires the use of two keys, held by the creditor 
and by the debtor respectively (3). It is clear in this case that the 
grantor has lost his power of disposal, as In the case of "qualified 
co-possession" for which German law provides (4). The pledge similarly 
remains effective even though the object pledged is situate on the grani ors 
commercial premises, provided that steps have been taken to exclude 
the possibility of a unilateral act of disposal by the debtor. The creditor 
under the pledge must continually ensure that the object pledged remains 
available. He must take necessary measures (5) to prevent incorrect and 
unilateral disposal by the grantor. The pledge will continue to exist even 
if the grantor disposes of the object pledged without the knowledge of the 
creditor under the pledge. 
The requisitie deed of guarantee also remains effective where a third party 
holds the object pledged for the benefit of the creditor under pledge and 
undertakes not to pass this on to the debtor without the creditor's consent. 
The deciding factor here is similarly the fact that the creditor under the 
pledge may effectively rely on the object not being returned to the debtor 
without the creditor's permission. 
c) No particular form is required for a pledge to be valid. Written, oral, 
formal and silent contracts are all acceptable (6). Rights under e pledge 
may be set up not only to secure pecuniary indebtedness for a specific sum 
but also pecuniary indebtedness for an unspecified amount. 
d) The conclusion of a contract for a pledge enables the creditor thereunder to 
require execution of the deed of guarantee as described under (b) above. - 258 -
As long as the claim of the creditor under the pledge remains outstanding, 
the latter similarly retains the right to withhold the object pledged 
vis-a-vis third parties. 
A creditor under a pledge who retains the object pledged is responsible for 
it in accordance with the general provisions applying in respect of 
liability for negligence (culpa). 
In accordance with the law applying to pledges the creditor under the pledge 
is not in fact entitled to use the object pledged. If the latter yields 
revenue, the creditor is not obliged to render this up to the debtor but, 
nevertheless, he may not assign such revenue as long as he is not permitted 
to sell the object pledged. Only in the event of it proving impossible to 
store any revenue accruing is he entitled to sell it earlier (7). 
Under a contract of pledge the creditor may neither assign nor re-pledge his 
rights thereunder in the absence of express agreement to the contrary. Nor 
may a pledge on movables be assigned for a sum of money greater than that 
which the creditor under the pledge has himself remitted to the debtor (8). 
The debtor may set up secondary charges under pledge. In this case, the 
second creditor under pledge must respect the rights of the first creditor. 
Where this occurs, the deed of guarantee is incorporated in the notification 
to the first creditor under the pledge of the second charge thereunder. 
The provisions stated under (b) above relating to pledges where the object 
pledged Is in the possession of the third party are of corresponding 
application. 
e) Realisation of the pledge. In the event of foreclosure or of the debtor's 
bankruptcy the creditor under the pledge has a preferential right to payment 
in respect of the object pledged over other creditors. In the event of 
bankruptcy, the creditor may, by virtue of his rights under pledge and 
independently of the realisation and general distribution of the bankrupt's 
estate,claim settlement of his claim under the object pledged (9). 
The creditor under pledge has a choice between various methods of realisation. 
aa) He may appropriate title to the pledge consequent upon a valuation carried 
out by two persons (appointed by the debtor and by the creditor 
respectively) after having paid any excess value to the owner of the 
pledge (10). 
bb) The creditor under pledge may proceed to sell the pledge by public 
auction. In this case he must pass the proceeds from the sale to the 
debtor after subtracting his due (ll). 
cc) The creditor under pledge and the debtor may agree on other methods of 
settlement. Recourse may be made to the Commissoria Lex, under which the 
pledge becomes the property of the creditor thereunder if the claim it 
secures is not settled by the appointed time, but this may nevertheless 
be made subject to investigation by the court with regard to equity. - 259 
2. HYPOTHECATION OF MOVABLES (CHATTELS MORTGAGE) 
Contrary to the position under German and Norwegian Law, Danish law enables 
certain kinds of movable property to be hypothecated. Securities or claims, 
on the other hand, cannot be bound by hypothec. 
a) In the past, the holder of a hypothec on movables enjoyed only limited 
protection in the event of bankruptcy, vis-a-vis the bankrupt's creditors. 
Acts numbers 176 of 29 April I960 and 177 of even date have improved the 
creditor's situation in many respects and the chances of charging movables, 
and chattels in their entirety in particular, under a hypothec have been 
widened. Nevertheless, little avail is made of pledges of this kind as a 
means of securing credit in the form of loans (13). 
b) The pledge is set up by contract as between the creditor thereunder and 
the grantor. So that the pledge may be secured vis-a-vis creditors or 
the grantor's fellow contracting parties bona fidei, the movables hypothec 
must be "tinglyset" (l4). As regards "tinglysning", a letter of pledge 
must be drawn up and signed by the grantor (15)· "tinglysning" is 
undertaken before the court having jurisdiction over the grantor personally 
or, should the latter not fall within the jurisdiction of any Danish court, 
before the court of first instance at Copenhagen (l6). As under German 
law, the Jurisdiction of the court is determined in relation to the place 
of permanent residence of the party concerned (17). If the debtor has 
several permanent addresses the "tinglysning" must be undertaken as regards 
each of them (l8). The competent court may similarly be that of the former 
Danish address of the debtor if he has not subsequently created any closer 
personal links abroad (19)· As regards companies and unincorporated bodies 
the competent court is that of their chief registered office (
Q0). If the 
debtor is a limited company, the "tinglysning" of the pledge must be 
undertaken at the place where the company's administrative centre is 
established (°l). As regards partnerships, it suffices if the "tinglysning" 
is undertaken wherever the partnership is entered on the commercial register 
(22). 
On the other hand, no "tinglysning" is required before the court within whose 
Jurisdiction the partners concerned fall individually (23). Where an 
unincorporated body has no registered office, the competent court is that of 
the place where any member of its management committee has his permanent 
address. 
In order that the protection of the debtor's other creditors and his fellow 
contracting parties bona fidei may continue to be ensured, the "tinglysning" 
must be renewed within ten years if the pledge constitutes movable property 
(24). As regards the pledging of industrial plant, see (g) below. 
The court presiding over a "tinglysning" will only take general note of the 
contents of the letter of pledge submitted in this connection. The court 
will ensure that the signatory to the document, where another person is 
the owner of the pledge, Is entitled to dispose of the latter on the grantor's 
behalf. The court undertaking "tinglysning", on the other hand, is in no 
position to confirm whether the grantor is the owner of the objects pledged 
or if the latter are, e.g., charged under an unexpired clause reserving 
title. The creditor under hypothec must respect such rights. - 260-
A further "tinglysning" of rights under pledge is unnecessary if the debtor 
leaves the area over which the court that undertook "tinglysning" had 
Jurisdiction. This reduces the practical possibility of confirming whether 
the objects pledged had not already been pledged previously to another 
creditor which might perhaps represent one of the reasons why this means of 
security is so little used. No advantage has yet been taken of the 
opportunity available under statute to create a central register for all 
hypothecs. 
c) So that "tinglysning" may be undertaken, a letter of pledge must be drawn 
up in a specified form. 
The Danish Minister of Justice, who has to authorise standard forms, has 
permitted the use of routine forms, on the one hand, and of special forms 
on the other hand, for certain kinds of pledge (e.g. pharmaceuticals). 
Where the entirety of chattels are pledged (see (g) below), no specific 
forms are required. 
So that the letter of pledge may be "tinglyset", it must indicate the nature 
of the object pledged, the name and address of the creditor under the pledge 
and of the debtor, and the sum of the debt, the rate of interest, and the 
period within which it must be paid off. 
There is no need for preferential rights of pledge that may exist on one 
and the same object to be indicated. As regards hypothecs for the 
maximum sum (registration relates to the maximum sum secured without the 
sum pledged being stated), such maximum sum must be shown. 
The letter of pledge must be countersigned by witnesses certifying the 
name (profession) and address of the debtor. The requirement is that such 
certification must be by either two witnesses or one Danish lawyer. 
d) Effectiveness inter partes. 
As long as objects remain pledged the debtor is bound to maintain them so 
as to avoid any loss in their value. The creditor under the pledge Is 
entitled to inspect them as to their condition. 
The grantor, as has already been stated, may set up a secondary hypothec 
(25) on the same object, if the creditor under the second pledge agrees to 
recognise the rights of the first creditor under the pledge. 
The debtor is not permitted to sell the pledge of his own accord or to 
re-pledge in the form of a pledge on movables (26). The creditor under 
pledge may demand that the object remain in the debtor's possession. 
e) Effectiveness vis-a-vis third parties. 
Once "tinglysning" is carried out (see (b) below), the creditor under the 
pledge is similarly protected vis-a-vis third parties against sale or 
re-pledging by the debtor and against distraint by other creditors (27). - 261 -
Other creditors may, however, while respecting the rights of the creditor 
under the pledge, distrain the object pledged by compulsory individual 
foreclosure (and thereby remove it from the debtor's possession). The 
creditor under the pledge may, moreover, without intervention by the 
grantor, demand that a pledge that has entered into third parties' 
possession be returned to the debtor. 
f) Realisation of the security. 
If the debtor fails to comply, the creditor will require enforceable title. 
He must obtain a court order enabling him to enforce his title so as to 
include the objects pledged in the compulsory foreclosure and so as to 
release the pledge for compulsory sale by auction. The proceeds of the 
sale by auction will be paid to the debtor after the sum due as secured 
by the movables hypothec has been deducted (28). 
If the debtor becomes bankrupt the object pledged merges into the estate 
and is realised by the liquidators. Certain special claims take precedence 
over the rights of the creditor under a pledge. This applies in the case 
of funeral expenses payable by the survivors, and to the costs of winding up 
the estate insofar as the object pledged is affected (29). With regard to 
the remainder, the creditor under hypothecated pledge is accorded a 
privileged claim and is reimbursed before any other creditors. 
g) Special types of hypothec. 
Any present or future title of the debtor may not give rise to rights under 
pledge (30). Nor may the entirety of rights or of objects be pledged, i.e. 
"groups of objects of the same kind or of the same destination bearing a 
general description" (e.g. stocks of goods) ("51). 
Nevertheless, certain statutory provisions allow the entirety of chattels 
to be pledged. In this way, a right of pledge has arisen similar in 
certain respects to the "floating lien" under English common law. 
Where an undertaking is pursued on leasehold commercial premises the owner 
may pledge the equipment forming part of the undertaking, including 
machinery and technical plant of all kinds. Where an agricultural project 
is granted on lease, the farmer may, moreover, pledge the livestock 
forming part of the project, his fertilizer, his crops, and other products. 
The pledge does not prevent these things from being abstracted from the 
project within the course of normal management C>2). 
They are other statutory opportunities for the entirety of objects, to be 
hypothecated. Pursuant to a. 65 of Act no. 209 of 11.6.195^, a pharmacist 
may charge his equipment and stock, including fire insurance premiums, under 
hypothec in order to secure loans granted in respect of what it has been 
agreed may be called the substance of the pharmacist's business. This also 
applies where the pharmacist is the owner-occupier of the premises. 
In accordance with Act no. 50 of 14.2.1951, owners and farmers under 
agricultural projects may - with the consent of the local council - hypothecate 
their crops in order to secure payment for seed, artificial fertilizers and 
seed-potatoes. The security comprises only the crop following the grant of 
the loan. These "securities for the pledging of crops" are "tinglyset" in - 262-
accordance with the provisions relating to the "tinglysning" of rights under 
the pledge of real estate. Within the brief period to which the rights under 
pledge relate - the compulsory foreclosure procedure must have been introduced 
by 1st January following the harvest - this has preference over all the rights 
under pledge previously charged on the agricultural project. 
According to the provisions of Act no. 24? of 8.6.1966, owners and users of 
agricultural projects who are not debtors under "tinglyset" "securities for 
the pledging of crops" may during the period between 1st August and 
15th October pledge the crop in order to secure a loan intended to maintain 
and improve the project. In this case, too, the owner pledges the crop in 
accordance with the provisions relating to hypothecs on movable property; 
however, the registration is made in the "ting register" on the page relating 
to the project concerned. No precise description is required of the pledged 
crop. 
3. TRANSFER OF TITLE TO GOODS HELD IN TRUST 
A form of credit against security that once strongly exercised both theory (l) 
and practice (2) was what came to be called "loans on movables". The lender 
purchased the articles - in the specific case of movables - from the borrower 
but nevertheless left them with the "vendor" who, in return, paid a "rent". 
The vendor "repurchased" the movables once he had paid the "purchaser" a "rent" 
equal to the amount of the loan plus interest. 
The contracting parties in this way ought to adapt the provisions of the law 
relating to pledges under lien, particularly those regarding publicity 
which was assured by "tinglysning", by transferring the right of ownership to 
the purchaser by virtue of the provisions relating to transfer of ownership 
without it being necessary for actual delivery of the article. 
In both theory (3) and practice (4) it has, however, been long considered that 
contracts of this kind have no effect on the "vendor's" creditors insofar as 
they do not constitute "normal" transactions recognised at law. When it comes 
to deciding whether a transaction may be considered as "normal", the courts in 
principle endeavour to determine whether the purchaser has need of the article, 
whether this must rest within the vendor's keeping, and whether the contract 
has been concluded shortly before the vendor became bankrupt. 
If the chief intention behind \ .e transfer of ownership was to secure the 
rendering of some other service for the purchaser (repayment of the loan), the 
contract cannot be upheld against the vendor's creditors as the conditions 
underlying the act of pledging have not been fulfilled (6). 
In certain specific cases, however, the conditions underlying pledges have been 
waived, namely where the transfer of the article has been carried through 
because the "purchaser" wished to give assistance to the vendor where the latter 
was a relative or a person close to him. This is the case, for example, where 
movables have been purchased by a friend of the vendor as he wished to protect 
the latter against the claims of his creditors (7). In this event, the validity 
of the contract often depends decisively on whether any business relationship 
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II. CREDIT ON GOODS 
1. SIMPLE PURCHASE 
a) General Points regarding Transfer of Ownership 
As was stated in the first part of the study (l), transfer of ownership 
is not, under Scandinavian legislation, considered as a single legal act. 
Transfer proceeds by stages and during each stage, within the scope of the 
various relationships, legal consequences take effect which, considered as 
a whole, constitute transfer of ownership in relation to third parties. 
The problems raised by the transfer of ownership inter partes are not 
considered as a matter falling under the law of property but, rather, under 
the law of contract. 
Danish law relating to the transfer of ownership in the case of the purchase 
of movable property creates a distinction between the following situations: 
- the position of the purchaser vis-a-vis other purchasers of the same object; 
- the position of the purchaser vis-a-vis the vendor's creditors instituting 
legal proceedings in connection with the security or compulsory execution 
in respect of the article; 
- the relationship between the vendor ani the purchaser's creditors, and, 
finally 
- the relationships between the vendor and persons to whom the purchaser 
has passed the article even though the vendor has the right to it. 
In each of these situations the various interested parties lose and acquire 
rights at various stages during the process of transfer. Rights may 
therefore be conveyed in one situation where this is not yet the case in 
another. 
We shall restrict ourselves below to examining matters relating to the 
purchase of goods. As a general rule, other types of contract (e.g. gifts, 
exchange) will be disregarded. 
b) The position in relation to third parties 
1. Conflict between the purchaser and the vendor's creditors 
In considering at what moment in time the purchaser is protected against 
the vendor's creditors a distinction must be drawn between individually 
defined services (a), services not defined by their nature (standard 
types of debt) (b) and goods which at the time the contract is concluded 
are not yet ready to be delivered (c). 
a) Individually defined services 
In the purchase of certain immovable property a simple contract 
suffices to protect the purchaser under
 nanish and Norwegian law, 
even if the purchase price has not yet been paid (2). In this case, 264-
the interests of the purchaser and those of the vendor's creditors 
by and large overlap. The purchaser wishes to acquire the object. 
If the vendor is bankrupt the creditors in bankruptcy will wish to 
realise the assets and insofar as this may be effected by executing 
a contract already concluded they will normally wish to see the sale 
completed. However, in the event of bankruptcy, compulsory measures 
within the scope of which the assets are normally sold does not 
constitute an advantageous form of sale. 
Similarly, under Danish and Norwegian law, it is generally held that 
the purchaser who has paid the purchase price in advance is protected 
against the vendor's creditors from the moment the contract is 
concluded (3). This interpretation has the support of several 
decisions by courts of major instance and by a Judgement of the 
Supreme Court (UfR 1950 A, page 287). Under these judgements, two 
persons who acquired the annual gross output of a particular peat 
bog, against part payment in advance, were legally protected from 
the moment the contract was concluded from the claims of a creditor 
of the vendor who after the sale had been concluded attempted to 
impose a distraint order on the peat. The judgement applied to a 
specified sum total of objects; there are grounds for supposing that 
it would similarly apply to particular objects (species). 
b) Services defined only by their nature (objects by nature) 
In the case of objects by nature, it is indispensable that the objects 
should have been individually specified other than under the 
provisions of the contract, if the purchaser is to be protected against 
the vendor's services. 
In Danish legal doctrine some writers have attached particular 
importance to whether the acquisition of individual identity is 
sufficiently final for the vendor to be unable to dispose of it 
without himself acquiring some liability (4). The requirements that 
they make for the acquisition of individualised liability to be 
considered as final are not stringent. Final acquisition of individual 
identity may therefore also be effected tacitly. Other writers attach 
importance to the question whether acquisition of the individual 
identity constitutes a normal act within the scope of the vendor's 
activities or whether his sole intention was to show favour to the 
purchaser to the detriment of his (other) creditors (5)· There is 
general agreement in legal thinking that transfer - "traditio" - is 
unnecessary for the protection of the purchaser but that this 
question may become important when it comes to proving whether the 
sale was a normal one. 
There is no more recent decision that clearly and unequivocally lays 
down the way in which individual identity is acquired. The difference 
between the two concepts referred to is not very great but, 
nevertheless, some uncertainty persists in Danish law. 
c) Transfer of future articles 
When the articles sold cannot be delivered at the time the contract - 265 -
is concluded the purchaser cannot compel the vendor's creditors, 
e.g. his creditors in bankruptcy, to manufacture the goods. The 
purchaser may, however, remove the article at the stage it has 
reached at the time of compulsory enforcement or of bankruptcy. 
If the article cannot be removed, e.g. in the case of a crop that has 
not yet ripened, the purchaser has no right to take delivery of the 
harvest. This is why it reverts to the vendor's creditors. In 
the absence of special circumstances, such as those above, however, 
the prevailing opinion in Danish law (6) is that the purchaser is 
protected as from the time the contract is concluded, provided that 
the necessary acquisition of individual identity has been made. The 
purchaser must then complete the transaction himself. 
2. The purchaser in conflict with other purchasers of the same article 
If the vendor has intentionally or by mistake passed on an article 
that he had already sold to another person, the rule that normally 
prevails is that of prior tempore potior jure. The first purchaser, 
i.e. the one who was first in concluding a contract with the vendor 
relating to an individually specified object or who is the first to 
have benefitted from the acquisition of individual identity Df a part 
of a normal debt, has privileged right to the article. This is the 
case when the article has been transferred to none of the parties; 
this is also the case when the article has been passed to the first 
purchaser and has subsequently been delivered to the subsequent 
purchaser and where the latter, at the time of delivery, knew or should 
have known that it had been sold to another person. When the article 
has been passed on to a second purchaser in good faith, certain writers 
consider that it should nevertheless be returned to the first purchaser. 
Other writers, on the other hand, assert that the second purchaser has a 
right to the article (7). 
When the article has not been passed to the first purchaser, this rule 
does not apply if there is any doubt as to whether the contract concluded 
between himself and the vendor was mandatory upon the two parties or as 
to whether it should have been executed. This rule does not apply, either, 
where the agreement does not constitute a normal purchase but a transfer 
by way of security (8). 
The following case raises a special problem: a merchant had assigned his 
claim on a debt to a bank constituting the purchase price and, in 
conjunction with it, his reservation of ownership. The first purchaser 
had to return the article that had been passed to him to the merchant, 
consequent upon which the merchant (vendor) sold it to a second purchaser 
who did not know of the bank's reservation of title. 
The Danish Supreme Court which, in the ordinary way, customarily grants 
the holder of a reserve of title greater protection vis-a-vis third 
parties than do courts in other countries (see (2) below) in this case 
granted ownership in the articles sold to the second purchaser in good 
faith. Emphasis was laid on the fact that the bank had not exercised 
any effective control on the process of the legal relationships between 
the vendor and the first purchaser (9). - 266-
3. Conflict between the vendor and the purchaser's creditors 
The relationship between an unpaid vendor and the purchaser's creditors 
is strictly tied to the contractual relationship between the vendor 
and the purchaser who is in arrears of payment of the purchase price. 
The question arises here whether the vendor can cancel the contract, or, 
without cancelling it, may claim restitution of the article before and 
after it has passed into the purchaser's possession. 
a) Has the vendor any retention rights on the article sold before this 
is passed over ? 
Within the framework of the relationship between the parties an 
unpaid vendor has retention rights under a. l4 of the Scandinavian 
Act on commercial transactions of 1905-1907. The vendor is not bound 
to deliver the articles sold unless the purchase price is paid 
simultaneously. This obligation on the purchaser in a cash-on-the-nail 
transaction does not apply, however, where the vendor has granted the 
purchaser deferred payment terms. 
Pursuant to a. 39 of the Act on commercial transactions, the 
purchaser's insolvency nonetheless gives the vendor the right to 
retain the article, even if credit has been given to the purchaser (10). 
If the article has been dispatched, the vendor can, moreover, prevent 
delivery to the purchaser or its inclusion in the bankrupt's estate. 
This retention right and the right to prevent delivery of the article, 
which corresponds to "stoppage in transitu" under English law, 
devolves upon the vendor in the following cases : 
- When after a contract of sale has been concluded, the purchaser 
becomes bankrupt or if a court imposes composition proceedings on 
him in lieu of bankruptcy, 
- When in the event of distraint he does not have sufficient funds 
to settle his debts and 
- When the purchaser's circumstances are such that it may be taken 
that he will be unable to pay the purchase price when it becomes 
due. 
The same applies in the case of a trader who ceases to make payments. 
This right of retention or the right to prevent delivery does not, 
however, give the vendor any right to cancel the contract. The vendor 
may cancel it only when the purchase price is due or the delivery 
period has overrun. The purchaser may, however, oppose retention of 
the object by giving security; he may, nevertheless, cancel the purchase 
If payment is not immediately due or in the event of security being 
lodged. Like English law, Danish law makes no provision for "Mahnung" 
("formal notice") and for the "Nachfrist"("extension") that exist in 
German law, nor for "sommation" ("writ of summons") and "délai de 
grace" ("days of grace") as exist under French law. In the case of 
a commercial sale, any delay in paying the price entitles the vendor 
to cancel the transaction forthwith. - 267 -
a. 39 of the Act on Commercial Transactions applies immediately 
only to the relationship between the purchaser and the vendor, but 
it also applies to any conflict arising between the vendor and the 
purchaser's creditors. In the event of Individual enforced execution, 
and in the case of bankruptcy, the vendor has the same rights of 
retention and to prevent delivery of the object against creditors as 
he has against the purchaser himself, a. l6 of the Danish Bankruptcy 
Code applies to contractual relationships other than those of purchase 
and, on broad lines, makes the same provisions as those of the Act 
on Commercial Transactions. A declaration by the bankrupt's 
administrators stating that it impinges on the contract is sufficient 
in this case to prevent cancellation by the vendor. There is no need 
to put up security (ll). 
b) Transfer of the article 
Under Danish law - as is the case under many other legal systems 
(German, English and U.S.) - the vendor may not cancel the contract 
for failure to pay the purchase price once the purchaser has taken 
possession of the goods. Similarly, the goods cannot be 
repossessed: cf. a. 28 (2) of the Act on purchases. The "action 
en revendication" ("proceedings for repossession") is unknown in 
Denmark. 
Transfer occurs when the goods enter into the physical possession of 
the purchaser or his employees or if they are stored in such a way 
as by all accounts and purposes to form part of the purchaser's 
business (12). 
When transfer to the purchaser has taken place and the vendor cannot 
cancel the transaction or retain the goods, he can no more demand 
restitution of the object from the purchaser's creditors. An object 
that has entered into the purchaser's possession may be the subject 
of particular enforced execution or fall within a bankrupt 
purchaser's estate. 
c) Repossession after transfer of the article 
Certain exceptions exist, however, to the rule by which the vendor 
may repossess the goods after they have passed to the purchaser 
when the purchase price has not been paid. This is the case where 
the sale has been made on a cash basis, where it has been made 
subject to a clause reserving title, and when transfer has taken 
place after the purchaser has become bankrupt. 
Payment in cash 
a. l6 (2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that restitution must take 
place "when the vendor, in the event of failure of consideration, 
has made a valid reservation as regards restitution, or when there 
are grounds for assuming that the vendor does not wish to transfer his 
title before having received consideration, e.g. in the case of a 
cash sale without the vendor having expressly or implicitly granted 
credit to the purchaser". a. 28 (2) of the Act on Commercial 
Transactions makes the same provision, which is interpreted in the 
same way. 268 
Cash payment implies that consideration by the two parties must be 
given simultaneously. It is nevertheless accepted that transfer of 
the object by the vendor does not necessarily always mean that it is 
his intention to allow credit to the purchaser and that consequently 
he loses his rights to repossess the object (13). Transfer on approval 
or for purposes other than sale is accepted and the vendor is similarly 
given the right to repossess an object that he has passed over by 
mistake. In the latter case, the vendor must, however, repossess the 
article within the shortest possible time and if he does not do so it 
is accepted that he has allowed credit to the purchaser. Under 
Norwegian law, any transfer of the object with a view to selling it 
undertaken without simultaneous payment must be considered as a credit 
purchase, resulting in loss of repossession rights. 
Reservation of title, c.f. item 4 below. (l4) 
Services rendered to the estate in bankruptcy 
When a service is rendered to the estate in bankruptcy of the 
beneficiary, the renderer may, by virtue of a; 4 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, require that what has been rendered be excluded from the estate 
unless the receiver declares directly that appropriate consideration 
will be payable. This provision applies in principle to all contracts 
relating to things. Nonetheless, as regards sales, a. 4l of the Act 
on Commercial Transactions restricts the scope of a. 4 of the 
Bankruptcy Code; under the terms of this article it is insufficient 
for the receiver to state his intention to deal separately with the 
sale and he must also put up security. The vendor may insist on 
immediate security. 
This rule does not apply when the vendor has rendered a service to 
the estate or has made a transfer to the bankrupt knowing that 
bankruptcy has been opened or that application has been made for the 
institution of proceedings. In this case, all he has is a claim to 
the purchase price as a non-preferential creditor. 
4. SALE BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE OWNER 
Under both Danish and Norwegian law, the vendor's protection against 
resale by a purchaser who does not own the goods is similarly 
regarded as a question of transfer of title. The purchaser may lack 
authority to resell the object owing to the invalidity of his contract 
with the vendor, or because the object was encumbered with a clause 
reserving title or with some other corporeal right. 
When the contract is invalid as to its substance, the vendor is in 
many cases entitled under Danish law to free return of the object, 
even if the second purchaser has acquired the object from the first 
purchaser in good faith. The case is such, for example, when the 
purchaser has acquired the object by threat, misrepresentation or 
illicit money-lending. Legal opinion has criticised this approach 
and is disposed towards acquisition of title by a purchaser in good 
faith (l6). This attitude has not, however, so far met with real 
success in precedent (17)· Indeed, if the nullity of the initial - 269 -
contract results solely from the fact that the vendor has made a 
mistake or has proceeded on the basis of incorrect conditions 
precedent, the vendor cannot require restitution of the object from 
a purchaser in good faith. In such circumstances title has been 
transferred. 
5. PURCHASE FROM UNAUTHAURORESED AGENTS 
The same applies when the purchaser has acquired the object from 
an agent or custodian. According to a. 54 and a. 55 of the 
Scandinavian Agency Act, a purchaser in good faith in such cases 
acquires title to the object if at the time the contract is concluded 
the agent or custodian had the object in his possession. There is no 
requirement under the Act, in fact, as is the case in other instances 
where title is transferred in good faith, for the article purchased 
to have been passed on to the purchaser. The acquisition of title by 
the purchaser occurs as soon as the contract is concluded. 
6. COMMON ASPECTS OF ACQUISITION OF TITLE FROM PURCHASE FROM PERSONS 
OTHER THAN THE OWNER 
As has been stated above, the prevailing rule in Denmark and in 
Norway is that of vindicatio. In theory, this applies equally to the 
sale of articles that have been stolen, pilfered or obtained 
by false pretences and to the sale of articles encumbered by a 
clause reserving title (c.f. 2 below). 
There are,however, exceptions to this rule to which the following 
two considerations apply (18). 
A purchaser in good faith may acquire tile when the previous owner 
has failed to prove proper prudence. He may, for example, have 
passed the object onto a person while well aware that the latter 
would be likely to sell it without being entiteled to do so. 
Failure to act on the part of the former ower may similarly give rise 
to acquisition of title by a purchaser in good faith. The owner may, 
for example, have failed to act despite being aware that the article 
had been sold, that the conduct of the first purchaser had been 
unlawful when the object was sold, or that unlawful resale had taken 
place. 
7. REVIEW OF THE RULE RELATING TO CORPOREAL RIGHTS AFFECTING THE 
PURCHASE OF MOVABLE PROPERTY 
Discussions were begun in i960 in the Scandinavian countries regarding 
the problem of acquisition of title upon the purchase of movable 
property. A report was prepared in respect of each Scandinavian 
country. As regards Denmark, this was filed in 1964 (19). Subsequently, 
in 1967, the Nordic Council recommended the governments to enact a 
uniform Scandinavian law on the basis of existing Scandinavian studies 
and of a Norwegian government draft relating to acquisition of movable 
property in good faith, an act which - except - 270-
as regards theft and pilfering - is founded on the general principle 
of the acquisition of movables in good faith. 
In Denmark, no bill has yet been put to Parliament. The essential 
effect of the bill would be to extinguish the rights of the initial 
owner, except in cases where loss of the object may be attributed 
to theft or pilfering. Evidence of the purchaser's good faith is 
nevertheless made subject to strict conditions. 
c. The relationship inter partes 
The relationship between the contracting parties is considered 
in Denmark to be a matter of the law of contract. 
The purchaser of an object whether it be particularly identified 
or of standard type may require performance in kind, unless 
delivery of the object has become impossible. As has already 
been stated, the vendor is obliged to deliver the object only 
against payment, unless he has allowed credit to the purchaser. If 
the vendor has to dispatch the object, he is bound to undertake 
such dispatch without simultaneous payment, even if payment is to 
be made on a cash basis. He may, however, seek refuge in 
warranties and stipulate that the object will not be delivered 
to the purchaser at destination until the latter has paid the price. 
In the event of the purchaser's insolvency or bankruptcy, the 
vendor, further, as has already been stated, is entitled to retain 
possession of the object and to prevent its delivery to the 
purchaser. If the object has entered into the purchaser's 
possession, the vendor cannot normally repossess it (cf. b (3) 
above). 
d. Repossession rights 
c.f. (3) and see above. 
e. Vendor's preference 
Danish law allows the vendor no preferential claim to the product 
of the article sold, whether under individual enforced execution 
proceedings or under bankruptcy. - 271 -
2. SALES WITH CLAUSES RESERVING TITLE 
a) General 
We have stated above, under 1 (b) 3. c, that the vendor is generally able 
to reserve title to movable property. The necessary grounds for valid 
reservation of title are not generally governed by law; they tend to derive 
from principles developed in theory and practice (l). These rules apply 
equally to general reservation of title and to reservation of title 
accorded under the Act on Sale by Hire Purchase. 
The general conditions under which reservation of title may be validly 
made are as follows: (2) 
The reservation of title must be clear and evident. It must arise from the 
terms of the contract (3). There Is in Denmark no commercial practice by 
virtue of which reservation of title can be agreed without an agreement in 
terms (4). Agreement may, however, have been made orally (5). 
The reservation of title must apply to specific objects mentioned in the 
contract. No reservation of title may be made as to things that cannot be 
differentiated from other things in the purchaser's possession, such as 
e.g. cereals sold to a trader (6). No reservation of title may be made 
on goods intented for resale in the absence of consignment contract. In 
order that a reservation of title may be set up against the consignee's 
creditors, legal precedent requires that the latter have the right to 
return unsold goods, that he settle his accounts with the consignor after 
each resale transaction or at least on a regular basis, that the product of 
the article sold should be kept separate from the consignee's own 
belongings, and that the consignor exercise some control over the deposited 
goods and the accounts. These four requirements made by legal precedent 
need not always be cumulative. It might suffice if three of them apply. 
The contract relating to reservation of title must at the latest be 
concluded simultaneously with the passing-over of the object to the 
purchaser. The vendor cannot reserve his right to title on goods already 
In the purchaser's possession; however, where this is the case, transfer 
against future guarantee in favour of the vendor is not permissible. It 
is not therefore possible to stipulate that reservation of title to goods 
delivered subsequently should similarly apply to goods delivered previously 
(7). 
Reservation of title may be set up against third parties only with regard 
to the vendor's claims arising out of the contract of sale (8). 
Older, unsecured claims or subsequent entitlement to damages in respect of 
the object are not included amongst claims secured by the reservation of 
title. On the other hand, security will apply to all services linked to 
the performance of the contract of sale, e.g. to any risk supplement, to 
interest, etc. 
When these general conditions have been fulfilled, reservation of title 
does not apply solely Inter partes, but also with regard to the purchaser's - 272-
creditors and further purchasers in good faith. The vendor may demand 
restitution of the object from the purchaser making improper use of it 
for the benefit of third parties or if the object is pledged or incorporated 
in the estate on the purchaser's bankruptcy; cf. 1 (b) 6 above. 
b) The Act on Sale by Hire Purchase 
The Danish law of 11 June 1974 on sale by hire purchase contains special 
provision regarding the sale of movables in this way. The Act applies 
to contracts of sale that provide for instalment payments one or more of 
which become due after the articles sold have been passed on to the purchaser, 
contracts in the case of which vendor has reserved the right to demand 
restitution of the object If the purchaser does not fulfil his obligations, 
or where the vendor has reserved the right of title to the object until 
payment has been made in full or to a specified extent. 
The vendor may reserve the right either to demand restitution of the object 
or right of title to the object If, not later than when the latter is 
passed on to the purchaser, he has not received a down payment of at least 
20 % of the agreed aggregate price. In any event, such a down payment must 
be at least 50 crowns (9)· Insofar as these conditions have not been 
fulfilled, reservation of title cannot be opposed either by the purchaser or 
by the purchaser's creditors or persons to whom the purchaser has improperly 
sold the object. 
The Act on Sale by Hire Purchase lays down no monetary limit as to its scope. 
It applies equally to sales governed by the Civil Code and to sales governed 
by the Commercial Code. For example, the sale of ten lorries to a transport 
undertaking falls within the scope of the Act even though the sale is a 
commercial one of substantial value and falls beyond the object of the Act 
(protection of consumers and limitation of the period for performance). 
This legislation further obliges many businessmen, and particularly motor 
vehicle dealers selling to transport undertakings and car hire companies, 
to resort to other forms of security such as, e.g., hypothecation (cf. I 
2 above) and leasing (cf. 3 below). 
Moreover, the Act contains detailed provisions on the procedural stages in 
the event of repossession o f the object for failure to pay. 
The Act provides that contracts stated to be hire contracts or in the case 
of which payment is considered as consideration for utilisation of the object 
are nevertheless to be considered as analogous to hire purchase transactions 
when it may be assumed that the possessor of the object will also become 
its owner (10). 27;¡ 
3. LEASING 
In Denmark and in Norway leasing is not governed by law. In both theory and 
practice it is generally held to be a bailment although strictly speaking it 
amounts to credit on goods. However, as has already been stated, the Act on 
sale by hire purchase also covers bailments that allow the bailee a purchase 
option and, moreover, as certain leasing contracts offer the "lessee" the 
right to purchase and also contain other features that are not essentially 
those of a bailment, the question whether and on what conditions a leasing 
contract should be considered as a sale by hire purchase is controversial as 
to theory and has not yet been cleared up by legal precedent. In a judgement 
on 9 November 1971, the Maritime and Commercial Court of Copenhagen 
recognised that the "lessor" had a right of title to five excavators that had 
been passed to a construction undertaking held to be trie "lessee'', on the 
grounds that the contract had provided no purchase right in favour of the 
"lessee" (l). Both this judgement and other decisions have put leasing 
companies on their guard against concluding standard leasing contracts the 
tenor of which differs too greatly from that of the customary bailment, and 
which could therefore be considered by the courts as hire purchase contracts. 
Several writers nevertheless have cast doubts on the need for such subtleties 
(2). The tenor of the contract apart, leasing, by means of vrhich the 
acquisition of motor vehicles and other plant is financed by finance companies 
in the capacity of "purchasers" or by plant manufacturers as vendors, should 
not fall within the scope of the Act on sale by hire purchase as the object 
of this is to protect the consumer; its provisions are inadequate to deal 
with commercial contracts such as those of leasing. - 274-
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INTRODUCTION 
The Danish legislation on intangibles is, like the legislation on intangibles in 
Finland, Norway and Sweden, the result of close cooperation between the Northern 
countries. With the exception of the laws on unfair competition, all the laws 
mentioned below are uniform in Scandinavia. '^/ 
I. COPYRIGHT 
A. DANISH COPYRIGHT LAW FOR TANGIBLE GOODS 
The most important source in the area of copyright law is Act no. 158 of May 
31, I96I on copyrights for literary and artistic works (cpl). The law was 
most recently amended by Act no. 174 of March 21, 1973 which takes into account 
the latest changes, in 1967 and 1971, in the Berne Convention and the World 
Convention which are described below. 
The law covers a literary or artistic work, whether this consists of a piece 
of fiction which is written or spoken, a musical or theatrical work, a film, a 
picture, a piece of architecture or functional art, or of any other form (cpl 
§ l). The copyright is valid until 50 years after the year of death of its 
owner, or, in the case where a work has two or more people responsible for it 
and it is not possible to separate the individual contribution as independent 
works, until 50 years after the year of the death of the last of them (cpl § 
43, in connection with § 6). The copyright holder can transfer his rights to the 
work in whole or in part (cpl § 27). Unless otherwise agreed, the transfer 
does not give the recipient the right to cnange the work, nor does it usually 
give the right to transfer the rights further to a third party, (cpl § 28). 
The copyright cannot be the subject of suits by creditors, either against the 
original owner or anyone to whom it has passed by virtue of marriage or 
inheritance (§ 3l). 
Cpl § 51 forbids the publication of a literary or artistic work under a title , 
a pseudonym or an insignia likely to cause confusion with a previously pubi' ished 
work or its author. § 52 lays down that the name or insignia of an artist may 
not, unless he consents, be put on a work of art created by somebody else. Nor 
may the name or insignia of an artist be put on a copy of a work if this could 
lead to confusion with the original. Under § 53, a literary work must not be 
changed or made public in conflict with the regulations in § 3, paras. 1 and 2, 
if cultural interests are thereby infringed, even if the copyright has expired. 
Under § 3, para. 1, the author has the right to have his name published when 
normal business practice would dictate this and on copies of the work itself, 
when it is made available to the public. Under § 3, para. 2, the work must not 
be changed or made available to the public in a way which is injurious to the 
literary or artistic reputation or style of the author. The Ministry of 
Culture has laid down certain guidelines in guide no. 269 of December 27, 1967, 
for the basic principles which can be expected to underlie the statements 
made by the Ministry in cases affecting public responsibility for the personal 
moral rights (droit moral) of deceased authors. 
The cpl is published in English in Le droit d'auteur 75« 1962 pp 144-149· A 
French translation of the cpl can be found int idem 74» 1961, pp 295-301. The 
amendment to the law of 1973 is not included here. - 280 
Act no. 157, of May I96I, on the rights to photographic pictures (phi) 
protects the producer of a photograph. Under phi § 1, he has the right to 
produce copies of the picture by photography, printing, drawing or any other 
method, and to show it publicly. The right is valid for 25 years from the end 
of the year when the picture was first produced (phi § 15). 
The phi has also been amended, by a law on March 21, 1973 (Act no. 175). 
A French translation of the phi of 196I is to be found in Le droit d'auteur 74: 
I96I, pp 293-295, and an English translation in idem 75: 1962, pp 142-143. 
Denmark has ratified the Berne Convention for protection of literary and 
artistic works, revised in Brussels on June 26, 1948, the World Convention on 
copyright, of September 6, 1952, the European Agreement of June 22, I960, on 
protection of television transmissions, and the International Convention of 
October 26, 196I, on protection of practising artists, producers of records 
and radio and television productions. Under Royal Decree no. 365 of September 
23, 1965, on the use of the cpl and phi in relation to foreigh countries 
(forei), the rules in these international agreements are made law in Denmark. 
This is done under the cpl, § 60, and the phi, § 20, which permit the extension 
of the regulations in the two laws in relation to other countries, if this 
extension is mutual (see below). 
Literature in English, French and German on Danish and Norwegian copyright 
law: 
Bogsch, Arpod» The law of copyright under the Universal Convention. 3rd rev. 
ed. Leyden 1968. 696p. (Denmark pp 286-95). 
Lögdberg, Ake: Das Urheberrecht neuerer Zeit in den nordischen Staaten. -
Archiv für Urheber-Film- Funk and Theaterrecht 56: 1970 pp 81-94. 
Lund, Torben: Artides on copyright in: World copyright. An encyclopedia.Ed. 
by H.L. Pinner. Vold 1-5. Leyden 1953-60. 
se også Dansk Juridisk Bibliografi (Bibliography of Danish Law) ved Jens 
Søndergaard /DJB/p. 395. 
B. DANISH INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 
1. The use of the cpl in relation to the outside world. The legal rights of 
aliens to copyright. 
The Danish copyright laws, cpl and phi, are based on the principle that Danish 
courts and authorities only use the provisions of these lavrs on the 
protection of authors -*', The law of copyright in other coutries is not used. 
In principle, a work which is not covered by the provisions of the laws is 
not protected by copyright in Denmark 4). There are, however, isolated, 
exceptions as shown below. 
The protection of the cpl is, under § 58, extended to the following types of 
work: 
1) works by Danish citizens and persons resident in Denmark, 
2) works initially published in Denmark, possibly simultaneously with 
publication in another country, 
3) films, the producer of which has his headquarters in Denmark or is resident 
in Denmark, 
4) architectural works built in Denmark and - 281 
5) art works forming part of buildings or other constructions in Denmark. 
The protection of the phi covers, under § 20, photographic pictures produced 
by the persons under category 1 above, photographic pictures initially 
published in Denmark or published in Denmark within 30 days after initial 
publication elsewhere, and pictures forming a part of buildings or other 
constructions in Denmark. 
As stated above, the regulations of the law can be extended to apply in 
relation to other countries, and to be made applicable to works and 
photographic pictures which are initially published by international 
organizations, as well as to unpublished works and pictures whose publishing 
rights are owned by these organizations. This has been done, by Royal Decree 
no. 365 of September 23, 1965 (forei), which was mentioned above. 
Under forei § 1, the regulations in the cpl-with the exception of those in 
Chapter V (see below) - are extended to include the following works covered by 
the Berne Convention: 
1) works by foreign authors who are citizens in countries belonging to the 
International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (the 
Berne Union) - in the case of published works assuming that the works were 
either initially published in a foreign country belonging to the Union, or 
published in a country belonging to the Union simultaneously with or within 
30 days of their initial publication in a country not belonging to the 
Union, 
2) works of foreign authors who are not citizens in countries belonging to the 
Union, if the works are intially published in a foreign country belonging 
to the Union or published in a country belonging to the Union simultaneously 
with or within 30 days of their initial publication in a country not 
belonging to the Union. 
3) building works by foreign authors, if the building works are constructed in 
a foreign country belonging to the Union, 
4) works of graphic or plastic art by foreign authors, if the work form3 a 
part of a building situated in a foreign country belonging to the Union. 
Forei § 6 extends the cpl - with the exception of Chapter V - to include the 
following works, which are covered by the World Convention: 
1) works by foreign citizens of countries which have ratified the World 
Convention of 1952 on copyright, 
2) works by foreign authors, when the works are first published in a foreign 
country which has ratified the Convention, 
3) works by foreign authors resident in a foreign country which has ratified 
the convention, if this country has brought its own legislation into 
agreement with the World Convention in this way, 
4) works by stateless persons and refugees who are permanently resident in 
countries which have ratified Supplementary Protocol 1 to the World 
Convention. 
§ 9 lays down that: 
The regulations in the law on copyrights for literary and artistic works - with 
the exception of chapter V - apply to works first issued by the United Nations 
Organization (UNO), by the specialized agencies connected with UNO or by the 
Organization of American States, as well as to unpublished works which the 
organizations mentioned have the right to publish. - 282 -
The cpl gives a greater extent of protection in Chapter V than in § 58 for the 
production of literary or artistic work by practising artists (see § 45-48), 
for publishers of catalogues and programmes (see § 49) and for press releases 
(§ 50). 
In addition, the cpl § 58, para. 2 lays down that the regulations on "droit 
moral" in § 51-53 of the law applicable to all works (cf. the description of 
these regulations above, under A). 
2. The application of foreign legal regulations on copyright; 
Danish courts and authorities use foreign copyright regulations, to a 
limited degree: Forei § 2 deals with foreign works covered by the Berne 
Convention. It lays down that: 
Para 1. When the period of protection of copyright for a work has expired 
under the current legislation of the country of origin of the work, 
the work is no longer protected under the regulations of the law on 
copyright with the exception of 51-53. 
Para 2. For published works, the country of origin is deemed to be the 
country where the work is initially published, or, in the case of 
simultaneous publication or publication within 30 days in two or 
more countries belonging to the Union, the country with the 
shortest period of protection of the copyright. In the case of 
works published in a country belonging to the Union simultaneously 
with or not more than 30 days after the initial publication in a 
country not belonging to the Union, the country belonging to the 
Union is considered as the sole country of origin. 
Para 3. For unpublished works, the country of origin is deemed to be the 
country of the author. In the case of building works and works of 
graphic or plastic art which form part of buildings, however, the 
country of origin is deemed to be the country belonging to the 
Union in which these works have been constructed or included as 
part of a building. 
3 lays down that: 
In the case of these kinds of works of functional art, as well as 
industrial models and patterns which are only protected as models 
and patterns in their country of origin, protection is only 
extended under the Danish legislation on patterns. 
Forei 7 and 8 deal with works covered by the World Convention 
7 lays down that: 
Para l) When the period of protection for a work under the current 
legislation of its country of origin has expired, the work is no 
longer protected under the regulations of the law on copyright, 
with the exception of 51-53. 
Para 2) When a work was published for the first time in the country which 
has ratified the Convention, this country is regarded as the country 
of origin of the work. In the case of simultaneous publication or 
publication within 30 days in two or more countries which have 
ratified the Convention, however, the country which has the shortest 
period of protection among these is regarded as the country of 
origin of the work. - 283-
Para 3) When a work is initially published in a country which has not 
ratified the Convention, the country of origin of the work is 
deemed to be the country of which the author is a citizen. 
Para 4) In the case of unpublished work, the country of origin is deemed to 
be the country of which the author is a citizen. 
8 lays down that: 
The regulations in 6-7 do not apply to works whose country of 
origin is, under the rules in 2, one of the members of the Berne 
Union or a former member which has withdrawn more recently than 
January 1, 1951· 
Under forei 5 and 10, equivalent rules apply to photographic pictures. 
Under 11, para. 2 and 12, para. 2, the principle that the period of 
protection is only that laid down in the country of origin of the 
work is held to apply to television transmissions covered by The 
European Agreement of June 22, I960, and to practising artists, 
producers of records and radio and television productions covered by 
the International Convention of October 26, 196I. 281 
II. INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAW 
Both the law of patents, trade marks and patterns in connection with tangible 
goods and the regulations governing conflicts of these industrial rights - the 
international civil law - bear the mark of the fact that Denmark has ratified the 
Paris Convention of March 20, 1883, with the amendments and additions adopted in 
Brussels on December 14, 1900, in Washington on June 2, 1911, in The Hague on 
November 6, 1925, in London on June 2, 1934, in Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and 
in Stockholm on July 14, 1967. 
A. THE LAW ON TANGIBLE GOODS 
1. Inventions (patents (5) and know-how) 
a) Patents are governed in Denmark by Act no. 479 of December 20, 1967, the 
Patent Act (pat). As a result of the pat, the Government issued 
proclamation no. 481 of December 20, 1967 on applications, etc., in 
connection with patents (patpro). Under 1, a patent can be registered 
for an invention which can be used in industry, but not for species of 
plants or animals or for important biological methods for the production 
of plants or animals, nor - until such time as the Minister of Trade may 
determine otherwise - for discoveries of foodstuffs and medical 
preparations or methods for the treatment of foodstuffs (pat Chapter XI, 
section 1, para. 2). 
Under the pat, 2, patents are only registered on inventions which differ 
substantially from what was already known before the day the patent 
application was submitted. The invention must in other words be new, in 
that anything which has become publicly available through written 
material, lectures, use or in any other way, is deemed to have become 
public knowledge. It follows from patpro 28, para. 2, that the 
investigation of whether this condition is satisfied is to be undertaken 
on the basis of registered patents and patent applications in Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland, Norway, Germany, Great Britain, France and the United 
States, in addition to any available literature in cases where 
consideration of this is thought necessary. If these investigations 
arrive at the conclusion that the invention under consideration does not 
differ in any major way from others described in foreign patents or 
applications for patents, then the patent will not be registered. 
The patpro also lays down that a person seeking a patent in this country 
for an invention for which he has previously applied for a patent 
elsewhere must state what the relevant patent institution has told him 
about its investigation of the entitlement to patenting of the invention. 
He must deliver verified documentation of this, if the Danish patent 
authorities so request. In addition, the Danish patent authorities have 
made agreements with a number of foreign authorities on exchange of 
results of their investigations into the novelty of patent applications 
(see patpro 32 on this subject). 
In addition to novelty, the invention must represent an advance. The 
invention must be substantially different from what was previously known 
and from results which are considered as obvious for an expert in the 
relevant field (7). - 285 
The Danish patent authorities are the Directorate for Patents and Trade Marks 
(Direktoratet for patent- og varemaerkevaesenet, abbreviated here Dir) and the 
Patent Appeals Board (Patentankenaevnet), which deals with appeals against the 
decisions of the Directorate. The Dir also deals with cases on trade marks and 
patterns and runs the trade marks and pattern registers in addition to the patent 
register. 
An application for a patent must, by 9, be submitted to the Dir and must 
among other things include an exact description of what is desired to 
be protected by the patent (the patent request). When the application 
has been submitted, the Dir undertakes an investigation of the invention, 
to test among other things whether it satisfies the requirements of 
novelty and being an advance. If these and a number of formal 
requirements are satisfied, then the invention is made available to 
public inspection to give members of the public at large the opportunity 
to object to the patent. The availability of the invention for 
inspection is announced publicly. Objections must be made to the patent 
authorities within 3 months of the announcement (pat 19-21). 
When the application has been finally approved, the patent is registered. 
This must be announced publicly, and letters of patent must be made out 
(pat 26). 
A registered patent can be maintained for up to 17 years from the day the 
application was submitted (pat 40). 
A compulsory licence can be announced for several reasons in Denmark. 
A compulsory licence can be announced if the patented invention is not 
used to a reasonable extent during a certain period of time (pat 45), in 
the case of legal dependency (pat 46), when it is important to the 
public interest (pat 47) and in certain cases of previous use (pat 48). 
Cases on the invalidity of patents, on interventions against patents and 
on compulsory licences are decided by the courts. Decisions by the 
patent Directorate to register patents can be brought before the Patent 
Appeals Board: if the patent is alleged to be invalid, then the case may 
also be taken to the courts. Cases where the patent is refused by the 
Directorate must be brought to the Patent Appeals Board not more than 2 
months after the decision. The decision of the Patent Appeals Board can 
be brought before the courts. If the decision of the Patent Appeals 
Board is that the patent should not be registered, then the case must be 
brought not more than 2 months after this decision (cf. pat 24-25 and 
52-53). 
There are no rules in Denmark saying that cases on invalidity of patents 
must be decided by a special invalidity case in the courts. 
Chapter III in the pat (28-38) includes, like the laws in the other 
Northern countries, rules on Northern patent applications,, These lay 
down that a person who wishes to patent an invention in all 4 Northern 
countries, or in 3 of them, can apply for this in one of the countries 
and have a patent made out there applying to all the relevant countries. 
However, these rules have not yet been put into force, and it is not 
known whether they ever will be. 
b) Inventions are also regulated by Act no. 18 of January 27, I960, as amended 
by Act no. 215 of May 31, 1968 on secret patents (war materials or methods 
for the production of war materials), which was formulated with a view to 
cooperation within NATO, and by Act no. 142 of April 29, 1955, with later 
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c) The pat has been published in English in a special publication, "The 
Danish Patent Act 1967", published by the Association of Danish Patent 
Agents, 1968. The Northern patent law is translated into French in "La 
propriété industrielle 84": 1968, pp I68-I85, and the Danish law on 
inventions by employees appears in French idem 72 : 1956 pp 196-197· 
d) Know-how is a legal phenomenon known in Denmark, but there has not been 
any special legislation on it. Know-how is protected to a certain 
extent by the rules in legal proclamation no. 145 of May 1, 1959 on 
unfair competition (comi), in particular by 11 in this, forbidding the 
passing on or use of trade secrets which have come to the knowledge of a 
person who has been employed with or cooperating with or carrying out 
duties for a firm, and by 15 (general clauses) which forbid "actions 
taken in connection with business which, even if they are not covered by 
the other stipulations of the law, conflict with honest business ethics". 
The latter rule, the contravention of which (by contrast to ll) cannot 
lead to punishment, but only to a ban on such practices and duty to give 
compensation, has given rise to an extensive range of cases, and has 
among other things been used in some cases of appropriation of the know-
how of others, which has been used by the copier in a dishonest way, and 
which do not come under 11 of the law (see e.g. UfR i960 - 1042 H.). 
2. Designs (9) 
Designs are regulated by the Act on Designs, no. 218 of May 27, (des). As 
a supplement to the law, a proclamation was issued: no. 388 of August 20, 
197O, on applications and registration of designs (despro). 1, para 1 of 
the law defines a design as the outline for the appearance of an article of 
goods or for an ornament, and thus covers both useful and ornamental designs. 
There are no rules in the Northern countries protecting utility designs 
(Gebrauchsmuster; brugmuster) (l0). 
The des, 1, para. 2, gives the producer of a design or the person to whom 
his rights have passed the right to obtain sole rights to the design by 
registering it. Under des 2, a design must be substantially different from 
those known before the day the application was submitted to allow 
registration to take place. Anything which has been open to public 
inspection by delineation, exhibition, tendering or in any other way is 
deemed to be known. A design not generally available for inspection is also 
considered as previously known, if the design appears in another Danish 
application for patent rights or trade mark or design registration, if the 
latter application was submitted before the day that the design application 
was submitted. 
The approach for applying for design right has a certain resemblance with 
the approach for applying for a patent; however, the investigation with 
regard to novelty is less exhaustive (cf. des 9-23 and despro 13ff.). The 
investigation only has to cover the currently valid design registration in 
Denmark under the current law (l970) and -again under the current law-
registrations which have ceased to be valid within the last 5 years, and 
older registration applications which have not yet been decided upon. 
The registration is valid for 5 years and can be renewed for periods of 5 
years. 
Designs which are not protected under the des, including utility designs, 
are probably to some extent protected by the rules contained in comi, in 
particular in 9 of this law, which among other things forbids anyone to use - 287-
a business insignia or the like to which he is not entitled, in the course 
of trade, and in 15 (see the remarks above). 
The Northern design laws have been published in French in "La propriété 
industrielle 87" 1971 pp' 226-241. 
3. Trade Marks (ll) 
a) Trade marks are regulated in Denmark by the Act on Trade Marks, no. 211 
of June 11, 1959, as amended by Act no. 151 of May 10, 1967 (tml). As 
a supplement to the tml, the Minister of Trade has issued proclamation 
no. 335 of September 21, I960, on the reporting and registration of 
trade marks (tmlpro). 
The tml covers figures, words or phrases, including slogans, letters or 
numbers which appear on the goods or the packaging of the goods (tml l). 
The rules in the law thus apply both to trade marks consisting of words 
and pictures, as well as to the symbols appearing on the goods and to 
slogans. In Sweden and Finland, on the other hand, slogans cannot be 
registered. 
The rules of the law are similarly applied to offers of work and services. 
Trade marks of services are thus also protected in Denmark. 
The trade mark right can, however, also be secured in Denmark (though not 
in the other Northern countries) by use (see tml 3 para. 3)(l2). In 
addition, trade marks rights can be secured in any of the Northern 
countries by the more intensive use which is marketing. A trade mark is 
deemed to be marketed when, in the relevant trade circle in Denmark, it 
is generally known as an insignia for the goods or services of the holder 
(see tml 2). The legal effects of use and marketing are, however, 
roughly the same. (13) 
The protection obtained by use and marketing is less than that obtained 
by registration. The act of registration results in rights to a trade 
mark being laid down, the existence and extent of which are easy to 
determine and prove, while the user is often in the case of a conflict 
forced to try to obtain a legal judgement in his favour. The right to a 
trademark established by use and marketing ceases when the trade mark is 
no longer used, while a registration which is maintained gives protection 
whether it is used or not, as there are no rules in Denmark (or in Norway 
or Finland) dictating that a registered trade mark ceases to be protected 
if it is not used. (l4) 
When an application for registration is made, the Dir considers among other things 
whether the trade mark has the necessary distinctive appearance. If the Dir 
decides that there is no reason why the trade mark should not be registered, the 
trade mark is presented publicly. The trade mark is publicly announced, and is 
registered (tml § 20) if no objection to the right of possession of the owner is 
made within 2 months from the announcement. The registration of a trade mark is 
valid for a period of 10 years, and can be renewed (§ 22). 
Unfair use of another's name, firm, business insignia or the like is 
forbidden as a consequence of comi § 9 and can also under some 
circumstances be banned by the general clause in § 15, which forbids 
actions in the course of trade which conflict with honest business 
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b) The Act on Standardized Marks no. 212 of June 11, 1959, opens the 
possibility of association of persons involved in trade to obtain sole 
rights for their members by registration of use to use certain symbols 
for goods or work or services, wich are offered by members in their 
activities, and it makes it possible for public authorities, as well as 
those foundations and other legal individuals, organizations or 
associations which inspect or lay down norms for goods or offers of work 
or services, to obtain sole rights to particular symbols to use for 
those goods, or offers of work or services, which are the subject of 
inspection or for which norms are laid down. Most of the rules in the 
tml will apply to these standardized marks. 
c) The Danish Act on Trade Marks has been published in French in "La 
propriété industrielle" 76: I960, p. 6l - 67. The Act on Standardized 
Marks has been published in French idem p. 67 - 68. The tml has been 
published in German in "Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, 
Ausland und internationaler Teil", I960, p. 300 - 303. An English 
translation of the Swedish tml is to be found in "Unidroits Year Book 
I96I, Unification of Law, Chapter 1", p. 259· The Swedish Act on 
Standardized Marks is to be found idem p. 273. 
B. DANISH INTERNATIONAL LAW ON TRADE MARKS, DESIGNS AND PATENTS (l6) 
1. International civil law 
Danish law, like that of most other countries, follows the principle of the 
territorial nature of industrial property rights. The rules of Danish law 
on industrial rights only apply to Danish territory. Danish rules do not 
normally protect against violations of Danish sole rights which take place 
abroad. 
Foreign rules on industrial property rights do not apply to Danish 
territory. Rights arising from foreign laws are not normally protected 
against violations taking place on Danish territory. The Danish rules, in 
other words, are "sovereign" on Danish territory but are not "exportable" 
to other countries. 
The rule of the territorial nature of sole rights also holds abroad. Just 
as Danish courts and authorities do not recognise foreign sole rights on 
Danish territory, foreign courts and authorities do not take account in 
their territories of Danish rights. 
The opposite of the territorial principle, the principle of universality, 
under which a trade mark, a pattern or a patent which has been recognised 
in one country is also protected in all the other countries, has not found 
support. 
The general rule of the territorial nature of intangible rights is, however, 
broken by exceptions, mainly by those created by the Paris Convention of 
March 20, I883, with later supplementary conventions, on the establishment 
of a union for the protection of industrial property rights. The Convention 
on International Patent Cooperation (P.C.I.), which was signed in Washington 
on June 19, 1970 but has not yet come into force, will ease the protection 
of an invention in several member countries by establishing the same 
procedure for patenting. The conventions on the European patent and the 
Common Market patent, which may be expected to be signed in 1973-74, state 
that a central, supranantional authority is to be empowered to issue patents 
which are simultaneously valid in several member countries. These 289 
Conventions do not abolish the territorial principle, but they extend the 
territory for which the patent is valid. 
The basic principle of the territorial nature of intangible rights which 
has been mentioned here is expressed above in rules which determine the 
conditions under which the rules of a country will be used by its own 
courts and authorities. There is no mention of when foreign law applies, 
and of the rules of which foreign country the courts of a country apply in 
cases on competition taking place on foreign territory. Which national law 
then decides whether an alien has intangible rights, and if so then in what 
they consist and for how long they are valid? This question also arises in 
the cases where the registration authorities and courts of a country 
exceptionally take account of foreign intangible rights. 
_The ^o_ll_ow_ing a^uesjtions _will_be _cons_idered here: 
I. The protection against infringement of industrial property rights taking 
place on Danish territory given by Danish courts and registration authorities 
A. Rights created under Danish law. 
B. Rights created under foreign law. 
II. The protection against infringement of sole rights on foreign territory given 
by Danish courts 
A. The competence of Danish courts (internationale Zuständigkeit). 
Β. Protection of rights created under Danish law. 
C. Protection of rights created under foreign law. 
Questions I.A. and II.B. are only concerned with the application of Danish 
law. In connection with questions I.B. and U.C., the problem arises of which 
national law is decisive for the existence and content of foreign intangible 
rights. 
I. A. The protection by Danish courts of Danish exclusive rights on Danish 
territory 
1. A patent registered in Denmark gives its owner sole rights to use the 
invention. No one else may use it without permission for business 
purposes by using a method protected by the patent, or by manufacturing, 
importing, using, transferring, leasing, lending or selling objects 
protected by the patent, or in any other way. If a patent has been 
registered on a method for the production of a product, the sole rights 
also cover the products produced by the use of the method (see pat § 3). 
The protection is valid on Danish territory. 
In the same way, it is laid down in the Design Act, that the design 
rights give the owner the sole rights to use it for business purposes. 
No other person is permitted to use it by manufacturing, importing, 
selling, transferring or leasing goods which are protected, by the 
design rights, or which do not differ in any major way from the design, 
or goods which contain something which does not differ in any way from 
the design. This protection is also valid on Danish territory. 
There are certain exceptions to this territorial protection for patents 
and designs. The Minister of Trade can decide that spare parts and 
equipment for aircraft may be imported regardless of a registered patent 
or existing design right, for the purpose of repairing aircraft coming 
from a foreign State which concedes equivalent rights to Danish aircraft - 290 
(see pat § 5, para. 2, and des § 7). It is stated by the Ministry of 
Trade that there has not yet been occasion to introduce regulations of 
this kind into Denmark. (l7) 
The following exceptions apply for patents in particular: 
The pat § 5, para. 1 lays down that regardless of whether a patent has 
been registered on an invention, persons other than the patent owner 
may use the invention during the use of a foreign vehicle, vessel, or 
aircraft during the temporary or fortuitous presence in Denmark of the 
relevant means of transport. (l8) 
In addition, the pat § 3, para. 3 lays down that the patent rights do 
not cover the use of objects which were sold in Denmark in violation of 
sole rights in a shop or under similar circumstances, if the purchaser 
at the time of purchase did not know, and could not have been expected 
to know, that the sole rights were being infringed. 
Thus, objects which were bought in good faith can be freely used and 
sold to third parties. No consequences follow from the violation of a 
foreign patent right by the producer and the dealer. (l9) 
2. The Danish tml § 4 gives the owner of rights to a trade mark under 
Danish law the sole right to use the trade mark in the course of 
business. 
No one else is permitted to use the mark or a mark with which it might 
be confused, whether the mark appears on the goods themselves or on the 
packaging of the goods, or in advertisements, business stationery or in 
any other way, and regardless of whether the goods are intended for 
home or export sale. 
The sole right of the owner of the trade mark thus applies in a 
territorial manner. Any use on Danish territory is restricted to the 
owner of the trade mark. In addition, use abroad by exports is 
forbidden, but litigation on this can of course only be undertaken 
through Danish courts (see below, II. Α.). 
There is, however, an important exception. If the owner of the Danish 
right to a trade mark has obtained from abroad the right to use a 
particular type of goods, then he cannot prevent the import and sale in 
Denmark of goods of the same type - "genuine goods" - which display the 
same mark and which have been brought into circulation abroad by the 
original owner of the trade mark or by some other person who has legally 
obtained the rights to it. This consumption principle does not 
necessarily apply to patents and designs (see pat § 3 and des § 5·), 
which both prohibit the import by others of the goods whose patent or 
design is protected. 
B. The protection in Denmark of alien exclusive rights 
1. If an invention is specified in an application for a patent, an 
inventor's certificate or for protection of a utility pattern in another 
country which has ratified the Paris Convention of March 20, 1883, then 
priority is given for 12 months for an application for Danish patent 
rights on this invention, in accordance with the rules of the 
Convention (see pat § 2 and § 4 in connection with § 6 and patpro § 9). 
Similarly, protection is given to trade marks and designs (see tml § 30 - 291 -
and tmlpro § 8 and also des § 8 and despo § 8). 
The priority in this case holds for 6 months. 
As laid down in article 4 A, para. 3 of the Paris Convention, priority 
is obtained in Denmark for any application in another country belonging 
to the Union sufficient to be considered an application for a patent, 
the protection of a design or a trade mark. It is, for instance, 
irrelevant whether an application for a patent concerns an invention which 
can be patented in the first country of application. In reality, 
therefore, this does not protect foreign rights to patents or designs 
or trade marks, but rather recognises a special legal position with 
regard to an intangible which is obtained by making applications which 
fulfil the formal requirements for the granting of sole rights. (21 ) 
The Convention does not only give the applicant priority. He is also 
entitled to apply for patent rights in several countries in succession 
for a period of 12 months, without the later applications being 
adversely affected by the rule that the invention must not already be 
known abroad (see in the case of Danish law § 2, para. 2 in the pat). 
The rules in the Paris Convention, article 11, on priority for 
exhibition have also been introduced into Denmark in the tml, § 18, 
para. 2, the pat. § 2, para. 3 no. 2, and the des § 2. As in the 
Convention, the protection is restricted to inventions, trade marks 
and designs which have been shown during the previous 6 months at an 
official or officially recognized exhibition in a country belonging to 
the Union. 
A patent right, design right or trade mark obtained in Denmark on the 
basis of the priority rules is a Danish intangible right, the granting, 
extent and period of validity of which is determined by Danish rules. 
2. The tale quale rule in article 6 d) of the Paris Convention has also 
been brought into Danish law, as it is laid down in the tml that it 
may be decided (and would then be laid down) that a trade mark which 
could not otherwise be registered in Denmark but which is registered in 
a foreign country may under stated conditions be registered in Denmark 
in the same way as it is registered in the foreign country. A 
registration of this kind does not have wider validity than it does in 
the foreign country. The rule has little practical importance in 
Denmark, as the tml has made it possible to register all known forms of 
trade mark. (22) 
It is only in connection with the decision on registration that account 
is taken of the foreign registration. The extent and content of the 
trade mark right are determined by Danish rules (see UfR 1938-11, in 
which it was laid down that a mark which was first registered in Germany 
and later in Denmark did not give its owner "any further protection than 
registration in this country normally gives"). Conversely, it is 
assumed in the judgement in UfR 1957-483 that an originally French mark 
which was registered here gave its owner full protection under the 
Danish rules, in that it was stated that there "is nothing to prevent 
the Danish law giving the plaintiff more extensive protection than the 
French law. (23) 
As can be seen from the rules which have been set out here, the 
application of foreign law which is involved in the protection of 
foreign rights is only fragmentary. The content and extent of the 
rights which follow from the priority rules and the tale quale rule are 
mainly determined by Danish law. - 292-
3. Under the tml, § 3, par. 3, no symbol may be used as a trademark which 
could be confused with a trademark which someone else has used abroad if 
this is known or should be known to the intending user in Denmark. The 
decisive point is not whether the mark has been registered abroad but 
whether it has been used. 
If the user of the trademark in Denmark is in bad faith, therefore, he 
will not be allowed to use the trade mark, and under § 14, no. 7, he will 
not be able to get it registered either. The law demands that the trade 
mark is continuing in use abroad, but it does not lay down whether it is 
only the use abroad or a sole right in connection with the use which is 
protected. (24) Would the tml § 3, para. 3 and § 14, no. 7 be able to 
prevent use of registration in Denmark if the relevant person in the 
country where the mark is being used has not obtained a sole right, for 
instance because a sole right in that country requires registration, and 
this has not taken place? Under the wording of the regulation, it is 
only the use abroad which is decisive, and there is nothing in tmlpro 
either which shows that it is only use abroad leading to sole rights 
which exclude registration in Denmark. 
It is a necessary condition that the relevant symbol is used as a trade 
mark abroad. A symbol which is sufficiently distinctive in Denmark but 
which the applicant knows to be used in another country as a generic 
name for the goods, in that the symbol is a lapsed trade mark in that 
country, could probably be registered in Denmark. It is not used as a 
trademark abroad. It is probably also not possible to demand that the 
Dir or a person objecting to the registration of the mark after it has 
been displayed should demonstrate that the use of the mark abroad has 
created a sole right for the user. If, however, the applicant 
demonstrates that the user does not have a sole right, for instance 
because this requires registration in the foreign country and this has 
not taken place, then the decision is more doubtful. 
Under Article 6a of the Paris Convention, which has been ratified by 
Denmark, Denmark is only bound to take account of foreign trade mark 
rights when the mark is really known abroad. It could in fact be 
maintained that a user of a trade mark abroad should not be given better 
protection for the mark in Denmark than in the country where he is using 
the mark. Consequently, § 3, para. 3 and § 14, no. 7 should only protect 
persons who, by their use of a symbol abroad, have obtained trade mark 
rights there. 
The background of the law, however, suggests that it was intended to 
protect foreign users of trade marks, regardless of whether they had the 
mark protected in the country where it was used. This solution can be 
defended in the case where the use of a trade mark in a foreign country 
gives the user protection under the law on competition, if not under the 
law on trade marks, by making it unfair competition to use the trade 
mark of the competitor. 
In the cases where the applicant (or the new user) demonstrates that the 
user abroad is completely unprotected there, the result of the law is 
hard to accept. In these cases, in my view, the rules in the Swedish and 
Norwegian trade mark laws, which do not srive the user abroad any 
protection, even if the applicant or the new user is acting in bad faith, 
would give a more appropriate result, see §§ 3 and 14 of the Swedish and 
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Under the tml 14, no. 7, a trade mark may not be registered in Denmark 
when it could be confused with a mark which has been used abroad, by the 
time that the application for registration has been submitted and which 
is still being used there, and the applicant knew or should have known 
of this fact at the time of application. 
According to the preliminary work on the law, this means that trade 
marks which have been used to a certain extent abroad should be known to 
the applicant and can therefore not be registered. Marks which are only 
used to a slight extent abroad will be refused registration if it is 
declared that the applicant knew of them or, on account of special 
circumstances, should have known of them. Under the tml, § 14, para. 2, 
registration can take place if sufficient authority is given, e.g. the 
permission of the foreign trade marks owner, and there is no reason to 
believe that the registration will cause confusion. It is the use of the 
mark abroad which is decisive. The law does not lay down specifically 
whether it must also be required that the foreign use has led to sole 
rights for the user in the country where the mark is being used (see 
above). 
4. The Danish law on competition prevents the slavish imitation of the 
products of others, when these are not protected by the pat, tml and des 
or in some other way (see comi § 15). One judgement once protected a 
German manufacturer of ladies' blouses against the copying of the blouses 
by a Danish competitor in view of the fact that it had to be regarded as 
likely that the blouses would shortly appear on the Danish market. From 
this judgement (UfR 1958 121l) and others, the conclusion must probably 
be drawn that protection is not given in Denmark against copying for the 
Danish market of goods which are only traded abroad, unless their sale 
in Denmark must be supposed to be imminent (see Koktvedgaard p. 363 and, 
discussing Norwegian law, the judgement in NRT 1959 712 (717-718) and 
Per Brunsvig in "Nordisk immaterielt rättsskydd" (Northern legal 
protection of intangibles) I960 I46). 
II. The protection against infringement of sole rights on Foreign territory given 
by Danish courts 
Two questions arise here: 
A. Do Danish courts have competence in cases dealing with infringements of 
sole rights on foreign territory? 
If this is assumed to be the case, then the following question arises: 
B. Do the Danish laws apply? 
C. If not: Do foreign laws apply, and if so then the laws of which country? 
A. The competence of Danish courts 
There is little doubt that Danish courts are competent to deal with 
cases of violation of Danish sole rights on foreign territory. In the 
exceptional cases where Danish rules protect against infringements of 
Danish rights, Danish courts must also be competent to make judgements 
on infringements. 
Can Danish courts then deal with cases referring to the exercise of 
foreign rights on foreign territory? (25) 
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Cases dealing with the transfer of foreign sole rights could probably 
be brought before Danish courts if they are otherwise locally competent, 
even if the question of the validity for registration of the patent, 
design or trade mark may be evaluated and thereby prejudiced. (26) 
Cases in which the main question is of the validity of a patent, design 
right or trade mark right registered abroad can probably not be tried 
by Danish courts. The courts of one country cannot cancel the 
registration of a sole right made abroad and take effect on everyone 
concerned. (27) 
It is doubtful whether Danish courts can try cases of infringements of 
foreign rights. For instance, can the owner of an English patent sue 
a person resident in Denmark in connection with the sale of goods, by 
the latter in England in conflict with the patent? A Norwegian court 
has answered this question negatively. The reason for this seems among 
other thing to have been that the validity of the foreign patent could, 
after all, not be tested by a Norwegian court. (28) Even if this 
testing would only have been prejudicial to the demand for damages, it 
would, it is claimed, require such a detailed knowledge of the situation 
in the foreign country that the Norwegian courts "in the natural course 
of things seem forced to reject this task". In Swedish doctrine, Sigurd 
Dennemark has among other things replied to this that testing the 
existence of a patent, a trade mark or a design under foreign law is no 
more difficult than other questions on the use of foreign law. (29) 
The question does not yet seem to have been decided in Danish legal 
practice. There are no rules in the pat, tml, des or Administration of 
Justice Act which prevent litigation of this kind being brought. The 
plaintiff may have a legal interest in litigation, especially when 
defendants who are accused of infringement of a foreign right are 
resident in or have their main business activity in Denmark. Even if 
the court judicially takes a view on the validity of the patent, the 
decision will under no circumstances have any effect on anyone except 
the parties involved. In my view, taking account of this, cases of this 
kind should be allowed to be brought in Denmark. When the validity of a 
patent, etc., which is alleged to have been infringed under the rules in 
the country where the patent was issued can only be tested by a special 
invalidity case, and the defendant claims that the patent is invalid, 
then the case must be adjourned to give the defendant the opportunity 
to bring an invalidity case of this kind in the country of origin of the 
patent. If the defendant does not cause a case of this kind to be 
brought and expedited within a reasonable period of time, the Danish 
court should bring the case against the defendant for infringement of 
patent, trade mark or design rights to a conclusion. 
The question of the possibility of suing persons not resident in 
Denmark in Danish court is discussed below in the section on the law on 
aliens. 
B. The protection given by Danish courts to Danish sole rights on foreign 
territory 
It follows from the principle of the limitation of sole rights to Danish 
territory that Danish courts will not extend protection to a Danish 
patent or design abroad. If an invention or a design is not protected 
in a foreign country under the legislation in force there, the owner of 
a Danish patent or design cannot prevent their use in the relevant 
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The question arises, hovrever: what kinds of use are covered by the 
territorial protection on Danish soil? 
The pat and des both forbid the import, sale, transfer or leasing of 
the goods patented or with protected design. The pat also mentions 
loans. 
The tml should be understood in a similar way, when it in § 4, para. 1, 
forbids persons other than the ovmer of the mark to use a mark which 
could be confused with the trade mark in the course of business. 
The pat and des also forbid the use of the goods in Denmark. 
In the case of patents and designs, one must, as stated, conclude from 
the regulations of the law that the marketing abroad of goods which are 
not produced in Denmark is not covered by the preventive regulations of 
the law. The same probably applies to the regulations in the tml with 
regard to trade marks on goods which are neither produced nor stamped 
with the mark in Denmark (see below). 
However, the question arises whether goods only produced for export can 
be produced in Denmark even if use is thereby made of a Danish patent, 
design or trade mark belonging to someone else. 
Production of this kind must be considered ruled out where patents and 
designs are involved (see the pat § 3 and des § 4, which both forbid 
production in conflict with the sole right). This must be interpreted 
as covering any production in Denmark, even if the purpose is solely 
export. 
The tml 4, para. 1, specifically forbids the use of trademarks in 
conflict with the right of the owners, regardless of whether or not the 
goods are intended for export. According to Jan Kobbernagel, it is a 
condition that the person accused of infringement of the trade mark 
right conducts business in Denmark. (30) On the other hand, according 
to the same source, it can probably not be demanded that the marking 
(3l) itself should take place in Denmark. A marking made abroad is 
also covered by the ban in the law. 
It is, however, doubtful whether the law is to be understood in this 
way. The protection under the tml § 4, para. 1, probably also applies 
to goods which a foreign firm marks in Denmark with a view to sale 
abroad. On the other hand, it can probably not be extended to applying 
to goods which a firm marks and sells abroad. It would probably not 
conflict with the "Danish" mark belonging to someone else, if the goods 
are marked abroad. (32) If one were to assume the contrary, it could 
mean a weakening of the position of Danish firms in competition with 
foreign rivals. 
C. Which national legislation is decisive in a question of the existence 
and scope of a sole right? 
As mentioned above under Α., this question can arise prejudicially for 
Danish courts in cases on the transfer of trade marks, designs and 
patents, and probably also in cases where a declaration is sought to the 
effect that the use by the defendant of a trade mark, design or 
invention is unwarranted. - 296 -
The general rule in Danish international civil law, as in the foreign 
equivalents, must be that the law in the country where a sole right is 
claimed to have come about is decisive whether this claim is justified. 
Under the law of the same country, it is then decided whether the right 
must be based on registration, or whether the use or marketing of a 
trade mark or design gives the user protection, and the law of the 
relevant country also decides to what extent a sole right is protected 
and for how long the protection holds good. If the protection is 
deemed to exist, the right will normally be for the territory of the 
country, and normally only there. 
The question of whether a foreign sole right has been infringed must 
be decided under the law in the country where the infringement is 
alleged to have taken place (lex looi delicti). As a right can 
normally only be infringed on the territory where the right has arisen 
(as it does not apply outside), the law in the country where the 
right has arisen will normally be the same as the law in the country 
where the right has allegedly been infringed. 
If Danish courts are asked to judge an infringement on foreign 
territory, they will be entitled to instruct the defendant to pay 
compensation, if the conditions for this under lex loci delicti 
are fulfilled. As a rule, Danish courts will not be able to order 
other sanctions against the defendant such as punishment, banning 
or seizure of goods. Danish executive authorities will not be in a 
position to act outside the borders of the country, and will therefore 
not be able to implement a ban or a seizure of goods abroad. 
2. The law on aliens 
I. In general 
Foreign citizens resident in Denmark are in the same position as 
Danish citizens, with respect to obtaining patent rights and 
trade mark rights. The laws make no distinction here between 
Danish and foreign citizens. Individuals resident abroad - whether 
Danish or foreign citizens - are in principle also placed on an equal footing 
with Danes resident in Denmark. These rules follow from Articles 
2 and 3 of the Paris Convention as far as individuals who are 
citizens of or resident in countries belonging to the Union are 
concerned. But Denmark goes further than this. Danish law places 
in principle all aliens on an equal footing with Danish citizens. 
In the case of individuals resident abroad, who are described 
as aliens below, the law does, however, contain some special 
regulations. 
Limited companies and cooperative societies must be considered 
aliens when they are not registered on the Danish register of 
limited companies. (33) 
The tml, § 28, requires that an individual engaged in trade but 
not trading in Denmark must demonstrate that an equivalent mark 
is registered for him in the country of origin for the types of 
goods for which the application is made. Assuming mutuality, it 
can be decided by an announcement by the Minister of Trade that this 
rule should not be applied (see the tml § 28, para. 2). An 
announcemert of this kind has been issued (see proclamation no. 70 
of March 14, 1972 by the Ministry of Trade on the registration of 
trade marks for individuals engaged in trade, etc., belonging to 
certain foreign states. - 297 
Under the tml, § 31, the owner of a trade mark who is not resident 
in Denmark must have a representative resident in Denmark who can 
receive on his behalf legal suits and any announcements about the 
trade mark which have a binding effect on the owner. The name and 
place of residence of the representative is to be entered in the 
register of trade marks. 
If no proper representative has been registered, the owner of the 
mark must borout the situation in order before a time limit laid 
down by the Directorate for Patents and Trade Marks, of which he 
is informed by registered letter or, if the address of the trade 
mark is not known, by announcement in the journal of registration 
(registreringstidende). If a representative of this kind has 
not been appointed on expiry of the time limit, then the mark is 
deleted from the register. In this event, an announcement of the 
deletion must be made in the registration journal. The duty applies 
both to those who have succeeded in obtaining registraicn and 
those whose applications for registration are under consideration 
by the Directorate. 
The tml does not, by contrast to the pat § 66, para. 2 and the des, 
§ 46, give the Minister of Trade the option of exempting certain 
foreign owners of rights. 
The Swedish tml, § 31, is roughly in agreement with the Danish 
law, the Norwegian law is framed slightly differently. 
In § 45 of the des and § 66, para. 1 of the pat, it is laid down 
that the owner of a design or a patent who is not resident in 
Denmark must have a representative entered on the register who 13 
resident in Denmark and entitled to receive proclamations and 
other announcements regarding the design or patent on his behalf. 
Assuming mutuality, however, the Minister of Trade may decide that 
this rule should not be applied to owners of rights belonging to 
other countries, or who have a representative entered in the 
register who is resident in Denmark and can receive proclamations 
and other announcements, etc, on behalf of the owner (see the pat. 
§ 66, para. 3, and the des, § 46). 
If the owner of a patent or design does not have a representative 
of this kind, and if he is not exempted from so doing, then 
proclamations, etc., can take place by insertion in the Danish 
Official Gazette (Statstidende), as well as by notification through 
the post (see the Administration of Justice Act, § 159, paras. 2 
and 3). 
The duty to have a representative who lives in Denmark applies not 
only to the owner of a design or a patent, but also to an applicant 
for a design or a patent (see the des, § 12 and the pat, § 12). 
If an applicant fails to have a representative of this kind, the 
application will not succeed. As far as designs are concerned, 
the Minister of Trade can announce exemption under the rule in the 
des, § 46. 
The exemption rules in the des, 46 and the pat, 66, para. 3 are in 
particular intended to be used for individuals who are resident in 
the other Northern countries. - 298-
II. In detail, on the status of aliens in legal cases 
A. Aliens as plaintiffs 
In cases dealing with patents, trade marks, designs and other intangible 
rights, aliens have the same freedom to bring cases before Danish courts 
as they have in other cases of property law. However, individuals who 
are not Danish citizens, whether they reside in Denmark or abroad, must, 
under 323 in the Danish Administration of Justice Act no. 90 of April 11, 
196I (described below as the aja), if the defendant so requests, set 
aside a sum of a size deemed appropriate by the court - cautio judictum 
solvi - to secure the costs of the case which may be awarded to the 
defendant, unless Danes in the relevant foreign State are exempted for 
this kind of deposition. Denmark has ratified the Hague Conventions of 
1905 and 1954, which have also been ratified by most of the members of the 
EEC, and has an agreement with Great Britain on mutual exemption from the 
demand for deposition of securities. 
B. Aliens as defendants 
Aliens can normally not be sued in Denmark. However, there are numerous 
exceptions. 
1. Both the pat and the tml have regulations to the effect that cases 
against aliens which are brought under these laws can be brought to 
court in this country. These cases must then in the case of trade 
marks be heard at the Maritime and Commercial Court (Sp- og 
Handelsretten) in Copenhagen (see the tml, § 37, para. 3) and in the 
case of patents at a Copenhagen court, as a rule the Eastern Division 
of the Danish High Court (Østre Landsret), but otherwise at the City 
Court (Byretten) or the Maritime and Commercial Court (see the pat, 
§ 64, para. 2, in conjunction with para. l). Under § 50, cases on 
compulsory licences must always be decided by the Maritime and 
Commercial Court. 
Suits dealing with the right to a design, the cancellation of a 
registration or the transfer of a registration to someone else 
can be brought in Copenhagen when the plaintiff of the owner of the 
patent entered in the register does not reside in Denmark (see the 
des, § 45). 
When cases under the pa tml and des are brought against an alien, 
the suit must be announced to his representative in Denmark 
(see the tml, § 37, para. 1, the pat. § 66, para. 1 and the des, § 4l). 
2. The special rules about venue mentioned above must probably take 
precedence over the general rules in the aja on the competence 
(Zuständigkeit) of Danish courts in cases against aliens. The rules of 
the aja are, however, relevant for cases on inventions, designs, 
and symbols which are not covered by the rules in the pat, des, and tml, 
and for cases on unfair competition, where other sole rights, e.g. 
know-how or a copyright, are disputed or for which protection is 
sought. In cases of this kind, individuals not resident in Denmark 
can be sued at a Danish court if the special rules about exceptional 
venues can be used (see the aja, § 248, para. l). The aja, § 244 has - 299 -
particular importance here. It lays down that cases where punishment, 
compensation or redress for the infringement of rights are claimed 
can be brought at the place (i.e. the legal district) where the damage 
or infringement has taken place, or, if it took place in several legal 
districts then in any of these. The regulation is known to have 
been used on one occasion when an alien had infringed a copyright in 
Denmark (see UfR 1947 I87). 
In addition, under the aja, § 248, para. 2, aliens can be sued in 
Denmark in the legal district where they are to be found or have goods 
(assets) at the time of the proclamation of the suit. The regulation 
must be expected to be abolished in relation to individuals who are 
resident in the area of the EEC, in connection with the ratification 
by Denmark of the Convention of September 27, I968 on the competence 
of law courts and recognition and execution of legal decisions in 
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